RANSAC Nuclear News, April 18, 2001 Compiled by Kelly Turner
****Announcement**** The following new RANSAC report can be found at www.126.96.36.199: "Analysis of the Bush Administration's Fiscal Year 2002 Budget Requests for U.S.-Former Soviet Union Nuclear Security: Department of Energy Programs"
1. Russia's Risky Plan To Store Spent Nuclear Fuel For Profit
Fred Guterl and Eve Conant
April 23, 2001
(for personal use only)
Sixteen years ago Ramzys Faizullyn had the misfortune of being born in Novaya Kurmanova, a poor village near the Ural Mountains in the shadow of the Mayak nuclear-fuel reprocessing plant. From birth he has suffered from hydrocephalus, a swelling of the brain that has left him with daily headaches and dizziness. The Russian government gives his family a small allowance, acknowledging his illness as a side effect of radiation exposure. That's more than the Soviets ever did. But the government doesn't recognize other, more common symptoms - constantly aching bones, bleeding gums, weak teeth and chronic exhaustion - that Faizullyn shares with thousands of other residents of the Mayak area.
Now Faizullyn and his neighbors are distraught over Moscow's latest project: to import thousands of tons of nuclear waste from abroad and store it indefinitely in remote places like Mayak. Officials of Russia's Atomic Ministry prefer the more palatable term "spent nuclear fuel," but the distinction is lost on many Russian citizens. In a letter to President Vladimir Putin in December, Faizullyn wrote that if Russia had to import nuclear material, "please bring it to Moscow. We don't need any more. We don't want to have children like us."
Right now the law forbids Russia to act as the world's nuclear dumping ground, but the Atomic Ministry is pushing for a new one. With the potential to bring in billions of dollars, the Duma is likely to pass it, perhaps as early as this week. If it does, Russia starts down a path that could possibly lead to a repetition of the horrors of the Soviet nuclear programs - the ones that made the Ozersk region, where Mayak is located, one of the most contaminated places on earth. Russia wouldn't be the only culprit in such an outcome. So would the nations that, in their use of nuclear power, have amassed a staggering amount of radioactive nuclear waste, yet are unable or unwilling to find a safe place to put it. And so would the United States, which, through treaties, controls most of the world's nuclear materials and whose approval is essential to the success of Russia's plan. Russia's dilemma is a symptom of the wider problem of nuclear waste around the globe.
Russia didn't invent the idea of taking in the world's spent nuclear fuel. Nuclear-power experts have long been kicking around the idea of establishing sites where radioactive waste could be stored safely and securely. The problem is finding a willing recipient. A few years ago Pangea, a consortium of British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. and other energy firms, looked into siting a secure repository in Australia, whose wide-open spaces and stable geology might have made it an ideal place to park nuclear waste for the very long term. The Australians were having none of it. More recently, a private group called the Non-Proliferation Trust, run by former U.S. government officials, has backed a similar proposal for Russia.
Every country that uses nuclear power creates radioactive waste. Currently 150,000 tons of the stuff have been produced worldwide, and the total increases by about 10 percent each year. And yet no permanent repository has been built - and none is even close to completion. The technical problems are tough: a storage container would have to withstand earthquakes, fires, floods and other natural and man-made disasters for 10,000 years without leaking. So far nobody knows quite how to do that. Scientists working on the U.S. Yucca Mountain repository, which, when it is eventually finished, will hold casks of waste in tunnels hundreds of meters underground, have repeatedly underestimated the potential of nuclear material to leach from a container and wreak havoc in the environment. "There are a lot of people who will say that waste disposal is only a political problem," says Matthew Bunn, a nuclear-fuel expert at Harvard and former adviser to President Bill Clinton. "That's false. The more we learn about predicting what will happen in tens of thousands of years, the more we realize how little we understand."
Not that Russia is proposing to build a permanent storage facility. It isn't. Officials at the Atomic Ministry instead say they would accept nuclear waste and hold it in "temporary" storage for as long as necessary. "We only want to import spent, irradiated nuclear fuel that we will store for quite a long time, until there is a need to solve its destiny," says Boris Nikipelov, an adviser to the minister. The ministry isn't saying how long, but it could be decades. That would require building storage facilities for 39,000 tons of fuel, both imported and Russia's own, in Zheleznogorsk in Siberia. Facilities to store 3,000 tons more would be needed at the Mayak plant. Since all these sites would be "temporary," building them in a hurry wouldn't be difficult. All that's required is a bunch of dry casks_15-foot-high concrete or steel cylinders, which can be filled with waste and then welded shut - and a flat slab of concrete to put them on.
Leaving highly toxic waste out in temporary storage is not exclusively a Russian practice. Everybody does it. Not only are there no permanent facilities, but even if there were, temporary storage is often the only politically palatable option. It's not even necessarily a horrible thing to do. Dry casks are built to last 30 to 40 years, but some experts see no reason why they wouldn't last a hundred. And many countries routinely ship nuclear waste abroad. Germany sends the nuclear waste its reactors produce to France for reprocessing. France turns this waste into plutonium, enriched uranium (the kind used as reactor fuel) and "high level" nuclear waste, which gets shipped in casks back to Germany. There it is placed - temporarily, of course - in a lot near the town of Gorleben. Three years ago, under pressure from environmentalists, Germany refused to honor its obligation to take back waste it had sent to the French firm COGEMA for reprocessing. The incident was resolved only last month, after much wrangling, when Germany accepted the waste and promptly sent out another batch to the same reprocessing plant. COGEMA recently won a court case to take in waste from Australia and hold on to it until 2015. Japan, Taiwan, Britain and South Korea also participate in this global shell game. Even though reprocessing nuclear fuel has become uneconomical as the price of uranium has dropped, the practice gives countries an excuse to ship their fuel abroad for a few years.
It is not surprising that Russia's plan is opposed by the same environmentalists, such as Greenpeace, that have blocked German and French trains from shuttling nuclear waste in Europe. Nuclear-industry experts tend to find fault not so much with the idea of shipping nuclear waste around the world as with shipping it to Russia in particular. Consider the country's track record near the Mayak plant, where Faizullyn and his parents grew up. Operators of the plant, first opened in 1949 by the Soviet Union, used to dump untreated waste into tributaries that feed the Techa River. When whole towns began coming down with leukemia and other radiation-induced illnesses, the government converted a nearby swamp into an open-air radioactive sewer, euphemistically called Lake Karachai. Almost a mile long, the lake may be the single biggest repository of spent nuclear fuel in the world. In 1957 - about the time Ramzys Faizullyn's parents were born - an explosion at the plant flooded a nearby village with radioactive water and spewed radioactive gas out across 23,000 square kilometers of countryside. In 1967, during a particularly hot summer, Lake Karachai dried up, and winds carried its radioactive dust into the surrounding villages and forests.
In the years since, Russia has done little to improve the lot of people in these blighted villages. It has done nothing to clean up the environmental mess. Ironically, Russian officials argue that importing nuclear fuel is the country's best bet to make amends for these past errors.
Importing spent fuel could bring in $20 billion to this cash-starved country; 30 percent, insists the Atomic Ministry's Nikipelov, would go toward mopping up the radioactive cesspools that dot the countryside. Critics, however, are skeptical of this claim. "Shipping our waste to a poor country with the lowest possible nuclear safety standards is environmentally irresponsible and morally offensive," says Greenpeace Russia expert Thomas Munchmeyer, a former EU official in Moscow.
Russia's vast interior is another matter of concern. Getting nuclear waste from Switzerland or Japan to waste dumps in the Urals or Siberia would require shipping casks thousands of miles by railway, which, like most of Russia's infrastructure, is in dire need of repair. Environmentalists and terrorists would also have plenty of opportunity to stop the trains and create nuclear crises.
Even if the Duma gives the plan a thumbs up, chances are that Russia won't be able to make it work without the explicit approval of the United States. About 90 percent of all the uranium fuel that goes into reactors worldwide was mined in America and given away or sold abroad. Through treaties, the Americans still control it, even when it's spent. Without U.S. consent, Russia is shut out of virtually its entire market. Taiwan, a big potential customer of Russia's, needs a fourth nuclear plant to accommodate soaring demand for electricity; but its three other plants are already brimming with spent fuel, and no local communities are willing to accept it for storage. Russia could be a godsend for Taiwan, but all of its fuel is U.S.-controlled.
U.S. officials are simultaneously wary and ecstatic over the huge political lever they may soon have over Russia. If the Duma votes to approve the plan, the United States is the only obstacle between Russia and $20 billion. The Americans have plenty to gain. They could, for instance, make real headway in their longstanding goal of weakening Russia's nuclear ties with Iran (Russia has sent equipment and technical advisers). On the other hand, there's plenty to lose. If Russia is allowed to import and store U.S. nuclear fuel, the United States will bear a moral responsibility to make sure nobody, Russians included, is harmed. State Department officials insist that no deal would be approved unless Russia meets a host of demands, which include building a permanent repository.
Surveys show that Russians overwhelmingly disapprove of the plan. Last fall 2.5 million signatures were gathered on a petition to put the issue to a vote. Russia's Central Elections Committee deemed it invalid. Support for the bill has flip-flopped several times in recent months, but lawmakers always seem to come down in favor of passage. Whatever the eventual outcome, the world, and not just Russia, will bear responsibility for it. return to menu
2. Second Reading Of Spent Nuclear Fuel Import Bills
April 16, 2001
(for personal use only)
The lower house of the Russian parliament, the State Duma, has postponed the second reading of the bills favouring spent nuclear fuel imports to Russia to April, 18.
The State Duma has postponed the second reading of the bills, favouring spent nuclear fuel imports to Russia, scheduled to April 11. The Duma speaker Gennadiy Seleznev said, that the Duma Council decided to examine the bills on April, 18, RIA Novosti informed. This proposal had been submitted by leaders of some fractions.
In the end of March, nuclear minister Yevgeny Adamov, who had been actively promoting the idea of the spent fuel import, retired. Journalists and public were puzzled over, whether Adamov's dismissal meant change of the Ministry for Nuclear Energy, Minatom, policy, or it was only a "steam discharge". An opinion was voiced, that Adamov was sacked, having failed to ensure the bills passing. By the previous week, Minatom resumed its harsh propaganda for changing Russia into radioactive dumpsite.
"Spent fuel issue is very important, high technologies must be brought out to the world market", new minister Rumyantsev said.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is still keeping silence about the spent fuel issue, but he thanked ex-minister Adamov for his successful management of Minatom. This year Minatom "reached the best levels of the Soviet period", Putin said. No evaluation of Adamov's public activity has been done.
Rumyantsev's first steps
"The contracts for building nuclear power plants abroad correspond to all the international norms and Russia's interests, and the works will continue", Rumyantsev said. Russia has contracts for building three NPPs in Iran, China and India.
The first important step minister Rumyantsev is going to take, will be Minatom's assets transfer from commercial Konversbank and MDM-bank to the State Bank, Sberbank. This step is said to be the main difference between Rumyantsev and his predecessor Adamov. In this connection, one can recall Rumyantsev's self-appraisal as a "Tsar's man", which became wide-known recently. Earlier, because of the ministry's closeness, Minatom was repeatedly accused of manipulations with the money and bribing MPs.
Rumyantsev does not seem to make changes. He will keep Minatom's commercialisation, began by Adamov, as he is firmly confident, that it is necessary for the nuclear industry survival. That means, that the new minister will not change Adamov's approach to the spent fuel imports issue.
Manipulating public opinion
Current events, including shut-down of the independent NTV channel, show that the Kremlin political technologists have to a certain extent lost the sense of reality. They believe Russia has no public society today and the state-controlled mass-media would convince people of anything.
As it was public opinion, which caused Adamov's dismissal, they decided to make a new "correct" public opinion voiced by the "correct" environmentalists. On April, 7, two days before the Parliament hearings, a sensation emerged from the Kremlin political technologist Pavlovsky's site: "All-Russian environmental organisations support spent fuel import." "All" turned out to be only two organisations: Kedr party and Russian Ecological Congress (REC). But - who cares? - in the course of a propaganda campaign this circumstance is not so important as the news agencies have already called these two organisations "Russian environmental representatives" and even proclaimed "unity of environmentalists and nuclear scientists".
The reality is as following: after the petition to the President against spent fuel import, submitted in the middle of March by 672 organisations - among them Greenpeace, WWF, Social-Ecological Unity, - a letter appeared, signed only by two organisations, but loyal to official initiatives.
The plan was that during the weekend the greens would not be able to respond, but this "letter of the environmentalists in support of spent fuel import" would be already wide-spread in the press. It was even easier to do, because NTV channel, which used to say truth about Minatom's deal, was compelled to defend itself. Social-Ecological Unity mentioned, that the side-effect of the letter of the two organisations would discredit environmental movement. The public would think that environmentalists urged to protest first, collecting 2.5 million signatures for anti-nuclear referendum, and then later changed their minds. Who would pay much attention to the names, eventually mentioned in the document? Moreover, Kedr and REC really set a condition: "products of reprocessing of the spent fuel must be returned to the countries where it was produced."
The letter begins with a phrase: "Being professionally engaged in environmental safety problems, we understand that, in case of passing of the bills, our country will be able to get essential funds, about $20 billion during 10 years." In the Social-Ecological Union report this phrase is called not only boastful, but disgusting and cynical: "If the authors of the letter were really engaged in environmental safety problems, hearing about spent nuclear fuel, they would not mention dollars, but radiation-crippled children from Muslyumovo, Chelyabinsk and other "nuclear sites"<ï¿½>. $20 billion are also known to be enough only for building storage facilities and spent fuel reprocessing plants, but not for contaminated areas purification or environmental and social programmes".
On Wednesday, members of Green Cross ecological organisation, member of Russian Ecological Congress, said that their name was used for a "false-letter". The members of the Congress did not depute director of the Congress Pimenov to make such an appeal. Not a single organisation, out of 148 REC participants, would sign a letter, favouring radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel imports. "This story stinks" Larisa Skuratovskaya, Jemma Firsova and Alla Yaroshinskaya, members of the Green Cross Trustee Council said about the letter. The Green Cross environmentalists demand a REC Trustee Council conference to examine this situation.
Nuclear scientists' open letter
An open letter of the environmentalists was published soon after the open letter of the nuclear scientists to the State Duma MPs. The letter demanded to pass the nuclear bills. The letter was signed by academicians Evgeny Velikhov, Nikolay Lavernov, Vladimir Frotov, Nikolay Ponomarev-Stepnoy and others. Last Saturday, in interview to Echo of Moscow radio, Nikolay Ponomarev-Stepnoy said to have not signed up these documents.
Speaking about the bills, the academicians wrote in the letter: "we are confident, that the decision must be taken and that should be done immediately." At the same time, Minatom and Kurchatov Institute representatives keep saying, they do not need immediate decisions. In his interview for "Russia" TV-channel minister Rumyantsev said: "Someone thinks there are trainloads [of nuclear waste] ready to go to Russia as soon as the bills are passed. It is absolute nonsense." The same was stated by Kurchatov Institute external activities director Andrey Gagarinsky to Radio of Russia: "All we have today is [the reprocessing plant] "Mayak", we are talking about a long-term program".
Several famous scientists objected to the spent fuel imports. One of them is academician Alexey Yablokov, arguing that building the reprocessing plants would take much time, while spent fuel would be already in Russia.
Nuclear State Regulatory position
Soon after minister Adamov's dismissal, head of the Nuclear State Regulatory (GAN) Yury Vishnevsky held a press conference to "dispel the myths, created by the ex-minister". Speaking about radioactive waste imports, Vishnevsky said, that Adamov and people like him "sell their own country, while pretending they sell new technologies". According to Vishnevsky, spent fuel import will not bring profit: one third of the money will be spent for taxes, the other third for storage exploiting, and the remaining part "is said to be for environment, but it is obvious that something would be stolen".
The Minatom representatives argue, that nuclear waste can be reprocessed into uranium- 235, needed by Russian NPPs. According to Vishnevsky, Russia has already from 500 to 700 thousand tonnes of radioactive waste without foreign import. Moreover, one kilogram of uranium, extracted from the waste would cost about $1000, while one kilogram of newly extracted uranium costs only $18. "There are no technical conditions for imported spent nuclear fuel storage in Russia today", Vishnevsky said.
But during the parliament hearings held on April, 9, head of the GAN proposed the MPs to allow imports and storage of the spent nuclear fuel, produced in Russia. Vishnevsky claimed, such addition to the bills would promote developing of the Russian producers.
Reaction in the regions
Social Ecological Union informs, the State Duma's decision to accept the bills during the first reading in December, has been denounced by the Dumas and Legislative Assemblies of the following regions: Sverdlovsk, Saratov, Volgograd, Kemerovo, Kostroma, Altai, Bryansk, Novosibirsk, Yaroslavl and Vologodsk regions. The Legislative Assemblies of the cities of Murmansk, Khabarovsk, Yekaterinburg, Kaliningrad and North-West parliament Association also fight the nuclear bills.
In the end of March the State Department of the Tatarstan Republic objected to radioactive waste imports, declaring Minatom's idea to be "an extremely dangerous initiative, which contradicts to the interests of Russia's multi-national people." Tatarstan Anti-Nuclear Society issued an open letter to Russian citizens, criticising spent fuel imports from the national patriotic positions. It should be mentioned that until now, the state and Minatom have used national patriotic rhetoric, proclaiming environmental groups to be agents of the West, who are interested in Russia's failure in this profitable market. Tatarstan Anti-Nuclear Society claimed, that Russia's engaging in the process of radioactive waste import and reprocessing would result in total control over Russian nuclear industry by multinational, mostly American companies. It means, the loss of the state independence, the open letter states.
Ecodefence! group carried out a comparative analysis of the current legislation. The group questions Minatom's statement, that passing of the bills is needed to remove a ban on foreign radioactive waste reprocessing. The laws currently in force allow temporary import and reprocessing of foreign spent fuel, which, in fact, has never been prohibited. Special governmental decree no. 773 from July, 29, 1995, regulates the procedure, which is identical to how it is established in other countries, engaged in this unpopular business, e.g. UK and France. "Probably, new minister is not aware of this document", Ecodefence believes.
Like his scandalous predecessor, Adamov, minister Rumyantsev keeps supporting the idea of changing Russia into radioactive burial ground. New bills, in contrast to the old regulations, lift the ban for long-term storage of the foreign radioactive waste. In fact, they allow eternal storage of them in Russia.
During spent fuel reprocessing a lot of additional waste is generated. In the current legislation there is a demand to send the waste to the home countries of the spent fuel. New bills allow the waste of reprocessing to be kept and stored in Russia. Disposal of the waste in Russia land is provided in the feasibility study of the bills.
Today only Mayak plant in Chelyabinsk region is engaged in reprocessing of the spent fuel of nuclear power plants. According to GAN statistics, an amount of radioactive waste, equal to 400 mln Curie, or 8 Chernobyls, is stored at Mayak plant. The waste is being illegally dumped in the Karachay lake, the most contaminated place on the Earth, according to the UN experts. In spite of the fact that, foreign waste reprocessing has never been prohibited for Minatom, the ministry has failed to sign contracts with the "rich" countries, capable of paying for that. On the contrary, during the 90s, Minatom lost almost all the contracts with the Eastern Europe "poor" countries. That means lack of the demand for reprocessing services.
"Comparing the new bills with the laws currently in force, one sees, that the undertaking is directed not for Russia's positions consolidation in allegedly existing market, but for changing the country into radioactive dumpsite", Ecodefence! co-chairman Vladimir Slivyak said.
The vote results are already known?
Deputy chairman of the State Duma Mrs. Lubov Sliska assumes, that the bills, favouring spent nuclear fuel imports, will pass in the lower chamber of the Russian parliament on April, 18. "The attitude of the leaders of the MPs' fractions shows, there is no controversy about the bills", she said at a press-conference yesterday. return to menu
3. Nuclear Minister Pushes for Spent Nuclear Rod Imports
The Associated Press
April 17, 2001
(for personal use only)
New Nuclear Power Minister Alexander Rumyantsev on Monday pushed for the country to import other nations' spent nuclear fuel rods for reprocessing, two days before parliament takes up legislation on the divisive proposal. Rumyantsev, whom President Vladimir Putin appointed last month, said the legislation was essential for Russia to be able to export new nuclear fuel. "If other countries know that we can accept spent nuclear fuel for storage and processing, it will help expand our market opportunities," Rumyantsev told a news conference.
He said that Russia faced increasing competition from French and British companies that are eager to provide nuclear fuel to the former Soviet republics and Eastern European countries, which have Soviet-built nuclear reactors. The British and French offer to accept the spent fuel, he said. Rumyantsev also argued that the $20 billion plan to import up to 20,000 metric tons of nuclear fuel was good for Russia because it would generate to clean up radiation-polluted territories and deal with other legacies of the nuclear era.
Spent nuclear fuel imports will also allow Russia to process up to four times more of its own nuclear waste, which has been piling up because of a lack of funds to build new storage and processing facilities, he said.
The legislation is set to be discussed Wednesday by the State Duma. return to menu
B. Russian-Iranian Relations
1. Russia Commits to Iran Reactor
Karl Emerick Hanuska
April 17, 2001
(for personal use only)
MOSCOW - New Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev committed Russia on Monday to completing work on Iran's Bushehr nuclear power station, but was non-committal on plans to build a second reactor there.
The United States, which opposes the sale of nuclear technology to what it considers a "rogue state," had expressed alarm at suggestions that Moscow could build more reactors for the Islamic republic.
"If we are lagging behind schedule on the construction of the first Bushehr nuclear power plant, then we will catch up," Rumyantsev, who replaced Yevgeny Adamov late last month, told a press conference.
"We must fulfill our contractual obligations," he said. The minister repeated Russia's view that the 1995 Bushehr contract did not violate Moscow's international treaty undertakings as the nuclear cooperation was of a strictly civilian nature.
Russian specialists were in talks on constructing a second reactor at Bushehr, he said. But Itar-Tass news agency quoted him as saying that "no documents have yet been signed."
Moscow analysts said Adamov had been sacked for his "excessive enthusiasm" in reaching deals with Iran, which only aggravated Russia's already fraught ties with the United States.
Washington has slammed Russian sales of nuclear technology to Iran and has cited potential nuclear proliferation to justify its desire build a $60 billion national missile defense shield that has been strongly denounced by Russia.
Russia insists it is only providing technology with civil uses, but the United States fears it will help Iran develop nuclear weapons. Rumyantsev said he expected both sides to find a compromise on the issue.
Washington has also sharply criticized Moscow's decision to ship nuclear fuel to India's Tarapur reactor, but Rumyantsev said Russia intended to build a nuclear power station on the sub-continent, despite international concerns.
"India is our strategic partner. We want to ensure that there are no reproaches [from the international community] in this regard," he said.
Rumyantsev, previously the head of one of Russia's top nuclear laboratories, also backed a plan to earn billions of dollars by importing nuclear waste for treatment.
He dismissed the fears of environmentalists by saying Russia had the technology to handle the waste safely and would earn substantial income from the work. return to menu
2. Russia Vows Speed on Iranian Reactor
AFP/International Herald Tribune
April 17, 2001
(for personal use only)
The Russian atomic energy minister vowed Monday to speed construction of a nuclear reactor in Iran that is opposed by the United States.
"If we are lagging behind schedule in the construction of the first unit of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, we will catch up," Interfax quoted the minister, Alexander Rumyantsev, as saying.
Russia was commissioned to build the first reactor at the Bushehr site in January 1994, after a German company, Siemens, withdrew from a contract. The reactor is scheduled to become operational within the next 12 months, Tehran said recently.
The United States contends that the site will help Iran to develop nuclear weapons. return to menu
C. Russian Nuclear Power Industry
1. Russian Weapons Firms Eye Sales of $6 Billion
April 17, 2001
(for personal use only)
MOSCOW--Russia could boost its annual arms sales by nearly one-fourth, but only if it sells to markets opposed by the United States, the head of a top defense holding company said Tuesday.
Boris Kuzyk, the head of New Programs and Concepts (NPK), told a news conference that defense firms could increase exports to about $6 billion if they clawed their way back into markets lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
"This is just one sixth of the weapons market and well within Russia's reach .ï¿½ Russia once gave up part of what it held in this market. It is time to take that position back," he said.
President Vladimir Putin told a government commission on military trade last month that Russia exported $3.68 billion in weapons last year, with revenues to federal coffers totaling $2.84 billion.
Kuzyk said Russia could increase sales to $4.2 billion to $4.5 billion over the coming years by stepping up partnerships with allies such as China, India, Iran, Egypt, Algeria and Syria.
"Specifically, these countries should become the foundation on which Russia builds contacts, with potential partners in this sphere in southeast Asia, the near east and Africa," Kuzyk said.
Washington has criticized the export of Russian arms and technology to what it calls "rogue states," and has said plans to create a U.S. national missile defense system stem directly from Moscow's willingness to "sell anything to anyone for money."
Kuzyk seemed unconcerned by such criticism. "One still has to defend one's own interests," he said, adding that potential partners in Europe were Germany, France and Britain. "Western Europe is feeling an increasing need to oppose U.S. expansion in (the arms industry) by setting up firms producing its own high-tech types of weapons," he said.
Kuzyk added that developing the arms industry was key to reducing the economy's reliance on Russian commodity exports.
NPK, which holds a controlling stake in 15 defense firms, was set up in 1998 and is this year investing $60-90 million in projects. Last June, Kuzyk said NPK's export contract portfolio was around $960 million.
Russia sells just 5 percent of the world's arms, compared with 50 percent sold by the United States. return to menu
D. U.S. - Russian Relations
1. U.S.-Russian Nuclear Programs on Edge
April 14, 2001
(for personal use only)
Top officials at U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories are concerned that current tensions between Washington and Moscow are starting to harm joint programs to reduce nuclear weapons and secure nuclear materials in Russia.
Both countries have called for high-level reviews of a $700 million program aimed at keeping Russian nuclear scientists employed in non-weapon areas and providing security systems, expertise and wages for guards to keep nuclear materials from being stolen.
The round of mutual diplomatic expulsions after the February arrest of former FBI agent Robert Philip Hanssen as an alleged Russian spy has apparently led to the cancellation or delay of scientific and other exchanges.
Kenneth Luongo, executive director of the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council and a major participant in exchange programs, said yesterday after returning from Moscow that the Russian foreign ministry had called for a three-month moratorium while the U.S. effort designed to secure Russian materials is reviewed in Moscow.
Luongo said he believes Moscow's action is a reflection of the Bush administration's announced review of the program, which a White House spokesman said yesterday "will take several months." It also follows the administration's proposed $100 million reduction in funds for the program in next year's budget, sent to Congress earlier this week.
However, Luongo said," overall the pattern right now is inconsistent." On the plus side, he noted, the Pentagon's $475 million threat reduction program, which pays for the destruction of Russian intercontinental missiles and nuclear submarines, appears to be continuing. A Pentagon spokesman said it "has had no problems in the last several months."
Luongo also said the new leadership of Minatom, the Russian nuclear energy agency, "wants to continue the program," but shift the emphasis to joint research projects.
As is often the case when tension rises between Moscow and Washington, exchange programs, which involve relatively few funds and are easily reinstated, are among the first halted or delayed.
Last week, two high-ranking Russian nuclear scientists canceled their participation in next week's international arms control conference at Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico. One of them, Vladimir Belugin, director of the Institute for Experimental Physics at Sarov, Russia's preeminent nuclear weapons laboratory, wrote that "with great regret" he had to bow out because of a meeting in Moscow with the new atomic energy minister.
Roger Hagengruber, Sandia's senior vice president for national security and arms control, said he was disappointed that the Russians had withdrawn and added that other cancellations could introduce "a chilling element" in the relationship. He noted that a delegation of members of the Russian lower house of parliament, the State Duma, scheduled to take part in an exchange program at Harvard University and in Washington, had also canceled earlier this week.
Ironically, among the major presentations scheduled for the Sandia conference is one called "U.S.-Russia Cooperative Efforts in Threat Reduction: Lessons Learned and Future Concerns."
At the U.S. Energy Department, a spokesman said, "We have not restricted travel but are observing all normal travel precautions." A meeting of Russian nuclear scientists and U.S. personnel in Moscow to discuss the direction of American aid to the nuclear cities program has been delayed, one participant said.
Another American nuclear expert just back from Moscow, Bruce Blair, president of the Center for Defense Information, said he found even his close Russian colleagues have become distant. Blair traced some of the new suspicion and hostility to "a general crackdown by the Russian internal intelligence service."
Blair also noted that it "has become more difficult to get visas to visit the nuclear cities . . . and self-censorship has emerged among journalists in Moscow who fear [if they write about nuclear matters] they will find themselves in hot water."
A number of Russian academics who wrote about nuclear weapons and related arms control matters recently have been accused of espionage by Russian authorities.
2. US Reviewing Aid For Non-Proliferation Programs In Russia
April 17, 2001
(for personal use only)
US National Security Council initiated broad review of all American aid programs to Russia set up to stop the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Some programs are likely to change significantly as National Security Council officials have been critical of how $760 million a year are spent in attempt to dismantle and secure Soviet nuclear heritage, New York Times reported.
According to New York Times, the senior official said that several of the programs, such as the Department of Energy's $173 million program to strengthen the security and accounting for fissile material at nuclear weapons storage sites, appeared to be "very effective." Others, several administration officials said, may not be money well spent, like the more than $6 billion long- term effort to help Russia and the United States dispose of 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium each. Programs deemed ineffective could be sharply reduced, or even scuttled.
"This is not a challenge to Russia or an effort to dismantle non-proliferation programs. This is about enabling the progress we have made to continue and making non-proliferation programs even more effective. We want to strengthen non-proliferation," the senior administration official said to New York Times.
The review is examining programs run mainly by the State Department, Pentagon and Department of Energy that have invested millions of dollars into Russia and the former Soviet republics since the end of the cold war. Most were created by the Clinton administration, but a few started as Congressional initiatives supported by former President George Bush.
The official praised the Department of Defense's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs, which received $458 million from Congress in this fiscal year. By the end of 2000 those programs, among other things, had deactivated 5,288 missile warheads, destroyed 419 long-range nuclear missiles and 367 silos, eliminated 81 bombers, 292 submarine missile launchers and 174 submarine missiles, and sealed 194 nuclear test holes and sites in Russia and other former Soviet republics. 21 nuclear ballistic missile submarines, SSBN's, have been dismantled up to date with CTR's funds or equipment, while six SSBN's are being eliminated under CTR with work in progress.
The official was also positive about the Department of Energy's program that permits the United States to buy and convert 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium, the equivalent of 25,000 warheads, to low-enriched uranium that can be used as commercial fuel in nuclear reactors. Since the agreement was reached in 1994, about 110 metric tons of such uranium has been purchased and converted. The Department's $6 billion program to dispose of Russian and American plutonium, to which Congress has allocated $280 million to date, and its Nuclear Cities Initiative, established in September, 1998, to stop the brain drain from Russia's closed nuclear cities was halved by Congress in fiscal 2000, and placed other conditions on spending, New York Times reported. The Russian $2 billion part of the program is to be paid by the West, but only U.S.A. agreed to pay $200 million while Great Britain promised $70 million during 25 30 years, France offered technologies for $445 million provided Russia will not change them, Japan agreed to pay $34 million, Canada is ready to buy only MOX fuel from Russia, and Germany cannot support the program due to the pressure of the greens, Russian daily Segodnya reports. Therefore, significant investment is still needed for the Russian part of the program from the western counterparts.
"A prejudiced review that looks at what can be eliminated, and not what can be improved, is missing an enormous opportunity and is likely to further rile relations with Russia," a former Clinton administration official who is executive director of the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, Kenneth N. Luongo, said to New York Times. return to menu
E. Nuclear Safety
1. Reactor Unit No.1 Shutdown At Smolensk NPP: The Failure Caused By A Human Error
April 17, 2001
(for personal use only)
Reactor unit no.1 at Smolensk NPP was shut down after a malfunction at its electrical system on April 16th at 8:45 a.m., RIA Novosti reported, referring to Rosenergoatom press service.
Reactor unit no.1 had been under scheduled repair for the past five months. On Monday it was started up, but soon after the reactor reached the rated capacity of 1000 MW, it had to be shut down. Press service said that power reduction had been made correctly, radiation levels were reported to be normal. The press service also said the malfunction was caused by an operator error.
Smolensk NPP operates on three units with RBMK-1000 type reactors. Its total capacity is 3,000 MW. This year Smolensk NPP has already produced 4,968mn kW/hour, which is exceeding the planned rates by 105mn kW/hour. But malfunctions have already occurred lately: a failure was revealed in steam generator no.3 of the second reactor unit on March 6th. return to menu
F. Russian Military
1. Russia, Belarus for Military Cooperation in all Fields
April 17, 2001
(for personal use only)
Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov has expressed confidence at a meeting of the joint board of the defence ministries of Russia and Belarus in Minsk on Tuesday that military cooperation between the defence ministries of Russia and Belarus will develop in all fields and will be maintained on a proper level in future.
Recently, very serious reshuffle has taken place in the defence ministries of the two countries, but the course towards development of cooperation and integration in the military field remains unchanged, Ivanov said.
"A need has arisen to take more steps towards integration of the two countries in the field of defence", Ivanov said. Priority should be given to issues of unification of the legislation in the field of defence so that we could really develop and plan the activities of the joint group of our armed forces, Ivanov said. return to menu
G. Nuclear Cities
1. Russian-American Experts Endorse Working Group on European Nuclear Cities Initiative to Redirect Russian Nuclear Expertise
Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council
April 16, 2001
FOR RELEASE: April 16, 2001; CONTACT: Raphael Della Ratta, (202) 332-1412
Washington, DC - The Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC), a leading think-tank dedicated to U.S.-Russian nuclear nonproliferation engagement, today lauded the establishment of the International Working Group (IWG) for the European Nuclear Cities Initiative (ENCI) at the April 9-10 International Forum on Energy and Environmental Opportunities in the Russian Nuclear Cities, held in Como, Italy. The IWG will focus on the root causes of proliferation concern: chronic financial problems within the cities and significant numbers of excess workers, and will develop new strategies and identify funding mechanisms that will assist with the conversion and restructuring of the Russian nuclear weapons complex.
The ENCI is a European-led effort complementary to the existing U.S. Russia Nuclear Cities Initiative, and other international efforts, including the RANSAC-coordinated Russian Nuclear Complex Conversion Consortium. The Consortium is a network of non-governmental organizations, academic institutions, and private industries dedicated to identifying career-changing opportunities for scientists within the Russian nuclear weapons complex.
"I am very encouraged by the decision of Europe to play a more active role in the effort to facilitate the conversion of the Russian nuclear weapons complex," RANSAC Executive Director Kenneth N. Luongo said. "The formation of this international working group is an important step in increasing international attention to this important effort and facilitating the much-needed strategic integration of those nonproliferation programs aimed at developing non-weapons career opportunities for weapons scientists. Our goal will be to ensure that future international efforts are focused on applying Russia's vast scientific and technical expertise to tackling real-world challenges in the security, energy, and environmental fields."
This IWG, to be supported primarily by the European Union, will consist of a European Union chairman, and a Russian Federation co-chair. Other IWG members are expected to include European Union member states' governments; the governments of the United States and Russia; international nonproliferation entities; non-governmental organizations; and Western commercial organizations.
The Forum chairman's final remarks on the establishment of the International Working Group for the European Nuclear Cities Initiative are available at: www.mi.infn.it/~landnet/landau.html.
The Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC) was founded in 1997 with the purpose of developing new cooperative nuclear security initiatives, and ensuring the timely and effective implementation of existing government-government programs. The Council consists of Russian and American experts who have been involved in U.S.-Russian cooperative nuclear security programs for a decade. return to menu
2. An International Working Group For The European Nuclear Cities Initiative, Chairman's Conclusions
International Forum on "Energy and Environmental Opportunities in the Russian State Research Centres and Nuclear Cities"
April 9-10, 2001
The international community has been engaged in a cooperative effort with Russia to limit the potential spread of weapons of mass destruction for the past decade. Overall the strategy has been aimed at decreasing potential proliferation resulting from materials, technology and expertise and at converting the scientific and technological potential to civil applications. This effort has been primarily focused on addressing specific proliferation threats such as improving the security of materials or funding scientific research projects for individual scientists. Nevertheless many scientists and technicians are still engaged in substantive nuclear weapons work, the scope of this work being substantially reduced from Cold War levels, and the related financing has been commensurately cut. This has created a situation where there is excess expertise that might be attractive to potential proliferators. The implementation of the existing efforts, and the knowledge and relationships that they have created, now have led to a point appropriate for the development and implementation of a more comprehensive strategy to address the underlying causes of proliferation concern, including chronic financial problems and significant numbers of excess employees. For this reason the conversion and restructuring of the Russian nuclear weapons complex, and in particular its core located in ten Closed Cities (often called Russian Nuclear Cities -RNC), represents one of the most important international security challenges.
There are many international nuclear security cooperation programmes with Russia in place. In particular, the EU channels its efforts through the ISTC, while the USA, which also uses this channel, has a number of other related programmes. Russia has contributed greatly to financing the conversion process. However there is a need for an integrated international mechanism to strengthen the strategic coordination among these efforts, and to realign the focus of these different programs, managed by the different governments, so as to prevent an outflow from Russia of nuclear weapons scientific expertise that could be used in proliferating countries.
One important issue is that currently there is no integrated international strategy to bring Russian scientists who have promising peaceful research capabilities into partnerships with various agencies and institutions that could result in the further development and commercialization of new technologies. Some such commercialization efforts have been carried out in collaboration with private Western companies or financial institutions; for example in partnership with the International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC), Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) programme, or using the business development infrastructure put in place by the U.S.-Russian Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI). However, the commercialization success rate has been low, because the commercialization of new technology is difficult. So an essential objective in any coherent strategy to prevent proliferation is to take steps to realise in the marketplace the vast potential of expertise and scientific/technical knowledge that exists in the nuclear cities, creating new civil jobs for the excess workers. This should not exclude the financing of basic research, where appropriate.
An institutional mechanism is therefore needed to assist with the development of new strategies that can help the West and Russia to achieve their stated non- proliferation goals. This new mechanism can assist with the further coordination of international non-proliferation efforts. This mechanism should be in the form of an "International Working Group" for the European Nuclear Cities Initiative, supported primarily by the European Union. The International Working Group (IWG) should provide a forum for discussions, for exchanging experiences and for establishing possible synergies and financing mechanisms that will result in a strategic alignment of the various RNCs International programmes.
Additional funding by EU partners/donors coordinated by the IWG, could establish the financial core of a European Nuclear Cities Initiative (ENCI) to be established as a complementary and synergetic programme with ISTC and with the American initiatives.
2. Organization of the IWG
Members of the IWG should include (as appropriate) representatives of: ï¿½ The European Union (including its Member States and the European Communities) and the Governments of Russia and the U.S.A; ï¿½ International and multilateral Entities such as ISTC, and other bodies serving the overall objective of non-proliferation through science cooperation; ï¿½ Governmental Agencies and National Laboratories; ï¿½ Non-Governmental Organisations that have developed activities in the field of non proliferation in the RNCs, including LNCV (Italy) and RANSAC (USA); ï¿½ Commercial Organisations with an interest in collaborative activities with the RNCs; ï¿½ R&D Institutes, Production Facilities, Incubators/Innovation Centres in RNCs; ï¿½ Local and Regional Administrations of Russian Nuclear Cities.
The proposed structure of the IWG will consist of a European Union chairman, and a Russian Federation co-chair.
A Secretariat, headed by an Executive Secretary, will be established in the location of IWG. The Secretariat will be responsible to the IWG for organising its meetings, at least on an annual basis, will sustain the activities of the IWG between two consecutive meetings and will implement the decisions of the IWG on the use of the budget available to it.
The nominations of the Chairman, the co-Chair and of the Executive Secretary will be discussed and approved in the first meeting of the IWG. In the first meeting of the IWG a charter of the IWG will also be discussed and approved.
The first meeting of the IWG will be convened within the year 2001 by the Italian Government. The proposed initial location of the IWG Secretariat and of the first meeting is in Como, Villa Olmo.
3. Estimated Budget for IWG Management
A preliminary estimate for the first year cost of the IWG is 500 K Euro. This estimate includes meetings, organisation of the Secretariat, workshops and related activities. The mechanism for financing is subject to further discussion. A more detailed budget proposal will be presented shortly.
1) AVRORIN Prof. Ac. Evgenii N., Director Russian Federal Nuclear Center, Institute of Technical Physics-VNIITF, 456770 Snezhinsk, Chelyabinsk Region, Russia 2) BARNARD Mr. Ralston, Sandia National Laboratory, 1515 Eubank Boulevard SE, Albuquerque NM 87123, USA 3) BARYCHEVA Dr. Nina, Russian Federal Nuclear Center-VNIITF, Institute of Technical Physics, 456770 Snezhinsk, Chelyabinsk Region, Russia 4) BELKIN Dr. Victor, Senior Manager, Dept. of International and External Economic Cooperation, MINATOM, 24/26 Bolshaya Ordynka, 101000, Moscow, Russia 5) BRIOUSSOV Mr. Alexandre, Assistant to the Deputy Director General, Department of Nuclear Energy, IAEA, Wagramer Strasse 5, P.O. Box 100, A-1400 Vienna, Austria 6) BUCHARIN Prof. Oleg, Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton University, H-102 Engineering Quadrangle, Princeton, N.J. 08544, USA 7) CAVUOTO Eng. Ugo, ENEA, Lungotevere Thaon de Revel, 76, 00196 Rome, Italy 8) CHUKHAREV Dr. Vladimir, Institute of Technical Physics, RFNC-VNIITF, 456770 Snezhinsk, Chelyabinsk Region, Russia 9) COLE Mr. Charles, Pacific North West National Laboratory, Battelle Boulevard MSIN K9-33, Richland, WA 99352, USA 10) COTTA-RAMUSINO Prof. Paolo, USPID, LNCV and Dept. of Physics, University of Milano, Via Celoria, 16, 20133 Milano, Italy 11) DELLA RATTA Dr. Raphael, Consortium Coordinator, Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC), Washington DC Office, 1730 Rhode Island Ave. NW, Suite 307, Washington DC 20036, USA 12) DESMOND Dr. William, Director NCI Program, Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Ave., S.W., 7A-049, Washington, DC 20585 USA 13) DOMBROVSKIY Dr. Victor, Russian Federal Nuclear Center-VNIITF, Institute of Technical Physics, 456770 Snezhinsk, Chelyabinsk Region, Russia 14) DOROFEEV Dr. Konstantin, Director General, MCC Science and Technology Center, 53 Lenin Str., Zheleznogorsk, 662973 Russia 15) DYAKOVA Dr. Elena, Project Manager, Head of Economic Office, VNIIEF-CONVERSIA, 37, Mir Avenue, Sarov, Nizhni Novgorod Region, Russia 16) ELENA Dr. Mirco, ITC, Dept. of Physics University of Trento and Fondazione Opera Campana dei Caduti, Rovereto (Trento), Italy 17) EREMIN Dr. A. D., RFNC-VNIIEF, 37, Mir Avenue, Sarov, Nizhni Novgorod Region, Russia 18) EVANS Dr. Meredydd, Associate Director, Advanced International Studies Unit, Battelle, Pacific Northwest National Lab., 901, D Street, SW, Suite 900, Washington, DC 20024, USA 19) FATEEV Dr. Vladimir, Head of Department, Kurchatov Institute, pl. Kurchatova 1, Moscow 123182, Russia 20) FULLER Dr. James, Pacific Northwest Center for Global Security, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, P.O.Box 999, Richland, WA 99352, USA 21) GAMBIER Dr. Didier J., Principal Administrator, General Directorate for Research, International Scientific Cooperation Policy Unit, European Commission, Office SDME 1/59, B-1049 Brussels, Belgium 22) HENRYWOOD Ms. Ruth, Department of Trade and Industry, Nuclear Industries Directorate, 1 Victoria Street, London SW1H 0ET, UK 23) IANNUZZI Cons. Giovanni, General Direction for Political Affairs, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Piazzale Farnesina, 1, 00194 Rome, Italy 24) KAGRAMANIAN Mr. Vladimir, Planning and Economic Studies Section, Department of Nuclear Energy, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Wagramer Strasse 5, P.O.Box 100, A-1400 Vienna, Austria 25) KAMENSHCHIK Dr. Alexandr Yu., Landau Institute for Theoretical Physics, RAS, Kosygina Str. 2,117940 Moscow, Russia 26) KOUROTCHKINE Mr. Vitaly, VNIPIpromotechnologii, All-Russian Designing and Research Institute of production Engineering, Kashirskoje schosse, 33, 115409 Moscow, Russia 27) KURANOV Dr. Vyacheslav, Russian Federal Nuclear Center-VNIITF, Institute of Technical Physics, 456770 Snezhinsk, Chelyabinsk Region, Russia 28) LADY Dr. Robert, Counsellor, United States of America Consulate, Pol-Mil Section, Via Principe Amedeo, 2/10, 20121 Milano, Italy 29) LANTIERI Eng. Antonino, Director Assistant, Sustainable Energy Systems Division, ENEA, Via Martiri di Monte Sole, 4, 40129 Bologna, Italy 30) LARSSON Mr. Tor, Expert, Ministry of Defence and the Defence Research Institute, Stockholm, Sweden 31) LUONGO Dr. Kenneth N., Director, Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC), Washington DC Office, 1730 Rhode Island Ave. NW, Suite 307, Washington DC 20036, USA 32) MARTELLINI Prof. Maurizio, USPID, University of Insubria, Como and Secretary General Landau Network-Centro Volta, Villa Olmo, Via Cantoni 1, 22100 Como, Italy 33) MEYER Dr. Uwe, Deputy Executive Director (EU), ISTC, Luganskaya Ulitsa 9, 115516 Moscow, Russia 34) MLADINEO Dr. Stephen V., Program Manager International Techn. Ass., Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, 901 D Street S.W., Suite 900, Washington, DC 20024-2115, USA 35) MONAKHOVA Dr. Svetlana A., Russian Federal Nuclear Center-VNIIEF, 37 Mir Avenue, Sarov, Nizhni Novgorod Region 607190 Russia 36) NOVITSKY Evgeni, RNFC-VNIIEF, 37, Mir Avenue, Sarov, Nizhni Novgorod Region, Russia 37) PALDY Prof. Lester, Director for Technology and Society, Center for Science, Mathematics and Technological Education, State University of New York at Stony Brook, USA 38) PAPUSHKIN Dr. Vitaly, Leading Researcher, Center for Energy Efficiency, 54, Korpus 4, Novocheremushkinskaya St., 117418 Moscow, Russia 39) PONOMARENKO Dr. Tatiana, Russian Federal Nuclear Center-VNIITF, Institute of Technical Physics, 456770 Snezhinsk, Chelyabinsk Region, Russia 40) RACHKOV Dr. A. V., RNFC-VNIIEF, 37, Mir Avenue, Sarov, Nizhni Novgorod Region, Russia 41) RUBANENKO Dr. Nikolai, Center for Systems Research and Development, RFNC-VNIITF, 456770 Snezhinsk, Chelyabinsk Region, Russia 42) RYBACHENKOV Dr. Vladimir I., Cousellor, Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 32/34, Smolenskaya-Sennaya sq., 121200 Moscow, Russia 43) SHAPOVALOV Dr. A. F., RNFC-VNIIEF, 37, Mir Avenue, Sarov, Nizhni Novgorod Region, Russia 44) SHAPOVALOVA Dr. Olga, Russian Federal Nuclear Center-VNIIEF, 37 Mir Avenue, Sarov, Nizhni Novgorod Region 607190 Russia 45) SHMYGIN Dr. Valeriy, Russian Federal Nuclear Center-VNIITF, Institute of Technical Physics, 456770 Snezhinsk, Chelyabinsk Region, Russia 46) STOUDENIKINE Dr. Guennadi, Russian Federal Nuclear Center-VNIITF, Institute of Technical Physics, 456770 Snezhinsk, Chelyabinsk Region, Russia 47) SUOKKO Ms. Kirsten, W. Alton Jones Foundation, 232, E. High Street, Charlottsville, VA 22902, USA 48) TONGUE Ms. Margaret, Non-Proliferation Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London SW1, UK 49) TSVETOKHINE Dr. Alexandre, Russian Federal Nuclear Center-VNIITF, Institute of Technical Physics, 456770 Snezhinsk, Chelyabinsk Region, Russia 50) UPPULURI Dr. Ram, Environmental Defence, 1725 Connecticut Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, USA 51) URAKSIN Dr. Andrei, Attachï¿½ Russian Consulate, Via S. Aquilino 3, 20148 Milano, Italy 52) VON HIPPEL Prof. Frank, Center for Energy & Environmental Studies, Princeton University, H102 Engineering Quadrangle, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA 53) VORONTSOVA Dr. Olga S., Deputy Director of Center for International Relations, Russian Federal Nuclear Center-VNIIEF, 37 Mir Avenue, Sarov, Nizhni Novgorod Region 607190 Russia 54) VOZNIOUK Dr. Rodion, Russian Federal Nuclear Center-VNIITF, Institute of Technical Physics, 456770 Snezhinsk, Chelyabinsk Region, Russia 55) WATSON Mr. Christopher, Business Development Manager, AEA Technology, 329 Harwell, Didcot, Oxfordshire OX11 0QJ, UK 56) YUDIN Dr. Yuri, Director Analytical Center for Nonproliferation, RFNC-VNIIEF, 10, Muzrukova Avenue, Sarov, Nizhni Novgorod Region 607190, Russia 57) ZATSEPINE Dr. Vladimir, Deputy Director, Russian Federal Nuclear Center-VNIITF, Institute of Technical Physics, 456770 Snezhinsk, Chelyabinsk Region, Russia 58) ZHIGALOV Prof. Vladimir I., Head of Investment Department, Russian Federal Nuclear Centre VNIIEF, 37 Mir Avenue, Sarov (Arzamas 16), Nizhni Novgorod Region 607190 Russia 59) ZHURAVLEV Dr. Evgeny, Russian Federal Nuclear Center-VNIITF, Institute of Technical Physics, 456770 Snezhinsk, Chelyabinsk Region, Russia 60) ZRODNIKOV Dr. Anatoly, Director General, Institute for Physics and Power Engineering, 1 Bondarenko Sq., 249033, Obninsk, Kaluga Region, Russia return to menu