1. Powell Says NATO Membership for Russia 'Premature'
June 17, 2001
(for personal use only)
WASHINGTON -- After an initial meeting heralded as friendly and constructive, Secretary of State Colin Powell said Sunday it was "premature to even suggest" Russia be invited to join the NATO defense alliance.
Addressing the sensitive question after President Bush returned to Washington from an inaugural tour of Europe in which he held his first summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Powell said the Russian leader had not requested that NATO admit the former Soviet Union to the 19-member alliance.
"I don't think he quite said he wanted to join NATO," Powell told the "Fox News Sunday" program. "As the president tried to convey to President Putin, Europe welcomes Russia and he wants to do everything he can to encourage Russia to become part of a broader Europe."
But asked if that would include allowing the former Cold War adversary to join NATO, Powell said, "I think it's premature to even suggest that."
Powell noted Russia was not among the nine countries now officially aspiring to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which last expanded in 1999 to include the first members of the former Warsaw Pact -- the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.
Russia has opposed expanding NATO to include several former Soviet satellites, including the Baltic states, which it says will bring the Western security alliance to Russia's borders.
Echoing the message pushed by Bush, Powell said expansion would pose no threat to Moscow, asserting the three new alliance members now enjoy better relations with Russia.
"All of them have better relations with Russia now than they did before they became members of NATO."
"So we hope we can persuade the Russian leadership over time that there is nothing threatening about NATO enlarging, whether it is enlarging in the south, whether it is enlarging in the middle or whether it is enlarging in the north. Russia's future does lie to the West."
Powell said the U.S-Russian relationship would focus on creating "new linkages" in such areas as trade and commerce, cultural exchanges and efforts to reform the security framework the leaders agreed upon at their first summit in Slovenia on Saturday. These would include discussion of the anti-missile defense plan supported by Bush and opposed by Russia, he said.
The two leaders, who swapped personal anecdotes and even had an extended conversation on their own in English, also agreed to hold two more summits. return to menu
B. US - Russia Relations
1. Bush Seeks to Develop Russia Plans
June 18, 2001
(for personal use only)
WASHINGTON -- Throughout the sprawling U.S. government, teams of experts began work Monday on plans for the new-look relationship between the United States and Russia established at the Slovenia summit.
President Bush touched off the search for common ground with Russia by conferring with Secretary of State Colin Powell at the White House.
Bush said he wanted "to take advantage of the cooperation that I'm confident can exist." He telephoned the leaders of Spain, Britain and Poland to brief them on the talks he held Saturday with Russian President Vladimir Putin in a 16th century castle outside Ljubljana.
There was no evidence of concrete agreement between the two leaders, only parallel expressions of goodwill, smiles and handshakes for the cameras. They made no significant progress on such contentious issues as missile defense, NATO expansion and the spread of Russian technology.
However, Putin, like Bush, projected a cooperative air. "I think that we found a good basis to start building on our cooperation," Putin said.
At the State Department, Powell designated two senior American diplomats, John Beyrle and Elizabeth Jones, to follow through on the relationship with Moscow. They will compile reports and lists of issues that should be addressed directly with the Russian foreign ministry, a senior U.S. official said.
Similar preparations are being undertaken at the Pentagon under Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's direction, as well as at the Commerce and Treasury Departments.
Commerce Secretary Don Evans is expected to go to Moscow in July for talks.
Bush proposed to Putin at their summit that relations between the two countries be decentralized and an oversight group - established in 1993 and known as Gore-Chernomyrdin - be abandoned.
The goal is direct contact between the parts of the two governments responsible for particular issues. For instance, talks are being considered on terrorism, economic relations and U.S. investments in Russia. Arms control is another primary topic for discussion, but Russia's proposal to set up two working groups was resisted by the United States.
On Monday, Igor Sergeyev, who advises Putin on strategic issues, called on the Bush administration to respond to a Russian proposal for a negotiated reduction in long-range nuclear warheads to no more than 1,500 on each side.
Speaking at a conference on weapons proliferation held in Washington by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the former Russian defense minister said the United States had failed to respond to the proposals Putin made in advance of the summit.
"It's paramount to start negotiations immediately," Sergeyev said, adding that he found hope in the general willingness of the Bush administration to reduce stockpiles.
At the same time, Sergeyev defended the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which Bush wants to abandon to make way for a U.S. shield against missile attack.
Sergeyev denied Russia is helping Iran's nuclear weapons program. He said the technology Russia provides to Iran is for use in a light water reactor, much like technology the United States is giving to North Korea under an agreement to freeze that country's nuclear weapons program.
"To obtain weapons from the light water reactor in Iran is impossible," he said.
Sen. Dick Lugar, R-Ind., said Russia has been unable to destroy its stockpile of 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons, despite a sixfold increase in spending - to more than $100 million - on disposal.
The munitions, which were declared illegal in an international treaty, are stored at seven sites. "But not one has been destroyed primarily because of Russian budget shortfalls," Lugar said in a speech to the Carnegie weapons conference.
He has been unable to get congressional approval of a proposal for the United States to get rid of a large arsenal at Shchuchye, Russia. "It is time to utilize the window of opportunity to destroy these dangerous weapons," Lugar said.
The House Minority Leader, Rep. Dick Gephardt, D-Mo., questioned Bush's strategy on a missile defense, saying, "If your allies are not with you on that it's pretty hard to see how you increase your security."
On global warming, Gephardt told reporters at a breakfast meeting that "there didn't seem to be any advance at all" in Bush's meetings with allied leaders last week in Europe. return to menu
2. Putin Sees Upside of US Ties
June 17, 2001
(for personal use only)
Vladimir Putin made few concrete concessions to George W. Bush at their first summit meeting but tantalisingly suggested the path was open for a significant change in relations between the two former cold war adversaries.
It was clear that the Russian leader, ever the tough pragmatist, had decided he had more to gain from engagement with the new US administration than by rejecting its overtures for a new broad-based relationship. What that will mean in fact remains to be seen, but Mr. Putin said: "We are counting on a pragmatic relationship between Russia and the United States."
Mr. Bush said: "After our meeting today, I'm convinced that [Russia] can be a strong partner and friend, more than people could imagine."
Colin Powell, US secretary of state, described the two-hour summit in a Slovenian renaissance-style castle on Saturday as "a fitting capstone" to Mr. Bush's five-day tour of Europe. Of course, the US would not have agreed to meet the Russian leader if they had not previously had a good idea of what he would say.
In retrospect, the US choreography of the trip appears - given the prior evidence of a gulf in opinions between the US and some European governments - to have been clever. In visiting Spain and Poland, two NATO countries that are among the most sympathetic to US security ideas, the administration made plain that European opposition to its missile defence proposals is not unanimous.
Moreover, Mr. Putin's response in talks on missile defence exposed Jacques Chirac, French president, and to a lesser extent Gerhard Schröder, German chancellor, as being on the face of it more extreme in their opposition to abolishing the anti-ballistic missile treaty (ABM) between Moscow and Washington than Mr. Putin himself.
Mr. Bush has called for setting aside the treaty, which prevents the development of many types of missile defences that Mr. Bush wants to build.
Mr. Putin called the ABM treaty "the cornerstone of international security," but hinted he might be willing to talk about replacing it. Nonetheless, he suggested a strong aversion to the US deciding on its own to walk away from the treaty: "Any unilateral actions can only make more complicated various problems and issues."
He said the US and Russia had, because of the large numbers of nuclear weapons each possessed, "a special responsibility for maintaining the common peace and security in the world, for building a new architecture of security in the world".
Yet, Mr. Putin's vision of a new security architecture is likely to be significantly different from that of Mr. Bush, more likely to place emphasis on binding treaties. For their part, US officials have not ruled out such an approach, though many in the administration would oppose the US being constrained by new agreements.
Mr. Putin also reacted more positively than some expected to Mr. Bush's speech of the day before in Warsaw, in which he strongly backed expansion of the NATO alliance into the Baltic states, inside the former Soviet Union.
While Mr. Putin expressed serious reservations about this, he chose to focus on Mr. Bush's statement that Russia was not an enemy of the US. "When a president of a great power says he wants to see Russia as a partner, and maybe even as an ally, this is worth so much to us."
Mr. Bush said the two sides would launch "regular detailed and serious consultations on the nature of our security relationship," that would include discussions about missile defences. He said Mr. Powell and Donald Rumsfeld, defence secretary, would begin talks soon.
As part of what Mr. Bush said should be a broad relationship, Mr. Bush said the US would support Mr. Putin's desire to join the World Trade Organisation. "We think that Russia ought to be admitted into the WTO and we will work toward that end," he said.
Mr. Bush did nonetheless create a few hostages to fortune. While raising US concerns about Chechnya, freedom of the press and the transfer of Russian nuclear-related materials to Iran, the US president described Mr. Putin as "an honest and straightforward man who loves his country. He loves his family. We share a lot of values."
He said he had "looked into his eyes" and got "a sense of his soul." Asked if he was a man he could trust, the US president said: "Yes", adding he would not have invited Mr. Putin to his Texas ranch if he did not trust him. To these personal comments, Mr. Putin said he had invited Mr. Bush to his own home in Moscow, and that Mr. Bush was "a person who has studied history." return to menu
C. US Nuclear Stockpile
1. Bush Stunned by U.S. Nuclear Arsenal Size
June 17, 2001
(for personal use only)
WASHINGTON -- President Bush was stunned last month when told of the extent of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, Newsweek magazine reported in its June 25 edition, released on Sunday.
"I had no idea we had so many weapons," Bush was quoted as saying by an unidentified "White House insider."
"What do we need them for?" the president was said to have asked at a briefing, according to the Newsweek report.
But that was not a dumb question, the magazine noted in detailing the vast U.S. nuclear arsenal, which includes 5,400 warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles, 1,750 nuclear bombs and cruise missiles ready to be launched from B-2 and B-52 bombers, 1,670 "tactical" nuclear weapons and another 10,000 warheads in bunkers around the United States.
That potential for nuclear overkill may be reined in, however, as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld prepares at the Pentagon to implement Bush's stated goal of streamlining and downsizing the arsenal.
Rumsfeld has brought back retired Gen. George (Lee) Butler and former Reagan administration national security guru Richard Perle to spearhead an effort to reduce the arsenal to safer, more manageable and more cost efficient levels, Newsweek said.
"I see no reason why we can't go well below 1,000" warheads, Perle told the magazine. "I want the lowest number possible under the tightest control possible."
"The truth is we are never going to use them," Perle added. "The Russians aren't going to use theirs either." return to menu
D. Statements and Speeches: Russian Arsenal Security
1. Text: Bush Continues Emergency Related to Russian Fissile Material
US Department of State
June 19, 2001
(for personal use only)
President Bush has informed Congress that he is continuing an executive order published last year declaring a national emergency "with respect to the accumulation of a large volume of weapons-usable fissile material in the territory of the Russian Federation."
"It remains a major national security goal of the United States to ensure that fissile material removed from Russian nuclear weapons pursuant to various arms control and disarmament agreements is dedicated to peaceful uses, subject to transparency measures, and protected from diversion to activities of proliferation concern," Bush said in a letter to Congress.
Following are texts of the letter to Congress and a Federal Register notice continuing the national emergency:
(begin text of letter to Congress)
THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary June 12, 2001
TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:
Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), provides for the automatic termination of a national emergency unless, prior to the anniversary date of its declaration, the President publishes in the Federal Register and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date. I have sent the enclosed notice to the Federal Register for publication. This notice states that the emergency declared with respect to the accumulation of a large volume of weapons-usable fissile material in the territory of the Russian Federation is to continue beyond June 21, 2001.
It remains a major national security goal of the United States to ensure that fissile material removed from Russian nuclear weapons pursuant to various arms control and disarmament agreements is dedicated to peaceful uses, subject to transparency measures, and protected from diversion to activities of proliferation concern. The accumulation of a large volume of weapons-usable fissile material in the territory of the Russian Federation continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. For this reason, I have determined that it is necessary to maintain in force these emergency authorities beyond June 21, 2001.
GEORGE W. BUSH
THE WHITE HOUSE, June 11, 2001.
(end text of letter to Congress)
(begin Federal Register notice)
THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary June 13, 2001
CONTINUATION OF EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO PROPERTY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION RELATING TO THE DISPOSITION OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM EXTRACTED FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS
On June 21, 2000, President Clinton issued Executive Order 13159 (the "Order") blocking property and interests in property of the Government of the Russian Federation that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereinafter come within the possession or control of U.S. persons that are directly related to the implementation of the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation concerning the disposition of highly enriched uranium extracted from nuclear weapons, dated February 18, 1993, and related contracts and agreements (collectively, the "HEU Agreements"). The HEU Agreements allow for the downblending of highly enriched uranium derived from nuclear weapons to low enriched uranium for peaceful commercial purposes. The Order invoked the authority, inter alia, of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq., and declared a national emergency to deal with the threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States posed by the risk of nuclear proliferation created by the accumulation of a large volume of weapons-usable fissile material in the territory of the Russian Federation.
A major national security goal of the United States is to ensure that fissile material removed from Russian nuclear weapons pursuant to various arms control and disarmament agreements is downblended to low enriched uranium for peaceful commercial uses, subject to transparency measures, and protected from diversion to activities of proliferation concern.
Pursuant to the HEU Agreements, weapons-grade uranium extracted from Russian nuclear weapons is converted to low enriched uranium for use as fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. The Order blocks and protects from attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment, or other judicial process the property and interests in property of the Government of the Russian Federation that are directly related to the implementation of the HEU Agreements and that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of United States persons.
The national emergency declared on June 21, 2000, must continue beyond June 21, 2001, to provide continued protection from attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment, or other judicial process the property and interests in property of the Government of the Russian Federation that are directly related to the implementation of the HEU Agreements and subject to U.S. jurisdiction. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing the national emergency with respect to weapons-usable fissile material in the territory of the Russian Federation. This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the Congress.
2. Text: Weapons of Mass Destruction Top Security Threat, Sen. Lugar Warns
US Department of State
June 19, 2001
(for personal use only)
U.S. Senator Richard Lugar says the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is the single greatest threat to U.S. national security.
"More so than at any other time in the past, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery constitutes a profound and urgent threat at home and abroad," Lugar said June 18 in a keynote address at the Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference in Washington.
Lugar, a senior Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said potential adversaries view WMD as an effective means for countering U.S. conventional military superiority and as a means for threatening neighbors. "They are becoming the 'weapons of choice' rather than the 'weapons of last resort,'" he said.
Because of the more complex and dangerous environment posed by WMD, he said the United States must rethink "strategies and the continuing utility of the traditional tools available to counter the threats" the United States and its allies face.
He added that traditional deterrence based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation cannot be relied upon any longer in strategic planning. He said the United States must develop new deterrence concepts based on offensive and defensive forces.
Lugar also discussed the Nunn-Lugar program to dismantle the old Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal, lowering nuclear forces, chemical weapons elimination, and the need to employ former Soviet weapons scientists in peaceful pursuits.
Following is the text of Lugar's prepared remarks:
SPEECH BY SENATOR RICHARD LUGAR NUNN-LUGAR -- A TOOL FOR THE NEW U.S.-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP
Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference Washington, D.C. June 18, 2001
THE CURRENT THREAT ENVIRONMENT:
The strategic environment during the Cold War was characterized by high-risk but low-probability of a ballistic missile exchange between the superpowers. Today, however, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the opposite is the case -- we live in a lower-risk but higher-probability environment with respect to ballistic missile exchanges. Whereas previous strategic calculations assumed more or less rational actors, experiences with Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden, and others make this assumption less plausible today.
Long-range missiles are seen as a cost-effective deterrent for countries who decry American "hegemony" or seek to deter international peacemaking efforts. If a future aggressor were to have ballistic missiles capable of reaching U.S. or allied territory, hostile powers might be tempted to blackmail the U.S. into standing by in the face of aggression. In fact, hostile powers possessing these dangerous weapons could fundamentally change the decision-making process with regard to international engagement of the United States.
In short, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the number one national security threat facing the United States and its allies. More so than at any other time in the past, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery constitutes a profound and urgent threat at home and abroad. These weapons are seen by potential adversaries as possessing substantial utility, either for use against neighbors or as instruments of asymmetric warfare designed to overcome the conventional military superiority of the United States. They are becoming the "weapons of choice" rather than the "weapons of last resort." This more complex and dangerous environment requires us to rethink our strategies and the continuing utility of the traditional tools available to counter the threats our nations face.
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH:
On May 1, at the National Defense University, President Bush shared his thoughts on the need to fundamentally change the parameters of strategic deterrence. I share the President's view that the U.S. needs to develop new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces to ensure the safety and security of the American people in the future. Deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation.
Agreements between the U.S. and Russia on missile defense and continued offensive arms reductions are important goals, but they are only part of the solution. Missile defense is not a silver bullet that, by itself, can adequately protect the United States and its allies from the enhanced threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. But it is an important component that gives added credibility to the other elements of U.S. strategy as well as a means to protect the American people if our nonproliferation and diplomatic efforts prove less than perfect. Equally important, agreements and unilateral declarations on reductions of offensive arms are only successful if they are fully implemented by both sides and can be verified. Only then will security and stability be enhanced.
DEFENSE IN DEPTH:
I approach the response to these threats to American security through the prism of a "defense in depth." There are four main lines of defense against weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile threats. Individually, each is insufficient; together, they help to form the policy fabric of an integrated defense-in-depth.
The first is prevention and entails activities at the source such as the Nunn-Lugar/Cooperative Threat Reduction program that has deactivated over 5,500 nuclear warheads and efforts to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction and associated knowledge.
The second is deterrence and interdiction and involves efforts to stem the flow of illicit trade in these weapons and materials at foreign and domestic borders.
The third line of defense is crisis and consequence management and involves greater efforts at domestic preparedness such as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici program, which has supplied more than 100 American cities with the training to deal with the consequences, should such threats turn into hostile acts.
The fourth line of defense must include limited missile defenses against the growing ballistic missile capabilities of so-called rogue states.
Together, all four lines help form the policy fabric of an integrated defense in depth.
In addition to announcing his intentions to pursue a dialogue with Russia on missile defense and continued offensive arms reductions, President Bush requested a comprehensive review of U.S. policy towards Russia and our cooperative nonproliferation programs. In other words, as the President commences diplomatic discussions on the fourth line of defense, the Administration is reviewing the other three lines to ensure they are credible, efficient, and effective. I applaud this initiative because our challenge is to find the right balance between planning for the threats of the future and meeting those that are here and now! As my partner, Sam Nunn, noted recently:
"A limited missile defense has a place in a comprehensive, integrated plan of nuclear defense, but it should be seen for what it is -- a last line of defense. Our first line of defense is diplomacy, intelligence and cooperation among nations, including Russia."
Secondly, it is imperative that our debates over and funding for limited missile defenses be embedded in a revised and more all-encompassing nonproliferation strategy designed to reinvigorate U.S. efforts to prevent countries from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the first place. Enhanced export controls, arms control regimes and regional security alliances still have a role to play if employed selectively.
Most importantly, the Administration must ensure that programs and projects that compose our first and second lines of defense are managed effectively and funded properly. We must continue to place a priority on redressing the instability of the former Soviet arsenal by expanding joint approaches to eliminating weapons of mass destruction in Russia and in other countries all over the world.
The Administration should also determine how funding can be increased to accelerate non-proliferation efforts. The Bush administration should use its nonproliferation review to develop a comprehensive plan that sets mutual goals for securing the Russian arsenal and prescribes a step-by-step time frame for achieving those goals. Today, we spend less than one percent of our annual defense budget on non-proliferation efforts. Let me say that again, the U.S. spends less than 1% of our defense budget on the first line of defense against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.
This is unacceptable. It is far more effective and much cheaper to eliminate threats at their source than attempting to deter or defend against them later. This is not to say that other lines of defense don't have a critical role. Rather, at this point in time there is no better U.S. investment in combating this threat than the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program.
THE NUNN-LUGAR PROGRAM:
As the former Soviet Union began to break apart in 1991, mutual acquaintances in Russia came to former Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia and me and pointed out the dangers of the dissolution of a nuclear superpower. Weapons and materials of mass destruction were spread across four newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. Russian leaders requested our cooperation in securing and protecting these weapons and materials. This was the genesis of the Nunn-Lugar program.
This was not a problem that Congress wanted to deal with in 1991. Members were highly skeptical of committing funds to any program that seemed to benefit Russia. The atmosphere was decidedly hostile to any initiative that focused on a foreign problem. Americans were weary of the Cold War and the Gulf War. Both Congress and presidential aspirants had decided that attention to foreign concerns was politically risky. The House of Representatives had previously rejected, in a rather summary fashion, a plan to commit one billion dollars to addressing the problems of the former Soviet Union. That outcome did not give Senator Nunn and me much of a springboard for our initiative.
Yet we brought together a bipartisan nucleus of Senators who saw the problem as we did. We developed a plan to commit a small portion of Defense Department resources each year to the cooperative dismantlement of the old Soviet nuclear arsenal. Remarkably, the Nunn-Lugar program was passed in the Senate by a vote of 86 to 8. It went on to gain approval in the House and was signed into law by President Bush.
At a cost of less than two-tenths of one percent of the annual U.S. defense budget, the Nunn-Lugar program has facilitated the destruction of 423 ballistic missiles, 383 ballistic missile launchers, 85 bombers, 483 long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles, 352 submarine missile launchers, 209 submarine launched ballistic missiles, and 19 strategic missile submarines. It also has sealed 194 nuclear test tunnels. Most notably, 5,504 warheads that were on strategic systems aimed at the United States have been deactivated.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan became the third, fourth, and eighth largest nuclear powers in the world. Without Nunn-Lugar, they would still have thousands of nuclear weapons. Instead, all three countries are nuclear weapons-free. To put this into perspective, Nunn-Lugar has dismantled more nuclear weaponry than the countries of Great Britain, France, and China currently possess in their stockpiles and arsenals combined.
Not only has the Nunn-Lugar program made important contributions to our security, it has also provided a diplomatic basis for relationships with Russia. The last ten years have seen a series of high points and low points in the relationship. NATO operations in Kosovo, Russian military activity in Chechnya, and spy scandals have led to crises and stalemates. In some cases, these low points have led to the cessation of diplomatic contact. Talks were broken off, trips were canceled, and relations dropped precipitously. But through the ups and downs of the relationship, there has been one constant: the Nunn-Lugar program. Even during the moments of greatest tension, Nunn-Lugar has continued its important work. In many ways, the Nunn-Lugar program has represented the cornerstone and, at times, almost the totality, of the U.S.-Russian relationship. It has given expression to an area of cooperation where only competition might have existed were it not for our common goal of dismantling the weapons of the Cold War.
But the Nunn-Lugar program is a tool, a means to an end. Nunn-Lugar has prospered when U.S. policy towards Russia has been guided by a firm hand and a logical policy prescription. Nunn-Lugar cannot take the place of effective and coherent policy; in fact, it cannot operate without effective policy guidance.
Despite the success of Nunn-Lugar, the threat to U.S. national security from proliferation remains. Nunn-Lugar alone is insufficient to safeguard American security. But absent significant progress in the other lines of defense, it will remain the most efficient and cost-effective response to the threat. During his recent campaign, President George W. Bush underscored the importance of these efforts. He said: "I will ask the Congress to increase substantially our assistance to dismantle as many of Russia's weapons as possible as quickly as possible."
THE DIPLOMATIC SCENE:
Efforts to deploy a missile defense system will be a technological challenge for the United States but we must also look beyond the domestic stage in our preparations. I was pleased to learn of the President's intention to consult closely with our friends and allies in Europe and Asia. Administration officials have returned from a first round of meetings and consultations on the subject. Although breakthroughs were not achieved, an important first step has been taken.
The cooperation of like-minded nations is imperative if we are to fully enjoy the benefits of defense against missiles while maintaining multilateral efforts to stop or limit their spread. The President also pointed out that the U.S. will work closely with Russia in hopes of reaching an acceptable conclusion in the arms control arena. Let there be no doubt, this will require heavy lifting. Negotiations will not be easy or quick. A successful conclusion to these negotiations will require great patience and even better statesmanship. But I believe this Administration is up to the task and ultimately will be successful.
Many have characterized this process as a one way street, measured by U.S. gains and Russian losses. I disagree with this analysis. Russian interests continue to be served by the reduction of strategic offensive weapons systems. Furthermore, a strong case can be made that Russia is under an equal, if not greater, threat from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile attack.
Meetings in Moscow last December that I enjoyed with General Kvashnin, Chief of the Russian General Staff, and General Yakovlev, then-Commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces, centered on the costs associated with continued Russian reductions. Both pointed out that Russia will dramatically reduce its deployed warhead levels to 1,500, as announced last fall. We discussed a number of ways to meet these new force levels, repeatedly noting that the biggest hurdle in their plans was dismantlement costs. I believe the United States and Russia are on the same page on this issue.
LOWER OFFENSIVE NUMBERS:
As President Bush explained in his recent speech, he is "committed to achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs...." His goal is to move quickly to reduce nuclear forces. As a means of accomplishing these goals, the Administration has indicated a willingness to explore a unilateral but parallel method of reductions as opposed to seeking to expand the more traditional bilateral arms control process.
There are good reasons for pursuing a unilateral but parallel strategy. It is more flexible and better suited for faster action. Protracted negotiations would keep many weapons on station longer than is necessary. To be sure, a unilateral but parallel process is not perfect. But its strengths may make it a better approach than the more traditional ones in the current strategic environment. That is not to say that such a strategy does not have its drawbacks. It does. The lack of some degree of irreversibility and agreed-upon verification regime make it a less than a perfect solution. But I believe some of these weaknesses can be overcome by utilizing other tools.
Nunn-Lugar in a Unilateral but Parallel Framework
For example, I am convinced that Nunn-Lugar and other nonproliferation programs can play a critical role in overcoming the inherent limitations of a unilateral but parallel approach to offensive force reductions. Let us not forget, Russians will face many of the same challenges under a unilateral but parallel process as they do under current treaty frameworks. They cannot afford to dismantle their weapons systems. Currently, Nunn-Lugar is the means by which this task is accomplished. Absent an unexpected economic revival in Russia, the need for dismantlement assistance will continue. But Nunn-Lugar could also prove useful in providing verification in a unilateral but parallel arms reduction process.
Through the Nunn-Lugar program, the United States could maintain a window of observation into Russian dismantlement, as well as serve as a venue to provide Russia with an understanding and view of American reductions. It would not be capable of completely replacing a treaty verification regime, but it would be tremendously valuable tool. In addition to the utilization of national technical means, Pentagon contract inspection and acceptance visits as well as audit and examination visits could provide an effective verification tool.
Anyone who has witnessed the contractual negotiating process involved in undertaking and implementing a Nunn-Lugar project as well as the role of American firms in managing such projects on site and the auditing practices to ensure proper utilization of U.S. funds, can attest that the inspection and verification procedures associated with the program are every bit as stringent and intrusive as similar measures under an arms control regime.
AREAS IN NEED OF ADDITIONAL ATTENTION:
Chemical Weapons Elimination
Despite the tremendous progress Nunn-Lugar has achieved and the real prospects for additional contributions in the future, there are areas that require additional attention and support. In my opinion, chemical weapons elimination in Russia is at the top of this list.
The United States has agreed to assist Russia in the elimination of its chemical weapons arsenal. Specifically, the Pentagon will construct a chemical weapons elimination facility at Shchuchye near Chelyabinsk. In December, I visited the Russian facility there and toured the site of the proposed Nunn-Lugar destruction facility. Located nearly a thousand miles from Moscow, it is home to a staggering two million chemical artillery shells and warheads.
Shchuchye houses 50 percent of the former Soviet modern ground-launched chemical weapons arsenal. The weapons varied from compact 85 mm chemical artillery shells to much larger warheads carried on "SCUD" missiles. These modern, ground-delivered munitions -- filled with sarin, soman, and VX -- are in excellent, ready to-use condition and, for the most part, are small and easily transportable.
Critics of U.S. involvement argue that the weapons stored at Shchuchye pose no more than an environmental threat to the local Russian population. Nothing could be further from the truth. The size and lethality of the weapons I observed are clearly a threat. A Russian Major and I demonstrated the proliferation threat posed by these weapons by easily fitting an 85 mm shell, filled with VX, into an ordinary briefcase. Room was available for at least two more shells. One briefcase alone, could carry enough agent to kill thousands of Americans.
Under the Chemical Weapons Convention, Russia has declared a stockpile of 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons. These munitions have been collected and stored in seven sites across Russia. But not one has been destroyed primarily because of Russian budget shortfalls. The proposed U.S. facility would be capable of destroying 800 metric tons of weaponized agents each year.
The Pentagon has tried unsuccessfully over the last several years to launch this project. The Senate has supported these efforts, but the House of Representatives has objected. In an attempt to find a compromise the Senate adopted a plan that required specific conditions to be met prior to the release of U.S. funds for the project. Despite the fact that the House refused to accept this proposal, the Senate's efforts have triggered considerable action in Russia. First, Russia increased funding for chemical weapons elimination six-fold to over $100 million and is completing installation of the infrastructure necessary for facility operations.
Secondly, U.S. efforts to attract additional international assistance from other nations have proven successful. Thus far Italy, The Netherlands, The United Kingdom, the European Union and Canada have pledged to provide assistance. Others have indicated interest in contributing to the cause. Each nation has indicated that its contribution would be contingent on continued U.S. leadership in the project. In addition to Shchuchye, many foreign governments are actively supporting CW destruction efforts at other locations in Russia.
Finally, Moscow has agreed to consolidate the weaponry stored at seven sites into three primary or central elimination sites; this is an abandonment of its previous position which cited Russian domestic law as forbidding the transportation or movement of chemical weapons and agent in Russia. As a result the Nunn-Lugar destruction facility will be impelled to not only destroy the weapons stored at Shchuchye but those at other storage locations as well.
It is time to utilize the window of opportunity to destroy these dangerous weapons. It is imperative for Americans, Russians, and the world that Russia's vast stores of chemical weapons do not end up in the hands of rogue nations or terrorists. We are losing precious time to eliminate these dangerous weapons. Securing the necessary authorization and appropriations for the construction of the destruction facility is my highest priority this year.
A second area in need of additional attention and funding concerns efforts to employ former Soviet weapons scientists in peaceful pursuits. Programs such as the International Science and Technology Centers administered by the Department of State and Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention administered by the Department of Energy seek to employ these scientists in non-weapons-related work. In many ways, destroying weapons of mass destruction is the easy part; ensuring that the person who created them never does so again is harder. These programs are the best tools we have at our disposal to encourage these scientists to enter an open marketplace while remaining at the institutes and laboratories working on peaceful programs. That is not to say these programs cannot be improved, managed better, or implemented more effectively. They can and they should.
To date, tens of thousands of former Soviet weapons scientists have been employed through these programs. Considerable success has been realized, but with a renewed commitment of resources and leadership, the U.S. can make dramatic progress in ensuring that former scientists forego the temptation of returning to their former careers of producing materials and weapons of mass destruction in Russia or rogue states.
But these programs are transition measures, not long-term solutions. They are vehicles to move scientists from weapons research to peaceful work. The private sector must be the ultimate destination. Only when these scientists have long-term employment in peaceful pursuits and succeed in domestic and international markets, will we able to scale back our efforts. The private sector is the best long-term option.
American and European corporations have much to gain by cooperating with government efforts like the Nunn-Lugar/CTR program. I have proposed that American companies explore the possibility of purchasing or establishing long-term contractual relationships with these Russian chemical and biological laboratories in order to provide the best scientific minds with employment in peaceful endeavors. These facilities would be an excellent investment in hardware and production technology. Our corporations would enjoy association with some of the finest minds in Russia.
The Administration, NATO and the European Union must explore options to encourage and trigger greater private sector investment. Considerable thought and planning should be given to overcoming Western corporate hesitancy and an inhospitable Russian investment environment. It will not be an easy sell but we must convince the private sector to get involved in the response. Their role is critical to a successful nonproliferation end-game.
The U.S. and Russia have a difficult road ahead, one that will require compromise and sacrifice. The last ten years have shown that nothing is impossible. Let us approach the continued reductions of offensive arsenals with creativity and a willingness to cooperate, even as we search for areas of agreement on missile defenses.
We have a window of opportunity to reduce the threat of former Soviet weapons of mass destruction left over from the Cold War. The fundamental question is whether there exists sufficient political will in Moscow and Washington to devote requisite resources and leadership to these efforts. Statesmanship and patience will be required over many years.
UNITED NATIONS -- Iraq evaded U.N. sanctions in the 1990s, importing military equipment to build missiles and nuclear weapons from companies in Eastern Europe and Russia, according to unpublished U.N. weapons inspection reports.
The American arms control researchers who obtained the reports conclude that Saddam Hussein's shopping spree is likely to intensify as the enforcement of sanctions wanes and Iraq's revenue from illegally smuggled oil grows.
The findings by Gary Milhollin, director of the Washington-based Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, a nonprofit watchdog group, and researcher Kelly Motz, are being published in the July-August issue of Commentary magazine.
The unpublished U.N. weapons inspection reports were obtained by sources outside the United Nations, according to Motz. Their release comes at a time when the U.N. Security Council is engaged in tough negotiations on a U.S.-British proposal to toughen enforcement of a decade-old arms embargo on Iraq.
"The new proposal - whether adopted by the U.N. or not - has little hope of stopping the Iraqis from sneaking in what they need to rebuild their weapons sites and sneaking out the oil to pay for it," they wrote in the article made available Monday. "Even when the U.N. inspection regime was in place, the Iraqis had already figured out how to do just that."
A British diplomat disagreed. "The new resolution will set in place arrangements to monitor the flow of goods into Iraq and to crack down on illegal oil smuggling. So it's not right to claim that it will make no difference," the diplomat said, speaking on condition of anonymity. There were no immediate comments from U.S. officials on the report.
The Security Council imposed sanctions on Iraq after its 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The sanctions cannot be lifted until U.N. weapons inspectors certify that Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs have been dismantled along with its long-range missile program.
But inspectors with the U.N. Special Commission, known as UNSCOM, left Iraq after seven years in December 1998 ahead of U.S. and British missile strikes launched to punish the country for not cooperating with inspectors. For the last 2 1/2 years, the Iraqi government has barred U.N. inspectors from returning, demanding instead that sanctions be lifted immediately.
The two experts from the Wisconsin Project quote an UNSCOM assessment before the inspectors left in 1998 which said that throughout the 1990s Iraq imported goods from at least 20 different countries.
On Iraq's purchase list were "full-sized production lines, industrial know-how, high-tech spare parts and raw materials," the UNSCOM report was quoted as saying. The reports cited have never been made public by the United Nations.
The contraband cargo was almost always flown or shipped to Jordan and then transported by truck across the border into Iraq, the researchers found.
According to the report, Iraq decided in the early 1990s to target Eastern Europe, following the collapse of the Soviet empire, which spurred a wholesale weapons market. In the Commentary article, the experts describe trips by high-level Iraqi delegations to companies in Belarus, Ukraine, Romania and Russia. The only other company mentioned in the article is one based in Taiwan.
Ewen Buchanan, spokesman for UNSCOM's successor agency, the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, said UNSCOM informed the Security Council over the years of evidence of ongoing efforts by Iraq to buy a variety of items, particularly in the missile area, though it didn't name any countries involved.
The report published by Milhollin and Motz "showed sanctions didn't do what they were supposed to do because Iraq got hold of some banned items, but it also showed the value of inspections in that we uncovered some of this stuff," Buchanan said.
The two researchers said the only way to shut down Iraq's smuggling network would be to control all cargo coming into Iraq and the oil going out - something the U.S.-British sanctions proposal before the Security Council tries to do.
This would require cooperation of Iraq's neighbors, especially Jordan and Syria. But Jordan's Prime Minister Ali Abu-Ragheb said in a letter to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan (news - web sites) circulated Monday that the U.S.-British plan would threaten the tiny kingdom's national security and stability. return to menu
F. Russia - Iran Cooperation
1. Russia: No Nuclear Help to Iran
June 18, 2001
(for personal use only)
WASHINGTON -- A top aide to Russian President Vladimir Putin denied that Russia was helping Iran's nuclear weapons program. He called on the United States Monday to respond to Russia's proposal for negotiations to reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals.
Igor Sergeyev, who advises Putin on strategic issues, said the technology Russia provides to Iran is for use in a light water reactor, much like technology the United States is giving to North Korea under an agreement to freeze that country's nuclear weapons program.
"To obtain weapons from the light water reactor in Iran is impossible," he said at a conference on proliferation problems held by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Sergeyev acknowledged that controls on technology exports beyond the range of the Russian government had been a "headache" in the early 1990s.
But he said the list of prohibited materials for export has grown through the years.
At the same time, Sergeyev said the United States had failed to respond to proposals by Putin to place a ceiling of 1,500 on U.S. and Russian long-range nuclear warheads.
"It's paramount to start negotiations immediately," he said.
The Russian official said he found hope in a general willingness of the Bush administration to reduce stockpiles.
At the same time, he defended the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which Bush wants to abandon to make way for a U.S. shield against missiles.
The spread of sophisticated technology has become more dangerous, he said.
"The world may be entering a phase in which the use of nuclear weapons is more likely than before," the former Russian defense minister said.
In fact, he said, Russia is more vulnerable than the United States to theft of nuclear technology and accidental launches of missiles by other nations.
"We are hoping to improve our export control," he said. "It is one of the best control systems." return to menu