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Nuclear News - 3/22/2005
RANSAC Nuclear News, March 22, 2005
Compiled By: Jeffrey Read


A.  Cooperative Threat Reduction
    1. U.S. Experts Will Not Inspect Russia's Nuclear Facilities � Ivanov, Interfax (3/22/2005)
B.  Nonproliferation Diplomacy
    1. Ukraine Admits It Sold Cruise Missiles to Iran, China, Agence France-Presse (3/19/2005)
C.  Russia-Iran
    1. Russia's Top Nuclear Energy Official Describes Accusations Against Iran As Unfounded, Andrei Nizamutdinov, RIA Novosti (3/21/2005)
    2. Russians Will Not Help Anyone Make Nuclear Weapons � Official, MosNews (3/18/2005)
    3. Russia Against Bias in Assessing Iran's Nuclear Program, RIA Novosti (3/17/2005)
D.  Russia-North Korea
    1. Russia Wants Quick Resumption of Korean Nuclear Talks, RFE/RL Newsline (3/19/2005)
    2. Russia, China to Consult over North Korean Nuclear Problem on March 24, ITAR-TASS (3/18/2005)
E.  Nuclear Forces
    1. Russian Nuclear-Powered Submarine Placed No Nuclear Torpedoes in Mediterranean in 1970, RIA Novosti (3/22/2005)
    2. Soviet Navy Left 20 Nuclear Warheads in Bay of Naples, The Independent (3/19/2005)
    3. Russia to Launch New Nuclear, Diesel Submarines, Agence France-Presse (3/17/2005)
F.  Nuclear Industry
    1. Duma Worried About Dwindling Uranium Reserves, RFE/RL Newsline (3/18/2005)
G.  Nuclear Safety
    1. 444 Families Want to Leave Radioactive Village, Bellona Foundation (3/22/2005)
H.  Official Statements
    1. Press Conference Following the Four-Country Meeting Between Russia, France, Germany and Spain (excerpted), The Kremlin (3/18/2005)
    2. Russian MFA Commentary Concerning Reports About a Possible Review of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (3/17/2005)
    3. Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Towards an Integrative Approach, Linton Brooks, National Nuclear Security Administration (3/16/2005)
I.  Links of Interest
    1. Russia�s Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Part I: Background and Policy Issues, Gunnar Arbman and Charles Thornton, Swedish Defence Research Agency (11/1/2003)



A.  Cooperative Threat Reduction

1.
U.S. Experts Will Not Inspect Russia's Nuclear Facilities � Ivanov
Interfax
3/22/2005
(for personal use only)


Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said that no negotiations are currently being held on U.S. experts inspecting Russia's nuclear facilities.

"We are not discussing any possible inspections of Russian nuclear facilities by U.S. experts," Ivanov told journalists in St. Petersburg on Tuesday.

"More than that, both sides [Russia and the U.S.] have stated that security at their nuclear facilities is on an appropriate level," Ivanov said.


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B.  Nonproliferation Diplomacy

1.
Ukraine Admits It Sold Cruise Missiles to Iran, China
Agence France-Presse
3/19/2005
(for personal use only)


Ukraine has sold nuclear-capable cruise missiles to both China and Iran, the prosecutor-general's office said, but stressed that the deals were illegal and under criminal investigation.

"This is not about exports of missiles but rather illegal sales which are being investigated by the SBU (security service) which has opened a criminal investigation of the director of the company Ukraviazakas," the office said in a statement confirming a report by the London-based Financial Times's Friday edition.

The investigation was welcomed late on Friday by the United States, which along with Japan is reportedly worried about what appears to be a significant leak of military technology.

"I think it's fair to say that both the United States government and the Ukrainian government share a common concern and a dedication to acting to find out and prevent cases of proliferation," deputy US State Department spokesman Adam Ereli said.

"We've been working with the Ukrainian government to clamp down on proliferation. And the Ukrainian government, since these reports have come out, has said it's launching an internal investigation," he said.

"We certainly look forward to the results of that investigation," Ereli said. "And we'll work with them on steps and measures and joint actions we can take to prevent this kind of proliferation in the future."

Svyatoslav Piskun, Ukraine's prosecutor general, told the Financial Times that 18 Soviet-era X-55 cruise missiles were exported in 2001 -- 12 to Iran and six to China.

Piskun was also quoted as saying that the missiles were not exported with the nuclear warheads that they were designed to carry.

His office said a suspect in the case was currently standing a closed-door trial in Kiev.

Ukraine Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk said that the country's new leadership, which assumed power during late last year, was not responsible for the sales.

"We can only condemn the non-democratic actions that were carried out by the previous authorities," he said while on a visit to neighboring Belarus.

"The results of (our) investigation point to a criminal group that was involved in unlawful sales of arms," he said. Tarasyuk said the group included citizens of several countries.

The X-55, an air-launched missile also known as the Kh-55 and AS-15 and first introduced in 1976, has a range of 3,500 kilometers (2,175 miles), which would give China -- or North Korea, if it obtained the missile -- easy access to Japan, while Iran could hit its main regional foe, Israel.

Last month the Ukrainian government opened a criminal inquiry, at the request of Japan, into the illegal sale of 18 missiles by the Ukrspetsexport arms group to unspecified states via Russia.

The Ukrainian confirmation of missiles sales to Iran comes amid a tense diplomatic debate over Tehran's alleged quest for nuclear weaponry.

Reports about the missile sales going to Iran emerged earlier this month.

However Friday's statement was the first acknowledgement from the Kiev government, and is likely to heighten suspicions about Tehran's nuclear program.

The Islamic republic insists its nuclear program is aimed at peaceful civilian use but Washington claims it is designed to produce nuclear arms.

Ukraine had a massive weapons arsenal after the fall of the Soviet Union, but it returned its nuclear warheads to Russia or destroyed them under a US-funded disarmament program.

Its remaining weaponry is, however, a source of major concern in the West, fueled by several high-profile cases of arms trafficking including radar technology to Saddam Hussein's now ousted regime in Iraq.

Two anti-aircraft missiles and a launch system were reported stolen last month from a Ukrainian naval base in the Crimean peninsula, while Turkey reported seizing a Ukrainian radio-controlled missile and missile heads en route to Egypt last June.


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C.  Russia-Iran

1.
Russia's Top Nuclear Energy Official Describes Accusations Against Iran As Unfounded
Andrei Nizamutdinov
RIA Novosti
3/21/2005
(for personal use only)


Alexander Rumyantsev, Director of the Russian Federal Agency for Nuclear Energy, does not think there is any valid evidence to prove that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Mr Rumyantsev is currently in Paris, attending the international conference "Atomic Energy for the 21st Century."

According to Russia's top nuclear energy official, Iran has not committed any violation of international law that could give grounds for the global community to accuse it of contributing to the proliferation of nuclear technologies and materials. Inspectors of the UN's nuclear watchdog, IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], say that Iran is fully complying with all nuclear regulations and that it has committed itself to non-proliferation by signing the Additional Protocol to the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] and other relevant documents, Mr Rumyantsev noted in a RIA interview. "I can't see any connection between Iran and the problem of nuclear non-proliferation," he added.

According to Mr Rumyantsev, nuclear energy cannot possibly replace all conventional types of energy at this point in time, but it may be able to do so some time in the future. As of today, the nuclear industry accounts for a mere 17 percent of the world's overall energy output, he said.

The current atomic energy conference in Paris is, among other things, considering ways to use non-renewable energy sources for other economic purposes while making atomic energy safe, cost-effective, and sustainable in terms of nuclear non-proliferation, the Russian delegate said. "On such terms, atomic energy could indeed become a replacement," Mr Rumyantsev said. It will be remembered that many countries are seeking to double or even triple their nuclear energy capacities in the two coming decades, he added.


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2.
Russians Will Not Help Anyone Make Nuclear Weapons � Official
MosNews
3/18/2005
(for personal use only)


�Do you really think that Russia has crazy people who would help anyone make nuclear weapons that could land in the hands of terrorists tomorrow? We have never done it and will never do so,� Ivanov said.

�On the contrary, we will apply every effort to strengthen non-proliferation policies,� the official assured Israeli television in an interview that was quoted by RIA-Novosti news agency.

Russia is �strongly opposed� to the emergence of nuclear weapons in Iran, Ivanov emphasized.

�As to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, this is a lawful right of any state including Iran. We cooperate with Iran only in peaceful programs under strict control of the IAEA. This provides a strong guarantee that those programs will not be used for military purposes,� Ivanov said.

In October 2004 Russia and Iran announced the completion of construction of Bushehr nuclear plant in Iran � a project the United States fears Tehran could use to make nuclear arms.

The 1,000-megawatt, $800 million Bushehr plant was due to be launched in 2005 and reach full capacity in a year later.


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3.
Russia Against Bias in Assessing Iran's Nuclear Program
RIA Novosti
3/17/2005
(for personal use only)


Russia is interested in the objective assessment of Iran's activities in the nuclear field. This keynotes the statement made at the press conference by acting chief of the Russian state service for nuclear technological and environmental supervision Andrei Malyshev.

He said that Russia, just as other countries, is interested in the Iranian nuclear program being under control of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Mr. Malyshev added that since 2004 the IAEA has been holding inspections in Iran to discover violations or not of its international obligations.

Russia participated in the IAEA Board of Governors and in establishing the fact whether the Iranian program may be dubitable. As of now, he summed up, no such fact, no dubitable nature of the Iranian nuclear program has been discovered. Mr. Malyshev said that additional documents are required to take a final decision.

As regards Russia's participation in building the Bushehr nuclear power station in Iran, Mr. Malyshev stressed that cooperation lies within the four corners of Russia's international obligations on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. "The Bushehr nuclear power station is an example of peaceful cooperation and not a process of transfer of technologies", he said.

As to the United States' position on the Iranian nuclear program, Mr. Malyshev stressed that, in his opinion, "the United States is not saying that Russian-Iranian cooperation is illegal".


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D.  Russia-North Korea

1.
Russia Wants Quick Resumption of Korean Nuclear Talks
RFE/RL Newsline
3/19/2005
(for personal use only)


Russia said Friday that it favored the resumption of six-nation talks over North Korea�s nuclear program as soon as possible. �We are in favor of resuming the six-sided negotations as soon as possible and finding solutions that would correspond with the interests of all sides,� Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Alexeyev was quoted as saying by the Interfax news agency. �We believe that if the concerns and fears of all the regional states that are taking part in the negotiation process are truly taken into account, it would create the conditions necessary for restarting the six-sided process and initiating the nuclear disarmament of the region,� he said at the North Korean embassy in Moscow. Alexeyev will discuss the North Korean nuclear standoff during a visit to Beijing on March 24-25, the RIA Novosti news agency reported later Friday.

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2.
Russia, China to Consult over North Korean Nuclear Problem on March 24
ITAR-TASS
3/18/2005
(for personal use only)


Russia and China will hold consultations in Beijing over North Korea's nuclear problem on March 24-25. Taking part in the meeting for Russia will be Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Alexeyev, an official at the Russian Embassy told Itar-Tass on Friday.

Alexeyev will have talks with China's Deputy Foreign Minister Wu Dawei and Assistant Foreign Minister Li Hui.

The parties are expected to discuss topical bilateral issues and sign a plan of inter-departmental consultations.

The meeting will be held in accordance with the accord between the foreign ministers of the two countries.

The Russian Embassy official described the positions of Moscow and Beijing on the North Korean issue as "coinciding."


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E.  Nuclear Forces

1.
Russian Nuclear-Powered Submarine Placed No Nuclear Torpedoes in Mediterranean in 1970
RIA Novosti
3/22/2005
(for personal use only)


Command of the Russian Navy refuted the allegations of several foreign media that a Soviet submarine placed "an unknown number of nuclear torpedoes" in the Mediterranean in 1970.

"On behalf of Russian Navy command, I deny vigorously the reports as utterly groundless. This is nothing more than groundless speculation that is absolutely untrustworthy and aimed at heightening tension in the Russian-Italian relations," Igor Dygalo, assistant to the Russian Navy commander, told the media.

According to the officer, several foreign media are exaggerating allegations that a submarine with the 5th Squadron of the Soviet Navy placed "an unknown number of nuclear torpedoes" in the vicinity of the Neapolitan Gulf. Some media mention 20 torpedoes.

Dygalo noted that the 5th Squadron of the Soviet Navy had operated in the Mediterranean since 1967 on a permanent basis. It was tasked with maintaining the balance of power based on the policies pursued by the Soviet Union.

According to several 5th Squadron commanding officers who led the force at different times, the Soviet warships had never entered the territorial waters of other countries because this was prohibited by relevant SOPs and orders governing the operations in the Mediterranean, Igor Dygalo said, adding that any violators of the orders would have faced harsh punishment.

"From the point of view of basic political analysis, reports on mining the Neapolitan Gulf with nuclear charges in 1970 holds no water either," the officer emphasized. The Soviet leadership would have never resorted to such steps, realizing the threat they would pose to the Mediterranean countries and the world as a whole.


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2.
Soviet Navy Left 20 Nuclear Warheads in Bay of Naples
The Independent
3/19/2005
(for personal use only)


Italy has an unwanted legacy from the Cold War in the form of 20 nuclear warheads on the seabed in the Bay of Naples, left there by the Soviet navy 25 years ago, it has been claimed.

An expert on Soviet-era intelligence, Mario Scaramella, sent a memo confirming the existence of the missiles to Guido Bertolaso, the head of Protezione Civile, Italy's civil defence agency.

"On 10 January 1970," the memo read, "a submarine of the November class detached itself from the Fifth Squadron (Mediterranean) of the Soviet navy with orders ... to place an imprecise number of tactical atomic torpedoes in the Bay of Naples. The submarine was armed with 24 nuclear torpedoes of two different types, for anti-aircraft carrier and anti-submarine use. They were used to mine the area used by the American Seventh Fleet."

The Bay of Naples, with the volcanic cone of Mt Vesuvius in the background, is one of the most famous beauty spots in Italy, as well as a busy commercial harbour. The city of Naples which wraps round the bay is the seat of Nato command for southern Europe. The whole region is also one of the most seismically active in Europe.

According to Mr Scaramella, the Soviet submarine in question sank months afterwards with only four nuclear torpedoes on board, leading experts to conclude that it had laid 20 torpedoes on the sea floor.

A naval expert, speaking on condition of anonymity, said it was highly unlikely that the torpedoes would explode. "It's much harder to make a nuclear weapon explode than a conventional one," he said. "Every single element has to perform perfectly. But the torpedoes would be a potential source of contamination. And the longer they stay on the sea bed, the greater the corrosion and the higher the risk they represent."

Mr Scaramella said there had long been rumours of nuclear minefields on the seabed, reported in 2001 in the International Atomic Energy Agency's "Tecdoc-1242 Inventory of accidents and losses at sea involving radioactive materials".

"The document includes the marginal note not confirmed'," he added, "to indicate that the Soviet Union had not been able officially to confirm the episode. But it was not denied, and the information was circulated to all the embassies in Vienna, where the agency is based, including the Italian one."

Mr Scaramella told The Independent yesterday that in 2004 the placing of the torpedoes had finally been confirmed by former Soviet officials.

Mr Bertolaso told the news weekly L'Espresso: "I have been assured by members of the armed forces that they are studying the matter. They said they have known of it for a long time but have lacked confirmation." The nuclear minefield was said to have been laid at the height of the Cold War, for activation in case of war and to cause radioactive contamination.

Mr Scaramella, who is an adviser to an Italian parliamentary committee on Soviet-era espionage, said he had discovered the existence of the minefield while following up an Israeli intelligence report that nuclear material had been obtained in Naples by Russian gangsters with the help of the Camorra, the Naples Mafia.

Mr Bertolaso said: "I hope we won't have to look for those missiles in the Gulf of Naples. I fear that there is everything down there, from cars on upwards. The technical people I have spoken to confirm that to find the torpedoes would be an extremely difficult operation."

But one naval source said he doubted the presence of the torpedoes. "The chances of them going undetected are extremely remote," he said.

"Sonar systems today give you a visual picture of the bottom of the sea. For a busy port such as Naples you map the bottom year by year. And the Italian navy's mine-clearing capability is very good."


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3.
Russia to Launch New Nuclear, Diesel Submarines
Agence France-Presse
3/17/2005
(for personal use only)


Russia will soon bring into service two new submarines, one nuclear and one diesel, the navy said Thursday.

The nuclear-powered Dmitry Donskoi is a fourth generation, strategic missile launching submarine of the 941 "Akula" class, a navy spokesperson told the ITAR-TASS news agency.

It was tested in June 2002 and will be put in service after testing of new armaments.

The second is the Saint Petersburg, a fourth generation diesel-electric torpedo submarine of the 677 "Lada" class.


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F.  Nuclear Industry

1.
Duma Worried About Dwindling Uranium Reserves
RFE/RL Newsline
3/18/2005
(for personal use only)


Russian Academy of Sciences member Vasilii Velichkin told the State Duma on 17 March that Russia's explored uranium deposits could be exhausted by 2012, ITAR-TASS reported. He said that it will only be possible to meet the demands of Russia's nuclear-power industry if production is increased by 40 percent by 2010 and by 240 percent by 2020. Following Velichkin's testimony, the Duma adopted a nonbinding resolution calling on the government to "urgently examine the question of priority funding for work to develop further Russia's uranium resources."

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G.  Nuclear Safety

1.
444 Families Want to Leave Radioactive Village
Bellona Foundation
3/22/2005
(for personal use only)


In the end of February deputy chairman of the Russian liberal Yabloko party Sergey Mitrokhin discussed with the head of the Nuclear Federal Agency Alexander Rumyantsev the problem of the urgent resettlement of the Muslumovo village, which suffered in the radiation accident after the discharge at the Mayak plant in 1957.

Sergey Mitrokhin presented the list of 444 families, which agreed to move from the polluted territory. Alexander Rumyantsev promised to meet the head of Ministry of Emergencies Sergey Shoygu to discuss the problem. Speaking to journalists, Mitrokhin said the Muslumovo problem had been discussed at the meeting with the Russian president Vladimir Putin and Alexander Rumyantsev back in December 2003. At that time Rumyantsev pledged to find money for the village resettlement. However, the Russian legislation stipulates that the local authorities, i.e. Clelyabinsk region administration, should take care of the resettlement. The problem is still not solved, and people continue to die on the polluted land. According to Mitrokhin, the Chelyabinsk administration is not interested in the development of the resettlement program. The meeting with Rumyantsev gave a new hope to relocate people from the polluted village, MK-Novosti reported.


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H.  Official Statements

1.
Press Conference Following the Four-Country Meeting Between Russia, France, Germany and Spain (excerpted)
The Kremlin
3/18/2005
(for personal use only)


[�]

QUESTION: My question is for Mr Putin and perhaps also for Mr Schroeder or Mr Chirac. It concerns the Iranian nuclear issue. Now that the European troika has had some success in negotiations with Iran and has managed to reduce the pressure on Iran from the United States, and now that Russia has signed an agreement with Iran on returning spent nuclear fuel, what other issues are still to be settled regarding Iran�s nuclear ambitions, and to what extent is there a correlation in these two policies towards Iran, from the European Union troika on the one hand, and Russia on the other?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: We have a high level of understanding with our European partners on the Iranian issue. There is no contradiction in our positions. We all share the same fundamental principle, and that is the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. All the actions we take regarding the Iranian nuclear issue are based on this principle and we are working together to find solutions that will not infringe on Iran�s interests in its plans to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Are there any other problems? Problems could arise in only one area and that is Iran�s continued commitment to making all its nuclear programmes open and transparent to the IAEA and showing that it is committed to not acquiring nuclear weapons. There are no other limitations.

We have indeed signed what for us is a very important agreement with Iran on the return of nuclear fuel. In accordance with the agreements reached, we will fulfil our obligations on a bilateral basis and will also monitor closely Iran�s cooperation with the international nuclear technology control authorities.

GERHARD SCHROEDER: I have no objections to make. We know that Iran is carrying out nuclear research and we naturally share Mr Putin�s approach to this issue. We cannot allow the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this respect we highly value the Russian Federation�s position and the policy it pursues.

JACQUES CHIRAC: I agree completely with this view and with what the Chancellor has just said. We fully support the Russian position and view it positively. We have no objections.

[�]


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2.
Russian MFA Commentary Concerning Reports About a Possible Review of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
3/17/2005
(for personal use only)


Question: How could you comment on the reports appearing in the media, in particular in The New York Times, that Washington would like to raise the question of re-concluding the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons on new terms? In this case references are being made to the unofficial statements of US administration officials that the NPT in its present form does not shut off the possibilities for developing a military nuclear potential under cover of peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Commentary: We really know nothing about any change of the official stand of the US in support of the NPT in its present form. On the contrary, our continual contacts with American officials show that Washington intends jointly with us to work actively to strengthen the Treaty, and to successfully hold another NPT Review Conference in New York in May.

Russia as a state party to the NPT and one of its depositaries presumes that the Treaty is a time-tested instrument which has become one of the pillars of the international system of security. The thirty five years of the Treaty's functioning have convincingly proved the effectiveness of its well-balanced nonproliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of atomic energy obligations. We are firmly convinced that it was and remains a major vehicle for containing the threat of the spread of nuclear weapons.

We consider that the new problems with which the world has been confronted today in the field of nonproliferation can and should be tacked on the basis of strengthening the NPT, whose potential is far from exhausted. All the complex issues of the Treaty's functioning will be considered in detail at the May Review Conference. We presume that it will reaffirm the viability of the NPT, the adherence to it of all the states parties, and work out specific steps for the future in strengthening the efficiency and effectiveness of this major agreement and imparting to it a universal character. We are preparing for this work and will constructively cooperate with all countries towards this end.


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3.
Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Towards an Integrative Approach
Linton Brooks
National Nuclear Security Administration
3/16/2005
(for personal use only)


Let me thank the organizers, in particular the United Kingdom and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for hosting a conference on a concern -- nuclear terrorism -- of such transcendent importance.

Today, the threat of nuclear terrorism is in the center of the U.S. and international security agenda. It was not always so. Only after the September 11th terrorist attacks and subsequent attacks around the world has the international community mobilized to confront the specter of terrorists armed with mass destruction weapons.

We can all take pride in the important work and steps taken to address nuclear terrorism in the four years since September 11th. Progress is underway to improve security of nuclear and radioactive materials, to update anti-terror norms and controls over nuclear technologies, and to heighten awareness of dangers arising from nuclear terrorism, thanks in part to conferences like this.

As impressive as these gains may be, far more remains to be done to keep nuclear and radiological weapons out of the hands of terrorists and states that sponsor them. A useful step forward would be to move towards an integrated strategy that joins more conventional anti-nuclear terror activities - i.e., securing nuclear and radioactive assets against theft and sabotage - with efforts to strengthen the core of the nonproliferation regime - i.e., safeguards, physical protection, export controls and strengthened treaty regimes - to prevent terrorist acquisition or brokering in WMD technologies. Prevention of nuclear terrorism and traditional nonproliferation programs form two halves of the same walnut; we cannot treat them as separate enterprises.

Sovereign Responsibility: A Starting Point

The fight against nuclear terrorism must involve all states. Opportunities for terrorists and their supporters to access weapons capabilities are expanding beyond national borders, as illustrated by the A.Q. Khan network and its ability to manufacture components off-shore and move weapons-related technology to clandestine end-users.

This panel is to address lessons for the future, the first one is that as a matter of principle, unless all states accept sovereign responsibility over activities under their jurisdiction and control -- whether that is trade and border controls or regulation of nuclear materials or nuclear facilities that are in conformance with international regimes -- we risk some future, catastrophic act of nuclear terror. This is a future that we have a collective responsibility to avoid.

The President's Nonproliferation Initiatives

An approach that rests on the principle of sovereign responsibility will work best when nonproliferation regimes are strong. Regrettably, the patchwork of treaties, arrangements, and state obligations that form the nonproliferation regime are facing serious challenges.

Last February, President Bush highlighted nuclear proliferation dangers and called on the international community to "translate into action" the consensus that proliferation cannot be tolerated and must be stopped. Let me group the President's proposals into four imperatives and comment briefly on each.

First, efforts to secure high-risk materials must be expanded. This is an important area of work for the United States and our G8 and other partners. Cooperation with Russia, given its vast stores of weapons-suitable material, is naturally a first-order priority. Our strategy to ensure the security of weapons material has five core elements:

-- Stopping the further production of fissile material usable in weapons;

-- Consolidating high-risk material and repatriating fresh and spent HEU [highly-enriched uranium] from research reactors;

-- Protecting vulnerable nuclear and radioactive materials by accelerating security upgrades and deploying detection systems at strategic transit points worldwide;

-- Eliminating excess weapons-grade plutonium, continuing to down blend excess HEU for commercial power and, to the extent possible, ending the use of HEU in civil nuclear applications; and

-- Ensuring that sustainable national nuclear regulatory programs are in place to keep nuclear materials and facilities under proper control.

This cooperation has yielded tremendous progress in recent years, protecting or eliminating fissile material equivalent to many hundreds of nuclear weapons.

Newer initiatives like the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative are moving forward to build international support for national efforts to identify, secure, recover, and facilitate the disposition of nuclear and radioactive materials of possible interest to terrorists. Since last September, this initiative has repatriated fresh HEU fuel from Uzbekistan and the Czech Republic to Russia, initiated regional training programs, and initiated more than 10 other joint projects.

As the two largest nuclear states, a special burden falls on the United States and Russia to keep nuclear and radioactive materials out of the hands of terrorists. Cooperation with Russia on nuclear security will remain a priority for the United States. Cooperative programs have wide support, are well funded, and are a regular discussion item between the U.S. and Russian governments, as was indicated by the recent Joint Statement on Nuclear Security Cooperation at the Bush-Putin meeting in Bratislava. An important and growing element of our cooperation is to exchange best practices, first with one another and subsequently with all states and with the IAEA. No matter how good a security system is, there is always something to learn in exchanges with other professionals.

The United States is not advocating measures for others that it is unwilling to accept for itself. We are tightening regulatory controls and have dramatically improved our internal security posture. We have installed additional protective barriers external to facilities, and upgraded existing barriers for increased strengthening. Our perimeter alarm systems have been enhanced to counter the increased threat, and we have strengthened security to protect sensitive shipments. Facility access controls for employees and visitors to our facilities have been upgraded, and we have enhanced our protective forces training to focus on tactical training to oppose terrorists. We take this threat very seriously.

Second, states must scrupulously comply with international nonproliferation undertakings, whether under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), IAEA safeguards, international nuclear and radiological conventions, or the new UN Security Council Resolution 1540.

The NPT requires that all states complete a safeguards agreement with the IAEA; yet more than 30 Treaty states have yet to do so. Many fewer states have signed, much less ratified the Additional Protocol to IAEA safeguards or have the infrastructure to control exports or monitor borders for illicit, WMD-related trade. This lucrative opportunity to potential proliferators must be eliminated. I am proud of the leadership my government has shown in signing and ratifying the Additional Protocol, which, as the President has recommended, must become a new universal standard for nonproliferation.

Knowing what we now know about the sophistication of the nuclear black market, if trade controls fail then countering proliferation through the interdiction of trade is clearly needed. This is the purpose of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), launched by the United States and others in 2003 to promote interdiction principles, share information and conduct operational exercises. Resolution 1540 and PSI come together in an important respect: in order for interdiction to succeed, states must have the legal basis and means both to identify and hold seized trade.

The global reach of the A.Q. Khan network was telling in this regard. Consider the report of the Malaysian Inspector-General of Police concerning the involvement of a Malaysian company in the Libyan nuclear procurement ring. According to this report, nuclear specialists within Malaysia were unable to identify controlled components as those that might contribute to Libya's uranium enrichment program. This experience was repeated in other countries, and suggests that unless states take seriously their domestic responsibilities to control activities under their jurisdiction, the gaps exploited by the Khan network will continue to be open to tomorrow's proliferators and terrorists.

In addition to greater vigilance by states, targeted and coordinated programs of assistance are also needed. The United States promotes cooperative exchange programs on export control, border security, and physical protection to redress these implementation gaps. The programs have expanded in recent years to include more than 50 countries in every major region of the world.

The international community must also consider how it can respond to states that take the responsible course of abandoning weapons of mass destruction. The United States recently expanded efforts to redirect former Soviet weapons scientists towards peaceful commercial employment to include Libyan and Iraqi scientists. These efforts are needed to prevent leakage of WMD know-how, but they also aid states that have turned away from the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction to build their economies and science and technology base.

More could be done to improve coordination of international outreach programs, including use of the IAEA and Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to inform members of 1540 requirements and facilitate training activities or elaborate "codes of conduct" and "best practices" for industry and nuclear users.

Third, the integrity of the NPT and IAEA safeguards must be preserved, especially in regions linked to terrorism, religious extremism, and long histories of armed conflict. Though the articles of the NPT and the original IAEA safeguards agreement were drawn up years ago, they remain relevant in today's world. Our goal must be to ensure that these arrangements are strengthened, complied with, and fully enforced.

Some argue that proliferation in North Korea, Iran, and, before it recanted, Libya, tell the troubling story of an NPT too outdated or weakened to blunt nuclear proliferation. The United States believes this critique is misplaced. Nonproliferation institutions express the will of their members. If we are dissatisfied with regime performance, then the burden falls on us -- the peaceful, cooperative governments -- to correct deficiencies and demand redress, including earlier intervention by the United Nations Security Council, from those who violate their treaty and international safeguards obligations.

To brace IAEA safeguards, President Bush has called for the creation of a special IAEA verification committee to monitor and enforce compliance with nuclear nonproliferation obligations. Terms of reference for this committee are now under consideration by the IAEA's Board of Governors. We look forward to examining ways in which IAEA verification authorities can be improved or even expanded. Equally encouraging is the creation of new units within the IAEA to review commercial satellite imagery and monitor foreign procurements. To the extent these new capabilities provide the IAEA with earlier warning of evasive activities, they should be a welcome addition to IAEA safeguards and our common nonproliferation and anti-nuclear terror goals.

For safeguards and global security measures to be fully effective, we need full implementation of new instruments that address nuclear terror. The United States was a strong proponent of efforts last year to complete new Export/Import Guidance for the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. Implementation of this Guidance is essential for controlling beneficial civilian devices when exported from one country to another and for preventing their theft or use in malicious acts, such as detonation of a dirty bomb. This year, we hope for similar success to update the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Code and Convention are integral parts in the prevention of nuclear and radiological terrorism, and we will work with others to ensure these instruments are universally applied.

President Bush and the other G8 leaders urged all states to implement the revised Code of Conduct and recognize it as a global standard at the Sea Island Summit last year. We call upon all Member States to apply the revised Code of Conduct to prevent diversion of sources and acts of radiological terrorism.

Fourth, the proliferation of enrichment and reprocessing technology must be stopped. While terrorist acquisition of an enrichment plant is a low risk, the continuing spread of sensitive nuclear technologies can only create greater opportunities for sub-state actors to acquire weapons materials. Libya, Iran, and North Korea all to one degree or another benefited from the illicit acquisition of enrichment or reprocessing technologies. Unfortunately, the NPT's right to peaceful nuclear cooperation (Article IV) makes no distinction between sensitive fuel cycle and other nuclear technologies.

Recognizing this risk, President Bush last year proposed that supplier nations refrain from transferring enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that did not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants. The Nuclear Suppliers Group and G8 nations continue to examine this proposal, as well as others that would establish solid eligibility criteria for receipt of such transfers and make the Additional Protocol a new condition of peaceful nuclear trade.

Conclusion

At the opening of the nuclear age, Albert Einstein warned that the advent of nuclear fission had changed everything except the way we think, and thus we drift towards disaster. Einstein's world of one or two masters of nuclear technology was far different from the one we live in today, in which nuclear science and materials are widely spread, but the risk of disaster remains. Nuclear security in today's age of terrorism requires global participation, not just by national governments, but also by police forces, border guards, cities, communities, harbors, research institutes, and factories.

With a concerted and action-oriented approach to combat nuclear proliferation threats, one that involves the cooperation and input of nations and respect for international agreements, norms, and standards, the United States is convinced that the consensus against proliferation will, as President Bush suggested, be "translated into action."

Thank you for your attention.


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I.  Links of Interest

1.
Russia�s Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Part I: Background and Policy Issues
Gunnar Arbman and Charles Thornton
Swedish Defence Research Agency
11/1/2003
(for personal use only)
http://www.foi.se/raw/documents/34575_russia-tactical-nuclear-weapons-I.pdf


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