A 16-ton cache of material for chemical weapons left behind by Albania's former Communist government will be destroyed beginning next year with U.S. help, Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.) announced yesterday, describing the move as a breakthrough in the elimination of such stockpiles around the world.
A U.S.-Albanian agreement to destroy the chemicals marks the first expansion of a key U.S. nonproliferation program -- the Cooperative Threat Reduction initiative -- into a country outside the former Soviet Union, Lugar said. The program already has destroyed or dismantled more than 6,400 nuclear warheads and hundreds of other weapons in Russia and other former Soviet republics.
"We now have latitude to work with other countries who will know we have the willingness and the funds to cooperatively eliminate weapons of mass destruction," said Lugar, who co-founded the program 12 years ago with Sam Nunn, then a Democratic senator from Georgia. "If we do not continue to pursue this avenue . . . accidents and misappropriations will occur."
Late Wednesday, the Bush administration formally authorized the release of $20 million to fund the destruction of the Albanian cache, which consists of barrels of an unspecified chemical stored in a small brick depot in a rural area.
U.S. officials declined to divulge details about the cache for security reasons, but said the chemicals were acquired more than 15 years ago by the leaders of what was once Europe's most isolated and rigidly Marxist government. Albania became a multi-party democracy following the overthrow of communism in 1990, and its leaders have since sought close ties with the United States.
In theory, the Albanian chemicals could be loaded into bombs or artillery shells for use in a military conflict, or dispersed by terrorists in an attack against civilians, weapons experts said. The presence of such a cache in Albania was a violation of the country's commitments under the Chemical Weapons Convention, which Albania ratified in 1994.
Albanian leaders have said they discovered the chemicals while surveying the country for hidden small-arms caches placed in remote areas by the former government. The United States has already helped Albania install fences and surveillance gear, and will now provide money and technical support for the destruction of the chemicals over the next two years, Lugar said.
Nunn, now chief executive of a nonproliferation advocacy group, Nuclear Threat Initiative, said the case underscored the need for the global expansion of U.S. nonproliferation efforts approved by Congress last year. "We need to use this and other tools to move faster to keep dangerous weapons and materials out of the hands of the most dangerous people," Nunn said. "We are in a race between cooperation and catastrophe."
1. Berezovsky Foils $3M Nuclear Suitcase Plot ï¿½ Sunday Times
(for personal use only)
Russian tycoon Boris Berezovsky has tipped off the British media about his role in foiling a plot by Chechen terrorists to sell a nuclear device ï¿½ one of the legendary ï¿½atomic suitcasesï¿½ - on the international black market.
Berezovsky, who resides in England and is Britainï¿½s 14th richest man, told The Sunday Times that an exiled Chechen named Zakhar contacted him by phone in 2002 saying he was the intermediary of a man who wanted to sell a nuclear bomb concealed in a suitcase.
The Russian tycoon had previously helped Zakhar by giving him $5,000 when the two men were in exile in Paris. ï¿½I didnï¿½t hear from him again until he rang me when I was in England and said he had enormous, very important information about nuclear weapons,ï¿½ The Sunday Times quoted Berezovsky as saying.
ï¿½I informed the American embassy in London. I told them it could be serious or it could be a provocation.ï¿½ Berezovsky asked Yuli Dubov, a business associate and fellow exile, to investigate the background to the plot. Dubov said that Zakhar had claimed that the portable bomb was one of several made by Soviet scientists during the early 1990s.
ï¿½One of them disappeared during the mess of the early 1990s,ï¿½ Dubov wrote in a report. ï¿½The person who holds this suitcase with a bomb wants to sell it and he (Zakhar) is empowered to act for him.ï¿½
ï¿½Zakhar approached Berezovsky. The price asked for it is not large, only $3m. The idea is that Berezovsky pays $3 million and advises on whom the A-bomb should be delivered (to). Zakhar will then organise everything in the best possible way,ï¿½ Dubov was quoted as saying.
Berezovsky arranged a taped meeting between his men and Zakhar in Paris. He then sent the tape to the CIA.
During a subsequent meeting, arranged at the behest of the CIA in London, Zakhar was asked by Berezovskyï¿½s aide to provide evidence that the nuclear device existed. But Zakhar, by this time suspecting a trap, failed to do so, according to Berezovskyï¿½s account. Berezovsky said that he reported the matter to British intelligence through an intermediary.
Berezovsky told the newspaper that was the end of the affair as he knew of it.
A senior Whitehall security official confirmed to The Sunday Times that MI5 was aware that Berezovsky had approached the authorities on several occasions ï¿½offering to assist in investigations into the supply of illicit nuclear and radiological materials.ï¿½
ï¿½He has made these allegations to the authorities in private, but we canï¿½t discuss the details,ï¿½ the official was quoted as saying.
Intelligence in Europe and the United States suspects that Chechen rebels may have gotten their hands on nuclear materials stolen from the Rostov region, in southern Russia.
Security concerns abound surrounding Russiaï¿½s nuclear arsenal, which has been poorly protected since the mayhem that followed the breakup of the Soviet Union.
In a remarkable moment in the first presidential debate, both candidates agreed that the No. 1 national security threat facing the United States was the prospect that weapons of mass destruction would fall into the hands of terrorists.
Although the public consensus confirming the importance of this issue is new, it is not a new concern. Our government has been working on solutions to the problems of weapons proliferation and terrorist acquisition of loose nukes for more than a decade. In 1991 Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar Act, which has devoted U.S. money and expertise to helping the nations of the former Soviet Union safeguard and dismantle their enormous stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems and related materials. This program has deactivated more than 6,300 nuclear warheads as well as thousands of missiles and hundreds of bombers and submarines. It has employed weapons scientists in peaceful pursuits and provided security enhancements at nuclear, biological and chemical sites.
Today, even after more than 12 years of success, creativity and vigilance are required to ensure that the Nunn-Lugar program is not encumbered by bureaucratic obstacles or political disagreements. But as one of the authors of the program and a frequent traveler to Russia and the newly independent states on missions to accelerate the dismantling, I am gratified that both candidates have strongly endorsed the Nunn-Lugar program and associated nonproliferation initiatives.
Despite this apparent consensus, however, the Kerry campaign has accused the Bush administration of giving Nunn-Lugar and other nonproliferation issues low priority. This charge is not true. The Bush administration's record on securing weapons of mass destruction has been one of innovation and activism. Its record on securing dangerous weapons and materials is a rare case in U.S. politics where the performance of a candidate far exceeds his rhetoric on the issue. The president's campaign has reason to tout his multilateral accomplishments in this area. The Bush campaign has successfully communicated its core national security message: that the president is best equipped to carry out a comprehensive war on terrorism. It must now emphasize its substantial diplomatic achievements in the field of nonproliferation.
Chief among these successes is the rarely mentioned Group of Eight Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Under this agreement, negotiated by the Bush administration, the United States will spend $10 billion over the next 10 years to safeguard and dismantle weapons of mass destruction and related materials in the former Soviet Union. The other members of the G-8 agreed collectively to spend another $10 billion over the same period. Our commitment of funds is primarily money that we had planned to spend anyway through the Nunn-Lugar program and associated efforts. With this agreement, the president doubled the funds committed to securing these weapons in Russia with minimal additional obligation to American taxpayers.
The Bush administration also successfully recruited more than 60 countries to participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative, a program that has enhanced our ability to interdict shipments related to weapons of mass destruction around the world. Through the Energy Department, it established the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which aims to reduce and secure high-risk nuclear and radiological materials globally. It has facilitated the acceleration of Nunn-Lugar work at the critical chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuchye in Russia through personal intervention by the president and national security adviser Condoleezza Rice. It finalized the deal with Libya that laid open that country's weapons programs. It advocated passage of the IAEA Additional Protocol, which greatly expands the International Atomic Energy Agency's ability to detect clandestine nuclear activities. It secured passage in April of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, which for the first time required states to criminalize proliferation. It also has provided constant encouragement to the promising talks between India and Pakistan that represent an important opportunity to reduce tensions on the subcontinent. The president supported, through personal communications with congressional leaders, and signed into law the Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act, which establishes new authority to use the program's funds and expertise outside the former Soviet Union. On Thursday President Bush authorized the first use of the Nunn-Lugar program outside the former Soviet Union when he directed U.S. agencies to help safeguard and destroy a chemical weapons stockpile in Albania after the Albanian government appealed to us for aid in dealing with this previously unrevealed hazard.
Sen. John Kerry has correctly sensed the mood of the public on weapons of mass destruction, but President Bush has repeatedly demonstrated his personal commitment to Nunn-Lugar and has been out in the world achieving nonproliferation goals. The administration has established relationships and expertise that are critical to the paramount objective of preventing weapons of mass destruction from falling into terrorist hands. The Bush administration will not have to start from scratch in 2005.
The writer is a Republican senator from Indiana and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Iran is unlikely to accept European incentives aimed at getting it to suspend uranium enrichment, diplomats said, raising the likelihood of a showdown with the UN nuclear watchdog agency next month.
Envoys from Britain, France and Germany offered civilian nuclear technology and a trade deal to the Iranians in a private meeting at the French mission to international organisations in Vienna. But Western diplomats said they doubt the Tehran regime will back down easily.
The incentives included the promise of lucrative trade, a light-water nuclear research reactor and the chance to buy nuclear fuel from the West.
"The negotiations occurred in a friendly atmosphere," Sirus Naseri, a member of the Iranian delegation, told The Associated Press. "We will go back to our capital to try to find a compromise which is acceptable to both sides."
Amir-Hossein Zamaniyan, director-general of international affairs for Iran's Foreign Ministry, would take the proposal back to Tehran for study, the Iranians said.
The offer came a day after President Mohammad Khatami said Iran would not give up uranium enrichment, which can be used both to generate electricity or build a nuclear weapon.
Iran insists its nuclear activities are peaceful and geared solely toward generating electric power. The United States contends that Tehran is running a covert nuclear weapons program.
On November 25, the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency's 35-nation board of governors will deliver a fresh assessment of Iran's cooperation with the nuclear agency. The United States is pressing to report Iran's noncompliance to the UN Security Council, which has the power to impose sanctions.
Iran is unlikely to cave in quickly to demands that it suspend enrichment, a Western diplomat familiar with the nuclear agency's dealings with Tehran told The Associated Press.
"I wouldn't be surprised if Iran doesn't react until the eve of the board meeting" with any significant concessions, said the official, who was not directly involved in the meeting.
Although the IAEA also had no hand in the European offer, agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei has said he welcomes any attempt to negotiate an end to the standoff - so long as Iran consents to continued comprehensive inspections that can verify it does not pose a nuclear proliferation threat.
The Bush administration - which labelled Iran part of an "axis of evil" along with North Korea and Iraq when it was still ruled by Saddam Hussein - said this week it did not endorse the European allies' plan.
US Secretary of State Colin Powell told Abu Dhabi television that "it is time for the matter to be referred to the Security Council unless there is a complete change in attitude on the part of the Iranians and they come into compliance with their obligation under IAEA strictures, and also in compliance with the commitments they made to the European Union."
The British and German foreign ministers have urged Iran to indefinitely suspend its nuclear program. Iran has resumed testing, assembling and making centrifuges used to enrich uranium, heightening US concerns that its sole purpose is to build a bomb.
Iran's long-range ballistic missile capabilities, combined with its nuclear know-how, pose a threat not only to Israel but to Europe, Israeli President Moshe Katsav said in Vienna.
"Why does Iran need rockets with a range of 3,000 kilometres? Why is Iran investing money in the development of weapons of mass destruction?" Katsav said during the first visit to Austria by an Israeli head of state.
If Tehran does not accept the European incentives, suspend enrichment and agree to IAEA verification that it has done so, Britain, France and Germany likely would back the US push to report its defiance to the Security Council, diplomats said.
Experts say Iran has been building a heavy-water reactor, which would use plutonium that also could be used in a nuclear weapon. A light-water research reactor, by contrast, uses a lower grade of plutonium.
2. Preparatory text for European proposals on Iran
(for personal use only)
Officials from Britain, France and Germany were in talks with their Iranian counterparts Thursday in Vienna at a meeting to give Tehran a final chance to reassure the world that it is not secretly developing atomic weapons.
The European nations are reported to be offering Iran valuable technology for peaceful nuclear energy if Iran complies, but possible UN sanctions if it does not.
Following are extracts from a confidential document, obtained by AFP, that was presented to the G8 group of leading industrialized nations last week.
Diplomats in Vienna said it remained the basis of the European position at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), although modifications might still be made.
The Europeans call on Iran:
-- "to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing related activities in a compehensive and internationally verifiable manner ... "
-- "the suspension will include the manufacture and import of gas centrifuges and their components; any assembly, installation, testing or operation of gas centrifuges; all other enrichment and reprocessing activities including work to construct or operate any plutonium separation facility; and the production of feed material for enrichment processes, including all activities to test or operate the uranium conversion facility ... any converted yellowcake should be put under IAEA safeguards."
-- "The suspension will be indefinite, until we reach an acceptable long term agreement."
If Iran complies:
-- "We would reaffirm the right of Iran to develop research production and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination in conformity with Article 2 of the NPT" (nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty).
-- "We would support Russian/Iranian cooperation in the field of power reactors and fuel supply and management."
-- "We would be ready to give political assurances of access to the international fuel market, at market prices, consistent with G8/NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group) comparable assurances, with spent fuel being returned and reprocessed outside of Iran."
-- "We would support the acquisition by Iran of a Light Water Research Reactor."
-- "The European Union would be ready to resume negotiations on an EU/Iran trade and cooperation agreement once suspension is verified."
-- "We would continue to support the adherence of Iran to the WTO."
-- "We would cooperate in the prevention and suppression of terrorist acts in accordance with respective legislation and regulations. We would continue to regard the MEK (Iranian resistance group) as a terrorist organization."
-- "We would pursue the objective of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction ... "
-- "We would agree to cooperate with Iran to help it establish and develop an effective national system of export, transit and end-use control of WMD related goods and technologies including dual use ... "
-- "We would agree to strengthen cooperation with Iran in the combat of all forms of drug production and trafficking, including in the regional context."
If Iran does not comply:
-- "We will support the referral of the Iranian nuclear issue to the UNSC (United Nations Security Council)."
-- "We would consider the opportunity presented by the Tehran agreement of 21 October 2003 to resolve the questions relating to Iran's nuclear programme within the framework of the IAEA not to have been taken by Iran."
Once at the Security Council:
-- "If an initial political call to Iran were not successful, the Security Council could then consider making the suspension mandatory. It could also consider strengthening the powers of the IAEA to carry out inspections in Iran."
-- "Should Iran reject the Security Council's demands, the Council would have to consider what measures might be appropriate under Article 41 of the UN charter. But we do not need to consider that in more detail at this stage."
1. Russian Senators Want Probe Into Finances of Strategic Nuclear Forces
(for personal use only)
The Security and Defense Committee of the Russian parliamentï¿½s upper house wants the Audit Chamber to check the effectiveness of the funds allocated to the countryï¿½s strategic nuclear forces from the federal budget, the RIA-Novosti news agency reported on Monday.
The suggestion was put forward during a session dedicated to the Audit Chamberï¿½s work plans for 2005.
Apart from the probe into the finance of the Strategic Nuclear Forces, the senators want the Audit Chamber to check the logistics of the Moscow Military District.
The Committee for Regional Self-Governing suggested checking how regional legislatures are dividing the differentiated taxes between the federal and regional budgets.
The Budget Committee suggested checking if the means allocated for the federal program ï¿½Electronic Russiaï¿½ are spent effectively.
The Committee for Economic Policy, Entrepreneurship and State Property wants probes into the finances of such companies as Russiaï¿½s flagship airline Aeroflot, nuclear firms Atomenergoexport, Zarubezhenergoproekt and Atomstroiexport and also the ZID weapons factory.
TVEL, Russia's sole nuclear fuel trader, appointed a close aide to President Vladimir Putin as its new chairman, in a new sign of the Kremlin's growing control over the strategic sector.
The election of Sergei Prikhodko, an aide to Putin on foreign affairs, comes at a time when TVEL, which supplies fuel to one in six nuclear power plants in the world, is under the spotlight as it prepares to start fuel shipments to Iran once Moscow and Tehran finish an atomic plant there in 2005-06.
Earlier this year, Igor Sechin and Vladislav Surkov, also Putin's long-time confidants, were appointed to chair oil firm Rosneft and pipeline firm Transnefteprodukt, respectively.
Dmitry Medvedev, Putin's chief of staff, is chairman of gas monopoly Gazprom -- which also controls a company in charge of building the Bushehr atomic power plant in Iran.
South Korea on Monday announced the establishment of its own nuclear watchdog, a body designed to ensure that the countryï¿½s scientists will not be able to conduct any further secret nuclear experiments.
The step comes as International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors prepare for their third visit to South Korea, with a report into the countryï¿½s clandestine uranium enrichment programme expected at the end of November.
The Ministry of Science and Technology said it was establishing the National Nuclear Management and Control Agency to monitor ï¿½nuclear energy-related activities.ï¿½
South Korea would ï¿½reassure the international community and the IAEA of its firm commitment to the spirit of non-proliferation,ï¿½ the ministry said in a statement.
ï¿½The [agency] will consolidate the nationï¿½s safeguards measures and will continue to extend its nuclear transparency through further reinforcing co-operation with the IAEA,ï¿½ it added.
Seoul admitted last month that a group of its nuclear scientists had enriched 0.2 grams of uranium at a government research laboratory in 2000, an embarrassing confession considering that it is a key player in the international effort to convince North Korea to dismantle its nuclear programmes.
The government insists the level of enrichment was not high enough to produce nuclear weapons and the experiment was conducted without the governmentï¿½s knowledge. However, some Western diplomats have said the uranium was close to weapons grade and doubted the experiment had a civilian purpose.
Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the IAEA, said in Seoul this month that South Koreaï¿½s research activities did not appear to have broken nuclear safeguards, although they should have been reported earlier. The IAEA will decide next month whether the infringement is serious enough to be referred to the United Nations Security Council.
Either way, North Korea has seized on the experiments as another excuse not to return to the six-party talks about its own nuclear programme. Among other conditions for resuming negotiations, it is insisting the Southï¿½s nuclear programme be discussed.
1. Further UK-Czech Republic Cooperation to Assist Russia in Destroying Chemical Weapons
Ministry of Defense of the United Kingdom
(for personal use only)
The Czech Republic has reaffirmed its support for a UK-led international project helping Russia destroy its lethal chemical weapons stocks.
At a ceremony in London today, Stefan Fule, the Czech Ambassador to the UK, pledged a further ï¿½40,000 towards the construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuchï¿½ye in the Urals. It follows a similar donation last year.
Russia has the worldï¿½s largest declared stockpile of chemical weapons. More than 40,000 tonnes, mostly consisting of modern nerve agents, is stored at seven sites in the west of the country.
Destruction of these stocks is a key requirement of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and an important plank in the global fight against WMD proliferation.
Adam Ingram, the Armed Forces Minister, said:
ï¿½I warmly welcome this further Czech contribution as an important step in strengthening international co-operation to destroy chemical weapons. We look forward to working closely with our international partners in implementing this assistance.ï¿½
The new funds will be spent further developing the Shchuchï¿½ye chemical weapons destruction facility. The international project, which also has support from Canada and New Zealand, has already provided water supplies and an electrical substation to support the facility.
The project will be managed as part of the UK MODï¿½s assistance programme, under the terms of a UK-Russia bilateral Agreement.
Notes to editors
1. The UK Government decided in 2000 to contribute up to ï¿½12M, phased over 3 years, for high priority chemical demilitarisation and biological non-proliferation projects in Russia.
2. Assistance with Russian chemical weapon destruction is a key element of the G8 Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction. The UK has announced that it will contribute up to US 750M over the ten years of the Global Partnership, and that up to US 100M (ï¿½70M) of this will be made available to assist Russia with the destruction of its chemical weapon (CW) stockpile.
3. The priority for UK assistance is support for construction of a key Russian chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuchï¿½ye, in the Urals. Nearly 2 million artillery munitions, containing lethal nerve agents, will be destroyed there.
5. The UKï¿½s first project was the construction of the water supply for the Shchuchï¿½ye destruction facility. This project was completed on budget in spring 2003 at a cost of over ï¿½2M.
6. The UKï¿½s second project ï¿½ the procurement of electricity supply equipment for a sub-station serving the Shchuchï¿½ye CW destruction facility ï¿½ is due to be complete by the end of 2004. It is being jointly funded by the UK, Norway, the EU and the Czech Republic at a total cost of over ï¿½7M (c. 10M).
7. The UK plans to carry out further projects at Shchuchï¿½ye, jointly with Canada, New Zealand and other donors. These will include procuring processing equipment for one of the buildings in which chemical warfare agents and munitions will be destroyed. The Czech Republic contribution will be used to fund one or more of this set of projects.
8. Several states are committed to providing support to Russia to help it meet its obligations to destroy its chemical weapons stocks, including the US, Germany, Italy, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Finland, New Zealand and Switzerland, as well as the European Union.
9. For further information contact Charlie Morton at the Defence Press Office on 020 7218 5903. Visit the MoD website at www.mod.uk
SUBJECT: Presidential Determination Relating to Obligation of Cooperative Threat Reduction Funds in Albania under Section 1308 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004
Pursuant to section 1308(e) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Title XIII of Public Law 108-136) and the authority vested in me by section 1203(d) of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 (Title XII of Public Law 103-160), as amended (CTR Act), I hereby certify that Albania is committed to the courses of action enumerated in section 1203(d) of the CTR Act.
I have also enclosed the justification for this certification.
You are authorized and directed to transmit this certification and justification to the Congress and to arrange for the publication of this memorandum in the Federal Register.
3. The dismantling of Libya's WMD programme is now complete
Department of State
(for personal use only)
Testimony by Paula A. DeSutter, Assistant Secretary for Verification and Compliance, before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights:
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is my pleasure to announce to you today on behalf of the Administration that our verification work in Libya is essentially complete. Our final team left Tripoli on September 20. We now have in place a consultative process reflected in the creation of the Trilateral Steering and Cooperation Committee.
Because of Libya's success in eliminating its WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and MTCR-class missile programs, the President announced on Sept. 20 that the United States was withdrawing certain sanctions against Libya, including terminating the national emergency imposed in 1986. The President's actions essentially ended economic sanctions against Libya, and resulted in the release of frozen assets in excess of one billion dollars. Another important part of the President's actions includes waiving certain statutory provisions so that American business in Libya can play on a more level playing field.
The U.S. will continue its dialogue with Libya on human rights, as well as economic and political modernization. We expect Libya to free political prisoners and start a new path of freedom for all Libyans, regardless of their political beliefs. We share the European Community's concerns over the plight of the Bulgarian medics. In addition, we remain seriously concerned by allegations of Libyan involvement in a plot to assassinate Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and these concerns have been raised with the Libyan Government. These concerns must be addressed. None of this week's actions change Libya's status as a State Sponsor of Terrorism.
It is, however, important that we recognize the momentous changes taken by Libya in dismantling its WMD and long-range missile programs. It could not have been an easy decision to abandon weapons programs in which it had invested untold amounts of money. It could not have been an easy decision for Libya to seek new ways to ensure its security. And it could not have been easy for Libya to voluntarily open up their most sensitive facilities and buildings to international organizations, as well as to us, and our British partners. But they did all these things.
Our goal from the beginning was to assist the Libyans, as partners, in meeting their December 19, 2003, commitments and to verify that they had fulfilled that promise. To accomplish this, we set up three phases for our work. Each of the phases included a group of U.S. and British experts going to Libya; talking to Libyan officials; visiting sites; working together to understand their WMD and missile programs; and determining ways to dismantle these programs. We also kept the international community informed of our progress.
The first phase involved removing some of the key material that was of greatest proliferation risk on a priority basis, identifying the scope of the programs, and assisting the Libyans in their treaty and safeguards-mandated interactions with the IAEA and the OPCW. In January we removed nuclear weapons design documents, uranium hexafluoride (UF6), and key centrifuges and equipment, including material from the Khan network. On the missile front, we received a detailed description of a range of Libyan missile research and development activities, and removed parts from Libya's SCUD-C missiles to make them inoperable.
Phase II was focused on removing or eliminating the remaining elements of Libya's programs at Libya's request. Our teams removed a large amount of material and equipment from the nuclear and missile programs. During this phase, the Libyans destroyed over 3,000 chemical munitions and consolidated and secured their stocks of chemical weapons agent and precursors for destruction. The logistics of this effort were daunting, and this would not have been possible without the flexibility and speed of implementation permitted by the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund. As part of this effort, we managed to remove over 1,000 metric tons of nuclear equipment, SCUD-C missiles, their launchers, and other equipment by ship. In addition, we arranged the removal of more than 15 kilograms of fresh high-enriched uranium reactor fuel to Russia.
Phase III was primarily a verification phase. In some ways this was the hardest part of the effort. Our goal was to speak with many of the Libyans who were responsible for their WMD and missile programs. We wanted to better understand the extent of those programs and the procurement network supporting them. Ultimately, we needed to determine whether Libya had truly eliminated its WMD programs. As it had in the previous visits, Libya cooperated in providing full access to people and facilities. Importantly, we also received an assurance from Libya that it would cut off trade in military goods and services with countries of proliferation concern--for example Syria, Iran, and North Korea.
Verification is not a science, and no verification determination can be absolutely certain. But what we can say, and what I am saying with regard to Libya, is that we have verified with reasonable certainty that Libya has eliminated, or has set in place the elimination of all its WMD and MTCR-class missile programs.
During this entire effort, we visited scores of declared or suspected sites. We interviewed dozens of scientists, technicians and Libyan Government officials regarding their involvement in these programs. We have received and are still reviewing thousands of pages of documents.
But perhaps the greatest proof of Libya's strategic commitment lies in Libya's elimination by removal of its once dangerous nuclear program and its most sophisticated missiles, and in the chemical munitions destroyed in Libya.
Some work remains. Some dismantlement cannot be done overnight. Libya has collected its stockpile of chemical agent and precursors and is preparing to destroy them safely with our help and with the cooperation of the OPCW. That effort will take some time to complete. Libya has begun the process at the OPCW to seek approval to convert its former chemical weapons production facility at Rabta to produce pharmaceutical products. We support this effort and are working with the OPCW to that end. It would be a symbol of the sea change that Libya has undergone, that Rabta, long a symbol of Libya's dark designs, might someday be producing life saving drugs for the people of Libya and the African continent.
Libya ended its emerging SCUD-C missile program, and has agreed to destroy its SCUD-B missiles.
To resolve these and any additional issues that arise, Libya, the United Kingdom and the United States have established a Trilateral Steering and Cooperation Committee that will meet to discuss those issues and facilitate Libya's further implementation of its commitments. In practice, this committee has been in place for some time. On behalf of the United States, Under Secretary of State John Bolton has been meeting and talking with his counterparts from the United Kingdom and Libya, and Under Secretary Bolton will lead this process for the United States.
President Bush said on December 19, 2003, that as Libya eliminates its WMD programs and cooperates with us in the War on Terrorism, that its good faith would be returned. The Libyans have acted in good faith in eliminating their WMD and MTCR-class missile programs and we have reciprocated. In response to each Phase of the elimination effort, we have made moves to improve our relations with Libya. After the completion of Phase I we lifted travel restrictions, permitted travel-related expenditures in Libya, and allowed U.S. firms with pre-sanctions holdings to negotiate contracts for their reentry. After Phase II we terminated the Iran Libya Sanctions Act with respect to Libya, issued a general license for trade and investment, and upgraded our diplomatic relationship to a Liaison Office from an Interests Section. And now that Phase III is completed we are lifting the national emergency, essentially ending economic sanctions, including unfreezing Libyan assets and permitting aviation trade. In adopting a policy of using waivers to provide commercial assistance to U.S. firms in Libya, the Administration has sent a clear signal of improved bilateral relations.
I have been involved in verification for a long time, and the opportunity presented by Libya's decision is unique. This is one of those rare times that a state has volunteered to rid itself of its WMD programs--and it is a first for a state sponsor of terror to do so without regime change. We must do our best to ensure that Libya's voluntary decision stands as a model for others as a pathway to restore themselves to international legitimacy.
The results of Libya's decision are truly breathtaking. I would not have thought it possible ten months ago that all significant components of Libya's nuclear program would be in Tennessee or elsewhere outside the country rather than in Tripoli. All this is only possible because of the strategic commitment by Libya to rid itself of WMD and long-range missiles.
It is even more significant that Libya's commitment was not made with preconditions. There was no freeze proposal, no attempts at concealment or delaying tactics as we see in North Korea and Iran, no deals other than a mutual commitment to act in good faith. The United States and the United Kingdom insisted on the application of verification measures that met and indeed went beyond international standards and could give the international community confidence. Libya's agreement was proof of its sincerity to rid itself of its WMD programs.
The reasons for this decision are many. Of course, Libya's desire to rejoin the international community and the world of international commerce was an important factor. But this has been true for many years. I believe it is the Bush Administration's multifaceted attack on the proliferation of WMD that is having a real impact on the unraveling of the shady and dangerous international WMD black market.
It was clear to Colonel Qadhafi that we were willing to use all the tools at our disposal to stem the flow of WMD. Ongoing international diplomacy, coupled with economic sanctions, isolated Libya and were having a significant impact on Libya's international status and economy. The Bush Administration's relentless pursuit of the WMD black market was exposed Libya's and others' WMD programs and diminished their chances of success. It is also indisputable that the example of Iraq was there for all to see. The timing is instructive. In March 2003 as we were getting ready to invade Iraq, the Libyans made their first overtures, but fell short of admitting their nuclear weapons program. In October, after we and our allies in the Proliferation Security Initiative seized a nuclear-related equipment shipment headed for Tripoli, Libya permitted the first Americans into the country and made the admissions that ultimately ended their programs.
What has this meant for Libya and, more importantly, the people of Libya? The benefits have not just been in the abstract. They are direct and are being implemented now. In response to its actions, Libya has seen the tangible benefits that better relations with the United States can bring. We are no longer enforcing some of the most important sanctions against Libya, including travel restrictions, trade in oil and other important industries. U.S. Government officials have noticed that formerly empty hotels in Tripoli are teeming with Western businessmen. The United States has opened a Liaison Office in Tripoli, and Libya has opened an Interests Section in Washington. Libya participates in international meetings like those held by the OPCW and the IAEA--not as a pariah nation, but as a partner in the laudable goals of these organizations. Libya's recent help to the World Food Program efforts in Darfur, Sudan, shows that it is trying to rejoin the world community in a positive way.
We have sent doctors and scientist redirection experts to assist the Libyans in their efforts to modernize and redirect the scientific and health care fields, shifting their efforts from WMD to more productive activities with the full support of the international community. It is our hope that cooperation on education, healthcare and scientific training can build the foundation for security and prosperity for all Libyans.
What bears mentioning, though, is that the United States and the United Kingdom did not offer specific promises or rewards to the Libyans. Libya acted once it realized of its own accord that ridding itself of WMD, rather than pursuing it, offered the best enhancement to Libyan security and future prosperity. For our part, we held out the most attractive incentive available: the ability to naturally reap the benefits that comes from participating fully in the community of nations. By ending its pariah status, Libya is no longer shunned by the outside world. Economic and security benefits have been the natural and inevitable result.
Our approach to rogue states and their pursuit of WMD was best enunciated by President Bush in February:
"Abandoning the pursuit of illegal weapons can lead to better relations with the United States, and other free nations. Continuing to seek those weapons will not bring security or international prestige, but only political isolation, economic hardship, and other unwelcome consequences."
The United States, the United Kingdom, and Libya have worked together as a team to eliminate Libya's WMD programs and to begin the process of improving relations between Washington and Tripoli. We only hope that states with even more worrisome nuclear weapons programs such as Iran and North Korea will learn from Libya's positive example and agree to rejoin the community of civilized nations by giving up these terrible weapons that do nothing except undermine their own stability.
4. NNSA Expands Efforts to Combat Illicit Smuggling of WMD-Related Equipment and Technologies
National Nuclear Security Administration
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The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is expanding its efforts to train border guards and customs officials worldwide to combat the threat posed by the illicit smuggling of WMD-related equipment and technology.
NNSA's export control office has designed a new Commodity Identification Training (CIT) curriculum to educate and train customs inspectors and border enforcement personnel from around the world in techniques of detection and interdiction. This program supports the Bush administration's priority to prevent illicit trade in items and technologies needed to manufacture weapons of mass of mass destruction (WMD).
By the end of November, these trainings will be conducted in coordination with 11 countries, including Lithuania, Latvia, Georgia, Turkey, Thailand, and Ukraine. Latvia is NNSA's most recent success, and has formally added the training to the curriculum for its customs personnel, with plans to provide it to on-duty customs personnel on a rotating basis.
"Our goal is to help partner countries incorporate WMD training programs for customs inspectors, investigators, border guards and other key personnel. NNSA initiates these partnerships with our experts at the national laboratories, with the ultimate goal of preventing dangerous nuclear-related technology from falling into the hands of terrorists or proliferant nations," said NNSA Administrator Linton F. Brooks.
In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, NNSA's export control office, in coordination with the Department of State, expanded its cooperation with major supplier states like China and Turkey. Based on concerns heightened by the A.Q. Khan proliferation network, which provided illicit materials to Libya, NNSA established new partnerships with technical and enforcement organizations in a number of Asian countries. NNSA works in these and other countries in the Mediterranean and Middle East that may serve as transshipment points for proliferation-sensitive equipment. These projects reflect NNSA's core missions to promote international nonproliferation and reduce the global danger from WMD.
The CIT program itself is new, and expands NNSA's long-standing cooperation with Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan to support outreach to industries and scientific entities, and improve nuclear licensing practices. Through the CIT program, U.S. experts provide border enforcement organizations with technical training and support to help prevent export control failures. Border enforcement organizations serve as the last line of defense against illicit exports, and therefore play a critical role in exposing and thwarting export control violators.
The Department of State's Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program coordinates and partially funds the CIT program and other NNSA international export control trainings.
5. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540: The U.S. Perspective
Andrew K. Semmel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State
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Andrew Semmel, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nuclear Nonproliferation Remarks at Conference on Global Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 Chatham House, London October 12, 2004
Thank you very much.
It is a genuine pleasure to be here among such distinguished panelists and guests. I very much regret that I was unable to be here yesterday to participate in the full conference agenda. Let me first thank Chatham House for organizing this timely and focused look at ways to strengthen international efforts to prevent state and non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540) is the latest in a series of internationally directed, concrete measures aimed at preventing WMD proliferation and, most particularly, preventing and countering terrorist acquisition and use of these deadly weapons.
As the original sponsor of UNSCR 1540, the United States took a leading role in the international community in developing and adding this tool to our collective "toolbox" of measures to prevent proliferation. My remarks today offer a look back at the conditions prompting the call for UNSCR 1540, and our priorities in negotiating the resolution. I will also look forward at how the United States hopes Resolution 1540 will contribute to more effective and more robust responses to terrorist efforts to acquire WMD.
A Layered Nonproliferation Defense
Over the years, while working with others, we have built a complex nonproliferation regime to deal with diverse proliferation threats. With each "layer" or initiative added, the regime has sought to adapt to new challenges presented by advances in technology, evolving security dynamics, and other events. The first line of nonproliferation defense are the global nonproliferation treaties -- the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT], Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC], and Biological Weapons Convention [BWC]. They have served us well for decades by creating widely accepted norms against WMD acquisition, stockpiling, and proliferation, and they continue to advance dialogue and cooperation among nations. However, we have learned hard lessons with North Korea, Libya, Iraq, and Iran. These treaties have established strong global norms, but their ability to prevent WMD acquisition is only as strong as States Parties' willingness to comply with their treaty-based obligations, and the resolve of compliant parties to hold others to their obligations.
The multilateral export control regimes -- the Nuclear Suppliers Group [NSG], Zangger Committee, Missile Technology Control Regime [MTCR], Australia Group, and Wassenaar Arrangement -- are a second, important layer of our nonproliferation defense. Each of these export control regimes plays a critical role in identifying key WMD and missile-related material, technology and appropriate approaches to control access to such items. In the case of the Zangger, NSG, and Australia Group, these limited membership export control regimes have given greater specificity to items of concern under the NPT and CWC, and have broadened the materials or technologies controlled. However, recent experience -- such as the clandestine A.Q. Khan nuclear trafficking network -- make clear that having strong supplier-state commitments and solid control lists do not automatically translate into prevention of illicit exports. Proliferators have adapted, and often stayed one step ahead of preventers and prevention. We, too, must adapt and stay one step ahead of them. Proliferators have become adept at circumventing export controls through falsification of end-use information, end-user documentation, or cargo manifests; illicit suppliers and shippers collude and use transport routes and transshipment points in countries that lack strong controls and enforcement mechanisms.
In addition to nonproliferation treaties and regimes, the United States and other countries have engaged in a variety of ad hoc bilateral dialogues, partnerships with key like-minded states, and other measures to enhance national controls over sensitive technologies and to reduce, secure, or eliminate sources of sensitive materials and technology. While seeking positive solutions, we have not shied away from use of sanctions and other punitive measures to achieve nonproliferation goals.
In general, this "layered nonproliferation defense" has worked well, where implemented, to impede and slow efforts of state and non-state actors to acquire WMD. But progress has been spotty and even frustrating, since not all states are willing or able to take seriously the appeal for stronger nonproliferation measures. Though countries can agree generally on the danger posed by weapons of mass destruction, rarely can they agree on concrete responses.
In the wake of 9/11, global nonproliferation took on increased urgency, spurred by the tangible information gathered in the tragedy's aftermath about the ambitions of terrorists and terrorist organizations to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction. This clear nexus of terrorists seeking WMD created an imperative to evaluate whether existing tools were sufficient to address the growing threat.
Over the three years since 9/11, the United States has looked through fresh eyes at the nonproliferation "toolbox." After a frank review, we assessed that the nonproliferation architecture assembled over the past three decades needed to be reinforced and fortified by new measures. We did not identify any "quick fixes" or simple solutions for this threat. We recognized starkly that, when it comes to the WMD threat and its correlation with terrorism, time is not on our side. We simply did not believe that we had the luxury of our predecessors for negotiation crossing many months or years to arrive at a solution to this danger.
Against this backdrop, President Bush in the fall of 2003 called on the United Nations Security Council to adopt an anti-proliferation resolution. He urged that it require states to criminalize the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related materials; to enact and enforce strict export controls; and to secure sensitive material within their borders. In February of this year, in the wake of revelations about the A.Q. Khan network, President Bush reissued this call in a speech at the U.S. National Defense University. He also outlined a number of additional proposals to strengthen nonproliferation efforts -- seven in all. Intersecting with this focus on terrorism was a growing awareness of the Khan network. Companies within countries were building specialized components for exports to countries seeking nuclear weapons. In specific cases, the government was not aware of the company's activities nor did it have controls in place that would enable it to halt the exports.
Building UNSCR 1540
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 is rooted in the Security Council's groundbreaking 1992 Presidential Statement. That statement constituted the Council's first recognition that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a threat to international peace and security.
Resolution 1540 builds on U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373. Passed in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Resolution 1373 requires states to put in place measures to ensure their banks do not finance terrorist activities, they do not allow terrorist travel, and their territories do not support training for a next terrorist attack. UNSCR 1373 foreshadowed 1540, in that it highlighted the importance of controlling the flow of critical technologies across borders. Resolution 1540 takes this call to a new level, requiring that states establish and enforce legal barriers to acquisition of WMD whether by terrorists or by states.
The crux of UNSCR 1540 requires states to ensure that they have the infrastructure in place to address the threat posed by non-state actor involvement in any aspect of WMD proliferation. It decides that states shall not support non-state actors involved in such activities, and that states shall enact and enforce the necessary laws to prevent these activities on their territories. It requires states to monitor and control sensitive technologies, materials, and equipment that exist in, are manufactured by, or transit their territories. The aim is to prevent terrorists from acquiring them, but also, as we saw with A.Q. Khan, to prevent non-state actor involvement in trafficking of materials, equipment and technology, as well as transshipment and financing.
Ensuring that states adopt effective controls and enforcement over sensitive items is not a new endeavor. The United States and many other countries have been trumpeting the importance of strong and effective laws and enforcement measures for many years in a variety of settings. Significant strides have been made in elevating awareness about the importance of strong controls and in taking decisive action to put in place measures that keep deadly technologies out of the wrong hands. Yet a clear gap remained between the global consensus about the threat of WMD proliferation and concrete action on the ground. If I may use a baseball metaphor, there has been much "wind-up" but not much "pitch" and very little "follow-through."
While not a proliferation panacea, UNSCR 1540 helps close this gap ï¿½ more "pitch and follow-through." It makes strong national controls and enforcement a requirement, rather than an option. Rather than engaging in protracted, multiyear treaty negotiations, the Security Council responded relatively quickly to lay out some basic requirements to address the threat to international peace and security posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It is a necessary requirement, because terrorists or those that sponsor them exploit opportunities where they exist. Prevention is only as strong as the weakest link in the chain. Proliferators, like those involved in the Khan network, have shown their cunning in using not the quickest or most cost-effective routes to ply their dangerous trade, but in seeking the path of least resistance. UNSCR 1540 seeks to meet proliferators' lethal flexibility with the firm resolve of states to cut off the path to proliferation. It places a premium on establishment of legal and regulatory measures at the national level. It seeks to build capacity from the bottom up, rather than attempting to impose it from above.
During the negotiation of UNSCR 1540, the United States worked hard to maintain a high standard of accountability in what the resolution requires. Our aim was not to burden countries with additional obligations; we acted from the awareness that lax controls over WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials could be catastrophic for all. The structuring of the resolution under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter reflects this sober reality. The United States wanted the resolution to address the WMD threat in as comprehensive a manner as possible, and to reinforce existing nonproliferation treaties and regimes. Though the preoccupation of many nations on terrorist acquisition of WMD is reflected in the resolution's text, the resolution maintains a broader thrust that WMD proliferation writ large should be stopped.
Resolution 1540 also reflects the steady progression of national and international efforts to define and address the challenge of WMD terrorism in the post-9/11 environment. Virtually every multilateral body and regional organization that deals with nonproliferation or terrorism has examined this issue since 9/11. Numerous "course corrections" have been adopted. The multilateral nonproliferation regimes have reviewed their control lists to identify and restrict supply of items of use to terrorists or terrorist organizations. The International Atomic Energy Agency's [IAEA] Illicit Trafficking Database Program has new relevance as we look for connections between smugglers with nuclear or radioactive material and terrorists, and the Agency has developed innovative approaches to help member states account for and secure nuclear and radiological materials.
New initiatives have been launched, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), one of the most successful counterproliferation initiatives in recent memory. The PSI brings together countries in partnership to defeat the trafficking of deadly weapons and technologies involving state or non-state actors of proliferation concern. The PSI and 1540 are complementary. Paragraph 10 of the resolution reflects this symbiosis. The October 2003 seizure of the BBC China traveling to Libya with a cargo hold full of centrifuges is a dramatic example of cooperative action to prevent WMD proliferation, which 1540 promotes as both necessary and essential.
Many states worked to shape resolution 1540's emphasis on proliferation as a serious threat to peace and security that requires concerted action of all responsible states. States need to have the necessary legal and regulatory infrastructure in place, and they need to enforce it. 1540 also reflects the growing consensus that cooperation among states is not only useful, but is essential to preventing proliferation. This is particularly important in preventing illicit trafficking in WMD, an area of cooperation that is embodied by the PSI. The consensus adoption of UNSCR 1540 in April signals an important recognition that every nation has a responsibility in this endeavor, and must redouble their efforts to ensure that terrorists do not succeed in their deadly quest. It reaffirms the truism that since all states have a stake in combating use of weapons of mass destruction, all states should play a part in preventing their acquisition.
Looking Forward -- Implementation of 1540
Resolution 1540 is the result of a tedious, sometimes contentious, but ultimately successful negotiation among many countries, and consensus agreement on a way forward. It preserves the core priority articulated by President Bush: The international community needs to take concrete action; states must put in place effective controls and enforcement, so that non-state actors will not acquire deadly technologies that they would then turn on civilized nations. We are determined to work closely with other countries to ensure they establish effective national controls and enforcement measures.
We also expect that states will take seriously paragraph four of the resolution, and submit comprehensive reports to the 1540 Committee on their efforts to comply with the resolution's operative elements. These reports will be an important tool in understanding the scope of the challenge before us, and how best it can be addressed. We live in an era of global economies and growing interdependence. No state will remain unaffected by WMD proliferation; none of us is stronger than the weakest link. It is in all our interests to be frank and open about our capabilities to respond to proliferation threats. Each state's critical review of its own laws and regulations will help locate gaps. This process may facilitate an understanding of "best practices" by countries. The Nonproliferation Committee's review of these reports will help match assistance with the needs of member states. As President Bush has noted, the United States is prepared to assist where it can.
The United States has compiled a report that provides a comprehensive accounting on the range of U.S. laws, programs, and initiatives to address proliferation. A multi-agency effort, our report provides detailed information on U.S. efforts to implement the resolution. The report also includes detailed reporting on our efforts to assist other states, support existing nonproliferation treaties, and establish cooperation among states to prevent illicit trafficking. These are key aspects of 1540 that ought not be overlooked. The U.S. report is a snapshot in time -- albeit a long one, at 62 pages in length -- but offers a valuable resource for those interested in knowing how the United States government has approached this particular problem. We are scheduled to submit our report to the 1540 Committee in New York today [October 12].
The Nonproliferation Committee in New York is working to assemble a panel of experts to review country reports. Though 1540 has been structured under Chapter VII, we do not envision "enforcement" as a role for the Committee. We believe that there is strong international support for this resolution, and that states will comply with 1540's provisions without the need for Council action. If asked, the United States will work with states on a bilateral basis, or in partnership with other states, to assist them in fulfilling their responsibilities under 1540. This includes identifying what countries require assistance and how best that assistance can be provided. We, of course, will revisit this view if it becomes evident that countries are not taking their 1540 obligations seriously, or are ignoring their responsibility to put in place the legal and regulatory infrastructure required under the resolution.
Let me conclude by saying that the clear intent of terrorists and terrorist organizations to acquire WMD, and their known disregard for innocent lives, adds great urgency to an already grave security imperative. The international community cannot rest on its nonproliferation laurels. It must be as creative, agile, and aggressive in preventing proliferation as the proliferators themselves -- whether state or non-state actors -- are about acquiring WMD. This is a race we cannot afford to lose. Preferably, our "game plan" should be multilateral, multinational, multiyear, and multidimensional. It should include diplomacy, law enforcement, economic incentives and disincentives, border security measures, and where necessary, the use of force. It should run the full gamut of persuasion and coercion, as appropriate. It should [be] flexible and adaptive.
No one state, nor any single approach, can solve this global problem. To the contrary, a single state supplying critical materials or technologies could defeat the efforts of us all. Success requires collaboration, a long-term commitment, clear-eyed vigilance, a multiplicity of tools, as well as a serious commitment to defeat this modern scourge. There must be commitment, but there must also be follow-through in the form of enforcement. There may yet be time to prevent terrorists and those who sponsor them from acquiring deadly capabilities. We strenuously hope this is the case. We look forward to working with other countries in implementing the resolution, and building a stronger, tighter, and more effective set of nonproliferation tools to keep the world's most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the world's most dangerous individuals.
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