WASHINGTON -- The events of Sept. 11 shattered any illusion that America is secure from foreign attack. As horrible as that day was, future attacks could be far more deadly. If terrorists had used a nuclear weapon in lower Manhattan, hundreds of thousands might have died.
President Bush has noted the potential threat we face if Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups obtain weapons of mass destruction. These groups are seeking chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, he told European leaders last week. If they obtain them, they will be a threat "to every nation and eventually to civilization itself."
The primary sources for these materials of destruction are weapons plants and reactors in the former Soviet Union, where thousands of tons of weapons-grade uranium, plutonium, chemicals and pathogens are stored at hundreds of sites. Some of these sites lack fences, alarms or qualified security guards. Systems to account for fissile material are rudimentary or nonexistent.
Several times in the last decade, individuals or groups have attempted to steal and then sell nuclear, chemical or biological materials from sites in Russia. We know this because we have captured them. But how many incidents have happened that we don't know about? It would only take a softball-sized lump of highly enriched uranium, or a baseball-sized lump of plutonium, along with materials readily available on the commercial market, to put together a nuclear device that could fit in an S.U.V.Terrorists are also working to perfect the delivery of deadly chemical and biological agents on a broad scale.
As President Bush meets with President Vladimir Putin of Russia this week, he should discuss devising effective ways to ensure that weapons and materials of mass destruction in and around Russia remain safe, accounted for and secure.
In 1991, Congress approved legislation that provided money to Russia and other former Soviet states to help them dismantle their nuclear arsenals and create safe storage for weapons-grade nuclear material. Under the program, named for former Senator Sam Nunn and Senator Richard Lugar, more than 5,600 warheads have been deactivated since 1992. The United States has spent more than $2 billion to aid Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan in the destruction of their weapons, and has helped Russia safely dispose of thousands of tons of nuclear weapons and materials. Despite this effort, most Russian nuclear material is inadequately secured.
Meanwhile, the United States government has hired or helped place thousands of former weapons scientists from the Soviet Union to work in university labs, hospitals and power plants. Many more, however, remain out of work or underemployed. They are thus susceptible to selling their expertise to terrorist groups or rogue states.
Despite the success of these programs, we need a better plan to reduce the threat of these weapons — one that takes into account the new realities of the world after Sept. 11.
First, we need a clear mechanism for leadership and accountability. Coordination between the dozens of federal departments, agencies and bureaus responsible for scores of nonproliferation programs must be improved. Funding for these programs must be drastically increased — and not just by the United States. America's allies, and international organizations like the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency, should also do their part.
Russia's partnership is vital to the success of this effort. The nonproliferation of nuclear materials — as well as chemical and biological agents — must become a cornerstone of Russian-American relations. Preventing weapons of mass destruction from falling into the wrong hands is a goal we both share. Russian cooperation in neutralizing Iraq's program for weapons of mass destruction should be part of any new security arrangement between Washington and Moscow.
On Sept. 11, the unthinkable happened. Worse could be yet to come, especially if terrorists acquire and use nuclear weapons. The only real defense is an effective, long-term strategy that prevents the spread of dangerous chemical, biological and nuclear materials. The United States cannot do this alone. We need President Putin's help — and he needs ours. return to menu
2. Nuclear Terrorism: Tighter Security Could Prevent Disaster
The Record (Bergen, N.J.)
November 13, 2001
(for personal use only)
NEARLY 10 years ago, the Soviet Union dissolved and the Cold War ended, but the threat of nuclear attack persists -- particularly from terrorists. This week, as President Bush meets with Russia's President Vladimir Putin, the two leaders need to work out plans not only to reduce the two nations' nuclear arsenals, as expected, but to take extensive steps to tighten the security around Russia's nuclear stockpiles.
As an article in Sunday's Los Angeles Times reported, security experts worldwide are increasingly concerned about the nuclear threat that many had presumed to have waned with the Cold War. "Absent a major new initiative, we have every reason to expect there will be an act of nuclear terrorism in the next decade, maybe sooner," said Graham Allison, an assistant Defense secretary in the Clinton administration.
Among the well-documented causes for alarm:
Although the United States has spent billions to help Russia and the other 14 former Soviet republics identify and reduce their nuclear arsenals, the security surrounding the remaining nuclear stockpiles often is flimsy at best. Guards have gone for months without pay, and dozens of breaches of security rules have been reported in the past year. Some of Russia's nuclear storage facilities remain off-limits to American officials, a decade after the end of the Cold War.
Small amounts of the type of uranium that can be used for a nuclear device have disappeared.
As Mr. Bush reminded Americans last week, Osama bin Laden has been seeking nuclear weapons for years.
A portion of the blame lies with former President Bill Clinton, who talked a good game about the nuclear security problem but seldom followed through. But Mr. Bush could be doing a better job as well.
When the president was campaigning for office, he promised to boost spending to improve the security of the Soviet nuclear stockpiles, and to push for "an accurate inventory of all this material." Once elected, however, Mr. Bush reversed course, proposing to reduce spending on nuclear security. This week's meetings with Mr. Putin provide a great opportunity to remedy the situation.
While few experts see an immediate threat from a conventional nuclear bomb, there is growing concern that terrorists will sooner or later be able to construct a crude "dirty" bomb that would not kill as many people but would contaminate a large area and would be easier to detonate.
The Defense Department's Cooperative Threat Reduction program has spent $4 billion to deactivate thousands of nuclear warheads and get rid of hundreds of subs, bombers, and missile launchers. But as a federal task force recommended earlier this year, the United States needs to spend up to $30 billion over the next decade to prevent terrorists from using some sort of nuclear device against American citizens or troops. The prevailing thinking is that it is far cheaper and far more effective to protect the nuclear materials than to intercept them after they've been turned into a bomb.
Some have gone as far as pushing nuclear energy as a means of dealing with the problem. Russia and the other former Soviet republics would have a financial incentive to sell their weapons-grade plutonium to the United States for use in nuclear reactors. The drawbacks to that approach are the drawbacks associated with nuclear energy -- from safety concerns to the disposal of nuclear waste. return to menu
3. U.S. Must Help Russia Diminish Nuclear Risk
Los Angeles Times
November 12, 2001
(for personal use only)
Nuclear weapons in the hands of Osama bin Laden. A suitcase bomb detonating in the middle of the Golden Gate Bridge. A radiological bomb spewing plutonium over the White House, creating a keep-out zone in central Washington to last for thousands of years. Suddenly, the press is full of scenarios like these, and people are worried.
The United States has committed funds to responding to these threats, such as training crack nuclear emergency search teams and deploying good nuclear sensor systems. But funding for one critical priority is missing: We must stem the nuclear flow at its source.
The meetings this week between President Bush and Russian President Vladimir V. Putin provide an excellent opportunity for the two to talk about bolstering nuclear threat reduction efforts. Nearly a decade ago, we began working with Russia and other countries in the region to build better fences around nuclear facilities and to train workers to be reliable custodians of nuclear assets. These programs are our first line of defense against a nuclear terror attack.
And yet these programs have not seen a penny of increased spending since the Sept. 11 attack.
Why is this, when the country is sick with worry that the next attack will be a nuclear one? It seems that ambivalence in the White House may be keeping new funds from flowing in this direction. The Bush administration has complained that the Russians shouldn't let us foot the bill for programs that ought to be their top priority as well.
This issue has peaked over the shutdown of Russia's three plutonium production reactors. Originally built to pump out plutonium for the Soviet bomb program, the reactors now provide heat and electicity to the cities of Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk. In the process, they continue to produce 11/2 tons of weapons-grade plutonium every year, enough for about 375 new bombs. For this reason, shutdown of the reactors has been a top priority.
The Bush administration, however, has not been enthusiastic about the shutdown plan, which involves replacing the three plutonium reactors with fossil-fuel plants. "We don't build enough energy plants in this country," I heard one administration official say, "why should we build them in Russia?"
The Bush team has a point. The Russian Federation is no longer in such desperate straits as it was a decade ago. Indeed, while the U.S. economy has ceased growing, the Russian economy is perking along at an annual growth rate of 5%. Russia should therefore, the administration reasons, be in a position to shoulder more of the responsibility for nonproliferation priorities--such as the shutdown of the plutonium reactors that the U.S. finds difficult to fund.
We should not take this argument too far because the size of the Russian economy is still minuscule compared with that of ours.
As one Russian colleague commented when he heard about the $40-billion post-Sept. 11 supplemental funding, "That's nearly double the entire Russian defense budget for this year."
Nevertheless, we could take special action to help the Russians finance such programs.
One good idea is the so-called debt-for-security swaps that have been proposed. Under this concept, we would forgive Soviet-era debt in exchange for Russia putting rubles into nonproliferation programs. These swaps would have to be carefully structured, with firm agreement on what projects and when.
But we need more dollars going into these programs too. We cannot afford to cut the budget and shunt nuclear threat reduction programs to the back burner. We need to take urgent steps to further counter theft at Russian facilities.
Every time we go into a Russian nuclear site, we immediately survey it to decide what quick fixes are needed to upgrade security. Is there a splintered old door that needs to be replaced? Do windows need to be bricked up or equipped with bars?
If we began next April, the start of the summer construction period, within nine months we could complete quick fixes on all of the facilities in the Russian weapons complex that we so far haven't touched. The Russians would have to give us access to the sites, and the U.S. government would have to quickly get all the planning and paperwork in place. But it could be done and would give a huge boost to the nuclear security of both the United States and Russian Federation.
Bush and Putin should focus on this cooperation as a critical part of our fight against terrorism. The next attack on the United States or the next attack on Russia could be nuclear. return to menu
4. Cold War Revisited
November 12, 2001
(for personal use only)
Presidents Bush and Putin are expected to conclude a deal this week on nuclear arms and Star Wars. Bush administration officials indicate that it will be a deal from the last century, despite Bush's protestations that the cold war is over. There will be concessions to anti-nuclear opinion, fake statistics, continued planning to fight and win nuclear war, a neatly laid out course for a new arms race and, regrettably, no plan to implement the "unequivocal" commitments to eliminate the bomb made at the UN last year.
Public opinion and most nations are profoundly against nuclear weapons. A few may be needed, people feel, but generally less is better. For half a century superpower leaders had to come up with some concessions to that view. This time there will be an agreement to reduce nuclear arms to about 1,800 each for the US and Russia from present totals of around 7,000. Such a massive reduction will make us safer. There may also be steps to put a safety catch on some that are left, but America's Trident will remain able to burn any pinpoint on the planet at a moment's notice.
What are thousands of nuclear weapons for? Even if one wanted to Hiroshima the Taliban, surely a few dozen would suffice? President Bush apparently thought something similar and wanted "just" a thousand for a rainy day. But the high priests of nuclear theology, notably the National Security Council's Franklin Miller, insisted that potential targets should determine the number. And, as ever, the prime targets are Russian and Chinese weapons before they can be fired. In the immortal words of Stanley Kubrick's general, such an attack would not mean that "we would not get our hair mussed, but 30 to 40m dead - tops". Bush has completed his review of nuclear strategy and the ability to launch a strike at Russia's forces - the major attack option 1 of the single integrated operating plan for nuclear use remains in place. So much for getting beyond the cold war.
Washington and Russia collude in cooking the nuclear accounting. Thousands more "reserve" and "tactical" weapons are left out of the headline number on each side. In a concession to US power, Putin, with his own bombers rusting, has apparently agreed that planes such as the 94 B-52s be counted as one weapon, when in fact they each carry 20 nuclear cruise missiles with a 1,500-mile range. This one line of small print doubles the US total.
President Bush's prime security concern before September 11 was to shoot missiles down with other missiles. If anything the terrorist attacks have reaffirmed the view that the US should be protected against all kinds of threats. Should Russia and China wish to keep their ability to destroy America - their deterrent - and get into another arms race, well so be it, the US won the last one, argued Ambassador Evan Galbraith, a senior adviser to President Bush and long-time chairman of the influential National Review, in a speech in London last month.
The connection of the missile shield to a nuclear surprise attack is rarely made explicit by Washington. A leaked memo in the summer of 2000 from the Clinton administration was one bizarre example. With the self-confidence of the truly hare-brained, the Clintonites explained to the Russians that providing Russia kept its rockets on a hair trigger they would still be able to destroy America if the US launched a surprise attack, even after the Pentagon had built a few score anti-missile missile systems to fend off rogue states. Don't blame me - I did not invent this stuff. You can read it for yourself on the website of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (www.thebulletin.org).
Putin is expected to concede that the US can continue to test missile defences and will not cite this as a breach of the anti-ballistic- missile treaty which limits US and Russian anti-missile missiles. In turn, out of respect for its ally in the war against terrorism, Washington will not declare the treaty null and void as many Bush supporters have demanded. As all the history of the military industrial complex shows, once weapons start putting taxpayers' dollars in the pockets of shareholders and employees they become unstoppable. In this instance there is an exotic array that would fill the pages of a Christmas catalogue of war toys, from space-based lasers to kinetic kill vehicles.
Everyone wants to be defended, but a verified and enforceable nuclear-free world is a cheaper and more technically feasible solution than anti-missile missiles. Nuclear proliferation and disarmament have been effective and must be improved. According to Nato the worst missile now in the hands of "rogue" states is the Scud which uses an engine designed by Werner von Braun for the Nazi V-2. Sixty years later this is the worst the "bad guys" have got, mainly because Russia and China have not given them anything better. Even China has only managed to build rockets of a standard the superpowers surpassed in the 1960s.
The challenge now is to put more energy into enforceable international law ban ning nuclear, and for that matter, biological and chemical weapons. The "coalition against terrorism" is, we are told, to last for years. Can we expect to be better or worse off if we are trying to scrap and check up on as much dangerous junk as we possibly can? And what are we to make of a coalition leader if it continues to want to police the world by force alone and without recourse to international law?
Britain has said that it would join multilateral talks on eliminating nuclear arms when the time is right. As the prime minister has said in Ireland and the Middle East, there is a choice between starting a dialogue or not. This is also true of implementing the rhetoric of a world free from weapons of mass destruction.
Dan Plesch is senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. return to menu
5. Summit & Nuclear Issue
Voice of America
November 10, 2001
(for personal use only)
INTRO: Keeping the world safe from nuclear weapons is a key issue at the summit meeting this coming week between U-S President Bush and Russian President Putin. Given the September 11tg attacks in the United States, a special concern is that nuclear weapons might fall into the hands of terrorists like Osama bin Laden. V-O-A's Ed Warner reports a discussion of the issue by leading American scientists and members of the U-S Congress.
TEXT: Secret forces crept up to the U-S nuclear research site at Los Alamos in New Mexico. Within minutes, they had disposed of the guards and carried off several bombs worth of nuclear materials in a garden cart.
A fearful action, but luckily only simulated. U-S special forces conducted mock raids on Los Alamos and other nuclear facilities around the country to test their security. In half the attempts, they succeeded in their mission.
If this could be done in America, says Frank von Hippel, chairman of the American Federation of Scientists, imagine what might happen in Russia, where nuclear facilities are far less secure. On a visit to one of them, he found 30 tons of plutonium inside a 50-year-old warehouse with a padlock on it. While the United States spends 800-million dollars a year to protect its facilities, Russia commits 170-million.
At a recent meeting of the Federation of American Scientists, participants said the terrorist attacks in the United States are also a nuclear wake-up call. They said terrorists willing to give their lives for their cause would not hesitate to use a nuclear weapon.
F-A-S president Henry Kelly said it is crucial to keep reducing the thousands of nuclear weapons in both the United States and Russia that might fall into terrorist hands:
/// KELLY ACT ///
We need to work closely with other countries, with Russia in particular, to address the very difficult problem of preventing terrorist attacks, as to nuclear materials, biological materials, and chemical weapons. One of the major concerns we have is the ability of groups like the Taleban to get hold of nuclear materials, and there are a lot of nuclear materials left over from the cold war.
/// END ACT ///
These materials are not serving any useful purpose, said F-A-S member Richard Garwin, one of the architects of the hydrogen bomb. On the contrary, their danger has been recognized by Presidents Bush and Putin, who have agreed on a mutual reduction of nuclear missiles along with acceptance of some form of U-S missile defense:
/// GARWIN ACT ///
Now this really is a different world. We no longer have a Soviet super power. We do not need to worry about them combing the oceans of the world and destroying our strategic submarines before they could strike back. And so we do not need all of these weapons, and we do not need to be ready to launch them ourselves promptly because they are now invulnerable at sea, and many of the in their silos are pretty invulnerable there, too.
/// END ACT ///
Mr. Garwin said a stolen nuclear weapon could kill far more Americans than died on September 11th. Yet Russia has prevented adequate inspection of its nuclear facilities even while the United States is helping pay for the clean-up.
At a recent Congressional hearing, Representative Ron Kind said a new agreement with Russia will allow access to these facilities:
/// KIND ACT ///
A window of opportunity has opened for us to get into areas of Russia that we were excluded from just a short time ago. We should be taking full advantage of the relationship that the president has now developed with President Putin, so we can fully fund these programs that have a new opportunity of doing a better job of preventing the great next catastrophe from striking the American people.
/// END ACT ///
Congressman Russ Holt, a physicist who has worked on nonproliferation issues, warned against reducing funds for these programs:
/// HOLT ACT ///
As disruptive and troubling as the recent incidents with anthrax have been, they pale in comparison to what would happen if people were using materials from the former Soviet weapons labs. I do not believe there is a man or woman in America who thinks we should be doing less this year than we were doing last year to control and stop the flow of materials and technology from the former Soviet weapons labs.
/// END ACT ///
Members of Congress noted the two nations are in complete agreement on the nuclear danger. Now it is a matter of reducing it. return to menu
6. Arms Control: The First Line of Defense
David Kimball and Wade Boese
November 7, 2001
(for personal use only)
The Bush administration spent its first eight months in office disparaging arms control as a failed policy of a bygone era and has said almost nothing about the role arms control can play in the new "war" on terrorism. Yet arms control is vital to preventing individuals, groups, or countries from carrying out future, even deadlier terrorist attacks using chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.
While the Bush administration and Congress are right to strengthen U.S. defenses and emergency responses to terrorist attacks, no civil defense plan or national missile defense system will make the United States immune to chemical, biological, and nuclear attacks. The first line of defense must be to deny, or make as difficult as possible, efforts to buy, build, transfer or steal these weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and deliver them.
Arms control is that first line of defense and it has helped guard U.S. security for more than 30 years. Except North Korea, which might possibly have enough plutonium for one or two nuclear bombs, none of the so-called rogue states, let alone terrorists, possesses nuclear weapons or long-range ballistic missiles to deliver them. But they are trying to get these capabilities, and the Bush administration should expend every effort to make sure they don't succeed.
President George W. Bush should increase, not decrease as currently planned, funding for programs to secure and destroy Russia's nuclear weapons and its more than a thousand metric tons of fissile material that could be used to build an estimated 40,000 additional weapons. An independent, bipartisan panel in January declared that "the most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today" is that Russian weapons of mass destruction and weapons-usable material could be "stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation-states."
The Bush administration should also push to get international arms inspectors back into Iraq to help prevent Saddam Hussein from reconstituting his WMD programs and potentially passing these lethal weapons to others. With top Bush officials lobbying for concerted military strikes against Baghdad as part of the war on terrorism, Russia and China should be willing to work with the United States to get inspectors back in the country rather than see a new U.S. military campaign waged against Iraq.
Other measures the Bush administration should consider include reaching a codified agreement with Russia to sharply cut U.S. and Russian Cold War-era nuclear arsenals, intensifying efforts to persuade North Korea to abandon its attempts to build long-range ballistic missiles, negotiating an agreement to help enforce global compliance with a treaty banning germ weapons, and pressing Russia and China to cut off all interactions with Iran that could assist its acquisition of nuclear weapons. It would also be wise to maintain, rather than cut, U.S. funding for international nuclear test ban treaty monitoring activities.
Like the war on terrorism, the United States cannot stem global WMD proliferation alone. Washington needs broad international support, particularly from Russia and China, whose cooperation will be essential in shutting off the flow of WMD technology and knowledge to those wishing the United States harm.
Now is the time for the Bush administration to seize upon the emerging unity underlying the international coalition against terrorism to energize and bolster efforts designed to prevent and impede the spread of weapons of mass destruction. As President Bush prepares to host Russian President Vladimir Putin for three days of talks beginning Nov. 13, he must be careful not to undercut support from key countries by pressing ahead with his missile defense plans and unilaterally withdrawing from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which Russia and China argue would upset world security and stability.
The Bush administration should not abandon its missile defense plans to appease Moscow and Beijing. Yet the administration should acknowledge that effective and reliable strategic missile defenses are technologically several years, if not decades, away. Therefore, Bush should avoid scrapping the ABM Treaty in his pursuit of missile defenses, which could lead Russia to halt reductions in its nuclear arsenal and compel China to significantly buildup its nuclear forces.
As horrible as the September 11 attacks were, they could have been worse. It is the Bush administration's first responsibility to the American public to do everything in its power to eliminate or minimize the risk of future WMD attacks. Successfully meeting this challenge will require strengthening, not dismantling or neglecting, the international framework of arms control and nonproliferation. return to menu
7. Dealing with the Unthinkable
November 1, 2001
(for personal use only)
IF YOU had asked before September 11th what was the greatest threat to peace in the 21st century, the answer would have been the same as it is today: the spread of weapons of mass destruction. But now there seems a world of difference. Proliferation-trackers have long fretted about such weapons falling into the hands of hostile, even if hopefully deterrable, governments. Now they are weapons of choice for suicidal terrorists with no calculation of restraint. Whether the anthrax-laced letters in America are al-Qaeda's follow-up to September's attacks on New York and Washington or the work of some other group, there could be worse to come (see article). Is the decades-long battle to control the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons now lost?
There is no doubt that if al-Qaeda's boss, Osama bin Laden, has such weapons he will try to use them; supporters have in the past threatened a “Hiroshima” against America. The world is not helpless against such threats. But an effective response to prevent future threats, by al-Qaeda or anyone else, requires that, alongside the current military, diplomatic and financial campaign against al-Qaeda, a lot more effort, money and political will be put into the anti-proliferation cause.
Between them the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) already outlaw the spread of such weapons. More pressure needs to be applied to those who have not signed up: India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba are outside the NPT, and North Korea refuses proper inspections; Egypt, Libya and Syria are among the hold-outs from the CWC. A harsher diplomatic spotlight needs to be turned on cheats: Russia, a repository power for the BWC, admits it had (some think still has) a biological-weapons programme; Iran barely disguises its nuclear ambitions.
But aren't treaties aimed at states anyway useless against groups like al-Qaeda? On the contrary, they establish the norms that make its threatened actions a crime. And Mr bin Laden is no Dr No, with lavish weapons laboratories of his own; whatever he does have has been filched, one way or another, from government-run programmes.
Some of the proliferation gaps to be plugged are glaringly obvious. Before the 1995 sarin attack on the Tokyo underground, which killed 12 people and injured more, Japan had no laws making dabbling in chemical or biological weapons a crime. Governments that have signed the CWC are now obliged to adopt national laws to implement its rules, though many drag their feet. Few have taken measures to implement the biological ban. Similarly, when it was discovered after the Gulf war how easily Iraq had run rings round safeguards on its nuclear materials, verification rules were tightened, giving the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) tough new powers. But these apply only in countries that sign up to them, and few have done so. Until more western governments do, it will be hard to lean on potential rule-breakers elsewhere.
When it comes to proliferation, prevention is a lot less costly than cure, and small amounts of money can buy a lot more security. As a UN organisation, the IAEA has long been denied a budget increase for its safeguards work, despite a proliferating workload. More now needs to be done to help governments protect other less potent nuclear materials, in hospitals or industry, but the agency has to hand the cap round.
Short of a government deliberately helping the terrorists, the likeliest source of the smuggled materials and expertise al-Qaeda has been after is the sprawling weapons complex in what was once the Soviet Union. Earlier this year, the Bush administration tried to cut the money America spends helping to protect and dismantle Russia's surplus nuclear weapons, to reduce its stocks of weapons-usable material, and to find employment for its scientists. Even before September 11th that looked like a false saving. Better for Mr Bush to use the opportunity of his upcoming summit with a more co-operative Vladimir Putin to find creative ways to speed up the work.
The risks to come
Much can be done, but is there the will? After its Iraqi shock, the UN Security Council decreed that the spread of weapons of mass destruction—like terrorism today—constituted a threat to international peace and security. Soon afterwards it fell out over whether to uphold its own resolutions on frisking Iraq. In 1998, when India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons, few governments applied sanctions. America is now lifting them. But if these two win any benefits open to NPT members, having flouted the rules, the treaty will be weakened.
The risk from ghastly weapons in the wrong hands can never be eliminated; it can be reduced. But defences against it will be only as good as governments make them. return to menu
B. U.S. Non-proliferation Budget
1. No Time To Haggle
David S. Broder
November 13, 2001
(for personal use only)
When Sam Rayburn was speaker of the House, he used to say, "There is no education in the second kick of a mule." We are about to learn whether Congress and the Bush administration have realized there is nothing to be gained by ignoring the threat of terrorism twice.
In the aftermath of Sept. 11, we discovered belatedly that the government had brushed off warnings from three blue-ribbon commissions that this nation was ill-equipped to defend itself against any form of terrorist attack.
Now we are about to learn whether similarly clear and authoritative warnings about the possibility of Russian nuclear weapons and materials slipping into the hands of terrorists will be treated with the seriousness they deserve. Thousands of lives could rest on the answer.
For reasons that seem trivial, and really inexplicable, Bush administration budgeteers are trying to save a few million dollars by holding back a successful 10-year-old program to assist Russia in securing its vulnerable nuclear materials and ensuring that penniless Russian nuclear scientists do not join or assist hostile forces.
The program was launched in 1991 by Sen. Richard Lugar, the Indiana Republican, and then Sen. Sam Nunn, the Georgia Democrat, who between them know almost everything worth knowing about America's national security.
Under the Nunn-Lugar program, high-energy uranium and plutonium that could have built 5,000 nuclear weapons have been removed from Russian warehouses and "defused." But the same Energy Department special task force that cited that success last January warned that "much more remains to be done [to counter] the most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States, . . . the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation-states."
A number of such attempts have been made and thwarted, the report said, but "imagine if such material were successfully stolen and sold to a terrorist like Osama bin Laden."
The authors of this report were neither amateurs nor alarmists. They were Howard H. Baker Jr., the former Senate Republican leader and Reagan White House chief of staff, subsequently named ambassador to Japan, and Lloyd Cutler, White House counsel during the Carter and Clinton administrations.
They recommended that the Nunn-Lugar program be increased to the point that all nuclear weapons-usable material in Russia could be secured or neutralized within the next eight to 10 years. That would cost about $30 billion -- just 1 percent of projected defense expenditures.
President Bush, as far back as the campaign and as recently as this month, has spoken of his concern about nuclear weapons or materials falling into terrorist hands. But his budget last winter proposed cutting overall defense nuclear nonproliferation programs by $100 million, with roughly $55 million coming out of the programs focused on Russia. As Nunn told me the other day, there is "a puzzling disconnect between the president's words and his budget recommendations."
Nunn delivered a blunt warning of the nuclear-terrorist danger at the National Press Club last March, calling it "America's greatest unmet threat." Now, he said, "it must be apparent to everyone that keeping weapons of mass destruction away from terrorists is our most urgent security need."
Lugar agrees. "After 10 years," he told me, "we are at the point where the Russians are ready to push the Nunn-Lugar program further. It is clearly in our interest and theirs to avoid the fatal intersection of nuclear weapons and terrorist groups."
Former secretary of state James A. Baker III told me, "I can't think of a better use of our funds. It is probably some of the best money we could ever spend."
Harvard's Graham Allison, a former Clinton Defense Department official, lays out the case at length in the latest edition of the Economist.
All this makes it mind-boggling that Congress and the administration are haggling over the minuscule sums involved. The recently passed Energy Department appropriations bill brought the money for Nunn-Lugar to within $10 million of last year's figure, but conferees rejected a move by Rep. Chet Edwards, a Texas Democrat, to boost the program by $131 million.
The issue faces the House Appropriations Committee again this week. With bipartisan support for expanding the program, Chairman Bill Young, a Florida Republican, was prepared to put $45 million for Nunn-Lugar into the supplemental spending bill. But when Bush read the riot act to legislators last week about staying within his overall budget limits, even threatening his first veto, Young cut back the proposal to $18 million.
Spending discipline is important. But if, God forbid, a terrorist ever slips a suitcase nuclear weapon, with stolen Russian materials, into the United States, we will rue the day the government decided this was a good place to economize. return to menu
C. Nuclear Terrorism
1. Russian Official Reveals Attempt Made to Steal Nuclear Materials: Report Coincides With Bin Laden's Claim to Have Weapons
November 13, 2001
(for personal use only)
A senior Russian official has reported a major incident involving the attempted theft of nuclear materials in the past two years, raising fresh fears about the security of the former superpower's aging nuclear arsenal.
The incident, revealed in a report by the Russian nuclear regulatory agency, coincides with claims by Saudi-born fugitive Osama bin Laden that he has acquired weapons of mass destruction and would be willing to use them as a last resort. While U.S. officials are skeptical that bin Laden has acquired a real nuclear weapon, they believe he might have acquired radiological materials that could be scattered into the atmosphere with the help of a conventional bomb.
A White House official said he had no information to support claims in the Pakistani media that bin Laden had met with retired Pakistani nuclear scientists who have shown sympathy for his fundamentalist Islamic views. Earlier, a well-placed Pakistani official told The Washington Post that one of the architects of Pakistan's nuclear bomb, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, had acknowledged holding meetings on humanitarian matters with bin Laden associates in the southern Afghan city of Kandahar.
The report of a serious attempt to compromise Russian nuclear security surfaced at a conference this month in Vienna hosted by the International Atomic Energy Agency that was convened to discuss the possibility of terrorist attacks on nuclear facilities. Western experts at the conference were taken aback when Yuri Volodin, head of the safety department at the Russian nuclear regulatory agency, reported a previously undisclosed security violation of the "highest possible consequence" sometime during the past two years.
Matthew Bunn, a Harvard University nuclear expert who worked at the Clinton White House, said Volodin refused to provide further details about the nature of the violation. Bunn said he assumed that the materials had been recovered, as otherwise the Russians would probably not have drawn attention to the incident in a public forum. Volodin could not be contacted for immediate comment.
There have been dozens of attempts by smugglers and terrorists to gain access to Russia's vast nuclear arsenal in the 10 years since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, but no leakage of sufficient quantities of highly fissile materials to build a nuclear weapon has been confirmed. Thefts of low-grade radiological material have been more frequent.
While U.S. officials say there is no doubt that bin Laden's al Qaeda terrorist network has attempted to acquire nuclear and biological weapons, there is considerable debate over whether he has been successful. That is why considerable attention has been focused on the activities of Mahmood and other Pakistani nuclear scientists who have been questioned repeatedly by the Pakistani police over the past two weeks.
According to Pakistani officials, Mahmood and his associate, Abdul Majid, told police that they went to Kandahar, the Taliban stronghold in southern Afghanistan, as part of their work for the Islamic relief organization Ummah Tamer-e-Nau. They said they helped construct a flour mill near the city, and denied passing on nuclear information or materials to anyone in Afghanistan.
Mahmood's area of expertise is the production of plutonium, the highly fissile material used in some of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. He was transferred to a desk job in the spring of 1999 after publicly advocating increases in the production of plutonium to help other Islamic nations build nuclear weapons. He has also spoken out strongly in support of the radical Taliban movement, which he has described as a "movement of Islamic renaissance."
Some Western experts suspect that the Kandahar flour mill could be a cover for some kind of biological or chemical weapons program, which could involve milling bacteriological agents to fine powders. It is more difficult to imagine it being used as a screen for a nuclear program. return to menu
2. Expert Says 180 Terrorist Groups Have Interest in Nuclear Weapons...
November 13, 2001
(for personal use only)
In an interview published in "Izvestiya" on 9 November, Vladimir Dvorkin, the scientific leader of the Center of Strategic Nuclear Forces at the Academy of Military Sciences, said that 180 to 200 terrorist groups worldwide seek to acquire nuclear weapons. He said that the ability of these groups to acquire nuclear materials and/or weapons depends on money, professional expertise, and the goals of the terrorists themselves, as well as on the security measures taken by nuclear powers. PG return to menu
3. ...But Russian Atomic Energy Official Says They Will Not Obtain Them In Russia
November 13, 2001
(for personal use only)
Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Bulat Nigmatulin said on Ekho Moskvy on 9 November that terrorists will not obtain nuclear weapons or technologies from Russian laboratories. "People who are working in Russian nuclear laboratories are loyal to their cause. They are patriots of Russia," Nigmatulin said. PG return to menu
4. Russia Has No Evidence of Bin-Ladin Possessing Nuclear Weapons
BBC Monitoring Service
November 13, 2001
(for personal use only)
Text of report in English by Russian news agency ITAR-TASS
Moscow, 13 November: The command of the Russian Defence Ministry has no evidence that the Al-Qa'idah terrorist group headed Usamah Bin-Ladin has nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, Chief of the Defence Ministry Department in charge of Russia's nuclear arsenal Gen Igor Valynkin told journalists on Tuesday.
"Bin-Ladin does not and cannot possess nuclear weapons either of Soviet or western production," the general stressed.
Nevertheless, the general did not rule out that such weapons might get to the Taleban from Pakistan. "Bin-Ladin has contacts with secret services of Pakistan, the country which possesses nuclear weapons," Valynkin admitted.
"Therefore, we cannot rule out possible developments when Bin-Ladin gets nuclear weapons into his possession," the Russian general stressed.
Source: ITAR-TASS news agency, Moscow, in English 1117 gmt 13 Nov 01 return to menu
5. Do the Terrorists Have Nukes?
Wall Street Journal
November 11, 2001
(for personal use only)
MOSCOW--The threat of nuclear terrorism suddenly seems more real. People who slam passenger jets into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon would surely not hesitate to use nuclear weapons against big cities if they had them. But do they? And if not, can terrorists soon get hold of usable nuclear devices?
During a joint news conference with French President Jacques Chirac on Tuesday, President Bush said that Osama bin Laden has threatened in the past to use chemical, biological and even nuclear weapons, adding, "he is an evil man and I wouldn't put it past him to develop evil weapons to try to harm civilization as we know it."
President Bush also said that there is no evidence that bin Laden or his al Qaeda organization possess such weaponry. But just last month a three-star Russian general told reporters that terrorists had attempted to penetrate Russia's nuclear weapons facilities.
Gen. Igor Volynkin--chief the 12th Main Department of the Russian Defense Ministry, which is in charge of the delivery, security, maintenance and testing of all Russian nuclear weapons--told reporters there were recently two "attempts" by some unnamed "terrorists" to penetrate Russian nuclear storage facilities, known as "S-shelters." The attempts, according to Gen. Volynkin, were repelled.
The S-shelters are strongly fortified concrete bunkers in which nuclear warheads are stored and maintained when they are not attached to delivery systems. These bunkers were built in Soviet times. They are spread across Russia in the vicinity of large airfields and missile bases. The location of S-shelters is top secret and was not disclosed in arms-reduction talks with the U.S. The fact that some hostile outsiders had discovered these facilities and stalked them is highly discomfiting.
It has also been reported that bin Laden may have already obtained Russian nuclear weapons. In 1997 retired Gen. Alexander Lebed (today the governor of one of Russia's largest provinces) surprised and alarmed the world when he announced that at the time of the demise of the Soviet Union Moscow lost track of more than 100 suitcase-sized nuclear weapons. Mr. Lebed said that he learned about the "loose nukes" when he served for several months in 1996 as head of national security. Mr. Lebed said they were RA-115 and RA-115-01 nuclear weapons, which have one kiloton of explosive power and weigh up to 50 kilograms. It was alleged that these portable weapons were developed for the KGB to be used for attacks behind enemy lines in time of war.
The Russian military denied the charge that any nuclear weapons were unaccounted for, and declared that all Soviet nukes were moved safely back to Russia as the Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union collapsed. The Russian authorities also denied having ever mass-produced or deployed suitcase-sized nuclear bombs.
At the time, the U.S. officially supported the Russian denials. The State Department announced in 1997 that the U.S. did not place much credence in Mr. Lebed's remarks: "there is no evidence other than hearsay to support claims of portable Russian nuclear weapons gone missing."
If bin Laden or his supporters indeed obtained a genuine suitcase-sized Russian nuclear weapon (and not some fake traded on the black market), it is virtually impossible that they would be able to make it explode. Outsiders cannot directly use modern Russian and American nuclear weapons because they have security codes that fully deactivate them when there is an attempt at unauthorized penetration or activation. It is also not easy to use the core nuclear materials of a sophisticated nuke to make a clandestine bomb.
If there is any serious threat that bin Laden may get a usable nuke, its origin would likely be Pakistan, not Russia. Pakistan's nuclear weapons are armed with only weapons-grade uranium and are, apparently, not much more sophisticated than the bomb the U.S. dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. Such weapons tend to be bulky and their explosive yield is relatively low, but they are easy to reassemble. Bin Laden supporters in the Pakistani nuclear program (and such people, apparently, do exist) can, possibly, pass on the material and the knowledge to make a crude nuclear explosive.
Bin Laden and al Qaeda may have no usable nuclear weapons yet, as U.S. authorities assume. But experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency warn that there is a weapons category that is in many respects worse than nukes and much easier to make--radioactive bombs.
Such a weapon is a device to spread deadly radioactive contamination over a large area without a nuclear explosion. It may rely on a mix of conventional explosives with some highly radioactive substance like spent nuclear fuel, cesium that is used in medicine or in industry, plutonium from a nuclear weapon, or plutonium from a conventional nuclear power station that is not suitable for weapons production.
The explosion of such a bomb would create a radioactive cloud and cause severe and long-lasting contamination. If such a thing happened in New York, humans might have to abandon parts of Manhattan for hundreds, if not thousands of years, as they have the town of Pripyat in Ukraine, near the Chernobyl disaster area. The Soviets tried to clean up Pripyat, but it is practically impossible to clean a modern city of radioactive dust.
In the 1950s, when Russia and the U.S. did not have many nukes, radioactive weapons were developed and tested. Later they were withdrawn and replaced by tens of thousands of regular nuclear bombs. But now the relative ease of making radioactive weapons and their terrifying power may attract terrorists.
It's much easier to obtain radioactive materials in the republics of the former Soviet Union than true nuclear bombs. Radioactive materials are plentiful and they are poorly guarded. As a scientist in Soviet times, I easily obtained relatively large amounts of radioactive isotopes for research and no one ever seriously inquired what I did with them.
Almost all recorded cases of nuclear smuggling from the former Soviet Union have involved radioactive substances, not weapons-grade nuclear materials. The use of radioactive weapons by terrorists would probably not cause mass deaths of civilians, but the ensuing panic and economic losses make radioactivity an effective terrorist weapon--as devastating, if not more so, than anthrax, smallpox or other bioweapons. return to menu
D. U.S.-Russian Relations
1. U.S. Could Transform Competitor Into Ally
Dallas Morning News
November 13, 2001
(for personal use only)
For much of the 1900s, America's bugbear was communism's quest for world dominion. It led America to the brink of nuclear war over Soviet missiles in Cuba and into years of battle in Vietnam. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, that changed ... somewhat.
Russia may have lost its ideological motives, but it has retained its enormous nuclear capabilities. The meetings this week between Russian President Vladimir Putin and President Bush offer the opportunity to redefine their relationship. For Sept. 11 showed there's a new, shared enemy.
Islamic extremists threaten Russia's national security as well as America's. Russia has Islamic terrorists active in neighboring Central Asian states and separatists in its Chechnya province. Mr. Putin wisely overruled Russian hard-liners in clearing the way for American troops in Central Asia with flights in Russian airspace. As Russia turns to the West, America should respond.
The tone of this week is important. There's no reason to threaten American abandonment of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; a skillful agreement allowing additional warning systems and further testing of anti-missile systems are needed.
Nuclear security in Russia is a problem. Greater international efforts are needed – and the U.S. can lead the way – to help Russia better safeguard nuclear weapons and reactor facilities. For their part, Russians – who had a large biological warfare program – can help address bioterrorism.
Mr. Putin understands Russia's common interests with the West. His opposition to the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has softened. In return, Russia is considering an alliance ("small a") with NATO.
Increased economic relations can prove mutually beneficial. Russia has oil and gas, but needs better civil institutions and laws to invite foreign investment. Can the U.S. revoke the Jackson-Vanik Amendment that threatens economic sanctions and help Russia accede to the World Trade Organization? Can Russia ingrain democratic institutions – like a free press – in its culture and find a political solution to Chechnya?
Mr. Bush and Mr. Putin can serve the long-term interests of both countries by setting the course for a new, broader relationship – one that goes beyond strategic competition. return to menu
2. The real threat from Russia
November 13, 2001
(for personal use only)
President Bush welcomes Russian President Vladimir Putin, his new ally in the war on terrorism, for a three-day summit starting Tuesday that could fundamentally realign relations between the two former Cold War rivals.
There are opportunities for dramatic agreements on U.S. missile defense, the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty and substantial cuts in the thousands of offensive strategic nuclear arms held by both nations.
Yet the most important issue they will discuss--arguably the greatest threat to peace in the 21st Century--has gotten far less attention.
That is the prospect that elements of a nuclear arsenal could fall into the hands of a terrorist organization or rogue nation. Bush told the United Nations on Saturday that terrorists will use such weapons "the moment they are capable of doing so. No hint of conscience would prevent it."
This is a grave concern in large part because there is great uncertainty about the vulnerability of Russian nuclear materials and the status of some of the nation's top scientists.
Putin insists Russia's nuclear stockpiles are secure and that no Russian "loose nukes" or fissile material has fallen into terrorist hands. That sounds comforting, but the cold facts are that there were dozens of violations last year of Russia's rules for securing nuclear material.
Russian forces reported two incidents this year in which terrorists staked out a secret nuclear arms storage site. In late 1998, Russia stopped an attempt by an organized gang to steal more than 40 pounds of highly enriched uranium from a military facility in the Urals. There was an attempt by Taliban emissaries to recruit a Russian nuclear expert. There were reports a few years ago by a top aide to President Boris Yeltsin that 40 KGB nuclear suitcase bombs were not accounted for. The aide later backed off his statement, but doubts linger.
To combat these vulnerabilities, Russia must reduce the number of sites where nuclear weapons are stored, closing the vulnerable ones and heightening security at the ones that remain. The U.S. must continue to help with the destruction of Russian nuclear materials and with providing employment for nuclear scientists, who might otherwise sell their services to terrorists.
There have been breathtaking changes in relations between Russia and the U.S. since the Sept. 11 attacks. A new vision of the relationship is emerging; it is paying benefits right now in the former Soviet areas of Central Asia, where U.S. troops are stationed for the fight against the Taliban and Al Qaeda terrorist network.
The agenda for Bush and Putin holds the possibility of an historic agreement to cut offensive nuclear arms. The U.S. and Russia each have more than 6,000 warheads, those numbers could be pared to something between 1,750 and 2,250 warheads in the U.S. and 1,000 and 1,500 warheads in Russia.
It's ironic that these weapons were the focus of security concerns for decades. Yet, just as it appears an extraordinary breakthrough is about to happen, the risk of the great powers firing their arsenals has suddenly diminished. More important, it seems, is eliminating, or preventing the dissemination of, insecure nuclear materials. return to menu
3. Transforming Relations With Russia
New York Times
November 12, 2001
(for personal use only)
After a whirlwind of diplomatic meetings over the weekend in New York, President Bush turns his attention this week to one nation and one leader. Mr. Bush and President Vladimir Putin of Russia will spend three days at the White House and Mr. Bush's ranch in Texas trying to strengthen the surprisingly cordial relationship that has developed between the two men and their two nations in recent months. Though obstacles remain, Mr. Bush and Mr. Putin seem within reach of decisions that could open a new era of cooperation.
Mr. Putin gave a crucial boost to relations after Sept. 11 by providing strong support for Mr. Bush's campaign against international terrorism. He cleared the way for American military forces to use bases in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, Central Asian nations that border Afghanistan and were once Soviet republics. Moscow has also helped to arm guerrilla forces in Afghanistan. In the talks that begin tomorrow, the two leaders can enhance their cooperation against Osama bin Laden and other terrorist threats and work to narrow their differences on arms control and other matters.
Although advisers to both presidents caution that no formal arms control agreement is likely this week, the two sides are moving ever closer to an accord. Moscow is apparently ready to accept the missile defense testing that the Bush administration wants to conduct, as long as Washington does not formally repudiate the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty. The treaty can probably be preserved if the two leaders agree on language permitting limited defensive systems. It would be a grave error for Washington to walk away from a treaty that has helped keep nuclear peace for three decades.
Agreement is also near on trimming arsenals of long-range nuclear weapons by more than two- thirds, probably to somewhere between 1,500 and 2,000 warheads apiece. Currently, the United States has about 7,000 and Russia a little under 6,000. Such reductions would substantially reduce nuclear dangers and costs, including the risk of a warhead being accidentally launched or stolen as Russia's military infrastructure decays.
While they're at it, Mr. Bush and Mr. Putin ought to talk about ways to improve the inadequate security for Russia's nuclear weapons and materials. President Bush, who warned last week of Osama bin Laden's efforts to obtain nuclear bomb ingredients, should support Congressional efforts to add $100 million to programs that help Russia safeguard stockpiles of enriched uranium and plutonium.
Russia's relations with Iraq and Iran remain a source of friction. Iraq has exploited Russian support to evade international weapons inspections and cheat on United Nations sanctions. Russia has hoped that lobbying for eased sanctions will bring it new business contracts and repayment of Iraq's Soviet- era debt. These commercial considerations must be subordinated to the urgent need to curb Iraq's illegal biological and chemical weapons programs.
Similar concerns apply to Moscow's nuclear reactor and weapons sales to Iran. These deals have helped sustain Russia's struggling arms manufacturers and nuclear industry. Yet if Mr. Putin means to be a full partner in the struggle against terrorism, he must agree to restrict arms and nuclear deals with countries like Iran that refuse to cut their ties with international terrorists.
Mr. Bush made clear after his first meeting with Mr. Putin in June that he thought improved relations with Russia could be a centerpiece of his presidency. He has a chance to bring that goal closer to realization this week. return to menu
1. Experts to Assess Risks of Terrorism and the Nuclear Threat
Physicians for Social Responsibility
November 12, 2001
Contact: Bob Schaeffer, 941-395-6773, Lynn Martin, 617-868-5050, ext. 209, or Adrian Zupp, 617-868-5050, ext. 212, both of IPPNW
Who: Some of the world's leading experts on nuclear weapons, nuclear proliferation, and the potential for nuclear terrorism will be briefing U.S. and international media at this event sponsored by Nobel Peace Prize Laureate International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) and its U.S. affiliate Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR).
The line-up of experts includes:
Ambassador Richard Butler, former chief UN weapons inspector in Iraq and Diplomat in Residence at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of the forthcoming book Fatal Choice: Nuclear Weapons and the Illusion of Missile Defense.
Bruce Blair, president of the Center for Defense Information and formerly a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Blair is a former nuclear missile launch control officer who is an expert on the security policies of the United States and the former Soviet Union.
Jonathan Schell, formerly a writer and editor with The New Yorker, is one of the world's foremost authorities on nuclear issues. He is author of The Fate of the Earth, which was nominated for a Pulitzer Prize, and The Abolition. Schell is a frequent contributor to Foreign Affairs and The Nation.
Mary-Wynne Ashford, MD, a Canadian physician who serves as IPPNW's co-president. Dr. Ashford has written and spoken extensively on nuclear disarmament in North Asia, Russia, and the U.S., particularly on the urgent need for de-alerting and preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Ira Helfand, MD, of PSR is an emergency room physician who has spoken widely on the medical effects of nuclear war in the United States, the former Soviet Union, India, Pakistan, and France. Dr. Helfand is a co-author of "Accidental Nuclear War -- A Post-Cold War Assessment," which appeared in the New England Journal of Medicine.
Bob Musil, chief executive officer of PSR, is also adjunct professor in the Nuclear Studies Institute of American University and Adjunct Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at Swarthmore College.
John Pastore, MD, of IPPNW and PSR is a cardiologist at Tufts Medical School and St. Elizabeth's Medical Center of Boston. Dr. Pastore served as a research internist with the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission in Hiroshima and Nagasaki from 1969-1971.
In addition to addressing issues of nuclear terrorism in the wake of the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington, PSR will release a new report that details the medical impact of a nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and Russia.
IPPNW will present an overview of the variety of potential nuclear terrorist threats with particular emphasis on terrorist use of radiological weapons based on IPPNW's study "Crude Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and the Terrorist Threat."
This briefing takes place on the eve of the Bush-Putin Summit, where speakers hope national leaders will directly address issues of nuclear terrorism. return to menu