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Nuclear News - 09/25/01
RANSAC Nuclear News, September 25, 2001
Compiled by G. J. Marsh


A. U.S.-Russian Relations
    1. Russia May Seek U.S. Concessions, Susan B. Glasser, Washington Post (09/23/01)
B. Cooperative Threat Reduction
    1. Weapons Programs with Russia Wither, Walter Pincus, Washington Post (09/23/01)
C. Nuclear Terrorism
    1. America's Sovereignty in a New World, Robert Wright, New York Times (09/24/01)
    2. Muscovites Urge Move of Nuclear Facilities out of City Boundaries - Video, BBC Monitoring Service (09/23/01)
    3. IAEA General Conference Adopts Resolution on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, Press Release, International Atomic Energy Agency (09/21/01)
D. International Nuclear Cooperation
    1. States Back Steps to Strengthen Agency's Main Pillars for Nuclear Verification, Safety, Technology, Press Release, International Atomic Energy Agency (09/21/01)
E. Nuclear Waste
    1. Local Paper Unearths Unattended Nuclear Waste Storage in Central Ukraine, BBC Monitoring Service (09/25/01)
    2. Russia Holds Talks on Storage and Processing of Foreign Nuclear Fuel, BBC Monitoring Service (09/24/01)
F. Russian Nuclear Power Industry
    1. Construction of Russian Nuclear Plant May Resume after Two Decades on Hold, BBC Monitoring Service (09/24/01)

A. U.S. - Russian Relations

1.
Russia May Seek U.S. Concessions
Support on Terrorism Promised, but Moscow Sees Chance to Press Other Issues
Susan B. Glasser
Washington Post
September 23, 2001
(for personal use only)


MOSCOW, Sept. 22 -- President Vladimir Putin said there would be no "haggling" by Russia over the terms of its support for the U.S. war on terrorism, but interviews with Kremlin advisers and political allies reveal a long list of conditions Moscow hopes to impose.

Russia's demands range from explicit conditions, such as a promise that any U.S. military presence in former Soviet Central Asia would be temporary, to implied hopes that President Bush would back away from criticism of Russia's war against Islamic rebels in the breakaway region of Chechnya.

Many Russian politicians also see new opportunity to win long-desired concessions that would not have been possible before the Sept. 11 attacks, such as restructuring the country's huge Soviet-era debt, speeding its entrance into the World Trade Organization and possibly even joining NATO.

However unrealistic some of those proposals may be, the Russian bargaining list suggests the extent to which the country remains uncertain about what Putin called "a new level" of partnership with its old Cold War enemy. At the same time, Moscow has expressed what U.S. officials believe to be a genuine willingness to redefine an often tense relationship.

"I can say with 100 percent certainty that the cooperation will be unprecedented, of a level unseen ever before," said Alexander Oslon, a pollster who works for the Kremlin. "But without doubt, Russia will put its conditions on this cooperation."

Senior U.S. officials involved in the talks with Moscow confirmed that there have been sharp exchanges over everything from the relevance of Bush's proposed missile defense system to U.S. criticism of the Chechen war and Russia's reluctance to allow a U.S. military presence in Central Asia. But they also reported "an improved spirit of cooperation," as one put it, in solving disputes over NATO, missile defense and nuclear weapons proliferation.

"We are trying to get a sense of their limits, and they're obviously still thinking this through," said one top official. "But the desire to join forces is very palpable. They see this as an opportunity to show their bona fides."

"Don't believe the Russian press when they say Putin should give an answer to the question: Is Russia with the West or not?" said Mikhail Margelov, a close Putin ally in the upper house of the Russian parliament. "We have already made our answer. We are with the West. That has been decided."

But Putin, who retreated to the presidential vacation home on the Black Sea this week, has yet to spell out publicly the contours of that support, in part because of the debate raging within his inner circle -- "a lack of unity in the top echelons," as prominent legislator Alexei Arbatov put it, over how forthcoming to be.

Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, a close friend of Putin and a fellow KGB veteran, and other military leaders have been more reluctant, according to several sources. That's because, "frankly speaking, they still regard the United States as an enemy," one Kremlin adviser said, while Putin's political team "believes that we must take part in this coalition for political reasons."

Putin summoned his top defense, security and law enforcement officials to the Black Sea today to discuss the fight against international terrorism and spoke with Bush by telephone for about an hour.

In the short term, Putin's allies have focused on extracting promises that the United States will not act unilaterally and that it will provide military assistance in case of massive unrest on Russia's southern frontier in Central Asia.

"If Russia joins the United States and becomes a target for terrorists, we will demand that the U.S. give us direct military support," said Arbatov, a senior member of the parliament's defense committee. Added Dmitri Rogozin, chairman of the international affairs committee: "The point is that Russia is not a part of NATO and, as such, we have no guarantees of our security in case of an attack. Massive armed action by the U.S. may lead to destabilization all across Central Asia."

In the longer term, some Russian politicians favor what foreign policy analyst Sergei Karaganov called "a grand bargain," in which Russia would join with the United States in a new coalition, stop arms trade with Iran and other countries accused of sponsoring terrorism, and reduce nuclear weapons arsenals. "But for that we would have to get something," Karaganov said, suggesting the exchange could include "nonexpansion of NATO to the borders of Russia, solution of the problem of Soviet debt."

Less tangibly, Russian politicians insist that their country, still suffering an identity crisis a decade after losing superpower status, be treated as an equal partner with the United States and not just another ally among many.

"The most important point is that Russia wants to take part in only those actions in which Russia takes part in decision-making," said Sergei Markov, a political analyst. "We want recognition, not as American serfs, but as an independent country."

Despite such rhetoric, Markov and others interviewed this week were unanimous in their belief that Putin would offer concrete help. "The decision will not be yes or no," Markov said. "It is already yes. The only question is under what conditions."

Part of the Kremlin's calculations involve a change in Russian public opinion toward the United States after the attacks. A public opinion poll by the Kremlin immediately after the attacks found that 80 percent of Russians felt sympathy toward the United States, while 8 percent expressed satisfaction at the terrorist assault on America.

"A significant thaw has happened toward America," said Gleb Pavlovsky, a political consultant. "We are having a wave of solidarity, and while its nature is not political, it is becoming a political factor."

Still, he said, there are limits to what even a newly sympathetic Russian public would support. "The president does not have a mandate for participation in large-scale military operations."

Pavlovsky and others linked to the Kremlin said that Putin instead would emphasize the increasing irrelevance of Cold War-era international institutions, such as the United Nations and NATO, to cope with 21st-century threats. "Within the Russian political community," he said, "there exists a very high level of annoyance with the inefficiency of the United Nations in solving crisis situations."

Added Margelov: "It's a changing world, and we understand that international institutions that were established after the Second World War are not effective today. The United Nations does not work, and NATO cannot exist the way it has for the last 10 years. It is another remnant of the Cold War."
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B. Cooperative Threat Reduction

1.
Weapons Programs with Russia Wither
Walter Pincus
Washington Post
September 23, 2001
(for personal use only)


WASHINGTON - Nearly three dozen U.S.-Russian programs designed to prevent the spread of Russian nuclear weapons and materials have foundered because of disorganization and a loss of trust between the two countries, according to an official who was instrumental in creating the plans.

The programs, which have cost the United States more than $5 billion, have "often lacked coordination not only with Russia but also within" the U.S. government, said Siegfried S. Hecker, former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

"Nothing really terrible has happened," Hecker said, but a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's nuclear complex "is largely intact, vastly oversized and overstaffed."

With the election last year of President Vladimir V. Putin, a former KGB official, and the resurgence of Moscow's security services, access to once-secret nuclear facilities has tightened, according to Hecker. "Today, the window of opportunity appears to be closing, both because Russia does not need our money as desperately and because the security services have begun to close up the complex," he said in a lengthy article published recently in the Nonproliferation Review, a journal of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

Hecker, currently a consultant at Los Alamos, established early contact with Russian nuclear scientists after the collapse of the Soviet Union and was among the architects of the U.S. effort to avert the spread of Russian nuclear weapons. His comments come as the National Security Council is nearing completion of a review of the U.S.-Russian nonproliferation programs ordered by President Bush in March.

The administration already has signaled doubts about the effectiveness of the effort by cutting the budget proposed by the Clinton administration by $100 million. The programs, which will cost $872 million this year, have also been criticized by some lawmakers on Capitol Hill and by the General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress.

The nonproliferation effort began in the early 1990s to keep Russian nuclear materials from spreading, and to stop nuclear scientists from selling their knowledge to other countries. That was quickly complemented by the Nunn-Lugar program, which partially funded the destruction of Russian nuclear bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and nuclear subs.

Overall, the effort gave rise to about 30 U.S.-Russian programs, managed by the Defense, Energy and State Departments, aimed at tightening security at Russian nuclear facilities and providing money as an incentive to keep Russia's weapons scientists and engineers from moving abroad.

Speaking recently at a meeting sponsored by the Monterey Institute of International Studies and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Hecker said that although he remained a supporter of the programs' nonproliferation goals, a major overhaul was warranted.

"What is needed is a coherent, comprehensive, integrated strategy," he said.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union built nearly 20,000 nuclear warheads. Today, although the Russian strategic force is declining, many thousands of warheads remain deployed at dozens of locations and more than 60 storage sites. In addition, 1,000 metric tons of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium and between 125 and 200 metric tons of plutonium are spread throughout the country at various facilities. Russia maintains a large network of production facilities for uranium enrichment and nuclear reactors that continues to produce weapons-grade plutonium, as well as a network of three dozen nuclear weapons labs and dozens of defense institutes.

Hecker warned that the primary joint program for protection, control and accounting for nuclear materials and warheads at many of these facilities "has all but come to a standstill."

He blamed not only increased Russian security, but also U.S. bureaucratic demands that have "lost sight that these are Russian nuclear materials in the Russian nuclear complex."

He said an effort to provide Russian scientists with civilian jobs had been a success, but an Energy Department initiative that teamed Russian institutes with Western businesses has floundered, in part because of Russian security concerns.
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C. Nuclear Terrorism

1.
America's Sovereignty in a New World
Robert Wright
New York Times
September 24, 2001
(for personal use only)


PHILADELPHIA -- President Bush says that the Sept. 11 attack on the United States marks a new kind of war, the first war of the 21st century. There is a sense in which that's true, but what's chilling is the sense in which it's not, the sense in which the attack was old-fashioned. The terrorists didn't use biological or nuclear weapons, and next time they well could. A future enemy assault could kill not 6,000 people on American soil, but 600,000.

What would it mean for the United States to get serious about fighting that kind of war? F or one thing, Colin Powell would have to prevail over Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld in a struggle for the administration's foreign-policy soul. This is not just a question of "multilateralism" versus "unilateralism." President Bush has been consulting with our allies during this crisis, and that's good. But to keep nuclear and biological weapons out of the hands of terrorists, the president will have to go further and rethink an issue that has long divided Republican moderates and conservatives: the extreme devotion of the conservatives to national sovereignty.

The problem of sovereignty, in this context, is that controlling the spread of lethal technologies outside your borders often means giving the world more control over your own behavior. One example is the nuclear test ban treaty, which Mr. Powell endorsed years ago but the Bush administration opposes. Though President Bush would be happy for other nations never again to test nuclear weapons, he isn't willing to have America's hands tied.

Will the president now reconsider this policy? After all, the testing of nuclear weapons often leads to their development, creating more weapons-grade materials that could fall into the hands of the well-financed, well-organized and infinitely hate-filled terrorists whose existence is now manifest. If the president won't reconsider, that is a bad sign. The sacrifice of sovereignty entailed by the test-ban treaty is trivial compared with the sacrifice necessary to address the nuclear and biological threats in truly serious fashion.

What would an accord that was up to this challenge look like? The best existing model is the Chemical Weapons Convention, which Mr. Powell supported and Mr. Cheney and Mr. Rumsfeld opposed. Under the convention, any member nation can demand, on short notice, that an international team inspect a given building in any other member nation.

This agreement had a loophole to address concerns over sovereignty. Though a nation would be obliged to escort inspectors to the perimeter of a search site, it could thereafter stall them indefinitely through legal maneuvering (though such resistance would draw global attention and suspicion - a service in its own right). Even with this weakness, the convention is the closest thing yet to a weapons-of-mass-destruction accord with teeth: intrusive, short-notice inspections, and trade sanctions (if mild) against nonmember nations.

Conservative concerns about sovereignty aren't wholly frivolous. Which American buildings get searched has always been determined by American courts. Ensuring that searches authorized by an international body are constitutional - and that they don't become tools of espionage or simple harassment - is a stiff challenge. (And it is only one of many challenges. For example, enticing or even coercing reluctant states to participate is vital in the long run, since the strongest accord is a global one.) But the point is that however stiff the challenges seem, we can no longer dodge them.

Yet so far President Bush has done just that. In July, the United States angered Europe and much of the world by rejecting a draft protocol that would have added enforcement mechanisms to the 1972 ban on biological weapons.

By itself, the administration's decision is not inexcusable. Controlling biological weapons is much harder than controlling nuclear weapons. They're microscopic, after all, and the devices that make them have legitimate medical and industrial uses. Further, inspections raise particularly thorny issues of industrial or national espionage. So inevitably this first stab at controlling biological weapons, even though seven years in the making, had real flaws. What is alarming is that the administration has so far offered no alternative.

And how could it? An administration whose currently dominant foreign-policy faction opposed both the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty - both tame compared to what is needed - is just not up to the challenge. Unless, that is, it recognizes that the war on terrorism truly is of a wholly new kind - that it must be fought on many fronts, including the creation of international policing mechanisms that could impinge on national sovereignty as never before.

To some, agreements among nations may seem like hopelessly weak weapons against the Osama bin Ladens of the world, who aren't known for consulting international law before acting. But terrorists have to get their weapons of mass destruction somewhere . The tighter the world's control on the ingredients of those weapons, the more trouble they'll have.

Clinging to American sovereignty at all costs isn't just wrong. It's impossible. When a few dozen people can destroy the two largest buildings in your largest city, it's safe to say that some portion of your national sovereignty has been lost. And technological evolution will make it easier and easier for small groups to violate sovereignty on a larger and larger scale.

And the problem is not limited to nuclear and biological weapons. The Internet can spread dangerous information relentlessly and offers terrorists a cheap means of international organization. If governments don't respond with new forms of international organization, civilization as we've come to know it could truly be over.

So the question isn't whether to surrender national sovereignty. The question is how - carefully and systematically, or chaotically and catastrophically? Would you rather that your office building face a remote risk of being searched by international inspectors, or the risk of being blown up? Like everyone else, I wish we didn't have to make that choice, but the direction of history demands that we do.
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2.
Muscovites Urge Move of Nuclear Facilities out of City Boundaries - Video
BBC Monitoring Service
September 23, 2001
(for personal use only)


[Presenter] Our next report is from a rather unique military unit, the main task of which is to combat terrorism. There have never been and they never will be conscripts serving in that unit because it is only done by regulars who are responsible for the security of the most important nuclear facilities.

[Correspondent] Officers and regular servicemen used to describe their unique military special-purpose unit among themselves as a unit of hat-wearing people. That is because in the old days they used to wear hats, foreign-made suits and Finnish coats instead of uniforms...

The USA and Russia are now united in their understanding of the real danger presented by nuclear terrorism.

[Vladimir Kadyshevskiy, director of the joint institute of nuclear studies in the town of Dubna] The US Department of State has allocated special funds to equip the joint institute with the most-up-to-date methods of protecting nuclear materials and with the most-up-to-date ways of ensuring nuclear security.

[Correspondent] We have managed to put the dollars to use in no time at all. Special-purpose servicemen have been put on special alert. Still scholars cannot but worry about the situation which has arisen at nuclear facilities.

[Yuriy Oganesyan, captioned as vice-chairman of the same institute] You cannot expect a certain private company or a certain tycoon to wake up one day thinking responsibly for the country's future. This is the state's duty and this is the state's main duty.

[Correspondent] In a private conversation one of the senior officers of the special-purpose brigade stressed that it is the role of his people to guard the area they are in charge of and to understand its political importance as well.

The Muscovites have repeatedly and quite justifiably demanded that the leaders of nuclear facilities take their dangerous facilities outside the city limits. The scholars, in turn, have appealed to the governments of Moscow and Russia, to the Atomic Energy Ministry for help in this. But nothing has changed and reactors and hundred of tonnes of nuclear waste are still in the capital. However, the Muscovites can be certain of one thing.

[Vladimir Anisimov, captioned as commander of the special-purpose brigade] The servicemen of this unit are serving at a time when terrorist acts are being carried out even in Moscow. I would like to warn anyone, who is even contemplating the idea of carrying out a terrorist act at the facilities guarded by the unit, against that. They will be dealt with.

[Correspondent] Moreover nuclear scientists are now working on the creation of the next-generation nuclear reactors. Even if they are bombed, there will still be no nuclear contamination.

I am sure that quite a few of the world scientists will be gallant enough to take off their hats as a sign of gratitude to the nuclear special-purpose servicemen and the hat-wearing unit.

Source: Russian Public TV (ORT), Moscow, in Russian 0410 gmt 23 Sep 01
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3.
IAEA General Conference Adopts Resolution on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
Agency to Redouble Efforts to Combat Nuclear-Related Terrorism
Press Release
International Atomic Energy Agency
September 21, 2001
(for personal use only)


The IAEA General Conference adopted today a resolution that emphasizes the importance of physical protection of nuclear material in preventing its illicit use and the sabotage of nuclear facilities and nuclear materials.

"The tragic terrorist attacks on the United States were a wake up call to us all," said Mohamed ElBaradei, IAEA Director General. "We can not be complacent. We have to and will increase our efforts on all fronts - from combating illicit trafficking to ensuring the protection of nuclear materials - from nuclear installation design to withstand attacks to improving how we respond to nuclear emergencies."

"Unanimously, Member States at this General Conference called on the Agency to embark on a thorough review of its programmes," he said, "to see what we can do to enhance security of nuclear material and facilities."

"Of course, this is likely to require significant extra resources," Mr. ElBaradei said. "I am confident that IAEA Member States will rise to the challenge."

In response to the resolution, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said the Agency will be looking at ways to increase its information, advisory and training functions to help Member States to ensure in their countries that:

  • nuclear regulatory infrastructure is in place;
  • nuclear material, other radioactive materials and facilities are properly
  • protected against theft and sabotage;
  • the detection measures and equipment at borders and elsewhere are effective in combating illicit trafficking;
  • plans are in place to respond effectively to such events; and
  • issues regarding nuclear installation safety are addressed.
"In any case, we need to keep these risks in perspective. People with evil intent can do great harm to civilization and the targets reach across all areas of modern society. We can't build fortresses or become police States," Mr. ElBaradei said. "Nuclear, like any other technology we benefit from, has its vulnerabilities and no absolute guarantees exist. But we should not lose sight that nuclear power plants are among the most secure and robust industrial facilities in the world."
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D. International Nuclear Cooperation

1.
States Back Steps to Strengthen Agency's Main Pillars for Nuclear Verification, Safety, Technology
Press Release
International Atomic Energy Agency
September 21, 2001
(for personal use only)


VIENNA - States meeting at the annual conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have backed steps to reinforce the Agency's three main pillars of work related to nuclear verification, safety, and technology. The Agency's General Conference is scheduled to conclude later today.

Earlier today, States adopted a resolution on the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities to strengthen programmes related to prevention of nuclear-related terrorism. (See IAEA Press Release issued earlier today. Full coverage of the General Conference and its concluding session is provided on the IAEA's WorldAtom Web pages at http://www.iaea.org.)

Other major actions are highlighted below, grouped under the three main pillars. In addition, the Conference approved the Agency's programme and budget for 2002, which allocates expenditures of $245 million and sets a target of $73 million for the Technical Cooperation Fund.

Verification

Strengthening the IAEA Safeguards System.
States reaffirmed their conviction that safeguards can promote greater confidence among States and thus contribute to strengthening their collective security. They backed measures being taken and planned to more fully integrate and modernize the system. States emphasized the importance of safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols which grant the Agency broader verification authority for detecting possible undeclared nuclear activities and materials.
Nuclear Inspections in Iraq.
States called upon Iraq to cooperate fully with the Agency for the implementation of nuclear monitoring and verification activities mandated by the United Nations Security Council. They welcomed the fact that the IAEA remains ready on short notice to resume its UN Security Council-mandated inspections in Iraq which were suspended in December 1998.
Safeguards in Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).
States adopted a resolution backing the full implementation of IAEA verification responsibilities in the DPRK. The IAEA is continuing to monitor the "freeze" on facilities under the 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and DPRK, but it remains unable to verify fully the DPRK's initial 1992 declaration of its nuclear programme. States welcomed the IAEA's proposal to the DPRK earlier this year of the first "concrete steps" required for the verification process and the Agency's stated readiness to start this work without delay. They strongly encouraged the DPRK to respond positively.

Safety

Strengthening International Cooperation in Nuclear, Radiation, and Waste Safety.
Among other actions, States adopted a resolution encouraging the Agency to focus its efforts "where the need for improvement is greatest," and stressed the importance of education and training in establishing and maintaining an adequate infrastructure for radiation protection and nuclear safety. The resolution urges States to continue requesting IAEA safety services, including Integrated Safety Evaluations that help to identify needs and priorities. Among other activities, States welcomed steps for improving the safety of research reactors; plans to develop safety standards for nuclear fuel cycle facilities; assistance for the safe decommissioning of nuclear facilities; formulating an Action Plan for international work relating to radiological protection of patients in medical applications; strengthening the Action Plan for the safety and security of radiation sources; and actions for improving the safety of radioactive waste management. They emphasized the importance of the Agency's corpus of safety standards and international safety conventions including the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, which entered into force earlier this year.
Safety in the Transport of Radioactive Material.
States urged improved national regulation that is in conformity with the Agency's Transport Regulations, and the wider use of IAEA advisory services to raise levels of transport safety.

Technology

Technical Cooperation Activities.
States reaffirmed their support for efforts further strengthening the Agency's technical cooperation programme. Among other actions, they requested the continuing formation of effective partnerships at the national, regional, and global levels to coordinate and optimize complementary activities; to promote activities supporting self-reliance and cooperative efforts of national nuclear entities; and to provide factual input to the World Summit on Sustainable Development, being held in September 2002 in South Africa.
Nuclear Science, Technology and Applications.
States adopted a resolution that addresses the use of nuclear science and technologies in fields of food and agriculture, water management and desalination; health; and energy production. Among its six parts, the resolution requests the IAEA to continue its support of the Organization of African Unity's plan to eradicate the tsetse fly, which causes estimated annual losses of $4.5 billion; requests continued assistance, subject to availability of resources, to Central American countries affected by drought and famine in applying isotope hydrology techniques for preventing and avoiding such conditions; and highlights the Agency's international collaboration for development of innovative nuclear reactors and fuel cycles.
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E. Nuclear Waste

1.
Local Paper Unearths Unattended Nuclear Waste Storage in Central Ukraine
BBC Monitoring Service
September 25, 2001
(for personal use only)


Text of report by Ukrainian news agency UNIAN

Zhytomyr, 24 September: A nuclear waste storage has been found near Zhytomyr, Misto newspaper, which is published by the Zhytomyr city council, reported in the article entitled "Nuclear Bomb near Zhytomyr."

The newspaper reported that unknown people dug out a nuclear waste storage three kilometres off the Vakulenchuk settlement (Chudnivskyy District). It was a concrete well with wooden boxes cast in concrete. The boxes contained steel blocks marked as radioactive substance. A portion of them still remains in the boxes while some are reportedly scattered around the well, which is filled with water.

Each steel block emits from 0.017 to 1.2 milliroentgen per hour. The maximal permissible emission level is 0.03 milliroentgen per hour, thus the steel blocks exceed this limit by 3,900 per cent. The newspaper reported that the Soviet Army's military unit 83330, which stored nuclear warheads, used to be deployed at the site. The Ukrainian Armed Forces' unit A-1471, whose command is based in Kiev, is currently responsible for the site. The site is guarded by civil personnel, while foresters of the Chudniv military forestry enterprise cut woods nearby.

The newspaper said that the Security Service [of Ukraine] had instructed the local sanitary authorities to urgently isolate the radiation sources. The newspaper argued that the border troops' sanitary authorities should have taken care of the site in accordance with the regulations on tackling similar findings in the areas used by the military. But the mayor of Vakulenchuk, Svitlana Kotsyuba, told the newspaper that the radioactive waste is still scattered around the well.

Source: UNIAN news agency, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1210 gmt 24 Sep 01
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2.
Russia Holds Talks on Storage and Processing of Foreign Nuclear Fuel
BBC Monitoring Service
September 24, 2001
(for personal use only)


Text of report in English by Russian news agency Interfax

St Petersburg, 24 September: A governmental commission led by Academician Zhores Alferov has started negotiations on the possible storage and processing of used nuclear fuel in Russia, Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Valeriy Lebedev has told the press.

He made the statement at the Russian Industrialist-2001 Exhibition in St Petersburg on Monday [24 September].

Negotiations are being held, in particular, with Taiwan and Switzerland, Lebedev said.

It is premature to speak about contracts. "The fight for the market in used nuclear fuel will be serious and last for years," Lebedev said.

Russia is capable of processing 3bn-dollars' worth of used nuclear fuel from abroad. It has been treating used nuclear fuel for more than 25 years and has not had any accidents in the course of transportation and processing.

Source: Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English 1236 gmt 24 Sep 01
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F. Russian Nuclear Power Industry

1.
Construction of Russian Nuclear Plant May Resume after Two Decades on Hold
BBC Monitoring Service
September 24, 2001
(for personal use only)


Text of report in English by Russian news agency Interfax

Chelyabinsk, 24 September: The construction of the South Urals nuclear power plant, which was suspended in the late 1980s, may resume in 2005.

Chairman of the economic committee of the Chelyabinsk Regional administration Vladimir Dyatlov, told Interfax that the Regional authorities are discussing with the federal government the imminent resumption of the construction.

The plant is to have three power units, each with a capacity of 800 MW.

Source: Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English 0833 gmt 24 Sep 01
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DISCLAIMER: Nuclear News is presented for informational purposes only. Views presented in any given article are those of the individual author or source and not of RANSAC. RANSAC takes no responsibility for the technical accuracy of information contained in any article presented in Nuclear News.



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