1. 2006 G8 summit to spotlight energy security - Russian diplomat
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MOSCOW - Issues of global energy security will be foremost on the agenda of the 2006 G8 summit in St. Petersburg, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Yakovenko said Monday.
"International energy security will be one of the priorities of Russian foreign policy, which implies providing regular supplies of all kinds of fuels to people all over the world at reasonable prices," the minister said during Russian Oil and Natural Gas Week events.
During Russia's tenure as president of the club of the world's leading industrialized nations, it plans to formulate ways to stabilize fuel supplies, increase investment in the energy sector and guarantee environmental protection.
The Russian diplomat said global energy supplies must have minimal impact on the environment. He added that G8 countries did not always share similar interests, which was why it was necessary to seek an optimal balance of interaction in the energy sector along with a sensible pricing policy.
Yakovenko stressed that the outcome of the upcoming summit would play a significant role in further cooperation between the leading players on the world energy market.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said today Russia and the United States will soon for the first time begin sharing information on transfers of man-portable antiaircraft missiles outside their respective national borders.
Ivanov said the first exchanges of information will take place next month after Moscow and Washington recently signed an agreement to this effect.
He noted that terrorists were eager to acquire such weapons.
Russia has similar accords with former Soviet republics.
The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) plutonium disposition program has moved another step forward with the start of site preparation for its Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River Site.
NNSA announced Friday that the first subcontract for this work has been awarded to MDM Services Corporation, a small business located in Aiken. MDM Services Corporation will begin relocating approximately 85,000 cubic yards of earth at the MOX site in November and will be paid $468,013 for the work.
NNSA's plutonium disposition program aims to eliminate a total of 68 metric tons of surplus weapon-grade plutonium both in the United States and in Russia (34 metric tons in each country), and is based on a 2000 nonproliferation agreement between the two countries. Both countries will dispose of their plutonium by converting it to MOX fuel for use in existing nuclear reactors. Once the MOX fuel has been irradiated, the plutonium can no longer be readily used for nuclear weapons.
Established by Congress in 2000, NNSA is a semi-autonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy responsible for maintaining and enhancing the safety, security, reliability and performance of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear testing; working to reduce global danger from weapons of mass destruction; providing the U.S. Navy with safe and effective nuclear propulsion; and responding to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the U.S. and abroad.
3. Russia, U.S. hold anti-radioactive smuggling exercises in Far East
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VLADIVOSTOK -- Joint Russian-U.S. exercises to intercept fissionable radioactive matter trafficking across Russia's border were concluded Friday in the Maritime Territory in the Russian Far East.
The training exercises at the East shipping port in Nakhodka were part of the countries' Second Line of Defense program, according to the management of Vladivostok company PrimTekhnopolis, which deals with radiation safety problems at nuclear energy sites.
"The 'Barrier-2005' training exercises were completed successfully, and again proved the effectiveness of the current system for intercepting attempts at illegal transport of radioactive materials across Russia's border," the source said.
1. Russia trains 700 Iranian specialists to run Bushehr plant
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NOVOVORONEZH - The training of Iranian nuclear engineers for operating the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran has entered a final stage, the head of the Novovoronezh training center of the Rosenergoatom Federal Agency for Atomic Energy told Itar-Tass on Monday.
"Another group of Iranian specialists were given excellent grades at the examination after studies, and went home where they will work at the nuclear plant which is being built in Bushehr with Russian assistance," Alexander Ivchenko said.
The remaining four specialists from Iran are expected to receive certificates before the end of this year, Ivchenko said noting that in all, the center had trained some 700 Iranians.
They took theory and practiced with the simulator which allows for emulating the process of running the nuclear reactor.
Iranian repair engineers and specialists in various branches then had practice at the fourth reactor of the Balakovskaya nuclear power plant.
Russian specialists will guide them through training at the Bushehr reactor which slightly differs from Russian analogs.
The Novovoronezhsk training center is a large educational establishment of Rosneergoatom where Russian and foreign specialists are trained or take refresher courses for operating VVER-1000 reactors.
MOSCOW - Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov has proposed forming security forces in the Caspian Sea in charge of preventing the transportation of weapons of mass destruction and their components.
"Concerning security matters, it would be appropriate to form security forces in the Caspian Sea in charge of maintaining law and order, and preventing the transportation of weapons of mass destruction and their components. Theoretically, such a threat exists," Ivanov said on NTV television on Saturday.
Security forces could also combat poaching and drug trafficking, the Russian defense minister said.
"I've been in the Caspian region on many occasions and know how many problems are waiting to be solved there. One of them is all-out poaching. Clearing away kilometers of poachers' nets is part of our border guards and military's daily routine. Drug trafficking is another common occurrence," he said.
Ivanov said Russia does not want Iran to obtain nuclear weapons.
"Russia, as a civilized nation, is against the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran, or by any other country that is not a member of the nuclear club," the Russian defense minister said.
But one should see the difference between civilian and military nuclear programs, Ivanov said.
"I am convinced that Iran has the right to use the benefits of nuclear power engineering. Of course, military nuclear programs are a totally different matter," Ivanov said.
"The International Atomic Energy Agency has not revealed any facts suggesting or proving that Iran is running any covert programs, or is building infrastructure required for creating nuclear weapons in the future. This is objective reality," he said.
Ivanov announced that Russia sells very limited consignments of defensive weapons to Iran. "The share of arms deals in Russian-Iranian trade is microscopic," the Russian defense minister said.
MOSCOW -- The recent visit to Moscow by Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki has failed to elucidate whether or not Tehran will accept International Atomic Energy Agency recommendations to extend its moratorium on uranium enrichment.
Iran may refuse IAEA inspections if its nuclear program is referred to the U.N. Security Council, Mottaki told reporters after meeting Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.
"If Iran's nuclear file is referred to the Security Council, Iran may discontinue observing the additional protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," Mottaki said. Moscow is trying to keep Iran from doing this.
Iran's intention during this one-day visit to Moscow was most likely to secure Russia's support at the forthcoming session of the IAEA board of governors concerning the Iranian nuclear program. About a month ago the board passed a resolution by the Eurotroika of Britain, France and Germany to refer the Iranian nuclear file to the United Nations Security Council with the prospect of introducing international sanctions against Tehran. The document demanded that before the IAEA board meets in November Iran should resume its moratorium on nuclear activity and give up efforts to develop a full nuclear cycle.
Iran called the resolution "unacceptable" and said that if the board failed to amend the document Tehran would "stick to its position."
The resolution was harshly worded, and the conflict threatened to escalate. Denunciation of all earlier commitments, including the additional protocol, meant IAEA inspectors would be barred any access to Iranian nuclear facilities.
This would allow the United States as Tehran's main opponent to claim that Iran is on the threshold of creating nuclear weapons. Washington has already "cut back" Iran's lead time to develop such weapons from five or seven years, as the majority of international experts believe, to two years.
Moscow has a special role in resolving the Iranian nuclear issue. On the one hand, Russia, cooperating with Iran in nuclear matters, has some leverage on Tehran and, on the other, as a permanent U.N. member it can use its power of veto to stop any Security Council decision. Both Iran and the U.S. are aware of these two factors. As a result, Tehran and Washington stepped up their diplomatic efforts in the Russian capital.
Early in October, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice paid a sudden visit to Moscow, with the Iranian nuclear issue high on her agenda. Now the Iranian foreign minister arrived in Moscow at the same time as National Security Adviser Steven Hadley. Washington is making no secret of its intention to persuade Moscow to toughen its stand on Iran.
In September, Tehran secured Moscow's backing both at the U.N. General Assembly and at the IAEA board of governors' meeting. At the meeting, Russia and China voted against submitting the Iranian nuclear file to the U.N. Security Council. The Eurotroika and the board were forced to omit mentioning the referral deadlines. How do things stand now?
Moscow has repeatedly said lately that it is going to adhere to the IAEA position. "While Iran cooperates with it and maintains its moratorium on uranium enrichment and IAEA inspectors are allowed to see Iranian facilities, it is non-constructive to refer the file to the U.N. Security Council," Sergei Lavrov said earlier, explaining Russia's position. He confirmed it after meeting Mottaki. Russia, he said, believes in "continuing the efforts through the IAEA."
Judging from what Mottaki told journalists, this stand by Moscow came as a bit of surprise for Tehran. The next time the board is going to meet is Nov. 24. By that deadline Tehran is to decide if it accepts IAEA terms and desists from developing its own nuclear fuel cycle, or faces the prospect of its nuclear file being referred to the U.N. Security Council, with the inevitable international sanctions.
Igor Ivanov, head of Russia's Security Council, is planning to visit Iran in the next two to three weeks. It may be the last Moscow's attempt to persuade Tehran to accede to the IAEA recommendations.
(Pyotr Goncharov is a political commentator for the RIA Novosti news agency. This article is reprinted by permission of RIA Novosti.)
1. Document on Russian exports control policy to be issued in 2006 - Ivanov
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MOSCOW - A document on Russia's policy on exports control will be issued in the beginning of 2006, the defense minister said Monday.
Sergei Ivanov informed President Vladimir Putin and government members on the recent session of the interdepartmental commission for exports control and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their components.
The session focused on drafting what is known as the White Book, an open document explaining the national policy on exports control that appraises the problem in other countries, Ivanov said.
"Many countries lack effective exports control mechanisms," he said.
2. Russia to finish building world's largest nuclear icebreaker
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ST. PETERSBURG - The St. Petersburg Baltic Factory has begun dockside trials of the world's largest nuclear icebreaker, the company's press office said Monday.
The project to build the icebreaker was launched December 29, 1993 but was later suspended due to a lack of financing. Partial financing was resumed in the late 1990s.
The vessel, a modernized version of the Arktika series icebreakers, is the world's largest nuclear icebreaker measuring 150 meters in length (about 522 feet) and 30 meters in width (about 98 feet), with a displacement of 25,000 metric tons.
It is designed to break through ice as thick as 2.8 meters and will be ready for use in 2006.
4. China may grant loan for floating nuclear power unit in Russian north
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BEIJING - China could give Russia an export loan to build a floating energy unit for the nuclear power plant being constructed in Severodvinsk in Russia's European Far North, a source in the Russian delegation currently visiting Beijing said Sunday.
The Russian delegation led by Russian Vice Premier Alexander Zhukov is making preparations for the 10th regular meeting of the two countries' heads of government scheduled for November 3.
According to the source, Russia and China aim to resolve as soon as possible the issue of the project's financing through a Chinese loan.
The parties also aim to reach a swift agreement over building a hull for the floating station at a Chinese shipyard.
Russia is building a floating atomic power plant in Severodvinsk under a 2003 contract signed between China's Mashimpex and the Russian companies Rosenergoatom and Sudoimport.
According to the source, China also plans to design a pilot energy unit with a 600 MWt fast-neutron facility based on a closed fuel cycle.
Russia and China are already building a 65 MWt fast-neutron experimental facility under an inter-governmental agreement signed in July 2002. The parties plan to test the reactor between May 2006 and December 2008, and to put it into operation on December 31, 2008.
Russia and China may also jointly develop an experimental ground-based reactor prototype for a space energy unit, the source said.
According to the source, Russia's cooperation with China in the nuclear fuel cycle has strong potential given China's plans to bring the capacity of its atomic power plants up to 200 Gigawatts by 2020.
5. Russia offers help to lift nuclear curbs on India
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MOSCOW : President Vladimir Putin pledged Russia's support for India to get international restrictions on civilian nuclear technology transfers lifted.
The Russian leader made the promise while receiving External Affairs Minister K. Natwar Singh at his residence in Novo-Ogoryovo near Moscow on Thursday.
"Russia is helping India indeed in the Nuclear Suppliers Group," Mr. Singh said after the hour-long meeting. He specifically mentioned a recent NSG meeting in Vienna where the India case was discussed. "Russia, as well as the United States helped us at the Vienna meeting."
Russia had promised to set up four more nuclear reactors at Koodankulam in addition to two reactors it is currently erecting there once the NSG guidelines for India are modified to allow n-technology supplies.
Mr. Singh told newspersons that nuclear energy had been identified as a priority area of Indo-Russian cooperation along with defence and space.
"We hope energy cooperation will emerge as a strong pillar of our strategic partnership," Mr. Natwar Singh said. "We're fully prepared both technologically and financially to expand our presence in the Russian energy sector."
The Minister said a detailed plan to intensify Indo-Russian engagement in the energy sphere should be ready by the next bilateral summit in early December when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visits Russia. Russia's Industry and Energy Minister Viktor Khristenko will attend an Asian Oil and Gas ministerial meeting in Delhi next month.
A host of bilateral agreements that are being prepared for the summit include a defence secrecy protection pact, an agreement on utilisation of the rupee debt funds for investment, an accord on India's support for Russian entry in WTO and a visa facilitation agreement.
Welcoming the Minister at this residence, Mr. Putin said the Indo-Russian relation was at an "unprecedented high" and said high-level political contacts had been going on "practically uninterrupted".
The controversial issue of Iran's nuclear programme came up "briefly" for discussion between two leaders "in the context of the International Atomic Energy Agency," Mr. Singh said. Russia has firmly and consistently opposed the United States push to refer the Iran case to the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions. Speaking at the Russian premium diplomat-training institute, MGIMO, earlier on Thursday Mr. Singh strongly came out against sending the Iran nuclear programme file to the Security Council.
"Iran's peaceful nuclear programme must be discussed in the IAEA framework and must not go beyond it," the RIA Novosti news agency quoted the Minister as telling MGIMO students and professors. Mr. Singh also expressed the hope that the U.S. would not repeat the mistakes they made in Iraq and would not resort to the use of force against Iran.
Mr, Singh met Pakistani Prime Minister, Shaukat Aziz, on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) meeting. Both India and Pakistan joined the SCO as observers in July. Mr. Singh said they mainly discussed the assistance Pakistan needs in the aftermath of the deadly earthquake earlier this month. He said India had said three consignments of relief supplies to Pakistan and pledged $25 million in cash through the Red Cross.
6. Russia to commission three nuclear power plant units by 2010
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YEKATERINBURG-ASTANA -- Three power plant units with the total capacity of 3,000 megawatt will be commissioned in Russia by 2010, Chairman of the State Duma Energy, Transport and Communications Committee Valery Yazev said at a Friday seminar on legislative regulation of the fuel and energy industry.
He said the second unit of the Rostov nuclear power plant would be commissioned in 2008, and the fourth unit of the Kalinin nuclear power plant and the fifth unit of the Balakovo nuclear power plant would be commissioned in 2010, Kazinform quotes Itar-Tass.
"The service life of six large units of Russian nuclear power plants would expire by that time," Yazev said. "The Federal Atomic Energy Agency decided to delay the commissioning of the fifth unit of the Kursk nuclear power plant from 2007 to 2014 although the unit is ready at more than 70%. The construction and commissioning of power plant units, especially at nuclear power plants, is lagging behind the growing needs of the Russian economy," he said.
"The construction of a fast neutron reactor with a closed fuel cycle and a possibility to dispose war-grade plutonium, a BN-800 unit of the Beloyarsk nuclear power plant, is a priority that requires governmental support," he said. "The design of a new generation of fast neutron reactors will make it possible to use natural uranium, war-grade plutonium and spent nuclear fuel," he said.
The Beloyarsk nuclear power plant´┐Żs third unit has the world´┐Żs only industrial fast neutron reactor, BN-600. Its service life will expire by 2010.
In a period 10-14 October 2005 Rosenergoatom routine commission was estimating Kursk nuclear plant preparedness to operation during the fall-winter´┐Żs maximal load. The commission checked up state and fulfillment of measures on preparation of the nuclear plant´┐Żs units, departments and equipment. Rosenergoatom experts and Leningrad nuclear plant´┐Żs specialists in the RBMK-type reactor facilities took part in the commission.
The units´┐Ż equipment underwent required by norms and regulations tests and obtained permission to the operation. Table of safety concerning systems examination is being completed. Supplied needed amount of any kind of fuel, materials and component parts. Planned repairs of utilities and buildings were carried out. Maintenance and repairs of heat-cycle equipment, auxiliary boiler-house, heat piping was carried out. Necessary water pressure tests were accomplished. Fire extinguishing system, electrical equipment is ready to winter operation.
Detected by the commission, minor defects are being eliminated in working order.
1. Kazakh Leader Says Semipalatinsk Victims Will Be Compensated
Radio Free Europe
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Astana -- Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev today said that compensation payments will begin in 2007 for those who suffered from the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, RFE/RL's Kazakh Service reported.
Nazarbaev made the remarks at the 21st congress of the Kazakh Trade Union Federation in the capital Astana.
The Semipalatinsk range, located in northeastern Kazakhstan, was the former Soviet Union's main atomic weapons test site. Between 1949 and 1989, more than 460 nuclear explosions were conducted there.
Soviet citizens living near the site were exposed to several above-ground tests, and these people and their descendants have suffered from birth defects, high rates of cancer, and other serious illnesses.
Environmentalists say there are several inhabited areas of Semipalatinsk that still have radiation levels unsafe for humans.
2. No hazardous waste on the Ukrainian-Russian border - deputy
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KIEV - Ukraine does not have official data on the existence of stockpiles of hazardous chemical and nuclear waste on the Ukrainian-Russian border, a Ukrainian parliament member said Monday.
"According to official data, there are no such stockpiles there [on the border]," said Gennady Rudenko, head of the Ukrainian parliamentary committee on environmental safety.
He did however say that there could be cases of the improper storage of chemicals and mineral fertilizers in the border regions.
"After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine took possession of about 20,000 tons of hazardous chemicals used in industry and agriculture," he said. "We have, on numerous occasions, discovered cases of the barbaric treatment of the environment and blunt violations of environmental safety in other regions of the country."
The Russian daily, Komsomolskaya Pravda, reported last week that stockpiles of hazardous chemical and nuclear waste were located on the border between Russia and the Donetsk region in Ukraine.
1. Transcript of Replies to Media Questions by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov, Tel Aviv, October 27, 2005
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
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Question: Please comment on the statement of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Foreign Minister Lavrov: I already said today at the meeting with Senior Deputy Prime Minister Peres that what I saw on CNN is unacceptable. We shall convey that to the Iranian side. Today we are summoning the Iranian ambassador to the Foreign Ministry to explain the motives behind such behavior. I think that this does not add to the efforts of those who want to normalize the situation around Iran.
Question: Can this influence Moscow's position on Iran's nuclear dossier?
Foreign Minister Lavrov: On the nuclear dossier we shall be guided by the specific facts which the IAEA reports. The matter is too serious to depart from the main criterion here of not allowing a breach of the nonproliferation regime. On the other hand, I cannot fail to admit that those who insist on a referral of the nuclear dossier to the United Nations, have received additional arguments after this statement.
2. Intelligence Director Issues New U.S. Intelligence Strategy; Plan establishes major intelligence objectives, John Negroponte says
U.S. Department of State/Bureau of International Information Programs
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Washington -- A comprehensive U.S. strategy that is designed to integrate the missions of the 15 intelligence agencies better, while enhancing the collection of intelligence on threats to U.S. national security worldwide was released by the director of national intelligence October 26.
It specifically calls for defeating terrorism worldwide and promoting freedom and democracy.
"This strategy is a statement of our fundamental values, highest priorities and orientation toward the future, but it is an action document as well," said Director of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte. "For U.S. national intelligence, time for change is now."
The strategy focuses on five mission objectives and 10 related ´┐Żenterprise objectives,´┐Ż or goals.
The five mission objectives are:
-- Defeat terrorists at home and abroad by disarming their operational capabilities, and seizing the initiative from them by promoting the growth of freedom and democracy;
-- Prevent and counter the spread of weapons of mass destruction;
-- Bolster the growth of democracy and sustain peaceful democratic states;
-- Develop innovative ways to penetrate and analyze the most difficult targets; and
-- Anticipate developments of strategic concern and identify opportunities as well as vulnerabilities for decision-makers.
Overall, Negroponte told reporters October 26 that the current missions of the 15 intelligence agencies have not changed.
The enterprise objectives are designed to help the restructuring and transformation of the agencies that began after Negroponte became the chief intelligence adviser six months ago.
"U.S. national intelligence must be tailored to the threats of the 21st century, which seldom conform to the traditional profiles of hostile states and alliances," Negroponte said in the opening section of the strategy document.
He said that implicit in each of the tasks is the assumption that this new approach represents a far-reaching reform of previous intelligence practices and arrangements.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) was created in December 2004 with passage of the sweeping Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Act. (See related article.)
Text of the National Intelligence Strategy (PDF, 32 pages) is available on the ODNI Web site.
3. Progress Detailed in Countering World's Most Dangerous Weapons; State Department official lays out recent achievements, remaining challenges
U.S. Department of State/Bureau of International Information Programs
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The United States sees good progress being made in the development and implementation of a comprehensive approach to counter the full range of major weapons threats, according to the State Department's chief security and arms control official.
"The National Strategy to Combat Weapons Of Mass Destruction (WMD) is the first of its kind -- a broad, truly national strategy uniting all the elements of diplomacy, intelligence and power needed to counter WMD," said Robert Joseph, under secretary of state for international security and arms control.
Moreover, he said, that strategy "continues to provide a guide to action against this paramount threat" because it is "flexible and dynamic, suited to the changing nature of the proliferation threat."
Joseph made the remarks at a conference hosted by the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in Washington October 21.
The three pillars of the counter-WMD strategy are prevention, protection and consequence management, Joseph said. Prevention is self-explanatory, involving efforts to keep WMD and related materials and delivery systems from terrorists or rogue states.
Protection refers to counterproliferation, he said, with capabilities to "deter, detect, defend against, and defeat WMD" already possessed by terrorists or rogue states.
Consequence management means reducing as much or as many consequences of WMD attacks at home or abroad as possible.
Working from this strategic framework, then, the United States has used diplomacy to combat WMD proliferation in several ways:
-- Nunn-Lugar Programs, now funded at record-high levels, provide U.S. assistance mainly to states of the former Soviet Union to eliminate nuclear weapons and prevent their proliferation.
-- Global Threat Reduction Initiative reduces fissile and radioactive material worldwide.
-- G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction to persuade America's partners to contribute to the effort against a global threat to the international community.
-- Second Line of Defense and Megaports programs to install radiation detection capability at major seaports, airports and border crossings.
-- Redirection programs in Libya and Iraq to provide other employment for former weapons scientists and engineers.
-- Passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 to require all states to criminalize WMD proliferation, institute effective export controls and enhance security for nuclear materials.
-- Increasing the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards budget to allow the agency to detect, and respond to, nuclear proliferation.
-- Submitting the IAEA Additional Protocol to the U.S. Senate for ratification, and calling for universal adoption of the Additional Protocol, as well as for creation of a new committee of the IAEA board to examine ways to strengthen its safeguards and verification capabilities.
-- Proposing that the ability to enrich uranium and separate plutonium be limited to those states that already operate such facilities, and that the world's nuclear fuel suppliers assure supply to states that forego enrichment and reprocessing in order to rectify the greatest weakness in the nuclear nonproliferation system, which is the ability of states to pursue nuclear weapons under the cover of peaceful energy programs.
-- Creating the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to enable countries to use national diplomatic, military, law enforcement and intelligence assets to work in a multinational, yet flexible, fashion to apply existing national laws and international conventions to work multilaterally to disrupt proliferation networks, and to hold accountable the front companies that support them; and
-- Withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to develop missile defenses capable of intercepting and destroying a limited number of ballistic missiles from terrorists or rogue states.
This comprehensive approach to WMD proliferation has paid important dividends, Joseph said. He pointed specifically to the exposure and breakup of the nuclear proliferation commercial network built and operated by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan, as well as Libya's decision to give up its WMD programs and materials as examples of success.
Joseph said he sees three current challenges for counter-WMD efforts. The first, he said, is to end the nuclear weapons programs of North Korea and Iran. "There should be no doubt that both countries have such programs," he added.
The second challenge is to stop proliferation trade, whether by rogue states, individuals or groups, and to ensure that it does not re-start, Joseph said. Third, he sees a need to keep terrorists from acquiring and using WMD -- especially biological and nuclear weapons.
Following is the text of Joseph's remarks, as prepared for delivery:
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Applying the Bush Administration's Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction to Today's Challenges
Robert G. Joseph, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
Remarks to the Fletcher School Conference on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Washington, D.C. October 21, 2005
I am very pleased to have been asked to address this conference -- a conference on perhaps the most vital subject for international peace and security: as the President has said, ensuring that the world's most dangerous weapons are kept out of the hands of the world's most dangerous people. My remarks are intended to lay out what we as an administration said we would do to meet this pre-eminent threat, what we have actually done in the non- and counterproliferation areas, and how we envision the most significant weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation challenges that lie ahead of us.
FIRST: WHAT WE SAID WE WOULD DO
I believe that the Bush administration has done more than any previous administration to develop a comprehensive approach to counter the full range of WMD threats. Through presidential speeches and the publication of formal strategy documents, we have laid out a clear road map for action. This was important for two reasons: first, because of the importance of gaining wide support both within the executive and congressional branches, as well as from the broader national security community; and second, because of our confidence in the power of ideas, and the need for new ideas to transform our thinking about the threats that face our nation. Just one example early in the administration was the transformation of the decades-old debate surrounding the (Anti-Ballistic Missile) ABM Treaty, which I believe we won both on an intellectual basis and in diplomatic practice.
When we first came into office, we inherited an approach to proliferation expressed in presidential guidance that was based on promotion of universal arms control treaties and export controls. This was a reflection going back many years of perceiving proliferation more as a political challenge than a security threat. Almost immediately upon assuming office, President Bush emphasized that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was the pre-eminent security threat of the 21st century, requiring an entirely new, comprehensive strategy. In his first major speech on security issues, given at the National Defense University on May 1, 2001, the President said:
"[T]his is still a dangerous world, a less certain, a less predictable one. More nations have nuclear weapons and still more have nuclear aspirations. Many have chemical and biological weapons. Some already have developed the ballistic missile technology that would allow them to deliver weapons of mass destruction at long distances and incredible speeds. And a number of these countries are spreading these technologies around the world´┐Ż.
"Today's world requires a new policy, a broad strategy of active nonproliferation, counterproliferation and defenses. We must work together with other like-minded nations to deny weapons of terror from those seeking to acquire them. We must work with allies and friends who wish to join with us to defend against the harm they can inflict. And together we must deter anyone who would contemplate their use."
Follow-on speeches at West Point and the Citadel, as well as a return engagement at the National Defense University in February 2004, show a clear evolution of the administration's thinking about how to deal with the full spectrum of complex and dangerous threats from WMD from countries like North Korea and Iran, as well as from terrorists who seek WMD capabilities not as weapons of last resort, but as weapons of choice. In these speeches, the President called for new concepts of deterrence and defense, and new capabilities to deal with today's threats.
Beginning in the fall of 2002, following the terrorist attacks on our country the previous September, the administration published a series of official strategy papers on how we intended to counter the WMD proliferation threat. In both the National Security Strategy of the United States and the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, the President expanded on the requirements to meet today's threats and on the tools we would marshal against them. Last year, the President issued Biodefense for the 21st Century, which fleshes out the overall strategy for combating the particular threat from biological weapons.
The National Strategy to Combat WMD is the first of its kind -- a broad, truly national strategy uniting all the elements of diplomacy, intelligence and power needed to counter WMD. As the first pillar of the strategy, the Bush administration recognized the continuing importance of prevention and launched dramatically expanded U.S. efforts to prevent acquisition of WMD, related materials and delivery systems by rogue states or terrorists.
At the same time, the strategy recognized that prevention will not always succeed. Therefore, it placed new, and necessary, emphasis on protection or counterproliferation to deter, detect, defend against, and defeat WMD in the hands of our enemies. Further, as the third pillar, the National Strategy also focused on consequence management, to reduce as much as possible the potentially horrific consequences of WMD attacks at home or abroad.
These three pillars -- counterproliferation, nonproliferation and consequence management -- do not stand alone, but rather come together as elements of a unified approach. Underlining that point, the National Strategy also identifies four cross-cutting functions that are critical to combating WMD: improved intelligence collection and analysis; research and development; bilateral and multilateral cooperation; and tailored strategies against hostile states and terrorists. What is meant by tailored or targeted strategies is that there is no ´┐Żcookie cutter´┐Ż approach to combating proliferation: Iran is different from North Korea, North Korea is different from Libya or Syria, and the terrorist WMD threat is different from that of state threats. While many non- and counterproliferation instruments are common to all these threats, each threat must be treated as unique.
NOW LET ME TURN TO WHAT WE HAVE DONE
The Bush administration has given vitality to the use of diplomatic tools to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. U.S. assistance to other states to eliminate weapons and prevent their proliferation has been at record funding levels. Moreover, with the formation in 2002 of the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the United States successfully called on our foreign partners to contribute their share to the effort to meet what is a global threat to the international community.
While the bulk of U.S. nonproliferation assistance remains focused on the states of the Former Soviet Union, we have also expanded our efforts to address proliferation threats worldwide. Landmark programs include: the Global Threat Reduction Initiative to reduce fissile and radioactive material worldwide; the Second Line of Defense and Megaports programs to install radiation detection capability at major seaports, airports and border crossings; and redirection programs in Libya and Iraq to provide alternative employment for former weapons scientists and engineers.
The G-8 Global Partnership is an excellent example of the use of effective multilateralism to enhance our ability to prevent WMD and missile proliferation. Moreover, under U.S. leadership, even an economically focused organization like APEC the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum has acted on the realization that proliferation presents a dire threat to economic wellbeing.
On the international level, the United States has spearheaded the effort for the United Nations Security Council to take on its responsibilities to maintain peace and security against modern threats. A major milestone was the passage in April of last year of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540. In adopting 1540, the Security Council for only the second time since its founding invoked its Chapter VII authorities to require nations to take steps in response to a general, vice specific, threat to international peace and security. In particular, 1540 requires all states to criminalize WMD proliferation, institute effective export controls, and enhance security for nuclear materials. Much remains to be done to implement 1540 fully; and the United States stands ready to assist wherever and whenever it can.
The United States also has led the way to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) ability to detect, and respond to, nuclear proliferation. We instituted the successful effort to increase the IAEA's safeguards budget. We submitted the IAEA Additional Protocol to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. We have called for universal adoption of the Additional Protocol and the creation of a new special committee of the IAEA Board to examine ways to strengthen the Agency's safeguards and verification capabilities. We are pleased that the new special committee will meet for the first time this fall and begin its important work.
In addition to the President's proposals to strengthen the IAEA institutionally, he challenged the international community to rectify the greatest weakness in the nuclear nonproliferation system: the ability of states to pursue nuclear weapons under the cover of peaceful energy programs. The lesson of Iran and North Korea is clear: some states will cynically manipulate the provisions of the NPT to acquire sensitive technologies to enable them to pursue nuclear weapons capabilities -- the very capabilities the treaty is intended to deny.
To close this loophole, the President proposed that the ability to enrich uranium and separate plutonium be limited to those states which already operate such facilities. In return, he called on the world's nuclear fuel suppliers to assure supply to those states which forego enrichment and reprocessing. While this proposal has been called discriminatory by some, the fact is that the only states which sought new enrichment or reprocessing capability in the last 15 years did so for weapons programs. The list is telling: Iraq, Iran, North Korea and Libya.
Yet another, and perhaps one of the most important efforts of the Bush administration to combat weapons of mass destruction is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which shows the close interaction among nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and intelligence. PSI countries have put their diplomatic, military, law enforcement and intelligence assets to work in a multinational, yet flexible, fashion. They are applying laws already on the books in innovative ways and cooperating as never before to interdict shipments, to disrupt proliferation networks, and to hold accountable the front companies that support them. PSI has now expanded to include support from more than 70 countries, and continues to grow. It is not a treaty-based approach, involving long, ponderous negotiations which yield results only slowly, if at all. Instead, it is an active partnership, to deter, disrupt and prevent WMD proliferation.
The PSI approach is now expanding to cut off the financial flows that fuel proliferation. 1540 requires states to adopt and enforce effective controls on funds and services related to export and transshipment of WMD-related goods. In July of this year, G-8 Leaders called for enhanced efforts to combat proliferation through cooperation to identify, track and freeze relevant financial transactions and assets. This cooperation has already begun within the Egmont Group, a worldwide network of governmental financial agencies originally set up to combat money laundering. President Bush further augmented U.S. efforts when he issued in July a new Executive Order, which authorizes the U.S. government to freeze assets and block transactions of entities and persons engaged in proliferation activities. Currently eight entities -- four from Iran, three from North Korea, and one from Syria -- have been designated under the order, and we are working actively to designate additional ones.
Another key requirement of counterproliferation is to protect ourselves from WMD-armed adversaries. As President Bush made clear early in his first term, combating WMD requires both offensive and defensive capabilities. To be successful, we must bring a full range of defensive measures to bear. One element of the solution set is missile defense. Others are improved counterforce and passive defense capabilities. Still others are dual-use. Dual-use capabilities have long been considered proliferation problems, but dual-use capabilities can also be part of the solution. For example, the same disease surveillance and medical countermeasure responses required for public health protection against infectious diseases are critical for defending against biological weapons attacks.
LET ME NOW TURN TO THE RESULTS
The Bush administration's comprehensive approach to WMD proliferation has paid important dividends. The most dramatic success has been, of course, the destruction of the A.Q. Khan network and the elimination of Libya's WMD and longer-range missile programs. Many elements of our comprehensive approach were required for those achievements: actionable intelligence; interdiction; effective deterrence; and new non- and counterproliferation tools.
Intelligence penetration of the A.Q. Khan network gave us knowledge of the shipment of thousands of centrifuge parts bound for Libya on the ship BBC China. PSI cooperation among the United States, United Kingdom, Germany and Italy resulted in the diversion of the ship and the seizure of its deadly cargo. Interdiction of the BBC China, followed by cooperation from the United Arab Emirates, South Africa, Malaysia, Turkey and several European countries, led to the destruction of the Khan network and the on-going investigation, prosecution or imprisonment of many of its leading members.
In turn, just two months after the BBC China interdiction, Libya announced its historic decision to eliminate its WMD and longer-range missile programs. Several factors were at work: the revelation and disruption of Libya's nuclear weapons ambitions; the potentially severe costs of proliferation, demonstrated by the resolve of the United States, the United Kingdom and our partners to counter WMD in Iraq; and the potential benefits from adhering to international nonproliferation norms. In the months after Libya's decision, Tripoli worked with the United States and U.K. to disclose fully its nuclear, chemical and longer-range missile efforts, and to eliminate weapons and equipment, through destruction or removal. In return, the United States has lifted many economic and political sanctions on Libya that have produced benefits for the American people. We also are developing programs to provide alternative employment for Libyan scientists and engineers formerly involved in weapons of mass destruction programs. In taking these steps, Libya has been established as a second model for proliferators to follow: Give up your weapons programs and receive the benefits of being in good standing within the international community.
NOW FOR THE CHALLENGES AHEAD
While much has been accomplished in our fight against proliferation, much more remains to be done. I would highlight three challenges.
The first is to end the North Korean and Iranian nuclear weapons programs. There should be no doubt that both countries have such programs. President Bush has made clear that all options are on the table to address these direct threats to our security. He has also emphasized that our strong preference is to counter them through diplomacy.
Despite our best efforts and those of our partners, both North Korea and Iran remain serious proliferation threats. In the Six-Party Joint Statement on September 19, North Korea committed to abandoning all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs. This was a significant development, but we still must agree on, and implement, the detailed requirements of North Korean denuclearization and its verification. That task proved a major one in South Africa, even though it had already abandoned its weapons program and was fully cooperative and transparent in allowing verification by the international community. In North Korea, it will certainly be far more difficult.
In some ways, the challenge Iran poses to the nuclear nonproliferation regime is even more daunting. Although the evidence including Iran's almost 20 years of hiding all its nuclear fuel cycle efforts clearly indicates a weapons program, it continues to argue that its program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. On September 24, the IAEA Board of Governors found that Iran violated its safeguards obligations. This finding requires a report to the United Nations Security Council. The Security Council will not replace the IAEA effort but reinforce it, for example, by calling on Iran to cooperate with the IAEA, and giving the IAEA new, needed authority to investigate all Iranian weaponization efforts. We continue to work with other IAEA Board members on the timing and content of the report of Iranian noncompliance to the Security Council. We also continue to support the efforts of the United Kingdom, France and Germany -- the EU-3 -- to bring Iran back to the negotiations.
The second challenge is to end proliferation trade by rogue states, individuals and groups, and to ensure that it does not return. As I have described, we have made substantial progress over the last few years. We have moved from the creation of international export control standards to their active enforcement through enhanced national legislation, PSI interdictions, international law enforcement and financial cooperation. We have shut down the world's most dangerous proliferation network. More and more states are endorsing PSI and its Statement of Interdiction Principles.
Two weeks ago, I traveled to Central Asia to secure broader support for and participation in the PSI. Central Asian states now almost unanimously have endorsed the PSI and are prepared to take action to ensure their airspace will not be abused by proliferators. Given their geographic location as a crossroads for proliferation activity, the strong stance by these governments will serve as a deterrent to proliferators.
Similarly, we are working with Singapore, Japan and Australia to broaden PSI participation in Asia. I listened carefully to Singapore's Minister of Defense at the start of its recent PSI exercise, Operation Deep Sabre, which I attended in August when he said: "Singapore is highly sensitive to the dangers of proliferation, perhaps more so than most countries given our size and vulnerability. This is why counter-proliferation is one of our core security priorities." PSI participants like Singapore, a key transshipment hub, not only understand the global dangers posed by proliferation, but also have internalized the need to participate in PSI for their own national and economic security.
In his address at National Defense University (NDU) in February 2004, President Bush called for the expansion of our PSI efforts, including through law enforcement. We are working with our partners to dismantle the infrastructure of proliferation, especially its financing sources. Our efforts have had success, steadily reducing the opportunities available to proliferators. But we must continue to expand and deepen our efforts using all available national and international authorities and, where necessary, creating new ones until the proliferation trade has been effectively ended.
The third challenge that I would emphasize is the need to prevent terrorist acquisition and use of WMD, and especially of biological and nuclear weapons. Deterring terrorists from using WMD is a problematic challenge. If terrorists acquire them, they are likely to employ them, with potentially catastrophic effects. The acquisition routes to biological and nuclear weapons are quite different, requiring different approaches to proliferation prevention, counterproliferation and consequence management. Deadly pathogens are widespread -- most exist in nature but it is difficult to weaponize them successfully. With nuclear weapons, in contrast, any well-organized terrorist group with some technical expertise could probably create a crude nuclear device -- provided it has access to the weapons material.
Many of the tools we have in place to combat proliferation by rogue states are just as relevant against WMD terrorism. A few examples are reducing the global stocks of fissile material and securing those which remain; improved nuclear and biological detection capability; and the interdiction of illicit traffic in nuclear and biological materials. A key difference, however, is one of scale. We cannot rest as long as enough material for even one nuclear weapon remains unsecured or can evade detection or interdiction.
While many of the tools are the same, preventing WMD terrorism requires different approaches from those we have followed against state WMD programs or against conventional or non-WMD-related terrorism. Intelligence collection and action against the two have in the past been quite different, with anti-terrorist intelligence focused on individuals and groups, and anti-WMD intelligence focused on state-based programs. We are working hard to close any gaps in our intelligence collection, analysis and action on WMD terrorism.
We also require sustained strategic approaches -- national, multilateral, and global -- to combat WMD terrorism. In reorganizing the State Department nonproliferation and arms control structure to deal better with today's threats, one important step has been to create a new office of WMD Terrorism. This office will work with our international partners to harness all the relevant collective resources to establish more coordinated, effective, and interoperable capabilities to prevent, protect against, and respond to the global threat of WMD terrorism.
Let me conclude by noting that the strategic approach to combat WMD proliferation, which the President laid out over four years ago, continues to provide a guide to action against this paramount threat. Our strategy, and the new measures we have adopted to implement it, is flexible and dynamic, suited to the changing nature of the proliferation threat. We have accomplished much, but we must also continue to heed the warning which the President gave in the National Security Strategy document:
"The gravest danger our nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed. History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action."
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