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Nuclear News - 12/2/2004
RANSAC Nuclear News, December 2, 2004
Compiled By: Samantha Mikol


A.  Fissile Material Storage Facility
    1. Rumyantsev letter reveals specific amounts of nuke usable material, but raises many questions , Charles Digges, Bellona Foundation (12/2/2004)
B.  Cooperative Threat Reduction
    1. Confronting the reality of nuclear terrorism , AFP (12/3/2004)
    2. Australia accused of double standards as anti-proliferation meeting starts, AFP (11/30/2004)
    3. Bush Administration May Yet Pursue New Nuclear Weapons Capabilities, David Ruppe, Global Security Newswire (11/30/2004)
C.  Russia-Iran
    1. Russia to continue Iran nuclear cooperation - Lavrov, Interfax (12/1/2004)
    2. MOSCOW HOPES FOR TEHRAN'S COMMON SENSE , RIA Novosti (11/30/2004)
    3. RUSSIA TO CONTINUE CLOSE NUCLEAR ENERGY COOPERATION WITH IRAN - LAVROV , Arseny Oganesyan and Sergei Ryabikin, RIA Novosti (11/30/2004)
    4. Russia�s secret moves against Iran at IAEA revealed , Tehran Times  (11/30/2004)
D.  Russia-India
    1. INDIA TO PAY $2 BILLION FOR RUSSIAN WEAPONRY , RIA Novosti (12/1/2004)
    2. India to pay $2 billion for Russian weaponry , RIA Novosti (12/1/2004)
    3. Ivanov says no nuclear subs will be sold to India, Interfax (11/30/2004)
E.  Russia-Poland
    1. RUSSIA SIGNS ATOM DEAL WITH POLAND, RFE/RL Newsline (11/29/2004)
F.  Nuclear Safety
    1. ICE-BREAKER CATCHES FIRE IN ST. PETERSBURG , Dina Danilova, RIA Novosti (11/30/2004)
    2. INTERNATIONAL SAFETY-INCREASE PROJECTS EMBODIED AT KOLA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT , RIA Novosti (11/30/2004)
G.  Official Statements
    1. Alexander Yakovenko, the Spokesman of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Answers Russian Media Questions on Russian-Indian Relations (excerpted), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (12/1/2004)
    2. On the IAEA Board of Governors Resolution Concerning Iran's Nuclear Program, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (11/30/2004)
    3. Transcript of Replies to Russian Media Questions by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov, Vientiane, November 30, 2004 (excerpted), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (11/30/2004)
    4. Presidential Determination on Waiver of Conditions on Obligation, The White House (11/29/2004)
    5. Statement to the Ninth Conference of States Parties of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Ambassador Eric M. Javits, Department of State (11/29/2004)
H.  Links of Interest
    1. Nuclear Security Culture: The Case of Russia, The Center for International Trade and Security of The University of Georgia, Taipei Times (12/1/2004)
    2. Progress Reported in Big Job to Convert Research Reactors from HEU Fuel, IAEA (11/15/2004)



A.  Fissile Material Storage Facility

1.
Rumyantsev letter reveals specific amounts of nuke usable material, but raises many questions
Charles Digges
Bellona Foundation
12/2/2004
(for personal use only)


In what are the most specific data yet available, Rosatom Chief Alexander Rumyantsev essentially declassified nearly exact amounts of decommissioned weapons-grade nuclear materials to be housed at the Mayak Fissile Materials Storage Facility (FMSF) in a letter to Russian nuclear analyst Lev Maximov, a copy of which was obtained by Bellona Web.

The amount of fissile material slated for storage had remained a tightly guarded secret as the figures reveal Russia�s strategic nuclear capability, as well as the fact that they had, by the end of the Cold War, achieved near nuclear parity with the United States.

The United States declassified information on its own nuclear weapons programme output some years ago, indicating that it had produced 662 tonnes of nuclear bomb grade material�112 tonnes of which was plutonium and 550 tonnes of which was uranium�since 1945.

Rumyantsev�s letter to Maximov, dated November 19th 2004, was a response to an open letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin regarding security concerns surrounding the FMSF, which is being built by the US Pentagon-Run Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme. In it, Rumyantsev disclosed that Russia produced between 599 and 626 tonnes of weapons grade plutonium and uranium during the arms race.

Letting the cat out of the bag

According to Maximov, the facility presents a dire national threat to Russia, both in terms of concentrating so much weapons-usable material in one place, making it vulnerable to terrorist attacks, and because the FMSF�CTR�s longest running project to date�gives the Pentagon an inside view at, and the ability to cripple, Russia�s nuclear defence capabilities

But Rumyantsev�s response let the cat out of the bag: Of that, 599 and 626 tonnes of weapons-grade nuclear material, 533 tonnes is highly enriched uranium (HEU) and between 66.6 tonnes and 93.3 tonnes of it is plutonium, Rumyantsev wrote.

In the letter, Rumyantsev specifies that the FSMF, initially conceived in 1992 as a two part structure, is envisioned to house 50,000 containers holding more than 600 tonnes of fissile material�more than 100 tonnes over the early 90s 500-tonne estimates�extracted from decommissioned warheads.

In particular, Rumyantsev wrote that the construction of the FMSF�one of the US Defence Department Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme�s longest running projects�would take place in two stages. �The volume of the two-stage storage facility is 50,000 containers of fissile material,� Rumyantsev wrote.

�It is envisioned that each storage facility will hold [in 25,000 containers per facility] 8.333 containers of plutonium and 16,667 containers of uranium. Of those containers, some will hold not more than 4 kilograms of alpha-stage plutonium, others 5.6 kilograms of delta-stage and yet others 16 kilograms of uranium (the 90 percent enriched uranium-235 isotope).�

Much of this material, he indicated in his November letter, would be stored in metallic form, whereas the additional 1.2 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium still being produced annually by Russia�s three remaining plutonium production reactors in Seversk and Zheleznogorsk, would be stored in oxide, or power, form. Some 9 more tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium will be produced before these reactors are shut down within the next decade. The United States Department of Energy is currently financing the closure of those reactors.

CTR�s initial plans for the FMSF

Rumyantsev�s comments make surprising revelations and raise several questions. First, the current FMSF�which was officially opened with a ribbon-cutting in December 2003, but still has at least a year of additional construction before it can begin accepting nuclear material�is designed to hold only 50 tonnes of plutonium and 200 tonnes of HEU.

It was initially planned in 1992 that CTR would help finance and construct two such facilities that would conceivably hold some 500 tonnes of fissile material. But that notion of building two identical facilities�one in Seversk and the current one at the Mayak Chemical Combine in the southern Urals�was unilaterally scrapped by Rumyantsev himself in a 2003 letter to his US CTR counterparts.

Rumyantsev announced in the 2003 letter that the one wing of the FMSF at Mayak would house only 25 tonnes of plutonium in immobilizes form and no HEU, all of which would be diverted to the US-Russia HEU-LEU programme, via which Russia down-blends its excess HEU and sells the resultant low enriched uranium (LEU) to the United States for use in civilian reactors there. As a result, the current FMSF will operate only at quarter of its current facility and at an eighth of the initially-planned two wing approach.

Why no second FMSF?

Rumyantsev�s rationale for the decision not to build a second wing to the FMSF apparently hinged on the currently stalled 2000 US-Russia Plutonium Disposition Agreement, in which Washington and Moscow agreed to destroy 34 tonnes of surplus weapons grade plutonium.

The dispositioning of this plutonium is to take place in mixed plutonium and uranium oxide (MOX) fuel to be burned in specially retrofitted commercial reactors in Russia and the United States. This surplus plutonium, initially declared at 50 tonnes, was later cut back to 34. No progress has been made on the MOX programme since last spring, however, because Russia and the US Department of State are locked in a heated liability over the project that could eventually kill it.

While the infrastructure for the MOX programme was being built, the surplus plutonium was to be stored at the FMSF. But because both the United States and Russia agreed to destroy only 34 tonnes of surplus weapons-grade plutonium, Rumyantsev calculated that by slashing the 50 tonnes slated for storage at Mayak, and adding the 9 tonnes left over from the production reactors, we would meet his 34 tonne surplus plutonium obligation to the United States.

No official agreement between the United States and Russia regarding the actual form and structure of the FMSF was ever signed, so Rumyantsev was technically free to issue this edict.

Rumyantsev�s answers raise more questions

Questions, therefore, still shroud Rumyantsev�s responses and which could not be cleared up by Rosatom. For instance, Rumyantsev writes in his letter to Maximov as if the 1993 two-wing FMSF was still on the boards. The 599 to 626 tonnes of weapons grade material that were apparently to have been put into storage could have been accommodated for in the initial two-wing plan, the CTR and Rosatom officials concurred.

But Rumyantsev while writing makes no mention of the fact that he himself had abandoned that plan. Likewise, he makes no allusion to any Russian plans to build a second wing to the FMSF in the future. Such an option has been inconclusively discussed at high levels in the past, according to Rosatom officials.

Nikolai Shingaryov, Rostatom�s chief spokesman said he was unaware of Rumyantsev�s letter to Maximov and could not confirm or deny any information or figures that it contained. He said, though, that he was not acquainted with any plans to deviate from Rumyantsev�s 2003 directive to store only 25 tonnes of weapons grade plutonium and divert 200 tonnes of HEU to the HEU-LEU programme.

Another source in Rosatom�s fuel cycles division, who asked not to be further identified, confirmed that the 599 to 626 tonne figure was accurate.

�I am not able to say to the kilogram how much material there is, but between 599 and 626 tonnes would be a very specific estimate�more specific than we have seen before� he said.

An official CTR, who requested his name not be used, was surprised by Rumyantsev�s apparent candor.

�Naturally, the original two wing plan for the FMSF gave the US some basic estimates of [Russia�s] Cold War nuclear output, but I have never heard of anyone so high ranking as Rumyantsev naming such specific figures before,� the official said in a telephone interview from Washington.

�Granted, 599 to 626 tonnes is not pin-pointing it, but it�s by far the narrowest spread I have heard from them.�

Many Western nuclear analysts in the past months have suggested that the current FMSF could hold significantly more material than even the initial 50 tonnes of plutonium and 200 tonnes of HEU it was slated to house.

But the Rosatom source �doubted seriously� that the current facility could house anything near 626 tonnes of fissile material. �Conservatively, you could perhaps pack another 100 tonnes of fissile material into the FMSF, but nothing like what Rumyantsev suggests.�

The CTR official concurred. He said the Mayak FMSF was constructed in such a way as it could handle more material that it was initially slated to take. �But the extra 305 to 376 Rumyantsev suggests wouldn�t be feasible without another facility, as was initially planned.�

Both the CTR and the Rosatom official said they were unaware of any unilateral Russian plans to build a second wing for the FMSF, but the Rosatom official did say that such plans had been casually discussed in the corridors of the Ministry of Atomic Energy, Rosatom�s precursor.

�But nothing, to my knowledge, was every put into official form,� said the Rosatom official.

So where is this extra material going?

The fate of the extra 305 to 376 tonnes of surplus weapons-grade material mentioned by Rumyantsev and that will not fit into the current structure of the FMSF remains a matter of speculation.

It is doubtful that Rumyantsev and a close group of officials are planning on building a second wing to the FMSF with their own money for the simple fact that Rosatom has given every indication that it intends to pursue plutonium fueled reactors called breeders, for which this excess plutonium would be the backbone.




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B.  Cooperative Threat Reduction

1.
Confronting the reality of nuclear terrorism
AFP
12/3/2004
(for personal use only)


Nuclear terrorism is a dreadful prospect but a threat that is real. The September 11 attacks show that terrorists will not hesitate to inflict mass casualties in populated areas, killing themselves in the process. The only limitation on the horror they are prepared to unleash is the weaponry they can use.

And we now know that the 9/11 hijackers considered targeting American nuclear installations.

While the exercise is traumatic, none of us would find it too difficult to visualize the terrible human and economic damage from a nuclear explosion in a city. The cost would be horrific and ongoing. Fortunately, this most dangerous form of nuclear terrorism is made less likely by the difficulties terrorists would have in acquiring the necessary fissile material and expertise.

More probable is the prospect of terrorists using radioactive materials employed in medicine, science and industry to produce a �dirty bomb.� A dirty bomb would not cause mass destruction but could disperse radiation over a wide area. The psychological trauma, disruption and economic cost would still be disastrous. The global community has an obligation to take the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism seriously.

The global community�s first line of defense against the misuse of sensitive materials and technology, whether by rogue states or terrorist groups, is the framework of arms control treaties and export control regimes built up over several decades. Foremost among these is the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Regrettably, the Nonproliferation Treaty is under unprecedented pressure. North Korea�s announced withdrawal from the treaty and its determined pursuit of nuclear weapons challenges international security like never before. And the global community�s concerns about Iran�s nuclear intentions remain after two years of investigations by the world�s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

On top of this, the revelation of a sophisticated international black market in nuclear materials and technology, with customers including North Korea, Iran and Libya, reminds us starkly that we must act firmly and in unity to stop nuclear weapons falling into the hands of dangerous regimes and terrorists.

Australia has a strong commitment to work with Asia-Pacific countries to combat nuclear weapons proliferation and nuclear terrorism. At the recent Asia-Pacific Nuclear Safeguards and Security Conference, hosted by Australia in Sydney, regional countries expressed their firm resolve to confront these threats.

Senior representatives from 18 Asia-Pacific countries recognized that a strong nuclear safeguards and security framework was essential to realizing the benefits of peaceful use of nuclear energy. A number of practical priorities were identified including global application of the IAEA�s strengthened safeguards system, effective controls on exports of nuclear materials and technology, better protection of nuclear materials and facilities, and ensuring the effective control and protection of radioactive sources.

As the permanent member of the IAEA�s Board of Governors for the South-East Asia and Pacific region, Australia has consistently advocated practical measures that will make a difference. Australia was one of the first countries to contribute to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, which supports international efforts to deal with the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. Australia was also the first country to conclude an Additional Protocol strengthening the IAEA�s inspection and verification powers.

Securing fissile material against acquisition by rogue states and terrorists is a vital task for the G8 Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Earlier this year, Australia contributed $10 million to the Global Partnership. Our contribution is helping dismantle nuclear submarines decommissioned from Russia�s Pacific fleet to reduce proliferation and safety risks. We chose this project because of its direct relevance to our region.

Any nuclear security weaknesses at local or regional levels risk being exploited. As part of our commitment to regional cooperation on these issues, Australia has also set aside $4.4 million for work by the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization to boost the regulatory controls and physical security of radioactive sources in the Pacific and South East Asia.

While we continue to conduct this purposeful work, we should also recognize that there are causes for optimism. The nuclear ambitions of Saddam Hussein�s regime in Iraq have been thwarted. Libya has embraced a new future in concert with the global community as it dismantles its weapons of mass destruction programs, which included nuclear components. And more than 60 countries now support the Proliferation Security Initiative, which is countering WMD proliferation through practical measures and cooperation.

We should be quite clear about what is at stake. The world�s nonproliferation regime provides vital security benefits including the climate of confidence necessary for cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. And, of course, if all countries diligently implement the nonproliferation regime it will ensure we never have to confront that most horrible of terrorist attacks.


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2.
Australia accused of double standards as anti-proliferation meeting starts
AFP
11/30/2004
(for personal use only)


Australia may have "innocently" exported nuclear technology to parties with weapons of mass destruction programs, Defence Minister Robert Hill said Tuesday on the sidelines of an anti-proliferation forum.

As environmental lobby Greenpeace accused Australia of double standards over nuclear proliferation, Hill urged all Southeast Asian nations to closely monitor their exports of what he called "dual-use" goods.

Hill did not specify whether the material in question may have gone to government or non-government bodies, and said he had no reports of such products being obtained by terrorist organisations.

He described the goods as "nuclear-area technologies that can have legitimate non-threatening value, but at the same time can be used within a nuclear weapons program".

"They can be exported quite innocently and there have been suggestions that some may have been exported from Australia innocently that have been used within WMD, at least research programs," he told reporters after addressing an international meeting of the US-backed Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

The minister was responding to a report by Greenpeace accusing the government of supporting a company known as Silex Systems Ltd. in its research of laser-based uranium enrichment.

Greenpeace said the program could inadvertently help the spread of nuclear weapons.

Hill declined to comment specifically on Silex, which occupies floorspace of the government-funded Australian Nuclear Science Technology Organisation (ANSTO) at the Lucas Heights nuclear reactor in Sydney.

Greenpeace campaigner James Courtney said the government's support set a "dangerous double standard that erodes international efforts to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons-related technology."

Courtney called on the government to set an example to the rest of the world by ending research into sensitive nuclear technologies that posed proliferation risks.

"Our government is currently pressuring Iran to abandon its enrichment program and went to war to stop Iraq from developing this type of technology," he said.

Hill described Australia's system for monitoring exports as "quite sophisticated".

"Any company that is exporting a dual-use or potential dual-use technology from Australia that falls within the definitions within our legislation requires export approval and we examine that very carefully," he said.

"We look at the record of the intended recipient, the state and company or institution that's receiving those technologies, and sometimes we give guidance to the company.

"Sometimes under our legislation we simply advise them that the export will not be permitted."

Hill also told delegates from 19 countries attending talks by the US-backed Proliferation Security Initiative in Sydney: "We would like to see our efforts in that regard reciprocated by all states within our region."

Australia's Greens said they intended to ask questions in parliament about Silex's activities, saying its research could inadvertantly help the spread of nuclear weapons.




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3.
Bush Administration May Yet Pursue New Nuclear Weapons Capabilities
David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire
11/30/2004
(for personal use only)


The Bush administration could try to revive in fiscal 2006 several controversial nuclear weapons research and develop programs for which Congress killed fiscal 2005 funding earlier this month, a U.S. Energy Department official told Global Security Newswire last week see.

The administration has made no decision yet, however, on whether or not to do so, National Nuclear Security Administration spokesman Bryan Wilkes said.

In an interview following Congress�s vote on the fiscal 2005 Omnibus Appropriations bill, Wilkes described some of the options available to the NNSA, which has funded the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator and other �advanced concepts� nuclear weapons projects through the national nuclear laboratories.

Other than canceling the programs, the agency could seek permission from congressional appropriators to transfer some money from other accounts for the current fiscal year and it could try to pursue renewed funding in fiscal 2006, which begins next Oct. 1, he said.

Wilkes said though, �It�s too early to tell what we�re going to do.�

�We are disappointed that the appropriators in Congress did not follow the administration�s requests in several areas. And we�re going to have to finish collecting the information, take a look at the numbers, and as soon as we feel we have some good solid information really sit down and assess what we�re going to do down the line, for the long haul,� he said.

Funding for This Year Believed Unlikely

The omnibus bill, a massive collection of legislation appropriating money for multiple agencies, included language allowing the Energy Department to �reprogram� funding, that is, to shift money from one account to another.

The NNSA, however, first would need to obtain permission from congressional appropriators for shifts of more than $1 million and Wilkes said it would probably be difficult for the administration to persuade the committees to give that permission.

�It�s not very likely that the same people who are zeroing out certain accounts for next year are going to approve certain funds being moved there,� he said.

The funding was cancelled at the insistence of Representative Dave Hobson (R-Ohio), who chairs the key House Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development. Hobson has argued that the programs are destabilizing internationally.

Wilkes said the scientists who work on the programs do other work as well, so their talents would not be lost to the agency were no funding obtained for this year. In fact, about $9 million for advanced concepts was transferred in the bill to a program for designing improvements to existing nuclear weapons, he said.

Whereas national laboratories employees did �idea work� for the advanced concepts program, now they�re doing �design work on current weapons. So you still have people doing something with that money,� Wilkes said.

The administration had requested $27.6 million in appropriations for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator program and $9 million for other Advanced Concepts Initiative programs. Earlier this year, Congress had passed legislation that authorized in full that spending, but the omnibus bill following the direction of the House Appropriations Committee did not provide the money.

The bill also eliminated $30 million to shorten the preparation time to conduct a nuclear test, if ordered by the president; and all but $7 million of $29.8 million requested for constructing a new facility to build new plutonium triggers, or �pits,� for nuclear weapons.

Matt Martin, deputy director of the British American Security Information Council, wrote in a Nov. 24 press release that the battle over the programs may not be over.

�President Bush has made new and modified nuclear weapons an important piece of his plan for U.S. strategic planning, and he is not likely to give up easily on this effort,� he wrote.

�This is not winning the war by a long shot. But it is a consequential step and should send a very loud message to the administration,� said Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) in a statement last week of the funding cuts.



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C.  Russia-Iran

1.
Russia to continue Iran nuclear cooperation - Lavrov
Interfax
12/1/2004
(for personal use only)


An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) meeting on Iran's nuclear problem, which was wrapped up several days ago, provides Russia with the opportunity to continue its close nuclear industry cooperation with Iran, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said in Laos.

"The IAEA meeting was very important for providing inviolability of the nonproliferation regime," the minister said.

"This not only makes us confident that nuclear weapons will not be proliferated in this particular situation but also provides us with the opportunity to continue close cooperation with Iran in the nuclear industry area, and it will be continued," Lavrov said.


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2.
MOSCOW HOPES FOR TEHRAN'S COMMON SENSE
RIA Novosti
11/30/2004
(for personal use only)


Moscow is hopeful that Iran will continue productive co-operation with the IAEA.

The report of the information and press department of the Russian Foreign Ministry reads that the IAEA Governing Council concluded its session in Vienna on November 29.

The session adopted a resolution on Iranian nuclear programmes on a non-voting basis.

The resolution hails Iran's decision to continue and expand the suspension of its uranium enrichment activities. It emphases that complete and steady implementation of this voluntary confidence building measure, duly controlled by the IAEA, is essential for solving the remaining issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme. Besides, it welcomes the IAEA director general's confirmation that Iran's decision has come into force. The document points to the importance of Iran's continuing co-operation with the IAEA.

The Russian Foreign Ministry indicates that Russia took serious diplomatic efforts to assist a positive and mutually acceptable result both in bilateral contacts with Iran and with other key partners.

"The adopted resolution is an important step towards allaying concerns of the world community regarding nuclear developments in Iran," the Russian Foreign Ministry stressed.

Moscow is hopeful that Iran will continue productive co-operation with the IAEA and provide it with opportunities for effective control over the implementation of the voluntary moratorium that will assist the solution of the Iranian issue within the IAEA.

Iran ranks first in the number of IAEA inspections conducted in the past two years at its nuclear facilities. No evidence or confirmation of the military component in the Iranian nuclear programmes has been discovered despite the US and Israel's claims.

In mid-November, representatives of Iran and three European nations (Great Britain, France, Germany) achieved agreements with Tehran on suspending its uranium enrichment efforts, and the EU promised to launch negotiations on signing a trade agreement within the EU-Iran relations' framework and to promote Iran's membership in the WTO.

The sides set up working groups that will be drawing up final agreements on Iranian nuclear programmes and guarantees of their implementation, for three months.


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3.
RUSSIA TO CONTINUE CLOSE NUCLEAR ENERGY COOPERATION WITH IRAN - LAVROV
Arseny Oganesyan and Sergei Ryabikin
RIA Novosti
11/30/2004
(for personal use only)


The IAEA session on the Iranian nuclear program was crucial for the ensuring of the non-proliferation regime, the Russian Foreign Minister told RIA Novosti on his way to Bangkok.

"We believe the fact that the Iranian leadership decided to conclude these agreements is positive. In this situation, this not only instills confidence in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons but also lets Russia and Iran continue close cooperation in the field of nuclear energy," the Russian Foreign Minister said.

He recalled that the IAEA Board of Governors has adopted a resolution approving all the decisions of Iran voluntarily to freeze its uranium enrichment program. "Passed by consensus, the resolution preserves the Iranian theme within the IAEA framework," Mr. Lavrov stressed.

He believes that "the discovered way out gives enough confidence that there will be no violations of the nuclear non-proliferation regime."

Such has been Russia's position from the very beginning. "We've gone a long way to ease the situation precisely in this way," he stressed.

"It can be said now that the intensive talks between the EU troika and Iran were preceded by our contacts with Iranian leaders during my visit, meetings in Moscow between the secretaries of the Security Councils of the two countries, subsequent contacts between deputy Foreign Ministers and their Iranian counterparts, contacts through the Russian Nuclear Power Ministry. Not being an direct party in these agreements, Russia has indeed made efforts to lay a foundation for them," Mr. Lavrov said in conclusion.


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4.
Russia�s secret moves against Iran at IAEA revealed
Tehran Times
11/30/2004
(for personal use only)


A diplomat from a Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) country on Monday disclosed Russia�s secret moves against Iran during the current meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors in Vienna.

The diplomat, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told the Mehr News Agency that while intense negotiations are continuing between the Iranian diplomatic delegation, the IAEA, and the European Union with the aim of reaching a deal on the modalities of Iran�s 20 research centrifuges, Russian officials have been in constant contact with IAEA officials, telling them that Iran�s nuclear activities for research and development should be within the scope of Iran�s suspension of certain nuclear activities.

He said that the diplomats in Vienna were surprised by these moves, since Russia claims to be a friend of Iran and is Iran�s nuclear partner.

However, unlike Russia, China threw its support behind the Paris Pact and played a positive role by supporting the position of NAM with the aim of reaching a conclusion, the diplomat said.

He stated that Russia encouraged U.S. and European diplomats to take action against the Islamic Republic while Iran was fiercely protesting a clause of the resolution about its nuclear program.
The diplomat also said that Russian diplomats attending the IAEA Board session had informed the U.S. delegation that they are opposed to the idea of allowing Iran to gain access to the complete nuclear fuel cycle.


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D.  Russia-India

1.
INDIA TO PAY $2 BILLION FOR RUSSIAN WEAPONRY
RIA Novosti
12/1/2004
(for personal use only)


President Vladimir Putin will visit India on December 3-5, when contracts for the delivery of Russian submarines and aircraft, which are worth at least $2 billion, may be signed. A Russian delegation led by Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov has already arrived in New Delhi to discuss the upcoming deals in detail.

Vedomosti learned at a military complex enterprise working on Indian contracts that India was "highly likely" to sign documents on the ten-year lease of two decommissioned Project 971 Shchuka nuclear submarines, which are currently at the Amur Shipbuilding Yard. Besides this, the countries may sign a contract for the delivery of two Project 877 Varshavyanka diesel submarines and three or four Tu-22M3 medium-range bombers.

The re-fitting of one Shchuka submarine is 70% complete (the other is 30%-40% complete) and will cost India at least $400 million, while the leasing fees will be around $25 million a year, according to a source with knowledge of the situation at the shipyard.

Marat Kenzhetayev, an expert at the Center for Disarmament Studies, said the refits, the construction of coastal infrastructure, and crew training may bring Russia $2 billion. The Shchuka submarines will probably be equipped with Bramos anti-ship missiles developed by Russia and India. These missiles can also be installed on Tu-22M3 bombers. According to Mikhail Barabanov, a naval expert, India's Navy will thereby secure superiority over its neighbors, including Pakistan and China, in the Indian Ocean in the long term.

Moscow Defense Brief Editor Ruslan Pukhov said talks on the sale of another three Project 1135.6 frigates (a contract for the sale/purchase of three frigates worth $900 million was implemented this year) and Amur type submarines will begin after Mr. Putin's visit.



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2.
India to pay $2 billion for Russian weaponry
RIA Novosti
12/1/2004
(for personal use only)


President Vladimir Putin will visit India on December 3-5, when contracts for the delivery of Russian submarines and aircraft, which are worth at least $2 billion, may be signed.

A Russian delegation led by Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov has already arrived in New Delhi to discuss the upcoming deals in detail.

Vedomosti learned at a military complex enterprise working on Indian contracts that India was "highly likely" to sign documents on the ten-year lease of two decommissioned Project 971 Shchuka nuclear submarines, which are currently at the Amur Shipbuilding Yard. Besides this, the countries may sign a contract for the delivery of two Project 877 Varshavyanka diesel submarines and three or four Tu-22M3 medium-range bombers.

The re-fitting of one Shchuka submarine is 70% complete (the other is 30%-40% complete) and will cost India at least $400 million, while the leasing fees will be around $25 million a year, according to a source with knowledge of the situation at the shipyard.

Marat Kenzhetayev, an expert at the Center for Disarmament Studies, said the refits, the construction of coastal infrastructure, and crew training may bring Russia $2 billion. The Shchuka submarines will probably be equipped with Bramos anti-ship missiles developed by Russia and India. These missiles can also be installed on Tu-22M3 bombers. According to Mikhail Barabanov, a naval expert, India's Navy will thereby secure superiority over its neighbors, including Pakistan and China, in the Indian Ocean in the long term.

Moscow Defense Brief Editor Ruslan Pukhov said talks on the sale of another three Project 1135.6 frigates (a contract for the sale/purchase of three frigates worth $900 million was implemented this year) and Amur type submarines will begin after Mr. Putin's visit.


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3.
Ivanov says no nuclear subs will be sold to India
Interfax
11/30/2004
(for personal use only)


Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said Russia is not planning to sell or lease a Project 941 (Typhoon) ballistic missile submarine to India.

"We are delivering conventional submarines to India and do not rule out their future upgrade. As for nuclear submarines, we fully rule out their delivery," Ivanov told reporters in New Delhi on Wednesday.


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E.  Russia-Poland

1.
RUSSIA SIGNS ATOM DEAL WITH POLAND
RFE/RL Newsline
11/29/2004
(for personal use only)


Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov has signed a draft agreement to provide Poland with nuclear fuel for a research reactor, ITAR-TASS reported on 29 November. According to the agreement between Russia, Poland, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Russia will provide fuel for a reactor at the Institute of Atomic energy in Swierk. Poland agreed not to use the fuel to manufacture nuclear weapons or for any military purposes.

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F.  Nuclear Safety

1.
ICE-BREAKER CATCHES FIRE IN ST. PETERSBURG
Dina Danilova
RIA Novosti
11/30/2004
(for personal use only)


An incomplete ice-breaker caught fire at the local Baltiisky Zavod (Baltic Factory) ship-yard, what with fire-fighters doing their best to extinguish the blaze.

Talking to RIA Novosti, people at the public-relations department of the city's main civil-defense and emergency-situations department noted that the fire had been reported at about 9.00 a.m. Moscow time.

According to preliminary reports, construction materials are burning over a 50-square-meter area on one of the incomplete ice-breaker's decks.

Fire broke out at the incomplete "Fiftieth Victory Anniversary" ice-breaker, reports the Baltiisky Zavod press center. All workers have already been evacuated from that ship.

About 20 fire-engine crews that have been summoned to the site are still unable to contain the blaze, RIA Novosti's interlocutor added.

The "Fiftieth Victory Anniversary" ice-breaker had been launched December 29, 1993; her construction was eventually stopped for lack of money. Partial construction resumed in the late 1990s. On August 13, 2004 it was decided to channel additional monies into this ship-construction project in line with new nuclear-safety standards and the need to perform various operations because of delayed construction.

This ice-breaker was completed by 93 percent already July 1, 2004. Her hull, superstructure and stern mast are here for everyone to see; the ship-yard's workers have also finished installing all the main mechanical and electrical equipment.

This ship-yard had built a number of Arctica-class second-generation ice-breakers throughout the 1974-1992 period. Two nuclear ice-breakers, namely, the Taimyr and the Vaigach, were built over the 1989-1990 period in line with a co-production arrangement involving ship-yards of Finland's Wartsila company. The enterprise is now busy extending the service life of operational ice-breakers' power units in line with a long-term contract.


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2.
INTERNATIONAL SAFETY-INCREASE PROJECTS EMBODIED AT KOLA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
RIA Novosti
11/30/2004
(for personal use only)


The Kola nuclear power plant has checked progress of work on international projects intended for enhancing safety at the facility, found beyond the Polar circle.

Checks were made by representatives of the STUK (supervisory body for nuclear safety; Finland), Swedish international nuclear safety project SIP, Swedish companies SwedPower and CarlBro, as well as ZAO Tenzor, based near Moscow, and the research and development institute Atomenergoproekt, based in St.Petersburg.

In check were two international projects, begun in 2003 - the fire-detection and alarm system for power units 3 and 4, modernisation of the ventilation system for power unit 2, the Kola plant PR said.

The projects are carried out within the framework of technical assistance by the governments of Sweden and Finland in a bid to improve the Kola plant's safety.

"At a meeting, specialists came to the conclusion that all work has been in line with the schedule and the contract", the spokesman for the Kola plant said.

The projects are expected to be over in December 2004-March 2005.

The governments of Sweden and Finland have been providing technical safety-increase assistance to the Kola facility since the late 1980s. Since then, 29 projects have been carried out and 13 are in process. Total assistance given to the Kola nuclear power plant exceeds three million dollars.




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G.  Official Statements

1.
Alexander Yakovenko, the Spokesman of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Answers Russian Media Questions on Russian-Indian Relations (excerpted)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
12/1/2004
(for personal use only)


[�]

Question: What are the state and trends of bilateral trade-and-economic, scientific-technological and military-technological cooperation?

Answer: Mutually beneficial cooperation is developing in the implementation of such large projects as the Sakhalin 1 oil production project, where in 2001 the Indian state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation put about 1.7 billion dollars, and the project begun in southern India with the participation of Russian organizations for the construction of the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant worth 2.6 billion dollars in all.

Work is continuing on the implementation of major long-term projects of Russian-Indian cooperation in energy, metallurgy, civil aviation, and outer space; the possibilities are being explored of expanding mutually beneficial cooperation in new science-intensive and high-technology branches of the economy.

While highly assessing the positive trends in bilateral trade-and-economic cooperation, Russia and India note the need for reciprocal efforts to increase the volume of trade and to improve its commodity structure through raising in it the share of high-technology and science-intensive products, establishing favorable conditions for the growth of investment cooperation and industrial partnerships, and strengthening small and medium-sized business contacts. We believe that the Intergovernmental Russian-Indian Commission on Trade-and-Economic, Scientific-Technical and Cultural Cooperation is to play a leading role in this. Its tenth meeting took place in New Delhi, on November 18-19, 2004.

Military and military-technological cooperation with India is one of the major components of the whole range of bilateral relations. In recent years it has acquired qualitatively new features and is really helping maintain stability on the subcontinent.


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2.
On the IAEA Board of Governors Resolution Concerning Iran's Nuclear Program
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
11/30/2004
(for personal use only)


The session of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concluded in Vienna on November 29, having passed without vote a resolution on the question of the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement pursuant to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The resolution welcomes the decision of Iran to continue and expand the suspension of all the activities related to uranium enrichment and chemical processing. It stresses that carrying out this voluntary confidence-building measure fully and consistently, with due verification by the IAEA, is essential for solving the remaining questions as regards its nuclear program. It also welcomes the confirmation by the IAEA Director General that this decision of Iran has taken effect. The document points out the continuing importance of full Iranian cooperation with the Agency.

Russia, both in bilateral contacts with Iran and with other key partners, had been making considerable diplomatic efforts to promote the achievement of a positive and mutually acceptable result.

The adopted resolution is an important step forward in removing the world community's concerns regarding nuclear activities in Iran.

We presume that Iran will carry on the policy of constructive cooperation with the Agency and provide it with possibilities to effectively monitor the implementation of the voluntary moratorium, which will help resolve the Iranian question in the framework of the IAEA.


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3.
Transcript of Replies to Russian Media Questions by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov, Vientiane, November 30, 2004 (excerpted)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
11/30/2004
(for personal use only)


[�]

Question: How do you assess the IAEA resolution on the Iranian nuclear program?

Foreign Minister Lavrov: The IAEA Board of Governors has adopted a resolution approving the decision of Iran to voluntarily freeze its program of uranium enrichment. This is a consensus resolution and keeps the Iranian topic entirely within the framework of the IAEA. The Agency will continue to cooperate with Iran, and Iran to cooperate with it. If suddenly this accord for some reasons is impeded or violated, then the IAEA Director General will be duty-bound to report to the Board of Governors about this, whereupon an appropriate decision will be taken. On the whole, the found resolution helps ensure sufficient confidence that the nuclear weapons nonproliferation regime will not be violated. This was the stand of Russia from the outset, and we did a lot to have this situation defused the way it was defused.

Now it can already be said that the intensive talks between the EU Troika and Iran were preceded by our contacts with the Iranian leadership during my visit to Teheran, the meetings in Moscow between the Secretaries of the Security Councils of the two countries, and subsequent contacts, as well as through the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy. So that, although Russia is not a direct party to these agreements, it can be said that our efforts had also laid the basis for them to a certain extent.

Question: Has the policy towards Iran not changed in the light of what was said? Was it not influenced by the IAEA meeting?

Foreign Minister Lavrov: The IAEA meeting has very great importance for ensuring the inviolability of the nonproliferation regime. And that the Iranian leadership agreed to these arrangements, we assess it very positively. This allows us not only to be confident of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in this particular situation, but also gives us a possibility to continue our close cooperation with Iran in the field of nuclear energy, and it will be continued.


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4.
Presidential Determination on Waiver of Conditions on Obligation
The White House
11/29/2004
(for personal use only)


Consistent with the authority vested in me by section 1303 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375) (the "Act"), I hereby certify that waiving the conditions described in section 1305 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-65), as amended, is important to the national security interests of the United States, and include herein, for submission to the Congress, the statement, justification, and plan described in section 1303 of the Act. This waiver shall apply through the remainder of calendar year 2004 and for all of calendar year 2005.



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5.
Statement to the Ninth Conference of States Parties of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
Ambassador Eric M. Javits
Department of State
11/29/2004
(for personal use only)


Mr. Chairman, Mr. Director-General, Distinguished Delegates,

Let me begin by taking this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to welcome you to the chair, and to pledge the support of the United States delegation to ensuring the success of this Conference of the States Parties. I am especially pleased to address all of you at this conference, which marks a particularly historic year for the OPCW. The conference is always an important occasion. It is the opportunity for all of us to review and assess what we have accomplished in the preceding year. More important, it is an opportunity to launch our work for the coming year, in particular, by approving the budget and program of activity for 2005. But as we look at what we've accomplished in the past year, and what lies ahead, it seems to me that this year's conference is, in some ways, a special occasion.

It has been a good year for the Chemical Weapons Convention. Our ranks have grown to 167 member states. Chemical weapons have now been outlawed across the vast majority of the world. Libya made a strategic choice to abandon its programs for development of weapons of mass destruction, and acceded to the convention.

That welcome decision to abandon its chemical weapons program generated challenges for the OPCW throughout this year: a substantial, unexpected workload for the Verification Division and the Inspectorate, both of which performed ably, and a political challenge for member states in the form of a proposed technical change to the convention. The Executive Council also performed effectively, and unanimously endorsed that proposal. The technical change will allow Libya to convert the Rabta chemical weapons production facility to produce low-cost pharmaceuticals to treat AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis throughout the African continent and the developing world -- a "peace dividend" if there ever was one. It is my hope and my expectation that the 90-day review period will expire in January without any objections being raised, allowing the change to enter into force.

We've also done some good, important work in other areas -- less newsworthy and exciting, perhaps, but nonetheless vital. The Executive Council has recommended an expansion of the OPCW Working Capital Fund to help stabilize the Organization's finances -- a recommendation I hope we will adopt this week. The Technical Secretariat, with the cooperation of the U.S. and other possessor states, has undertaken important work to assess and optimize its approach to verification. And the Director-General has worked tirelessly to bring new members into the convention and to urge effective national implementation.

I'm afraid, distinguished colleagues, that the reward for all this good work is not to sit on our laurels. In the coming year we face a whole new series of challenges and opportunities, and need to rise once more to meet them.

The first challenge we face cannot wait until the coming year: we need to reach agreement on the budget and program for 2005 this week. I would like to thank the Director-General and the Director of Administration for presenting the 2005 budget to us in a new, Results-Based Budgeting [RBB] format.

The introduction of RBB is a major step forward in ensuring that OPCW resources are focused on the key concerns of the member states, and are used to maximum efficiency. This is OPCW's initial effort at RBB; further refinement is called for; but what is noteworthy is that the organization has courageously taken its first steps in a process that will define, in a more measurable way, what we expect the Technical Secretariat to accomplish, and why.

The Director-General's revised budget proposal calls for an increase of 3.5 percent for the coming year. We support the Director-General's budget proposals, and believe that consensus can be reached on the basis of his budget proposal with relatively little additional work. My delegation is ready to engage in that work.

Mr. Chairman, this conference finds us at the mid-point of the Action Plan we agreed to a year ago on implementation of Article VII obligations. The Action Plan was an important initiative, undertaken at the instruction of the first Review Conference in 2003. Our goal is not just a convention that is universal, but a convention that is universally implemented. And in today's security environment, where terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction are among the gravest threats we face, effective national measures to implement Convention obligations play a vital role in assuring our collective safety.

The plan of action has specific targets that all member states agreed to fully implement by the time the conference meets next year. It is a major undertaking, and there has indeed been progress; but a substantial amount of work remains to be done. As I have stated previously, the U.S. finds it disturbing, if not scandalous, that some States Parties have not even met their obligation to designate a National Authority, some seven years after entry into force of the convention.

Meeting the goals of the Action Plan will require that we redouble our efforts in the coming year. Our efforts over the past year were significant, but we have not achieved our goals. Nevertheless, we believe that every State Party should now have an understanding of what the convention requires, and we believe that sufficient support and assistance is available to permit every State Party to reach our shared goals. We are, then, cautiously optimistic that a large majority of member states will be in compliance with their Article VII obligations by the time we meet at next year's conference, especially in view of the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 earlier this year. At that point -- roughly a year from today -- member states will need to consider how to deal with those who still have not met their Article VII obligations.

In the meantime, the U.S. stands ready to assist the Technical Secretariat [TS] and member states through bilateral contacts, close coordination with the TS, responses to requests for assistance, and participation in regional workshops. We have collaborated with Romania, as many of you are aware, in developing an Implementation Assistance Program to provide information and assistance to States Parties in need. Both Romanian and U.S. technical experts are here this week to provide briefings, distribute and demonstrate the software, and answer any questions you may have.

We can all be proud of the fact that, since the last conference, we have added nine new States Party to the convention. We commend the work of the staff and the facilitator for universality, Hela Lahmar of Tunisia, for their tireless efforts to promote universal adherence to the convention.

It is clear that we are increasingly facing the challenge of dealing with the truly difficult cases -- states that have yet to be persuaded of the security benefits of renouncing chemical weapons. The difficulty of bringing in the last, reluctant holdouts increases the need to improve coordination within the Technical Secretariat, between the staff and member states, and among member states in order to encourage non-States Parties to join the convention.

We must continue to send a clear, unanimous message to those holdouts: the development, production, acquisition, possession, transfer, or use of chemical weapons is unacceptable under any circumstances. Once again, I pledge the continuing support of the U.S. to assist in these efforts.

Mr. Chairman, I am not going to spend time in my statement today on the subject of compliance. This is not because it is not important. Indeed, it is the most fundamental of issues, and deserves fuller treatment than I can give it in this statement. I am pleased to inform the conference that Ms. Paula DeSutter, United States Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance, will be addressing the conference tomorrow under the agenda item on "Status of Implementation" to discuss the critical issue of compliance under the convention.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Director-General, Distinguished Representatives, it has been an honor to address you today. We can all look back on a year of great accomplishments that have raised the profile of our organization. And we confidently look ahead to the challenges that face us in the coming year. The United States delegation, and I personally, pledge to work with all of you during the course of this Conference, and over the next year, as we address the complex and important issues on our agenda and strive to reach the common goal of a world without chemical weapons.

But before I step away from the dais, permit me to briefly address the men and women of the Technical Secretariat. Thank you. Thank you for your efforts, your hard work, and your many accomplishments. I cannot overstate how much we value and appreciate your dedication and skill. We recognize that the introduction of the OPCW tenure policy has resulted in disruption, and, for some of you, personal anxiety and strain. We want to ensure that each of you is treated fairly as the OPCW goes through this difficult, but necessary period of transition. And we want to assure you that you have our respect, and our profound gratitude. Thank you.


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H.  Links of Interest

1.
Nuclear Security Culture: The Case of Russia
The Center for International Trade and Security of The University of Georgia
Taipei Times
12/1/2004
(for personal use only)
http://www.uga.edu/cits/documents/pdf/Security%20Culture%20Report%2020041118..


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2.
Progress Reported in Big Job to Convert Research Reactors from HEU Fuel
IAEA
11/15/2004
(for personal use only)
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2004/retr2004.html


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