1. US Seen Resisting Cooperation On Terrorism, Arms
Inter Press Service
December 4, 2001
(for personal use only)
Despite appearances that Washington is working with the internationalcommunity in its war against terrorism, experts say this and anotherdefining foreign-policy issue - nuclear-arms talks with Russia - arestill dangerously wedded to the idea that the United States can pursueits goalswithout regard for others.
As evidence of this unilateralism - and its potentially disastrousconsequences for South Asia - Columbia University scholar YogeshChandrani points to the George W Bush administration's conduct of itsmilitary campaign in Afghanistan.
Washington is putting Pakistan - and by extension India and the rest ofSouth Asia - at risk of further violence and destabilization, Chandraniwarns. This is because it has failed to meet Pakistani President GeneralPervez Musharraf's conditions for supporting the US war againstAfghanistan's Taliban rulers. Musharraf had urged Washington to halt itsbombing campaign during the holy month of Ramadan and to prevent theNorthern Alliance from entering Kabuland Kunduz, he adds.
Denying the Pakistani leader's requests has served to undermine hisgovernment. "The war has been a strategic disaster for Musharraf,"Chandrani says, because Washington's actions have further exposedIslamabad to violent backlash by Pashtun extremists in Pakistan whoshare ethnic identity and kinship ties with the Taliban.
On nuclear-weapons talks with Russia, retired General Vladimir Dvorkinof the Academy of Military Sciences in Moscow says Washington'sinsistence that bilateral arms-control agreements with Moscow are notlegally binding - and are therefore subject to abandonment at any time -will "lead to an international legal vacuum".
Dvorkin says permanent resolution of the balance of nuclear weaponrybetween the two powers "needs a framework agreement binding on bothparties. It will be difficult, if not impossible, if we do not have abinding document in our hands."
Michael Klare, a US academic and author of the book Rogue States andNuclear Outlaws, says Washington's stance suggests that the US goalremains "permanent unipolar dominance".
The US and Russian analysts are critical of the arms-control agreementthat came out of Bush's talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin atBush's ranch in Crawford, Texas. While they welcome the commitment tocut long-range nuclear forces to about 1,700 warheads, from about 6,000each at present, they note that the 10 years it will take to reduce tothis level show that the two sides feel no sense of urgency. The reducedfigure could have been set even lower, they add.
Rather than look at the Crawford summit as a victory of cooperation,they argue that the decisions were framed by the ongoing Bushadministration insistence that it not be bound by any internationalrules.
Pavel Podvig of the Moscow Institute of Physics calls it "a disturbingsign" that Bush also has refused to destroy the warheads that will beremoved from the weapons. "What's more important: You see warheadsdismantled or you have the capacity to build up to 2,500 warheads?" heasks, further noting that no independent verification of actualreductions is envisaged.
In Klare's view, the United States has "no incentive to negotiate equalreductions". Rather, it desires "only to sign accords that perpetuateits overwhelming superiority".
"The US will only doom itself if it does not become a part of theinternational community," he warns.
Some observers acknowledge at least one bright spot in US-Russian armscontrol, however: the Cooperative Threat Reduction, a project started inthe mid-1990s both to safeguard and destroy some of the nuclear weaponsleft over from the Soviet Union.
Paul Walker, of the non-governmental group Global Green USA, says theUS$4 billion that has been spent so far has eliminated 500 warheads plusmissiles, missile launch silos and bombers, as well as chemical weaponsand production facilities.
Nevertheless, US unilateralism on arms control and the war againstterrorism evince an official mindset in which the only worthwhileinternational cooperation is that which is controlled by Washington,says Michael Ratner, of the Center for Constitutional Rights, acivil-liberties group. Ratner describes the US administration's movessince the September 11 terrorist attacks here and at the Pentagon as "acontinuation of old policies: war as a solution, superpower dominance,little regard for international institutions such as the UN, and nocompromising sovereignty in the name of international security". return to menu
2. Russia Hopes USA Will Pay Close Attention To Non-Proliferation
ITAR-TASS from the BBC Monitoring Service
December 1, 2001
(for personal use only)
The Russian Foreign Ministry expressed the hope that the implementationof Russian-US non-proliferation programmes will continue to be a subjectof close consideration in the United States.
The statement followed the call by some leading US congressmen forincreasing financial assistance to Russia in the next fiscal year toensure that its weapons of mass destruction are stored and scrappedsafely.
The ministry said on Saturday [1 December] that the move concerns properfunding for the Russian-US intergovernmental agreement on the processingof weapons-grade plutonium signed in 2000.
Russia believes that this agreement is "one of the most importantelements of a set of bilateral measures aimed at reducing the nuclearthreat, and that its speedy implementation fully serves the interests ofRussia and the USA", the ministry told ITAR-TASS.
This is especially important now that the joint fight againstinternational terrorism is closely intertwined with thenon-proliferation tasks, the ministry said. return to menu
3. US Reviews How To Stop Spread Of Nuclear Arms
November 30, 2001
(for personal use only)
A review of US efforts to help prevent the spread of weapons of massdestruction from Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Unionis in its final stages, US officials told lawmakers yesterday.
The Bush administration initiated the review soon after entering officebut the issue has become more topical amid growing concerns about theacquisition of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons by terroristssuch as Osama bin Laden.
The aim is to stop the spread of materials that could be used to buildsuch weapons, and to discourage former Soviet scientists from offeringtheir services to the highest bidder.
The administration has been criticised for cutting its budgets forefforts aimed at reducing the threat. Daniel Akaka, the Democraticchairman of the Senate subcommittee that held its hearing yesterday,welcomed President Bush's commitment to a big increase of assistance toRussia fordismantling such weapons.
"This was a welcome first step. Unfortunately, the administration cutthe budget for these programmes before completing its review," he said.
The administration has denied making such cuts. However, the RussianAmerican Nuclear Security Advisory Council, a think-tank aimed atencouraging non-proliferation activities, said the administration's 2002budget request cut funding by Dollars 100m from the previous year.
A bipartisan task force into the issue concluded that the funding forsuch programmes should be increased four-fold.
Thad Cochran, a Republican senator, described the review as aiming toget the best value for the money being spent on such efforts, saying itwas deceptive and misleading to say such funds had been reduced.
"It's more important to look at these efforts on aprogramme-by-programme basis," he said. "Reviewed in this way, it'sclear that the administration is increasing funds for programmes thatare contributing to our national security and to the security of othersas well."
For example, no funds were requested to eliminate nuclear missile silosbecause they had already been eliminated, he said.
The officials from the four US government departments involved in theprogrammes - State, Commerce, Defence and Energy - said the review hadnot affected their current operational efforts.
One of them, Marshall Billingsley, deputy assistant secretary of defencefor negotiations, sounded a note of concern about chemical weaponsprogrammes.
"We are concerned with the threat of chemical weapons proliferation, andare troubled by inadequate security and safety measures currently beingmaintained on stocks of chemical agent, and we have a programme that isaddressing this concern," he said. return to menu
Chuyskiye Izvestiya from the BBC Monitoring Service
December 2, 2001
(for personal use only)
Asked what would happen if Bin-Ladin decided to use the nuclear weaponshe is suspected of having, Kyrgyz physicist Viktor Gurovich said thatBin-Ladin would exterminate himself as he had no known means of deliveryand start-up devices. Gurovich also said that Kyrgyzstan does not needto create its own A-bomb and lamented the fact that nuclear weapons arepotentially accessible to extremist organizations rather than in thehands of stable states. The following is an excerpt from report entitled"The weapon of the intellect" by Kyrgyz newspaper Chuyskiye Izvestiya on30 November; subheadings as published
One could listen to well-known physicist Viktor Gurovich for hours onend. His rare blend of intellect, humour and erudition makes him anunusually interesting interlocutor. His life is literally filled withthe most interesting episodes. Fortune chanced to bring him togetherwith one of the fathers of the Soviet A-bomb, thrice hero of socialistlabour Academician Yakov Zeldovich. He knew [Russian nuclear physicistand human-rights advocate] Andrey Sakharov and [Academician] MstislavKeldysh. He was a pupil of well-known physicist Kirill Stanyukovich. So,today our guest is distinguished scientist of the Kyrgyz Republic,professor of the Kyrgyz-Russian Slav University, Viktor TsalevichGurovich. In line with President Askar Akayev's decree, he was recentlyawarded the Datsk medal.
[Passage omitted: on Gurovich' relations with the famous physicists;Keldysh helped Gurovich, who came from Kyrgyzstan, to find accommodationin the hostel of the Physics Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences]
Do we need nuclear weapons?
[Correspondent] It's most likely that Keldysh knew about Kyrgyzstan forother reasons as well. Wasn't the first uranium ore extracted here?
[Gurovich] It is completely true. The first bomb was made from Kyrgyzraw material, althoughsubsequent processing of uranium and plutonium was carried out inRussia. Therefore, our republic was directly involved in the creation ofnuclear weapons.
In dealing with the history of our science, I discover wonderful things.There is an ascent to ahigh-altitude station for studying space rays in the Murgab area insouthern Kyrgyzstan. It turned out that [Joseph] Stalin and [Lavrenti]Beria took a person interest in it. The station was built on theirinitiative and is still working. This is a unique laboratory. It yieldsastonishing information. The study of the interaction of fundamentalparticles coming from space is of great practical importance. The wisdomof the creators of our nuclear weapons was that they carried outresearch very widely, not restricting their task only to creating thebomb. Incidentally, since the station is located on our territory, wecould cooperate with the Russians and be involved in research. This isno short-term task.
[Correspondent] Viktor Tsalevich, what do you think, should Kyrgyzstanthink about having its own A-bomb, even if only for self-defence?
[Gurovich] Kyrgyzstan does not need it. But supposing such a task wasset. It involves two elements. We primarily need something that willexplode - either "pump out" the necessary isotope 235 from a hugequantity of uranium by employing electromagnetic or diffusion methods,or we must turn out plutonium in the reactor.
But there is the second element: it cannot be ruled out theoreticallythat the "explosive" can be bought on the side. I do not say that aready-made bomb can be bought, but its components may become an illegalcommodity. And an expert who knows the technology of how to produceweapons of mass destruction can easily assemble a bomb.
Bombs also happen to be bad
[Correspondent] So, if we really wanted to, would we be able to produceour own nuclear weapons?
[Gurovich] Of course, theoretically. Suppose we have ready-madematerials for an A-bomb, it would not be difficult to make a badversion.
[Correspondent] What does you mean - a bad version?
[Gurovich] To put it simply, suppose you have two pieces of uranium, yougathered critical energy, connected them and - from the physics point ofview an explosion occurred, but no explosion has occurred from thehydrodynamic point of view.
[Passage omitted: producing the explosion is highly complex]
[Correspondent] All those around us have acquired nuclear weapons andclaim that it is forself-defence... [ellipsis as given]
[Gurovich] Historically, nuclear weapons were intended as a deterrent.
[Passage omitted: US scientists created the first A-bomb and handed someof the information to their Soviet counterparts]
[Gurovich] These days it's terrible that nuclear weapons are potentiallyaccessible to extremistorganizations rather than in the hands of stable states. "Portable"versions of the bomb have emerged lately. They can be put into anartillery shell. The basic technology of nuclear weapons production canbe found in the open press. Of course, some secrets remain, but they canbe put together in principle. This is what is terrible.
[Correspondent] Supposing terrorist Usamah Bin-Ladin, who has beendriven into a corner, decides to use the nuclear weapons which heallegedly has. What could this lead to?
[Gurovich] Let's suppose he uses them: he will exterminate himselfbecause he does not have the means of delivery, start-up devices, or atleast, these have not yet been identified. Then there is another matter,a vast territory will be contaminated with radiation. If there had beenno global confrontation, from which we are gradually moving, away, thenmankind would avoid much misfortune. return to menu
2. U.S. Supports U.N. Anti-Nukes Push
November 30, 2001
(for personal use only)
Warning anew of the threat of nuclear-related terrorism, the UnitedStates on Friday pledged to support the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency'sefforts to stop terrorists from obtaining nuclear material.
Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham said the U.S. government is giving theInternational Atomic Energy Agency $1.2 million for the anti-terrorismeffort while Washington discusses increasing its funding for the agency.
U.S. contributions now make up roughly 25 percent of the agency's $300million annual budget, IAEA spokeswoman Melissa Fleming said.
Speaking to the agency's board of governors in Vienna, Abraham praisedthe organization's efforts to help countries increase security atnuclear facilities, calling its work "vital to the global war onterrorism."
"The work the agency does to deny nuclear material and radioactivesources to terrorists and state sponsors of terrorism is an integralpart of our effort to stem the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction," Abraham said.
After Sept. 11, the agency's director general, Mohamed ElBaradei, warnedthat terrorists could next try to attack nuclear plants or buildradioactive bombs.
Nuclear experts have warned that the collapse of the Soviet Unioncreated a political vacuum that left some nuclear material unaccountedfor.
On Friday, ElBaradei asked the IAEA's wealthier members to increase theagency's budget by $30 million to $50 million annually so it can expandits efforts to help countries safeguard nuclear material.
ElBaradei said the 133-member agency would use the money to helpgovernments prevent theft of radioactive materials and increase bordercontrols in order to prevent the smuggling of such material.
"We have the solutions," ElBaradei said. "Now governments have tocome up with the resources."
The agency, which sets international standards for radiation protection,said it has evidence of 175 cases of trafficking in nuclear materialssince 1993 return to menu
1. Nyet to nukes for Iran
The Boston Globe
December 3, 2001
(for personal use only)
The mounting danger from Iran's nuclear weapons program illustrates whyunilateralism in US foreign policy makes no sense.
Informed estimates from American and Israeli intelligence suggest thatthe Islamic Republic of Iran will have a nuclear weapons capability inthree to five years. This threatening prospect is the result of Russiantransfers of materiel and technology to Iran.
If the regime in Tehran can still be prevented from developing anddeploying nuclear weapons, the Bush administration will have to dosomething its predecessors tried and failed to do: get the Kremlin tocompletely cut off Russia's irresponsible sales of nuclear and missilematerials to the Iranians.
As often happens in the real world, the United States, despite all itswealth and strength, cannotunilaterally prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. A goal that isprofoundly in America'snational interest requires that Washington find a way to persuade Moscowto stop doing something that Russian leaders have defined as in theirnational interest - or in the institutional and mercenary interests ofRussian military officers.
Not only must President Bush accede to the exigencies of a multilateralforeign policy. To make the Russians give up what has been a profitable,clandestine commerce, Bush will have to plunge into precisely the sortof negotiating and deal-making that he and his advisers have long saidthey abhor.
To compel Putin to clamp down on his military's heedless nuclearcommerce with Iran, Bush has little choice but to offer positiveincentives and to brandish meaningful penalties. The Iranian nuclearprogram must become one of the deal-breakers in any comprehensivebargain for a strategic partnership between Moscow and Washington in theaftermath of Sept. 11.
Certainly it makes no sense to bestow a Russian veto over certain NATOdecisions if Putin continues to permit crucial nuclear and missilecomponents to be sold to Iran, under the pretext that Russian firms areacting on their own. In the sphere of nuclear proliferation, no businesscan be immune to government interference.
If Putin wants American cooperation in fostering stability in postwarAfghanistan and the surrounding region, he has to do his part by takingeffective action to make certain that Iran does not join Pakistan andIndia as a new member of the nuclear-capable club. One benefit ofUS-Russian cooperation in stabilizing Central Asia could be the buildingof lucrative oil and natural gas pipelines from the Caspian basin,through Afghanistan, to warm water ports in Pakistan or Iran. Putinshould be told that Russia will not share in that anticipated bonanzaunless he shuts off the nuclear pipeline to Iran. return to menu
2. Russia Ships Reactor To Bushehr, Will Train Iranian Nuclear Physicists
Interfax from the BBC Monitoring Service
November 30, 2001
(for personal use only)
Russia has sent to Iran a VVER-1000 nuclear reactor, which will beinstalled at the Bushehr nuclear power plant currently underconstruction, Russian Deputy Atomic Energy Minister BulatNigmatulin told reporters.
"The plant's foundation is currently being constructed, and the plant'slaunch is scheduled for September 2003," he said.
The Bushehr nuclear power plant was built in the mid-1970s by the Germanconcern Siemens. However, after the Islamic revolution the company hadto stop its work in Iran. Russian specialists are now working in Iranunder a Russian-Iranian contract, which envisions the construction ofone power unit at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. The value of thiscontract exceeds 800m dollars.
The Russian Atomic Energy Minister said that by the end of this yearRussia will have completed the feasibility study for the project of thesecond unit of the plant. One of the institutions involved in theproject together with the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry is alreadyworking on this feasibility study.
Atomic Energy Ministry representatives do not rule out that work in Iranmay be continued. After Russian nuclear physicists complete their workon the Bushehr nuclear power plant, they will build another two nuclearunits in Iran, but not necessarily in Bushehr, the ministryrepresentatives said.
Russia and Iran have an agreement under which Russia will supply fuelfor the Bushehr nuclear power plant. In addition, the Russian AtomicEnergy Ministry intends to organize the training of Iranian nuclearphysicists in Russia. The Iranian specialists are expected to be trainedat the educational centre of the Novovoronezhskaya nuclear power plant. return to menu
D. Russian Nuclear Forces
1. U.S. Missiles Still on Alert
The Moscow Times
December 3, 2001
(for personal use only)
De-alerting nuclear weapons means keeping them, but making them harderto use. It might start with a new presidential order -- "We don't launchuntil we've taken, say, five hours to think about it." A next step couldbe as prosaic as taking the launch keys away from the junior officersout in the ICBM silos. Over time, warheads could be taken off ofmissiles and stored. Candidate George W. Bush campaigned on de-alertingthe U.S. nuclear arsenal.
Enter the handshake in Crawford. President Bush agreed to reduce theU.S. arsenal from 6,000nuclear missiles to as low as 1,700. But oddly, he also said it wouldtake 10 years -- even thoughhis administration has been quite specific that it is not scrapping themissiles, only "de-alerting"them -- which in this case apparently extends to removing and storingwarheads. "Why that would take 10 years is beyond me," said John Isaacsof the Council for a Livable World, a disarmament group focused onlobbying Congress. Simply by giving new orders and collecting launchkeys, those 4,300 nuclear missiles could head into de-alert within 24hours.
And what of the remaining missiles? It seems they are not going to bede-alerted at all. A classified Nuclear Posture Review drawn up by theBush administration should soon be in the hands of key members ofCongress. Sources familiar with the report's contents say it keepsthousands of missiles ready to go in minutes. "They've categoricallyrejected de-alerting," says Bruce Blair, president of the Center forDefense Information. "[Bush] has reversed himself completely [from hiscampaign pledges]."
Blair, speaking at a conference last week in New York, reminded us wherewe are 12 years after the Berlin Wall fell: America still has nuclearweapons aimed at 2,360 Russian targets and poised for launch in justminutes. U.S. reconnaissance planes still prowl the edges of Russian airspace, looking for entry corridors for B-2 and B-52 bombers. "They flyaround the borders checking the performance of air defense radars,assessing coverage, looking for where the holes are," said Blair.
Several months ago, Blair -- himself a former Minuteman missile launchofficer -- spoke with a flight crew in Nebraska that was fresh back fromjust such a border-probing exercise. The crew told him they hadn't seena Russian fighter jet come up to challenge them in years.
Meanwhile, a launch somewhere in the world just about every day sendsNORAD, the strategic command outfit, into "three-minute huddles." Theyare supposed to emerge in that time period with an evaluation of thethreat, if any, and recommendations for the president, if appropriate.On a recent visit to NORAD, Blair watched just such an emergency huddlein response to a Russian missile launch. It turned out to be a SCUDmissile fired into Chechnya, he said.
In Wyoming two years ago, Blair watched two junior officers performingthe same job he had performed 30 years ago: rehearsing a launch. Thesemen -- both in their 20s -- were capable of launching 500 nuclearwarheads within just two minutes of receiving their orders. return to menu
2. Putin to inaugurate new nuclear sub
December 3, 2001
(for personal use only)
MOSCOW - President Vladimir Putin said Monday he would visit a northernshipyard to inaugurate a new nuclear submarine - a trip apparentlyintended to bolster the Navy's morale, shaken by the sudden weekendouster of several top admirals.
Putin told his Cabinet that he would visit the Sevmash shipyard in thenorthern town of Severodvinsk on Tuesday to launch the Gepardnuclear-powered submarine. The same shipyard launched the Kursk nuclearsubmarine, which exploded and sank in August 2000 inone of Russia's worst naval disasters and was hoisted from the BarentsSea floor in October.
Last week, Putin invited Northern Fleet chief Adm. Vyacheslav Popov tothe Kremlin along with other participants of the Kursk salvage effort topraise them for their good work. But after hearing a top prosecutor'sreport on Sunday, the president said that Northern Fleet admirals shouldbe disciplined for poor organization of the maneuvers during which theKursk sank.
The Russian Navy chief, Adm. Vladimir Kuroyedov, quickly fired Popov anddisciplined a dozen other admirals over the weekend. However, officialsclaimed that the punishment was notlinked to the Kursk's sinking, the cause of which remains unknown.
Officials said that Popov and others were punished for the poororganization of the maneuvers, but gave no details. The business dailyKommersant said Monday that the prosecutor's officehad specifically blamed the navy chiefs for sending the Kursk to seawith a full set of weapons, and not just the one torpedo and one missileit was supposed to fire during the exercise.
The Kursk sank when its torpedoes detonated in a powerful blasttriggered by a weaker initial explosion of a practice torpedo. If theKursk had carried just a single torpedo, the explosion would not havehad catastrophic consequences, Kommersant quoted the prosecutor's reportas saying.
The catastrophe that killed the entire crew of 118 dealt a painful blowto the navy and threw back its ambitious plans to order new ships andput a larger number of vessels on patrol.
In his speech before the Cabinet on Monday, Putin emphasized that nextyear, military spending must "have priority, even more so as we haveworked out a serious and ambitious program of military reform."
The Gepard is the first nuclear submarine to be commissioned by the Navysince the Kursk disaster. Its construction began in 1991 but was stalledby a severe funding shortage.
The Gepard is of a different type and half the size of the Kursk, at9,100 tons. It carries an array of supersonic nuclear-tipped cruisemissiles and torpedoes and is among the fastest and quietestsubmarines in the world. The Russian Navy already has eight submarinesof the same Bars class as the Gepard. return to menu
1. Interview With Donald Rumsfeld (excerpted)
CNN EVANS, NOVAK, HUNT & SHIELDS
December 1, 2001
(for personal use only)
HUNT: Mr. Secretary, we're running out of time. But let me just ask you-- the country with the greatest number of weapons of mass destruction,of course, is Russia. The Nunn-Lugar program seeks to pay off theRussians to try to dismantle those weapons and some of those roguescientists -- to pay off those rogue scientists. Why how does theadministration cut funding,both in the Defense Department and the Energy Department for Nunn-Lugarprograms this year?
RUMSFELD: Goodness, I would have to go check into that; I'm not anexpert on the subject. I do know that it's hundreds of millions ofdollars that we spend, we have spent. I would presume that the properresponse to that question is that after a program's been in place for aperiod, one does an evaluation of it, and takes a look and says: Is itaccomplishing the goals, or isn't it? Are they fulfilling their side ofthe agreement, or aren't they? And if you are, in fact, providinghundreds of millions of dollars in monies fungible, where is the moneythat they are not providing going? Is it going for other things that areequally nasty. And I just don't know the answer. And I do know that theUnited States taxpayers have spent hundreds of millions of dollars, andwe still are and they still will in the current budget. return to menu
2. Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham's Remarks before the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors,
November 30, 2001
(for personal use only)
Mr. Director General, Delegates, Members of the Board,
It's an honor to be here today. A great deal has happened since I washere in September, just six days after the terrorist attacks in mycountry.
We have seen the establishment of a global coalition against terrorism.Under the leadership of President Bush, that coalition has moveddecisively to eradicate a threat that challenges every civilized nation.The attacks of September 11 were an attack on all civilized countries,whoseconsequences are like a tidal wave causing economic and human sufferingaround the world, especially in the developing world. The consequencesof nuclear terrorism would be even more devastating to the world andcountries that depend on international trade - to say nothing of theaffect on public confidence in the safety of peaceful nuclear activitiesranging from power to the eradication of insects.
In September, speaking at the IAEA General Conference, I said"preventing terrorist acts underlies our continuing and robust supportfor this Agency. We know our security, and that of nations around theworld, is bolstered by what this Agency does to prevent theproliferation and misuse of nuclear and other radioactive materials."
This Agency's work remains vital to the global war on terrorism. TheIAEA and its members are a key part of the coalition against terrorism.The work the Agency does to deny nuclear material and radioactivesources to terrorist and state sponsors of terrorism is an integral partof our effortto stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
The IAEA and its robust system of inspections is vital to internationalsecurity. That pivotal role was acknowledged by Presidents Bush andPutin during the recently concluded U.S.-Russian summit. They reaffirmedtheir commitment to keeping dangerous materials out of the hands ofthose like Osama bin Ladin, who would not think twice about using themagainst any of us. The two Presidents declared that "urgent attentionmust be given to improving the physical protection and accounting ofnuclear materials of all possessor states, and preventing illicittrafficking."
In furtherance of this commitment, I held a series of meetings in Moscowthis week with my Russian counterpart and colleague, Minister of AtomicEnergy Alexander Rumyantsev. In addition to agreeing to accelerate andexpand U.S. - Russian cooperation in protecting nuclear material, wealso agreed to work together toward more effective international supportof our two Presidents' call for action. To that end, we will coordinateour efforts with other countries and with the IAEA to improve theprotection of fissile nuclear material and thereby strengtheninternational security. We specifically discussed the essential role ofthe IAEA in this regard.
Today, though, I want to discuss how this Agency can help meet thoseimportant objectives which we believe are shared by the entireinternational community. It is the view of the United States that,consistent with the Director General's recent report, the IAEA can andmust continue to make a significant contribution to keeping nuclearmaterials secure.
The U.S. welcomes the Director General's report as a significantcontribution to our efforts to chart a course on addressing the dangersof inadequately protected or controlled nuclear materials and otherradioactive sources. We agree with his conclusion that "the Agencyurgentlyneeds to enhance its efforts, in co-operation with the States, to narrowthe gap between the threat that now exists and the measures that arecurrently in place." Under the strong leadership of Director General ElBaradei, this report -- and the conference on terrorism that preceded it--demonstrate the degree to which the IAEA is uniquely poised to provideleadership and moral authority on the vexing challenge that nowconfrontsus.
There are many areas where the IAEA can help further the global fightagainst terrorism. Beyond implementation of its vital safeguardsresponsibilities, there are other steps the IAEA can and should take assoon as possible. The Agency's efforts need to be multi-dimensional,drawingon all of its capabilities to integrate new priorities into the Agency'score mission.
Consistent with the recommendations in the Director-General's report,the U.S. sees an expanded role for the IAEA in ensuring the physicalsecurity of nuclear materials. The international community has nogreater responsibility than to ensure this material is not onlyaccounted for, but is well protected, and thus reducing the likelihoodthat it can be stolen, or misused.
Here, there is much that can be done. For example, the IAEA can helpmember states assess their physical security requirements through itsInternational Physical Protection Advisory Service. We need to greatlyincrease the number and scope of these missions, follow up theirrecommendations, build appropriate action plans, and expand training.
The IAEA can also work with member states to track illicit materialstrafficking more effectively. In this regard, the United States islooking to expand our support to the IAEA nuclear smuggling databasethat we helped to establish. IAEA efforts should complement bilateralefforts, and focus on those countries and facilities not yet receivingadequate bilateral assistance. In all these undertakings, the Agencywill no doubt continue to ensure that information it develops toidentify vulnerabilities and steps proposed to remedy them are handledwith the highest degree of confidentiality.
Another thing we can all do is work to revise and strengthen theConvention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. We view thisas an urgent matter.
The IAEA can also support efforts by the U.S. and other member states tostrengthen border defenses - the so-called "second line of defense." TheIAEA can help member states identify, inventory, and control radioactivesources, thus reducing the risk associated with these sources.
The U.S. continues to be a strong supporter of the Agency's technicalcooperation program which is fundamental to the Agency's objectives. TheTC program can and should play an important role in the Agency's overallapproach to fighting nuclear terrorism. We believe the TC program canprovide services and assistance to member states that will both promotesustainable development and the safe, secure use of nuclear andradioactive materials. In addition, IAEA efforts in these areas willserve as an important and valuable complement to bilateral assistance.An important aspect and central to coordination efforts, would be thedevelopment of a data base of IAEA and donor country assistance forstrengthening systems to protect and track or secure nuclear orradioactive materials.
These are examples of the priority steps the IAEA can take now.
I recognize that full engagement on these initiatives is not withoutcost. It is clear that the Agency will need to reflect new priorities inits planning. So will we. For our part the United States is undertakinga fundamental review of all aspects of our approach to IAEA funding, andthe Agency's needs, including all aspects of the budget issue. We willreport to you as soon as possible the results of this effort.
I am also pleased to announce that the United States will provide anextrabudgetary contribution of $1.2 million to match the Nuclear ThreatInitiative's generous offer of $1.2 million to help enhance the IAEA'srole in combating terrorism. We look forward to working with the IAEA todetermine the specific allocation of this funding to programs inphysical protection, nuclear trafficking, and radiation sourcemanagement. We urge others to meet the needs for immediate funding.
Nearly fifty years ago, the world looked to the IAEA for leadership andis doing so again today.
I am confident that the IAEA will fulfill its fundamental mission ofensuring the peaceful uses of the nuclear and radioactive applicationsfor the benefit of all mankind. But today new responsibilities are alsodemanded. If history is a guide, the international community is in goodhands.
3. Joint Statement of the Secretary of Energy of the United States of America Spencer Abraham and the Minister for the Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation A.Yu. Rumyantsev on enhancing cooperation.
November 29, 2001
(for personal use only)
Guided by the provisions of the "Joint Statement by President George W.Bush And President Vladimir V. Putin on a New Relationship Between theUnited States and Russia," and, in particular, by the call for"improving the physical protection and accounting of nuclear materialsof all possessor states" expressed in it, Secretary Spencer Abraham andMinister A.Yu. Rumyantsev discussed steps to enhance cooperation betweenthe United States Department of Energy and the Russian Ministry ofAtomic Energy.
The Secretary and the Minister agreed on the necessity of closercooperation on enhancing the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime,improving measures on nuclear materials physical protection, control andaccounting as well as preventing illegal trafficking and handling ofnuclear and radioactive materials.
In this respect the Secretary and the Minister noted the importance ofcoordinating their efforts and cooperating with other countries and withthe International Atomic Energy Agency to increase efforts toward theprotection of fissile nuclear material in order to strengtheninternational security and to bolster safety and security in thepeaceful use of the atomic power for the benefit of increasing theeconomic well being and prosperity of the peoples of the world.
The Secretary and the Minister directed their subordinates to analyzethe efficiency of the present cooperation and progress in acceleratingthat cooperation and to prepare appropriate reports for them on how toperfect, enhance and expand the cooperation that they will consider attheir next joint meeting. return to menu
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