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Nuclear News - 12/08/00
RANSAC Nuclear News, December 8, 2000
Compiled by Christopher Ficek

A.  New Nonproliferation Initiatives
    1. Domenici Introduces Fissile Material Loan Guarantee Act,Office of Senator Pete V. Domenici (12/07/00)
B. Plutonium Disposition
    1. France will use Russian MOX-fuel for its NPPs, Bellona(12/01/00)
C.  Deep Cuts
    1. Lopsided Arms Control, Rose Gottemoeller, Washington Post(12/7/00)
D. Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
    1. Interview-Russian Arms Scrapping Plan Could Start by Year-End[Chemical Weapons], Reuters (12/08/00)
    2. Former Diplomats Salute Nunn, Lugar, for Efforts to QuellNuclear Danger, Ralph Dannheisser, Washington File, Office of InternationalInformation Programs, U.S. Department of State (12/07/00)
E. Russian - Iranian Relations
    1. Manilov Says U.S. Threats Over Iran Arms Sales 'Unacceptable',RFE/RL (12/08/00)
    2. Defense Minister: Russia Complying With Law Over CooperationWith Iran, RFE/RL (12/07/00)
    3. Russia 'To Limit' Arms Sales To Iran, Reuters (12/6/00)
F.  Russian Nuclear Power Industry
    1. Rostov Nuclear Plant Goes Online Today, RosBusinessConsulting(12/08/00)
G.  U.S. - Russian Relations
    1. Experts of 4 Countries Adjust Protocol to NRRC Agreement,Itar Tass (12/08/00)
    2. Experts Urge Bold U.S. Moves On Russia Policy, CarolGiacomo, Reuters (12/7/00)
    3. Final Communique- Ministerial Meeting of the Defence PlanningCommittee and the Nuclear Planning Group, NATO Headquarters (12/05/00)

A. New Nonproliferation Initiatives

Domenici Introduces Fissile Material Loan Guarantee Act
        Office of Senator Pete V.Domenici
        December 7, 2000
        (for personal use only)

Discussion Wanted on Further Reductions in Russian Proliferation Threats

WASHINGTON -- U.S. Senator Pete Domenici today introduced legislationto create a new program to provide incentives to Russia to further reducethe proliferation threat posed by vast stocks of Russian weapons-gradefissile materials.

Domenici introduced the Fissile Material Loan Guarantee Act FissileMaterial Loan Guarantee Act in the last days of the 106th Congress to givethe new administration, lending institutions, and the Russian Federationan opportunity to review the proposal before the 107th Congress convenesearly next year.

The bill would authorize federal guarantees of loans up to $1.0 billionfrom private sector lending institutions. For each $20 million loan, Russiawould be required to place two metric tons of weapons grade material, oneton of weapons-grade plutonium and one ton of weapons-grade highly enricheduranium, under international safeguards. This program would not requireU.S. expenditures, except in the event of defaults.

“By introducing this legislation now, I’m hoping that this concept willbe carefully reviewed by all interested parties,” Domenici said. “My hopeis that in the next Congress, these interests can come together to enablethis new approach to still further reduce the proliferation threats fromsurplus weapons materials in the Russian nuclear weapons complex.”

Domenici noted that he has explored this concept with top officialsof the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy and with interested lenders. Inaddition, Domenici said that he is aware that discussions on this ideaare progressing well among Western lending institutions, the Russian Federation,and the International Atomic Energy Authority, who would be responsiblefor certifying that safeguards are in place.

This bill would enable the imposition of international protective safeguardson new, large stocks of Russian weapons-ready materials in a way that enablesthe Russian Federation to gain near-term financial resources from the samematerials. The bill requires that these resources be used in support ofnon-proliferation or energy programs within Russia. It also requires thatthe materials used to collateralize these loans must remain under the InternationalAtomic Energy Authority safeguards forevermore. Domenici stressed thatthis legislation will not replace or diminish existing programs workingto ensure that weapons-grade materials can never be used in weapons inthe future. For example, the HEU Agreement is moving toward eliminationof 500 tons of Russian weapons-grade uranium, which could fuel 20,000 nuclearweapons. The Plutonium Disposition Agreement is similarly working on eliminationof 34 tons of Russian weapons-grade plutonium, enough material for morethan 4,000 nuclear weapons.

“These agreements enable the transition of Russian materials into commercialreactor fuel, which, after use in a reactor, destroys its weapons-gradeattributes. There should be no question that both these agreements remainof vital importance to both nations,” Domenici said.

“But estimates are that the Russian Federation has vast stocks of weapons-gradematerials in addition to the amounts they’ve already declared as surplusto their weapons needs in these earlier agreements. If we can provide additionalincentives to Russia to encourage transition of more of these materialsinto configurations where it is not available for diversion or re-use inweapons, we’ve made another significant step toward global stability,”he said.
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B. Plutonium Disposition

France will use Russian MOX-fuel for its NPPs
        December 1, 2000
        (for personal use only)

ITAR-TASS reported that France invested $70 million into the projectto reprocess Russian weapon-grade plutonium so it can be reused as fuelin nuclear power plants reactors.

Russian Nuclear Ministry official, Vladimir Kuchinov, said the UnitedStates, Great Britain and Japan have provided $340 million in total forthis project as well. He mentioned, however, that around $2 billion isneeded to fulfil the project. Until now the type of the reactor to burnthe new fuel on industrial bases has not been selected. The existing reactorscan burn only from 30% to 60% of plutonium fuel. This undermines one ofthe main purposes of using the plutonium fuel inreactors: plutonium thatwas not burned can be theoretically extracted from spent fuel and re-usedfor making of nuclear bomb.
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C. Deep Cuts

Lopsided Arms Control
        Rose Gottemoeller
        Washington Post
        December 7, 2000
        (for personal use only)

Not yet knowing who will occupy the Oval Office, Russian President VladimirPutin put out a call to the next U.S. president to move quickly to furtherreductions in strategic nuclear weapons. In a Nov. 13 press statement,he said: "There must be no pause in nuclear disarmament--radical progressis a real requirement. Russia is ready."

He went on to repeat an offer to move to a level of 1,500 warheads,well below the limit of 2,000 to 2,500 agreed on in the 1997 Helsinki Statement.For the Russians, this number has the advantage of being more in line withthe scant budget they say is available to support their strategic nucleararsenal.

How do we get there--to 1,500 warheads? Putin emphasizes that the mostimportant goal is for the two countries to move quickly and radically tolower the numbers. He says he would be willing to do it either jointlyor in parallel. The second course, parallel action undertaken unilaterally,is actually at the heart of nuclear cutback proposals brought forth byRepublican strategists this year. George W. Bush called for a unilateralapproach to strategic arms reductions in a May 23 speech to the Councilon Foreign Relations; he rejected formal negotiations and agreements astoo time-consuming to negotiate and too expensive to implement.

But would unilateral action be enough to satisfy us when the reductionsare in strategic nuclear arms, the weapons that pose the most direct threatto the territory of the United States? In that regard, I have a story totell about how the Russians have carried out another arms reduction. Itconcerns the presidential nuclear initiatives of 1990-91--measures adoptedby President George Bush and the Kremlin leadership. The goal was to removenonategic nuclear weapons from operational deployment and place themin central storage. The initiatives were not formal arms control agreementsbut unilateral measures to be implemented informally and in parallel inthe United States and Russia. There were no understandings reached on implementationstandards and no negotiated monitoring or verification measures.

Recently I was in Moscow and sat down for a chat with an old acquaintance,a navy man. He raised the subject of how the Soviet Union and, later, theRussian Federation, had implemented these unilateral measures in the Russiannavy. "We took the warheads off naval platforms but still require themto be nuclear-ready," he said. "Our captains are still judged by how welltheir sailors are trained to handle nuclear weapons, even though nuclearweapons are no longer carried day to day."

I said that the United States had implemented the initiatives differently,in that we no longer have such training requirements. He replied, "I don'tbelieve you. Why would you make changes absent a formal arms control agreement?"

When I said, "Budget," he responded, "I still don't believe you. Inour navy, unless there is a legal government-to-government document inthe form of a treaty or agreement, the procedures and requirements staythe same."

When I recount this story, people tell me that it worries them. I agree:An overemphasis on unilateral measures in arms control policy will causeproblems. President Bush and the two Russian presidents did not agree onany particular approach to implementation, and so the Russians have carriedout the initiatives in a way that suits their law and policy. But the resultdoes not give the United States the military objective that it wanted:an end to nuclear capability on Russia's nonategic naval platforms.

Uncertain military results are the weak link in any arms control policythat is wholly dependent on unilateral measures. The answer, however, isnot to abandon unilateral action--a proven method for accelerating stalledarms control policies. Instead, the United States needs to consider waysto strengthen unilateral measures.

One way might be simply to establish certain broad guidelines for implementation.For example, stipulate that "warheads should be stored away from activedeployment areas." Although such a measure could not be formally verifiedin a unilateral action, at least it would give the two sides a common standard.

Another step might be to devise confidence-building measures, such asreciprocal visits to naval platforms to see how unilateral reductions arebeing made. Yet another could be a hybrid approach: Unilateral measuresare used to jump-start a reduction process but are then followed up byincreasingly ambitious implementation and cooperation in monitoring, eventuallyarriving at a full-fledged reduction-and-verification regime.

This may sound complicated, but it is easier than trying to wrestlewith the questions that would arise from wholly unilateral reductions instrategic nuclear arms. If the Russians chose not to disband units, halttraining or destroy launch platforms, then we could not know that we hadactually achieved a reduction in the strategic nuclear threat to the UnitedStates. For our intelligence agencies and military, the burden of tryingto judge and counter the threat would be extraordinary. For the new president,the uncertainty would be grave.

The writer, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for InternationalPeace, was an assistant secretary for nonproliferation at the Energy Departmentduring the Clinton administration.
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D. Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)

Interview-Russian Arms Scrapping Plan Could Start by Year-End [ChemicalWeapons]
        December 8, 2000
        (for personal use only)

MOSCOW, Dec 8 (Reuters) - The United States could start clearing a sitein central Russia before Christmas ready to build a huge plant to destroythousands of tones of deadly Soviet-era chemical weapons, a U.S. officialsaid on Friday.

Russia is committed by treaty to destroy its 40,000 tonnes of chemicalweapons -- the world's largest stockpile -- by 2007, but is seeking moreinternational funds to help because its own limited finances mean it mightnot otherwise meet the target.

Under the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction programme, Washington isalready spending millions of dollars helping Moscow to tackle chemicaland other weapons of mass destruction.

Adolph Ernst, the programme's manager for chemical weapons destruction,told Reuters all was set for work to begin clearing a site near Shchuchiyein central Russia "before Christmas" if the green light came from Washington.

"It's just the matter of getting one single sheet of paper with a signatureon it," he said, referring to the U.S. Defence Department permission histeam needs to send in ground-clearers and prepare the site for buildingwork to start in spring.

Ernst, who was speaking at the offices of engineering firm Parsons,the U.S. general contractor, is in town for talks with Russian officials,including Munitions Agency chief Zinovy Pak.

Ernst said a tender would be held to select a Russian contractor tobuild the U.S.-funded plant, which with a twin Russian-financed factorywould eventually be able to neutralise 1,600 tonnes of sarin, soman andVX nerve agent rounds a year.

Sarin was the gas a Japanese doomsday cult unleashed on the Tokyo subwayin 1995, killing 12 people and injuring thousands.


Under existing plans and assuming Congress backs funding, the U.S. plantwould start destroying the weapons in 2008 but Pak wants to acceleratethe process.

"He's very interested in doing things much faster than that," said Ernst."It is their desire to start that destruction in 2004."

This could help Russia come close to the April 29, 2007 deadline setout in the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention, which seeks to rid the worldof deadly and deteriorating arms but does not control how funds are raisedto do it. Russia is already well behind schedule through lack of funds.

Stepping up the pace would cost more money sooner, and Washington wouldwant to see how much Russia and others chip in.

Russian arms control experts have suggested the West give Moscow freshbillion-dollar credits or write off Soviet and Russian debts so it canafford to destroy its chemical arms -- a task it estimates will cost $6-7billion over a decade or more.

Canada, Sweden, Norway and Britain are among the countries to providemoney to help Russia destroy its chemical weapons, and others are consideringit.

Artillery shells, multiple rocket launchers and missile warheads containingthe nerve agents are all held near Shchuchiye. They amount to a seventhof Russia's stockpile.

U.S. Senator Richard Lugar, who helped start the Cooperative ThreatReduction programme, will visit the area later this month.

When the plant is working, the nerve agent will be drained from themunitions and neutralised chemically before being mixed with molten bitumenand stored in bunkers in metal drums. The empty rounds will be rinsed andmisshapen to avoid reuse.

"The sooner all chemical weapons are destroyed, the safer everyone willbe," said Ernst, showing a diagram.

The first picture was of a one-cent coin with a 10-milligram drop ofVX on it, a lethal dose. The next depicted two multiple rocket launcherwarheads containing 600,000 lethal doses.

The third image was of the two warheads hidden in the kind of daypacktoted by millions of youngsters around the world.

Exploded in a sports stadium, the warheads could kill between 1,500and 23,000 people, depending on the weather.
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Former Diplomats Salute Nunn, Lugar, for Efforts to Quell NuclearDanger
        Ralph Dannheisser
        Washington File, Officeof International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State
        December 7, 2000
        (for personal use only)

American Academy of Diplomacy honors them with annual award

Washington -- The authors of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat ReductionProgram have been honored for their diplomatic efforts even as one of them,Senator Richard Lugar (Republican, Indiana), prepared to leave on anothertrip to Russia to expand the reach of the arms reduction program.

Lugar and former Senator Sam Nunn (Democrat, Georgia) jointly receivedthe annual Excellence in Diplomacy Award presented by the American Academyof Diplomacy December 6 at a luncheon ceremony at the U.S. Department ofState.

President Clinton saluted the two for their "groundbreaking effortsto reduce the nuclear danger and to help secure and dismantle weapons ofmass destruction in the former Soviet Union" in a letter read at the ceremonyby Joseph Sisco, chairman of the academy's board of directors. Nunn andLugar, Clinton said, "have worked with integrity, skill and determinationto advance America's ideals and to bring hope and freedom to people throughoutthe world."

Since the two Senate colleagues founded the program in 1991, after theend of the Cold War, it has been applied in deactivating over 5,000 nuclearwarheads, and Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus -- formerly the world's third,fourth and eighth largest nuclear powers -- have become nuclear weapon-freecountries. Nunn and Lugar also were nominated this year for the Nobel PeacePrize.

The academy is a limited membership organization made up of men andwomen who served as ambassadors at major embassies abroad or in seniorforeign policy positions in Washington. Its membership includes all eightliving former secretaries of state, several former secretaries of defense,directors of central intelligence, national security advisers and chairmenof the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Lugar, in accepting the award, cited progress under the CooperativeThreat Reduction Program as the "one constant" in a decade that has seen"a series of high points and low points" in U.S. relations with the formerSoviet states, including a number of "disagreements and diplomatic stalemates"with Russia.

The senator, just elected to a fifth six-year term, stressed that theso-called Nunn-Lugar program is simply "a tool, a means toward an end (that)...hasprospered when U.S. policy toward Russia has been guided by a firm handand a logical policy prescription.

"Nunn-Lugar cannot take the place of coherent and effective policy;in fact, it cannot operate without effective policy guidance. The programhas often borne the brunt of criticism for ineffective policy, but as Ioften remark, we must not blame the shovel if the hole is dug in the wronglocation," he said.

Lugar noted that he will be leaving within days for a scheduled 12-dayvisit to Russia to visit Nunn-Lugar sites and "work with our people andthe locals to jump start some of these programs."

"Specifically, I hope to gather enough information and experience toconvince my colleagues in Congress that we should move forward" in suchareas as chemical weapons demilitarization, dismantlement of nonategicsubmarines in the deteriorating Russian fleet, and the redirection of scientistsformerly involved in nuclear weapons development, he said.

The senator pledged to "remain in a leadership role to ensure that theNunn-Lugar program continues to successfully adapt to the changing politicaland strategic environment."

Nunn, in his remarks, stressed his belief that the United States hasan obligation "to continue to provide leadership" for peace in a worldbeset by formidable challenges. He called for a policy that encompasses"preventive diplomacy as well as preventive defense" and asked his audienceof present and former diplomats, "Can we develop a preventive diplomacyfund in the State Department?" to be used for that purpose.

The former Senate Armed Services Committee chairman said that politicaldivisions in the nation made obvious in the November elections for bothPresident and Congress provide "ample grounds for pessimism." But he saidhe remains "cautiously optimistic" about prospects for meaningful, cooperativeaction, not least because there is "much historical evidence to tell usthat weakened leaders often reach for the middle ground."

Nunn said he is hopeful that progress will be forged by such Republicansenators as Lugar, Ted Stevens of Alaska and Pete Domenici of New Mexico,all of whom he described as "governed by the facts," and their similarly-inclinedDemocratic counterparts, whom he did not name.

With such leaders in charge, he said, there is hope for the propositionthat "the facts should have some effect on our conclusions and our actionsin world affairs."

The academy also presented two awards for distinguished writing on thepractice of American diplomacy. Those went to Ambassador Herman Cohen,who finished a 38-year government career in 1993 as assistant secretaryof state for African affairs, and Ambassador William Gleysteen, Jr., U.S.ambassador to Korea from 1978 to 1981.
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E. Russian - Iranian Relations

Manilov Says U.S. Threats Over Iran Arms Sales 'Unacceptable'
        December 8, 2000
        (for personal use only)

First deputy head of the General Staff Colonel General Valerii Manilovtold Interfax on 7 December that U.S. threats to impose sanctions on Moscowif it goes ahead with conventional weapons sales to Iran are "unacceptable."Such sales are Russia's "internal affair," he said, adding that Russian-Iranianmilitary cooperation "poses no threat to third countries and is objectivelyaimed at strengthening stability and peace" in the Middle East. Also on7 December, Russian and U.S. experts wrapped up two days of talks thatfocused on Russia's plans to pull out of a 1995 agreement with the U.S.whereby Moscow had refrained from selling conventional weapons to Teheran.Few details of those talks have been made public. Reuters, however, quotedan unidentified U.S. Embassy spokesman as saying that the two sides had"full and frank discussions."
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Defense Minister: Russia Complying With Law Over Cooperation WithIran
        December 7, 2000
        (for personal use only)

Meeting with U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen in Brussels on 6 December,Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev commented that Russia is not violatingany international treaties or laws by pursuing "military- technical cooperation"with Iran, Interfax reported, citing unidentified members of the Russiandelegation in the Belgian capital. According to those sources, Sergeevstressed that the "positive changes" that have taken place in Iran mustbe taken into account, as must that country's "increasingly constructiverole in the Middle East." Also on 6 December, U.S. and Russian arms expertsmet in Moscow to begin discussing Russia's declared intention to pull outof a 1995 agreement with the U.S. not to sell conventional weapons to Iran.
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Russia 'To Limit' Arms Sales To Iran
        December 6, 2000
        (for personal use only)

MOSCOW, Russia (Reuters) -- Russian and U.S. officials have begun talkson arms sales, following assurances from Moscow that Russia will not selloffensive weapons to Iran.

The pledge was made by Russian defence minister Igor Sergeyev duringa 45-minute meeting with his U.S. counterpart William Cohen at NATO headquartersin Brussels, according to U.S. officials who attended the meeting.

"Sergeyev said they would sell only defensive weapons," said one U.S.official travelling with Cohen to a NATO defence ministers' meeting inBrussels.

"Most of these sales would be to service and maintain old Soviet equipment."

Russia, eager to boost revenues from sales on the global arms market,has said it plans to pull out of a 1995 deal with the U.S. which restrictedconventional weapons sales to Iran. Washington says Tehran is trying todevelop nuclear arms and supports anti-western "terrorist" groups.

Moscow has insisted that it can have trade links with any state it wishes,dismissing U.S. threats of possible sanctions if it backs out of the 1995deal.

Sergeyev is to visit Iran, possibly before the end of this year.

Lucrative market

Washington is particularly concerned that any new transfers to Irando not include technology that might improve Tehran's Sahab-3 missile,now in development with a range of about 1,500 kilometres (about 930 miles).

The prospect of new arms deals with Iran is tempting for Moscow, whichhopes to achieve $4 billion in sales this year by developing new marketsand by rebuilding its position with clients from the Soviet era.

But Russia still lags far behind the U.S., which accounts for around50 percent of the more than $50 billion global arms market.

U.S. officials described the Cohen-Sergeyev talks as "upbeat", sayingthat the U.S. defence secretary had praised his counterpart's suggestionat the NATO gathering that Moscow's ties with the western alliance neededto break out of a state of "permafrost."

The two defence leaders promised to work together on a range of issues,including a joint planned early missile warning system and co-operationon possible joint submarine rescue efforts.
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F. Russian Nuclear Power Industry

Rostov Nuclear Plant Goes Online Today
        December 8, 2000
        (for personal use only)

MOSCOW -- The construction of the Rostov Nuclear Power Plant has beencompleted. A representative of the Press Service of the 'Rosenergoatom'concern told RBC that Eric Pozdyshev, president of the concern, had arrivedat the power plant today. He will sign an official document on the completionof the construction, and a government expert commission of the State NuclearSupervision agency (Gosatomnadzor) will begin examining the power plant. The commission is headed by Deputy Nuclear Energy Minister Yevgeny Reshetnikov.

After Gosatomnadzor gives its consent, the reactor will be loaded withUranium-235. After that, the characteristics of the reactor will be monitoredfor 2.5 weeks while the reactor will operate at low capacity.

The capacity will be gradually increased to hundreds of megawatts duringthe next six months. The reactor will be finally put into operation inJuly next year. Its rated capacity is 1 million megawatts.
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G. U.S. - Russian Relations

Experts of 4 Countries Adjust Protocol to NRRC Agreement
        Itar Tass
        December 8, 2000
        (for personal use only)

MOSCOW, December 8 (Itar-Tass) - Consultations among the experts ofRussia, the United States, Belarus, and Ukraine ended at the American NuclearRisk Reduction Center (NRRC) on Friday, a Russian Defence Ministry sourcehas told Itar-Tass.

The working meeting was held under the agreement, dated September 15,1987, between the Soviet Union and the United States on the establishmentof NRRCs. Russian and U.S. experts meet at least once a year on the territoriesof the two countries alternately. The previous meeting took place in Moscowon December 6-8, 1999.

The Defence Ministry source pointed out that the said consultationscovered organisational and technical matters related to notifications aboutthe launchings of ballistic missiles, inspections, compliance with therequirements of disarmament agreements, and the functioning of data andsignal transmission systems. The working meeting of NRRC specialists wasan enlarged one, with experts of the four above-mentioned countries participating.

Several changes have been introduced to Protocol 1 (Notifications section)to the NRRC agreement as a result of the working meeting of experts andtheir consultations. Individual forms of notifications have been specifiedin view of the establishment of a Russo-American centre for the exchangeof data from early warning and missile launch notification systems andthe implementation of the START-1 Treaty. The Protocol is expected to besigned by the Russian Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of Stateduring their next meeting.
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Experts Urge Bold U.S. Moves On Russia Policy
        Carol Giacomo
        December 7, 2000
        (for personal use only)

WASHINGTON, Dec 7 (Reuters) - The next U.S. president should take boldsteps to mend Washington's frayed ties with Moscow, including unilateralcuts in nuclear arms and a halt to NATO expansion until 2005, a prominentthink tank said on Thursday.

With a new U.S. president due to take office on Jan. 20 and RussianPresident Vladimir Putin in power only a year, U.S.-Russia relations wereat a critical juncture, according to the report, called "Agenda for Renewal"and issued by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The report also recommended measures to promote Russia's long-term democraticand economic development and urged that Washington not block oil pipelineroutes through Russia and Iran.

It is one of a number of studies expected to be released in the nextcouple of months as members of the foreign policy elite on all sides ofthe political spectrum seek to influence the successor to President BillClinton.

Differences over NATO, Kosovo, missile defense, arms sales to Iran andwhat the Carnegie report called Putin's "dubious attachment to democraticnorms" have caused serious tensions in U.S.-Russia ties.

But the Carnegie experts argued that the relationship was on fundamentallydifferent and better terms than during the Cold War, and that the new administrationshould neither continue the status quo nor operate as if Russia was "merelya bundle of security problems."


The report urged strengthened steps to support Russia's democratic transformation.

"If Russia was a wobbly democracy under (former) President (Boris) Yeltsin,it is now in the gray zone between democracy and authoritarianism," givenPutin's "weakening of all major sources of power independent of the executivebranch," the report said.

But the Carnegie experts said that on the economic front, Putin hadsurprised many observers by assembling the "most pro-reform team in thegovernment since the early 1990s" and already posting accomplishments,including a major tax reform package and a balanced budget.

Among the Carnegie study conclusions:

-- The weakness of Russian maintenance of and control over its nuclearforces is a much greater threat to the United States than the possibleuse of those forces.

-- The United States and Russia are already committed under the STARTII treaty to slash their nuclear arsenals from more than 6,000 deployedweapons to 3,000 to 3,500 weapons by 2007. But Washington should unilaterallyreduce its level to 1,000 to 1,500 weapons, with the expectation that Russiawould follow suit.

Russia has proposed a 1,000-1,500 level under a START III treaty thathas not been negotiated and it is unlikely Russia will be able to fielda force beyond that number in 2010.

Republican George W. Bush, who looks increasingly likely to win theU.S. presidency, backed further nuclear weapons reductions during the campaignand hinted he might take unilateral action.

-- The United States and Russia should increase the time required tolaunch a nuclear strike from minutes to hours and then from hours to days.That would entail a series of negotiated measures to de-alert and de-targetland-based weapons.

-- Unless the missile proliferation threat significantly worsens (withanother North Korean test, for instance), Washington should not unilaterallydefect from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The new president shouldmake a fresh assessment of the threat of missiles capable of hitting theUnited States and redouble diplomatic efforts to stem proliferation.

During the campaign, Bush strongly backed a robust missile defense systemand was willing to scuttle the ABM treaty, which limits missile defenses,if needed.

-- In an effort to promote Russia's deeper integration into the Euro-Atlanticsecurity community, NATO should not consider expanding membership to stateson the territory of the former Soviet Union before 2005.

-- NATO must make every effort to build positive relations with Russiaby finding new areas of common interest, including opening NATO arms marketsto Russian producers.

-- The United States, which has been promoting an oil pipeline in theCaspian that circumvents Russia and Iran, should adopt a genuine multiplepipeline policy in this region and stop trying to limit Russian participationin its development.

-- The United States should recognize that while the Russian militaryhas committed numerous abuses in Chechnya, it is not in its interests orthose of the Caucasus region that the military simply withdraw from therepublic. Such a withdrawal would risk a return to anarchy.

-- The United States should boost efforts to foster Russian democracyby raising the annual democracy aid budget for Russia from $16 millionto $40 million and it should support higher education and training by allocatingU.S. funds to high-quality universities in Russia and other ex-Soviet states.
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Final Communique- Ministerial Meeting of the Defence Planning Committeeand the Nuclear Planning Group
        NATO Headquarters
        December 5, 2000
        (for personal use only)

1. The Defence Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group of theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organisation met in Ministerial Session in Brusselson 5th December 2000.

2. Collective defence planning remains the cornerstone of the Alliance'sability to provide for the defence and security of its members. Today wereviewed the national defence plans of Allies for the period 2001-2005and beyond and have adopted a five-year force plan which addresses therequirements of the future security environment.

3. In reviewing Allies' plans, we paid particular attention to the progressof implementation of the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI), launchedby Alliance Heads of State and Government at Washington last year. We concludedthat the DCI has significantly influenced the future force plans of Alliesand we welcomed the efforts underway to improve Alliance capabilities inkey capability areas such as provision of strategic sea and airlift, precisionguided munitions and further progress in consultation, command and controlcapabilities. We recognised, however, that it will be some time beforeAllies have fully developed many of the capabilities highlighted in theDCI, partly reflecting resource constraints. In this context, we also tookstock of Allies' defence expenditure plans. We noted that, this year, moreAllies project real increases in defence expenditure than was the caselast year and that greater emphasis is being put on improvements in themanagement of defence resources and the potential benefits of multinational,joint and common funding projects as ways to ensure greater cost-effectivenessin providing the military capabilities the Alliance needs. On the otherhand, we realise that, in many cases, additional funds appear necessaryto achieve the required capability improvements set out in the DCI.

4. We agreed on the need to continue to pursue greater efficiency indefence spending and to ensure that defence spending priorities match identifiedAlliance requirements. We also agreed to continue to seek the necessaryresources to ensure that our forces are properly equipped, manned, trainedand supported for the full range of Alliance missions. We will continueto review the success of our efforts, based on a number of important indicators,as part of our regular force planning work.

5. As part of this year's annual defence review we also noted the plannedcontributions by many Allies to support the European Union Headline Goal,which were announced at the Capabilities Commitment Conference. We expectthat the objectives of the Headline Goal and DCI will be mutually reinforcingand will give further impetus to the development of the military capabilitiesof the countries concerned. Such enhanced capabilities would also strengthenthe ability of the Alliance to contribute to ensuring security and stability.For each nation, there is only one set of forces and resources. The possibleoverlapping of NATO and EU requirements should be addressed and coordinatedby the two organisations in a coherent, transparent and consistent way,in order to harmonise those requirements and to review progress in meetingthem. In any event the autonomy of NATO and EU institutional decision-makingshould be fully respected. We will, therefore, continue to take accountof commitments made by Allies concerned to other organisations, to theextent that they have consequences for NATO force planning.

6. Against this background, we approved new Ministerial Guidance toprovide the framework for NATO and national defence planning in the perioduntil 2008 and beyond. The actions the Alliance had to undertake last yearto end the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, and the instability that stillexists in this and other regions, provide a stark reminder of the needfor the Alliance to have substantial and robust forces able to react rapidlyto emerging crises. The ability and determination of the Alliance to respondto non-Article 5 crises which threaten Euro-Atlantic security are closelylinked to its ability and resolve to continue to deter and defend againstaggression directed at Allies. The new Ministerial Guidance, therefore,emphasises the importance of having sufficient forces with the requiredcapabilities for all likely missions, able to deploy quickly and to sustainthemselves for as long as required, able to carry out their tasks and protectthemselves effectively, and able to operate together effectively with theforces of other nations engaged in the same operations.

7. At our Nuclear Planning Group meeting, we reviewed the status ofNATO's nuclear forces and other related issues and activities. We receivedwith appreciation presentations by the United States Secretary of Defensewhich included further information on U.S.-Russian efforts to establisha Joint Data Exchange Center in Moscow to share information from earlywarning systems regarding missile launches.

8. We affirmed the continuing validity of the fundamentally politicalpurpose and the principles underpinning the nuclear forces of the Alliesas set out in the Alliance's 1999 Strategic Concept. NATO's nuclear forcesare a credible and effective element of the Alliance's strategy of preventingwar, and they are maintained at the minimum level of sufficiency to preservepeace and stability, and under conditions that meet the highest standardsof safety and security. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed toNATO continue to provide an essential political and military link betweenthe European and North American members of the Alliance.

9. We reaffirmed the continued importance attached by Allies to fullimplementation of and compliance with international nuclear disarmamentand non-proliferation regimes. We confirmed our commitments made at thisyear's Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of NuclearWeapons (NPT) and will contribute to carrying forward the conclusions reachedthere. NATO Allies continue to support the ratification, early entry intoforce, and full implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty(CTBT), and remain committed to the immediate commencement and rapid conclusionof negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationallyand effectively verifiable and universal Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty(FMCT).

10. We expressed our full support to the United States and the RussianFederation for an early implementation of START II and for future negotiationson the basis of an agreed START III framework to reduce significantly thenumber of deployed strategic nuclear warheads of both countries. We alsorecalled the drastic reductions of NATO's nuclear forces in the new securityenvironment, and renewed our call on Russia to complete the reductionsin its nonategic nuclear weapons stockpile, as pledged in 1991 and1992 for implementation by the end of the year 2000.

11. We welcomed the resumption of exchanges with the Russian Federationon a range of nuclear weapons issues, under the auspices of the NATO-RussiaPermanent Joint Council, and we look forward to further exchanges in thespirit of improved transparency and full reciprocity.

12. At the 1999 Washington Summit, the Alliance agreed to consider optionsfor confidence and security building measures, verification, non-proliferationand arms control and disarmament in the light of overall strategic developmentsand the reduced salience of nuclear weapons. We received a comprehensivefinal report on the nuclear elements of this work and endorsed its conclusions,in particular proposals made in the area of confidence and security buildingmeasures and increased transparency as a basis for enhanced understanding,trust and cooperation. We commend the High Level Group for this valuablecontribution to the overall Alliance work in fulfilling the Summit remit.
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