The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon sent an urgentwakeup call that the United States should take seriously the continuingefforts by terrorist groups to acquire nuclear weapons.
The State Department currently lists more than a dozen rogue states andterrorist organizations, including Osama bin Laden, who are activelyseeking them.
Russia's vast and undersecured stockpiles of excess fissile materialsrepresent the most likely potential source of terrorist nuclearcapability. According to U.S. intelligence agencies, Russian criminalgroups are already supplying bin Laden and his al-Qaida terrorist groupwith components for nuclear weapons. All that's missing is the nuclearmaterial itself. In the days following the Sept. 11 attacks, Russia'sFederal Security Service reportedly thwarted an attempt by one of thesecriminal groups to sell stolen or diverted nuclear material to anunidentified buyer.
For several years, Russia has been hinting that it would be interestedin selling these same nuclear materials to the United States forpeaceful uses. Unfortunately, these hints have usually fallen on deafears.
Now, thanks to years of hard work and perseverance, we stand at thethreshold of just such an agreement -- and the timing couldn't be morecritical.
Russia's Cold War-era nuclear stockpiles, which include 700 to 800 tonsof highly enriched uranium and 150 to 200 tons of weapon-gradeplutonium, pose a growing risk because of serious gaps in Moscow'snuclear security. Many of these scattered stockpiles are stored inmakeshift warehouses, protected only by $5 combination locks or theequivalent. Small amounts of these materials have already beenconfiscated by European law enforcement officials from sellers lookingfor buyers.
It would take only 15 to 20 pounds of this uranium, or an even smalleramount of plutonium, to level a city the size of downtown Washington orlower Manhattan. Iraq and the terrorist group Islamic Jihad have eachreportedly offered Russian workers enormous sums of money for enoughnuclear material to produce a single weapon.
The blueprints and non-nuclear components necessary to build crude buthighly effective nuclear weapons are readily available -- the onlycomponent prohibitively difficult to develop or acquire is the nuclearmaterial.
There is no reliable way of keeping a nuclear weapon or contraband frombeing smuggled into U.S. territory if it ever does fall into the wronghands. Fortunately, Moscow appears willing to sell these same materialsto the United States, or to a U.S.-led group of international investors,for just a few thousand dollars per pound.
Sen. Pete Domenici, R-N.M., introduced a bill just before the Augustrecess that establishes a framework for how such a transaction mighttake place. Under the bill's provisions, the U.S. government wouldguarantee loans to Russia in increments of $20 million, up to $1 billionat any one time, accepting Moscow's fissile materials as collateral. Foreach $20 million loan, Russia would place 1 metric ton of uranium and 1metric ton of plutonium under International Atomic Energy Agencysafeguards at a secure facility in Russia that is mutually acceptable toboth Russia and the IAEA.
As part of the deal, Russia would guarantee that the fissile materialsplaced under IAEA safeguards would remain there indefinitely, meaninguntil they are used as nuclear fuel or otherwise permanently disposed.This entire process could be completed within just a few years.
The opportunity has never been greater to resolve the tremendous risk toU.S. and international security posed by Russia's enormous stockpiles ofundersecured nuclear materials.
Last but not least, the friendly relationship established betweenPresident Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin during their firstface-to-face meetings, combined with their declared intention to hold asummit in November to discuss nuclear arms reduction and missiledefense, could help provide the final boost to push this idea through tofruition.
Rep. Lois Capps, D-Calif., is planning to introduce a companion bill inthe House in the next few days. Congress should move quickly to considerthese two bills, make any necessary revisions and deliver legislation tothe president as soon as possible for his signature.
Otherwise, the next "act of war" against the United States might verywell turn out to be an act of nuclear war. return to menu
2. Curtailing A Nuclear Threat
October 10, 2001
(for personal use only)
Terrorist attacks on the American homeland should provide a boost forefforts to avert an even worse catastrophe by keeping nuclear weaponsmaterials out of the hands of terrorist groups. Congress will have achance this fall to consider one such proposal, and perhaps put it onthe table for a planned November summit.
Legislation being introduced in both the Senate and House would set up aloan framework that could, eventually, amount to the ultimate triumph ofcapitalism - American purchase of Russian nuclear weapons once destinedto destroy us, so that they can be used as power plant fuels.
Current proposals may not go far enough toward ensuring that end, andthere are concerns over nuclear power plant security and radioactivewaste disposal. But it's far better to target weapons-grade materials onelectricity production than city destruction, and America has anoverwhelming interest in securing stockpiles left poorly guarded in thewake of the Soviet Union's collapse.
If the United States can secure Russian uranium and plutonium suppliesand keep them out of the hands of terrorists, notes California Centerfor Strategic Studies President Brett Wagner, "we may have averted amillion deaths."
Russian stockpiles include 700 to 800 tons of highly enriched uraniumand 150 to 200 tons of weapons-grade plutonium - enough for 60,000 to80,000 nuclear weapons, according to Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., chairmanof the Senate Armed Services Committee. Twenty pounds of the uraniumcould level an urban center.
Since the early 1990s, the United States has been fundingnonproliferation programs designed to help financially strapped Russiakeep its stockpiles guarded and secure, and destroy warheads. But theprograms have been criticized as poorly administered and underfunded.They are also in line for major budget cuts by President Bush, althoughhe supported such efforts during his campaign.
New legislation crafted by Sen. Pete Domenici, R-N.M., and Rep. LoisCapps, D-Calif., offers at least the start of a more direct framework.They would allow the United States to guarantee loans others make toRussia in $20 million increments, up to a maximum $1 billion at any onetime. For each $20 million loan, Russia would secure 1 metric ton ofuranium and 1 metric ton of plutonium as collateral in an InternationalAtomic Energy Agency-monitored secure facility and keep it there untilit could be used as a nuclear fuel or otherwise permanently disposed of.
The numbers are based on private-sector estimates of the commercialworth of the materials, and appear to be a bargain, especially for theweapons-grade plutonium that could be used in new types of reactorsunder development.
Presumably - although not codified in the laws - the United States couldpay off the bonds and take possession of the collateral if Russia choseto default on the loans. That would let this nation either consider fuelusage or place the material in secure and monitored storage here. OrRussia could sell the material, diluted from weapons-gradeconcentrations, for a higher market price to an approved purchaser, andpay back the loans.
It would take an estimated $10 billion to secure the entire Russianstockpile. Critics have opposed nonproliferation aid to Russia asindirect subsidies for Russia's military budget and drains on our owndefense and foreign aid spending. But even a total cost 10 times the capproposed by current legislation still is far less than the costs ofSeptember's terrorism.
Proponents of the concept would like to see this effort expanded. Thelimited legislation being proposed, though, stands a better chance ofquick consideration and possible approval in time for Bush and RussianPresident Vladimir L. Putin to discuss the idea at a planned Novembersummit on nuclear arms reduction and missile defense. This could be agood place to start. return to menu
B. Nuclear Terrorism
1. Tiny Nukes Pose Big Threat: Could Terrorists Have Cold War Era Portable Nuclear Weapons?
October 9, 2001
(for personal use only)
As the US ramps up its intelligence efforts as part of the war onterrorism, many security analysts worry that terrorists might have tinynuclear weapons with enough explosive power to devastate a city.
Since the September 11 attacks, US officials have been warning thatchief terrorism suspect Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda network wouldlikely try again to target the United States and its facilities abroad.
"You can speak about a 100 percent chance," one US intelligence officialtold the Reuters news service Friday. "The probability is high thatthere will be more terrorist attacks, regardless of any retaliatoryaction on the part of the United States."
Among the scenarios experts worry about: a nuclear attack staged notwith missiles launched from foreign nations, but with nuclear weaponscontained in suitcase-sized containers.
Cold War Era Munitions
Created by both the United States and the Soviets during the Cold War,such suitcase nukes have enough explosive power to destroy the areaaround the White House in Washington or the New York Stock Exchange inlower Manhattan, spreading radioactive fallout over miles.
The US Defense Department made its own version of the suitcase nukes —called atomic demolition munitions, or atomic land mines — between the1960s and the 1980s, when it phased the weapons out because of armscontrol agreements. One version, known as the Special Atomic DemolitionMunition, actually came housed in a suitcase and weighed less than 163pounds.
The Soviet Union also made the suitcase nuclear devices, which were tobe used by Soviet special forces in sabotage and demolition missions.They reportedly did not come equipped with standard safety systems toprevent unauthorized demolition.
Terrorists Attempt to Buy Nukes
In 1997, a Soviet general declared that dozens of them were missing. Helater recanted his statement, but intelligence analysts worry thatSoviet nukes may end up in the hands of terrorists like Bin Laden.
In recent days, commentators have talked about suitcase nukeshypothetically, but associates of Bin Laden reportedly tried to acquirenuclear material in the 1990s, and analysts say small nuclear devicesare a real terrorist threat.
"Osama Bin Laden has been in contact with various sources, includingRussian Mafia groups, in an attempt to obtain radiological materials,perhaps tactical nuclear weapons," said former FBI investigator OliverRevell.
If such a device were detonated in a US city, the impact could bedevastating, said Robert Sherman of the Federation of AmericanScientists.
"If it's detonated on the surface, which it presumably would be, we'relooking at severe destruction of a couple of blocks, with radioactivefallout that could be a significant problem for a fairly significantdistance downwind," Sherman said.
"It doesn't necessarily have to be in ... a suitcase or a backpack, and itis very unlikely to be that way," he said. "Much more likely is a bombthat's in a car, or a truck, or in the hold of a ship, or in the cargosection of an airplane." return to menu
2. Russian WMD as a Terrorist Threat
October 8, 2001
(for personal use only)
An internal government report, obtained by an outside watch-dog group,reveals that America's 10 nuclear weapons research and productionfacilities are vulnerable to terrorist attack and have failed about halfof recent security drills. In several cases, commando squads were ableto capture enough nuclear materials to make nuclear weapons. If thisreport scares you, then just imagine how much worse things are inRussia, with its huge and under-funded nuclear weapons complex (seeRussia's Nuclear and Missile Complex).
The former Soviet Union produced over 1,300 tons of nuclearweapons-grade plutonium and uranium, most of which is now vulnerable totheft or diversion. Only a few kilograms are needed to produce even acrude nuclear weapon. Of even greater concern is the fact that Russiaitself doesn't even know how much material it produced or where all ofits is, and the world has to confront the very real possibility thatsome of this material may already be missing. We know that terroristgroups, including Al-Qaeda, have shown interested in getting suchmaterial from Russia in the past.
U.S. programs designed to secure Russian nuclear weapons, materials andtechnology have madesignificant progress, despite having come under recent funding pressuresand skepticism by the Bush administration and congress. The attack ofSeptember 11 appears to have refocused U.S. attention on the need toprevent other countries or terrorist groups from seizing this material.Obviously, U.S. facilities need to have the best possible security, andadditional resources and attention should be applied. But the morelikely scenario -- that Russian material will be seized and used againstU.S. territory or allies -- should be given increased funding andattention as well. How much of the administrations $40 billionanti-terror package will be applied to these threats remains to be seen. return to menu
C. US-Russia Relations
1. Russia Ready To Develop New Strategic Partnership With USA
BBC Monitoring Service
October 9, 2001
(for personal use only)
Text of report in English by Russian news agency Interfax
Moscow, 9 October: Russia is prepared for a stage-by-stage developmentof a new framework of strategic partnership with the United States,Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov told the leaders of the Allianceof Lawyers for World Security - Robert MacNamara, former US secretary ofdefence, and Thomas Graham, former deputy head of the Arms Control andDisarmament Agency - in Moscow today.
Strategic partnership between the two countries "must be based onmaintaining, consolidating and expanding the structure of treaties andagreements on arms cuts, limitation and nonproliferation of nuclearweapons which has taken shape over the past decades," the ForeignMinistry's report quotes him as saying.
Russia will submit to the 56th session of the UN General Assembly adraft resolution calling for preservation and implementation of the ABMtreaty which remains "the pillar of the international legal system innuclear disarmament and nonproliferation," he said. return to menu
D. Russia-Iran Cooperation
1. Russia Taking Additional Security Precautions At Iranian Reactor Site
October 10, 2001
(for personal use only)
Atomic Energy Minister Aleksandr Rumyantsev told ITAR-TASS on 9 Octoberthat the 1,000 Russian workers at the nuclear power plant constructionsite at Bushehr in Iran are taking extra security precautions inconnection with the U.S. actions in Afghanistan, but he stressed thatthere are no plans to stop the construction at present. "We will have torecall the specialists and ask Iran to delay the contract only if thehostilities broaden and endanger human lives," Rumyantsev said. PG return to menu
2. Russian Arms Deal Belies Tensions.
RFE/RL Iran report
October 8, 2001
(for personal use only)
The early October signing of an arms agreement between Iran and Russia,as well as the two countries' long-standing opposition to the Taliban,would seem to indicate a strong relationship between Moscow and Tehran.An American scholar recently pointed out, however, that Iran andRussia's relationship could fall apart due to disagreements about thedivision of the Caspian Sea's oil resources.
Russia and Iran have been aiding the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance(a.k.a. United Front) for several years. Russia's daily "Nezavisimayagazeta" newspaper reported on 4 October that Moscow plans to supply theNorthern Alliance with up to $45 million worth of tanks, armoredvehicles, and other weapons. The shipments, which the newspaper saidwould start within weeks, would include Mi-24 attack helicopters, Mi-8troop-carriers, 40-50 tanks, 60-80 armored personnel carriers, Gradmissile systems, artillery, mortars, antitank weapons, sniper rifles,and ammunition. The daily speculated that Washington would foot thebill. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov had said earlier that Iranmay get involved with antiterrorist operations in Afghanistan, and thissubject might be discussed during Minister of Defense and Armed ForcesLogistics Admiral Ali Shamkhani's early October visit to Russia (see"RFE/RL Iran Report," 1 October 2001).
Meanwhile, Shamkhani and Ivanov signed on 2 October an agreement for thesale of Russian weapons to Iran. The deal could earn Russia as much as$300 million annually. Radzhab Safarov, who heads the centercoordinating Russia-Iran programs, said on 4 October that the agreementaddresses the purchase of SU-27 and SU-30 jet fighters, KA-50 and KA-52helicopters, and T-90 and T-82 tanks. Safarov added that a few moreagreements are being drafted, Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostei (AVN)reported on 4 October, and negotiations for the Iskander-Eoperational-tactical missile system and the Yakhont supersonicship-based missile are nearing completion.
During his five-day trip to Russia, furthermore, Shamkhani touredseveral arms production facilities. He went to the Machine-BuildingDesign Bureau in Kolomna. An official there told ITAR-TASS on 3 Octoberthat Shamkhani would see several of its products: Igla, Igla-1, Dzhigit,Strelets-2M, and Strela-10MZ anti-aircraft and portable anti-aircraftmissile systems; Malyutka-2, Shturm, Ataka, and Khrizantema antitankmissile systems; Tochka-U and Iskander-E missile systems; and Arena-Etank protection complexes. Shamkhani visited the Northern Shipyards inSt. Petersburg, too. According to AVN, Russian defense experts expectShamkhani to purchase the export model of the Project 20382 corvette,which costs over $50 million.
Such transactions, as well as Russia's work on Iran's nuclear reactor inBushehr, make Washington very uncomfortable. National Security AdviserCondoleezza Rice told the U.S.-Russia Business Council's Annual Meetingon 4 October: "There is no doubt that we have been concerned aboutRussian proliferation in Iran, for instance. Now, it's our view thatthis is not good for Russia, and not good for the United States, and notgood for the region. We expect to continue to push the issues having todo with proliferation."
Regardless of American concerns, such transactions with Iran areimportant to Russia. Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Center for Analysisof Strategies and Technologies in Moscow, described the importance ofthe arms sale and of the relationship in an interview with RFE/RL.Pukhov said: "Iran, together with Armenia, is the only full Russian allyin the Middle East region. Even if Iran has a very important role in theMuslim world, it openly backed the Russian military operation inChechnya. [Iran] never condemned it, [on the contrary], several times itcondemned Chechen terrorism and separatism."
George Mason University Professor Mark Katz does not see therelationship between Moscow and Tehran as being so clear-cut. In a 24September presentation at the Kennan Institute in Washington, D.C., Katzexplained that from late 2000 through mid-2001, Russian-Iranianrelations appeared to be developing into a strategic partnership basedon shared interests. Disagreements over the division of the CaspianSea's resources and both countries' reluctance to reach an accommodationon this issue are straining the partnership. "Far from being gratefulfor Russia's willingness to sell arms and nuclear know-how to Tehran,"Katz continues, "the Iranians seem to think that Moscow should begrateful to Tehran for buying them. Tehran could, after all, buy theseitems from others."
Russian President Vladimir Putin is expected to visit Tehran in May2002, according to Mehdi Safari, the Iranian ambassador to Moscow. Headded that Speaker of Parliament Mehdi Karrubi would visit Russia thisyear, Interfax reported on 11 September. (Bill Samii) return to menu
E. Nuclear Waste
1. Russia's Plan To Import Nuclear Wastes May Attract Terrorists
October 9, 2001
(for personal use only)
Russia's Ecodefense Group argues that plans to import spent nuclear fuelfor permanent storage could have the effect of attracting terroristinterest because the authorities have not solved various securityproblems involved in the transport and storage of such materials,"Inostranets" reported on 2 October. Meanwhile, "Vremya novostei" on 4October reported that some in Moscow are concerned that instability inPakistan could allow terrorists to seize nuclear weapons there. PG return to menu
F. Russian Nuclear Power Industry
1. Russian Official Upbeat On Small Nuclear Power Stations' Design
BBC Monitoring Service
October 10, 2001
(for personal use only)
Text of report in English by Russian news agency Interfax
Moscow, 10 October: Russia has designs for 35 small nuclear powerstations, including 30 on land and five or six floating ones, AleksandrPolushkin, deputy executive director of Rosenergoatom concern, toldInterfax on Wednesday [10 October].
The first 70 MW floating station will most likely be built inSeverodvinsk at a cost of 100m-120m US dollars, he said.
The station will be installed in a barge, where a crew of 60 will stayin shifts of four months, Polushkin said. Nuclear waste will also bekept on the barge, he said.
Rosenergoatom is negotiating the construction of the stations withPrimorye, Kamchatka and Chukotka authorities, Polushkin said. Privatecapital will only be allowed to provide repayable credits for theconstruction, he said.
The licensing of the Severodvinsk construction is to be completed in thefirst quarter of 2002, Polushkin said. The construction of one suchstation will take four to five years, he said.
Small nuclear power stations reach the breakeven point in nearly 10years compared to 14 - 20 years for large stations, Polushkin said. InKamchatka and Chukotka, small nuclear power stations offset constructioncosts, he said.
Floating nuclear power stations are guarded as stringently as the largeones, Polushkin said. Rosenergoatom will see to it that all precautionsand security procedures are observed, he said.
Terrorists will not be able to penetrate the nuclear power stations'security systems, Polushkin said.
Source: Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English 1326 gmt 10 Oct 01 return to menu
1. Notice of Closed Meeting
National Nuclear Security Administration
October 11, 2001
[Federal Register: October 11, 2001 (Volume 66, Number 197)] [Notices] [Page 51933-51934] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr11oc01-44]
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
National Nuclear Security Administration; National Nuclear Security Administration Advisory Committee
AGENCY: Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration.
ACTION: Notice of closed meeting.
SUMMARY: This notice announces a meeting of the National NuclearSecurity Administration Advisory Committee (NNSA AC). The FederalAdvisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. 2 Sec. 10(a)(2) requires thatpublic notice of these meetings be announced in the Federal Register.
DATES: Friday, October 19, 2001, 12:30 to 19:00, and Saturday, October20, 08:30 to 15:00. Location: The meeting will be held in the metropolitan Washington area.The exact meeting site is yet to be determined.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jennifer Leonard (202-586-5555),Acting Staff Director of NNSA AC.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Purpose of the Committee: To provide theAdministrator for Nuclear Security with advice and recommendations onmatters of technology, policy, and operations that lie within themission and responsibilities of the National Nuclear SecurityAdministration. Additional information about the Committee, includingits charter, members, and current charge, is available at:http://www.nnsa.doe.gov. Purpose of the Meeting: To discuss nationalsecurity research, development, and policy programs, as the issuespertain to the Committee's charge. In addition, the Committee willdiscuss how the September 11, 2001, attacks impact the NNSA mission, theCommittee's focus, and path forward on the charge. NNSA acknowledges andapologizes for late posting of the meeting notice, due to uncertaintiesstemming from these recent events.
08:30-11:30 Debrief Administrator on Discussions, Next Steps 11:30-12:30 Lunch break
12:30-03:00 Wrap up Closed Portions of Meeting: In the interest of national security, themeeting will be closed to the public. The Federal Advisory CommitteeAct, 5 U.S.C. App 2 Sec. 10 (d), and the Federal Advisory CommitteeManagement Regulation, 41 CFR 102-3.155, incorporate by reference theGovernment in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. 552b, which, at 552b (c)(1) and(c)(3) permits closure of meetings where restricted data or otherclassified matters will be discussed. Such data and matters will bediscussed in each session. Minutes: Minutes of the meeting will be recorded and classifiedaccordingly.
Issued at Washington, DC, on October 5, 2001. Rachel M. Samuel, Deputy Advisory Committee Management Officer. [FR Doc. 01-25596 Filed 10-10-01; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6450-01-P return to menu
2. Kazakhstan May Be A Place To Dump Radioactive Waste Of Russia: Low- And Medium-Level Radioactive Waste' Import May Be Permitted Soon In Republic
October 9, 2001
PRESS-RELEASE Almaty/Kazakhstan - October 9, 2001 For more info: in Kazakhstan - Almaty city - Sergey Solyanik, "GreenSalvation", phone (3272) 683374, e-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org Karagandacity - Kaisha Atahanova, "Ecocenter", phone (3212) 52-08-51, 8 (300)3358460 , e-mail: email@example.com In Russia - Moscow - VladimirSlivyak, ECODEFENSE! phone +7(095)2784642, 7766281 e-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org http://www.ecodefense.ru
Kazakhstan may become a radioactive dump site for other countries,environmentalists from Russia and Kazakhstan warned today at the jointpress-conference. Press-conference was held today in Almaty city ofKazakhstan, former Soviet republic in Central Asia. Since the beginningof 2001 the politicians and public are actively discussing proposedchanges to the Kazakhstan' legislation that would allow local nuclearindustry to import low- and medium level radioactive waste from the restof world. Several amendments to local laws were presented in October2001 to Kazakhstan parliament by group of parliamentarians. Kazakhstan'nuclear industry claim it can make up to $40 billion as a result ofwaste import. According to environmentalists' statement, new lawallowing the import of radioactive waste to Kazakhstan for finaldisposition is environmentally dangerous and economically unprofitable.It contradicts local laws on environmental protection and the use ofatomic energy, also international agreements such as Arhus convention onaccess to information and Rio-de-Janeiro declaration on environment anddevelopment of the United Nations. Economic expediency of the wasteimport is not proved by the Kazakhstan' nuclear industry, and there isno evidence that "$40 billion" figure is real. "Dumping of radioactivewaste in Kazakhstan will result in environmental disaster for nextgenerations to deal with", said Sergey Solyanik of "Green Salvation"environmental group based in Almaty, Kazakhstan. "From a moral point ofview, plan to dump radioactive waste is cynical in the country wherenuclear testing resulted in the loss of many lives and great damage tothe environment". Earlier in 2001, Russian authorities approved newlegislation allowing the import of high-level radioactive waste (spentnuclear fuel) for reprocessing and storage. As a result of reprocessing,great amount of radioactive waste will appear - up to 200 ton per 1 tonof reprocessed fuel. Russian program aimed at import of 20,000 ton ofhigh-level waste during next 10 years. As soon as this program will berunning, Minatom would have amounts of low- andmedium-level radioactive waste greatly increased and then it may needKazakhstan to dump it. "Attempt to set up the dump site for foreign radioactive waste inKazakhstan is provoked by Russian Ministry of atomic power", saidVladimir Slivyak, co-chairman of ECODEFENSE!, environmental groupworking to stop the import of radioactive waste to Russia andKazakhstan. "Minatom urgently need a place to dump own radioactive wastethat already accumulated and that will be generated in the future. Itmust be stopped!" return to menu
3. The PIR Center Club held its meeting on "International Terrorism, Russia and New Security Challenges".
October 9, 2001
The PIR Center Club held its meeting. Academician Mikhail Kreimer,Chairman of the Board ofMilitary Experts, made a report "International Terrorism, Russia and NewSecurity Challenges". PIR Senior Research Associate Dmitry Evstafievmade comments to this presentation. After the presentations, theparticipants initiated a heated debate that involved counselors andfirst secretaries of the Australian, Italian, Dutch, Polish, US, andTurkish embassies, as well as the heads of Russian offices of largeWestern companies, and PIR research associates.
In the course of discussion the participants agreed that the problem ofinternational terrorism could not be solved with military means only.For effective struggle against international terrorism the internationalcommunity should form a mechanism of intense interaction of allcivilized states, including concerted economic, political, religious andmilitary efforts to prevent the activities of terrorist organizations.The role of international organizations, notably the UN SecurityCouncil, as a coordinating body in this struggle, should be enhanced. Itis necessary to look for and eradicate economic reasons for theemergence of terrorism.
The PIR Center will continue research on this urgent problem.
The PIR Center Club met in hotel Aurora Marriott for business lunch.
Joint Statement on Strengthening the Dialogue and Cooperation onPolitical and Security Issues in Europe and on the Problems ofNonproliferation and Disarmament by President of the Russian FederationVladimir Putin and President of the European Council Guy Verhofstadtwith the Assistance of Secretary General of the Council of the EuropeanUnion/High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security PolicyJavier Solana and President of the Commission of the EuropeanCommunities Romano Prodi
We recall our commitment to strengthen our political dialogue on topicalinternational political issues of mutual concern, such as thestrengthening of international security and crisis prevention andmanagement in Europe, nonproliferation and disarmament, exports ofconventional arms, the OSCE, the UN and the struggle againstinternational terrorism.
Toward this end we intend to make the maximum use of the possibilitiesprovided by the Joint Declaration of the EU-Russia summit on October 30,2000, and the conclusions of the European Council in Nice.
We have arrived at the conclusion that for this purpose it is alsoimportant to use in the most productive manner the tight schedule of thealready existing political consultations between the European Union andRussia. We have already increased the extent of our politicalconsultations, formal and informal, in Brussels and in Moscow at thelevel of high officials and at the level of experts. We will use all themeans available to us to build up our concrete cooperation and impart toit an operational character, especially in the most important fields ofthe current international situation, and to this end the SecretaryGeneral of the Council of the European Union/High Representative for theCommon Foreign and Security Policy and the Russian leaders, primarilythe Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, will continueto hold consultations on major international and crisis managementissues.
We have also agreed that apart from existing consultations individualmeetings will be held between the EU Political Affairs and SecurityCommittee (or its chairman) and Russia, including meetings atambassadorial level depending on the development of events. In addition,monthly meetings will be held between the Troika of the PoliticalAffairs and Security Committee with a view to discussing questions ofthe holding of consultations in the field of crisis prevention andmanagement.
The modalities of a possible Russian participation in crisis managementoperations of both a civilian and a military character will be workedout as the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is developed. AnESDP dialogue will generally be conducted with regard to the progressachieved by the EU.
We have agreed to deepen the dialogue and cooperation on a deep-goingreform of the OSCE with a view to defining the place of the Organizationin the European security architecture and improving its activities, inaccordance with its fundamental documents (the Helsinki Final Act of1975 and the 1999 European Security Charter).
Of primary importance is the prevention of the proliferation of weaponsof mass destruction and their means of delivery. In this regard, weunderscore the key role of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of NuclearWeapons (NPT Treaty) and a multilateral approach. TheEU program of action in the field of nonproliferation and disarmamentrepresents in this context an important positive contribution to theachievement of appreciable results.
We express general support for the Draft International Code of Conductin Preventing the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles, which has beenjust been elaborated within the framework of the MTCR. We are workingtogether on universalizing this document. The proposal of Russia forestablishing a Global System of Control (CSC) will become an object ofexchange of views between the EU and Russia.
We call upon all states to immediately and without preconditions toaccede to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, recalling that itsratification by all the 44 named states is necessary for its entry intoforce.
We will jointly work to give a universal character to the Convention onthe Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Convention on theProhibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons.
We are for continued work in a multilateral format on a legally bindingdocument strengthening the Convention on the Prohibition of BiologicalWeapons regime.
Taking into account the new proposals of Russia, aimed at implementingthe Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and theDestruction of Existing Chemical Weapons Stockpiles, we reaffirm ourintention to continue to cooperate with a view to finding a solution.
We support the establishment of an additional body of the Conference onDisarmament in the field of preventing an arms race in outer space.
We note the importance being attached to the prohibition ofanti-infantry mines. We will continue work on achieving this objective.
Russia and the EU stand for the strengthening of control over illegalflows of small arms and light weapons at the regional level. Thisimportant aim arises from the UN Conference on the Illicit Traffic inSmall Arms. It must help to contribute to the stabilization of stateswhich confront this threat. The profound OSCE document adopted inNovember 2000 offers common export criteria to each of the states.
Russia and the EU will work on imparting a universal character to andstarting the implementation of the Convention on Certain Types ofParticularly Inhumane Conventional Arms. They underscore the importanceof strengthening humanitarian norms and note that the next reviewconference will give an opportunity to advance in this direction. return to menu
H. Links of Interest
1.Interview with Ivan Safranchuk and Konstatin Makiyenko
Ekho Moskvy Radio, transcript by Federal News Service