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Nuclaer News - 12/04/00
RANSAC Nuclear News, December 4, 2000
Compiled by Ethan Penfield and Christopher Ficek



A. Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI)
    1. To Contain Nuclear Risk, U.S. Funds Soviet-Era City, WillEnglund, Baltimore Sun (12/2/00)
B. Russian Nuclear Forces
    1. Russia's Tu-95 MS Bombers Train in Arctic, Itar Tass (12/04/00)
    2. Nuclear Arms Reduction and Defense Reform in Russia [summaryof Sergei Rogov's comments], Elina Treyger, Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace Issue Brief Vol. 2, No. 12 (11/22/00)
C.  Nuclear Waste
    1. Novovoronezh NPP Discharges Radioactivity, Vladislav Nikiforov,Bellona (12/04/00)
D.  Russian Nuclear Power Industry
    1. Russian Uranium Stockpiles May Run Dry In 20 Years, Interfax(12/30/00)
E.  U.S. - Russian Relations
    1. Organization Would Target Nuclear Threat, Pat Murphy,Times-News (12/03/00)
    2. Professor Says U.S. Policy Destabilized Nuclear Power [excerptsof an interview with Stephen Cohen], The Charlie Rose Show, PBS Television(Transcript #2825) (11/30/00)



A. Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI)

1.
To Contain Nuclear Risk, U.S. Funds Soviet-Era City
        Will Englund
        Baltimore Sun
        December 2, 2000
        (for personal use only)

Western academics, Russians join forces on civilian projects

SNEZHINSK, Russia -- Evelina Kuropatenko devoted her life to findingbigger and better ways to blow the Western world to smithereens, and todaythe big capitalist nations are willing to listen to anything she has tosay, just as long as she stays happy.

This was the site of Russia's primary nuclear-development lab, and todaythe whole little city around it is being propped up by Western money sothat Kuropatenko and the 10,500 other physicists, mathematicians and techniciansstay content and busy at home, rather than disillusioned and busy somewhereelse -- in North Korea, for instance, or Iraq.

In the process, Snezhinsk has turned into a little Soviet island inthe midst of a turbulent new Russia. To come through the heavily guardeddouble fences that surround the city is to step back into an idealizedpast.

Here people go about their lives with a sense of purpose. Here thereare no Mercedes Benzes or cell phones or billboards or striptease clubsor bull-necked bodyguards. Here the streets are well-ordered, and the hedgestrimmed, after a fashion. Here there is no junk lying around.

Here, instead of sadistic traffic police preying on the chaos of thestreets, polite and discreet security agents keep a watchful eye on everyoneand everything.

If communism had worked, it would have looked like Snezhinsk, a cityof 50,000 just east of the Ural Mountains, where a little bit of the U.S.S.R.lives on -- and the U.S.A. is helping to pick up the tab.

The only thing that's changing is the emphasis. Americans and Europeansare paying for medical research, environmental technology, protein analysis.The Russian government still pays for weapons work, but, as at Americanlabs, the defense-oriented work force is reduced and getting smaller.

Snezhinsk used to be called Chelyabinsk-70. This top-secret town wasknown only by the name of a post office box in the nearest large city.It was founded in 1955 by a patriotic and inspired team of physicists whobuilt a lab on the shore of a lake nestled among birch and pine forests,where the landscape flattens out again after the round curves of the Urals.Anyone coming here had to pass through an old Russian village called Resurrection.

Snezhinsk looks like a throwback to the past because it is still closed,which means that no one is allowed in who doesn't have a reason for beinghere. Earlier this fall a reporter for The Sun was invited to accompanyan American scientific delegation on a three-day visit -- a rare opportunityfor a Western journalist to observe life behind the fence.

Kuropatenko, a mathematician who specializes in an area of statisticscalled Monte Carlo calculations, was the host, gathering various specialiststogether for daylong meetings with the Americans. The Russian scientistspresented proposals for research. Shrewd, gracious, and good-humored, Kuropatenkokept her occasionally talkative troops in line with a narrowing of theeyes and a certain movement of her jaw.

She and her husband, Valentin, also a mathematician, were among theearly settlers here. They were idealists then, and they are idealists now.Politically, they vote Communist. "We don't seek a return to the SovietUnion," says Valentin Kuropatenko, "but we want to ensure the dignity andstability of the country."

Yet they've enjoyed visits to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratoryin California, and they believe strongly in the conversion to peacetimeresearch. Evelina Kuropatenko welcomes the American role, hopes that Livermoreofficials can help the Russians master some of the more arcane aspectsof the new world -- such mysteries as marketing, sales, and patent law.

"Commercial technology," she says, "is what we need to learn from ourAmerican colleagues."

They live in a high-ceilinged apartment overlooking the lake -- a hugeapartment even by Moscow standards, in a building where the stairwellsare uncharacteristically well lit, freshly painted and odor-free. Theythrow heroic dinner parties, in rooms graced by photos of their daughters,both of whom grew up in Snezhinsk but neither of whom decided to stay oncethe larger world beckoned.

The young people, the children of the scientific elite, grow up andleave. Everyone agrees it's a problem, but at least they're not takingnuclear secrets with them. Boris Vodolaga, the head of the internationalprogram here, said that not one scientist from Snezhinsk had skipped outon his country and left for money elsewhere.

"It's the spirit of the collective," he said. "We've always been likean orchestra here."

But the effort to harmonize with new goals and new clients -- Americans,no less -- hasn't been easy. Inevitable cultural gaps and mistrust persist.The bureaucracies of both governments have meddled. Some people on bothsides question whether anything solid has been accomplished in nearly adecade of trying, at a total cost to the United States of $1 billion. (Thatdoesn't count $2 billion spent on dismantling weapons and missiles.)

There are a handful of programs. One, run by the Department of Energy,has sought to beef up security at Russia's scattered nuclear sites, toprevent thefts and acts of terrorism.

There is more than a ton of weapons-usable nuclear material here, andalthough Snezhinsk is better guarded than some other sites in Russia, securitydoes not meet international standards. Last year, 2 tons of aluminum werestolen from the lab.

Another program, called the International Science and Technology Centers,jointly backed by the United States, the European Union, Norway and Japan,has spent $230 million backing research projects in Russia and other formerSoviet republics. Almost 260 projects have been financed, or approved forfinancing, at Snezhinsk alone.

Scientists here have worked on neutron therapy for cancer patients,on comet-deflection technology, on radioactive cleanup techniques. EvelinaKuropatenko conducted an epidemiological study of Snezhinsk children onan ISTC grant.

But critics say the research has borne little fruit. It keeps scientistsbusy, but the work doesn't get directed into practical applications.

So two years ago the United States launched the Nuclear Cities Initiative,which is designed to foster commercially viable projects in Snezhinsk andthe nine other closed cities. (So far the program has focused on three.)

Here again, Snezhinsk is waiting for results. Ann Heywood, a mathematicianand robotics engineer from Livermore who led the delegation here last month(and is every bit as redoubtable as Kuropatenko), was holding discussionswith Snezhinsk scientists a year ago when her bosses pulled her off towork on another project. She has only now come back.

"'Looking back over seven years, so far there hasn't been an exampleof successful cooperation" on a commercial project, said Anatoly Oplanchuk,the mayor of Snezhinsk. "It isn't important who's at fault. When the examplecomes, this will be a very great help. It will significantly speed theprocess."

The Russians were particularly galled when they learned that between1994 and 1998, according to a General Accounting Office study, 63 percentof the money spent by the United States on Russian nuclear programs wasactually spent in the United States, on overhead, travel expenses and consultingfees. The Department of Energy has vowed to reduce that amount to 35 percent.

At the same time, though, the Russian government offered the closedcities an "offshore," tax-free status, which was immediately abused bybusinessmen who had no real links to them. Moscow is trying to correctthat.

A few years ago salary payments were in arrears, and alarm bells beganringing on both sides of the Atlantic over the demoralization of the staffand deterioration of the facilities. But now Russia, too, is putting moneyinto the lab, and both Russians and Americans say the most dangerous periodhas passed.

But even in these somewhat better times, nothing comes easy.

Just putting a delegation together -- coordinating schedules, persuadingMoscow to issue visas -- is a huge task. Visits are postponed, rosterscontinually in flux.

In the end, Heywood's little group included Joseph Pritchard, a StateDepartment specialist on nuclear cities; Dr. Mark Zern, a liver-transplantspecialist from the University of California at Davis; Dr. Nathan Levin,a nephrologist from the Renal Research Institute in New York; and LindaDonald, the institute's executive director.

For the better part of three days they sat in a building outside theboundaries of the lab -- which is still off-limits -- and listened to aparade of scientists who came before them to talk about the work they wouldlike to do.

Yuri Rybakov showed them a vibrating device he has made that he saidhas proved effective in reducing the incidence of kidney stones.

"If it works, people would love that, oh, yeah," said Donald.

Khyena Brainina talked about cheap sensors to detect immunity. Dr. SergeiBrokhman, a pathologist, talked about the extensive medical records, includingautopsy reports, that date back 43 years and that he would like to geton a computer database. Levin was particularly interested in that.

Nikolai Platonov talked about meridional diagnosis of the human energybody. Nobody knew what to make of that. The interpreter scolded him forusing words she'd never heard. Kuropatenko made Platonov sit down.

Then Zern and Levin talked about some of the research they hoped someonein Snezhinsk might take on.

Unavoidably, maybe, the two sides didn't always connect. Were the rightpeople getting together? "There must be lots of things going on here wejust don't know about," Levin said.

The Americans seemed interested in listening to and floating ideas forresearch. The Russians wanted contracts. Zern and Levin said they wereconcerned about the quality of the Russians' clinical testing.

In the end, the American team summed up, in order, what they deemedthe most promising projects. With this stamp of approval in hand, the Russianswill now pursue them through the NCI bureaucracy.

Snezhinsk, which means snowflake, still has its other role to play.From a peak of 18,000 defense workers, the All-Russian Scientific ResearchInstitute for Technical Physics now has 10,500 devoted to weapons work.In January, that is to be reduced to 8,000.

The work isn't as stirring as it was when the Kuropatenkos came here.Much of it involves careful maintenance of the nuclear material -- whichis a vital but not very stimulating job.

Vodolaga says he hopes to have researchers working part-time on weaponsand the rest on civilian research, paid for by the West. There has to bea compromise, he says, to keep people happy.

Happiness in a Soviet setting -- it means streets that are safe at night,plenty of vodka but no homeless people, a town full of Russian cars withouta Jeep Cherokee (the choice of gangsters) in sight. It means little lapelpins for visitors, of the type that were once ubiquitous here but vanishedsoon after 1991, and it even means Soviet rather than Russian e-mail addresses.

What the Americans are banking on is that that is the sort of happinessthat can keep everyone's worst nuclear nightmare at bay.
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B. Russian Nuclear Forces

1.
Russia's Tu-95 MS Bombers Train in Arctic
        Itar Tass
        December 4, 2000
        (for personal use only)

MOSCOW, December 4 (Itar-Tass) - Russia's strategic bombers Tu-95 MSare continuing training sorties in the Arctic, an air force spokesamanold Itar-Tass on Monday.

He said the bombers take off from temporary bases in the Russian FarNorth. Weather conditions in the region are harsh, with temperatures lowand magnetic fields unstable.

The Tu-95 MS bombers are armed with long-range air-ground cruise missilesX-55. The missiles, whose potential is similar to that of the US' Tomohawks,were designed in the designer office Raduga in 1976-77. The first testflight of X-55 was performed in 1978. The missile was added to the Russianair force's arms in December 1981.

The cruise missiles are carried by Tu-95 MS and Tu-160 bombers. Themissiles have a 7.1 metre length, 0.51 meter body diametre, 3.3 meter wingspan and 1,700 kilogramme weight. Power of their nuclear warheads is 200kilotonnes. The missile are equipped with an intertial guiding system withnavigation correction using a terrain map. The flight range is 3,000 kilometres.Russia also has an X-55 SM version with a longer range.
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2.
Nuclear Arms Reduction and Defense Reform in Russia [summary ofSergei Rogov's comments]
        Elina Treyger
        Carnegie Endowment for InternationalPeace Issue Brief Vol. 2, No. 12
        November 22, 2000
        (for personal use only)

On November 22, 2000, Sergei Rogov, the director of the USA and CanadaInstitute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and a prominent specialiston arms control, discussed the desirable direction of US-Russian nuclearrelations, and potential content of new strategic arms control agreements.
The event was chaired by Carnegie Endowment Senior Associate Rose Gottemoeller.

US- Russia relations are adrift today; the two nations are neither alliesnor enemies.  Despite frequently expressed opinions that US and Russiaare returning to a Cold War climate, Rogov expressed the hope that thereis a good chance for a strategic partnership.

Rogov stressed that it is necessary for the US and Russia to move awayfrom the Cold War mentality.   This mentality became institutionalizedin the military sphere through arms control agreements, shaped to regulatea "highly competitive relationship," which arose from the absolute, ideologicalnature of the US-Soviet conflict.  This conflict no longer exists,and the arms control regime today should be guided by different principles.Rogov offered three such principles.

The first principle is that the arms control regime should be regardedas an essentially transitional regime, and hopefully we will soon completethe last arms control package between the US and Russia.  Rogov'shope is that this regime will eventually obviate the need for the negativerules that make up arms control agreements, and enable the switch to morecooperative rules, similar to those shaping American relation with itsNATO allies. NATO members are bound by the CFE treaty; yet much more positiveand friendly principles define the relationship between these states, notthe treaty's restrictions.

The second principle is that the rigid relationship embodied by MAD(mutually assured destruction) cannot be changed overnight.  Rogov outlined three main components of MAD logic: the preoccupation withnumerical balance, reliance on counter-force weapons, and reliance on tacticalearly warning.  To illustrate the specific competitiveness of US-Russiannuclear relations, Rogov pointed out that numerical balance for instance,does not play a role in US relations with other nuclear powers. These threecharacteristics of MAD are what defined stability in the Cold War era -a very limited notion of stability, according to Rogov.  The new armscontrol package should, when possible, replace these components of MAD,and ideally lead us to a situation of  "no more MAD" in ten years.During this transition period however, most of these characteristics willremain applicable.

The third principle is related to the signals our two nations send toothers.  While Russia and the US aim to diffuse tension and tone downthe competitive nature of their previous nuclear relationship, they shouldnot send signals to China or any other state that a possibility of catchingup" exists.  Both nations have a strategic interest in not dealingwith a China that aspires to strategic military parity with them.

In accordance with these three principles, Rogov offered several possibleactions.  One of the options is simply a low number of weapons. President Putin recently reiterated the Russian position that START IIIshould take both country's arsenals to 1,500 warheads.  Rogov assertedthat this is too high for Russia; even if the official ceiling is 1,500,Russia should and most likely will have less. Rogov offered 1,000 warheadson ballistic missiles as a better limit. Rogov pointed out that this allowsairborne weapons to be treated in a different package.  Perhaps theold definitions of strategic and nonategic weapons should be changed;instead we should distinguish between nuclear weapons carried by ballisticmissiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) and those that are carried by aircraft. Witha limit of 1,000 warheads on ballistic missiles, a common ceiling shouldbe established on ICBMs and SLBMs of no more than 500.  Under thisarrangement, each side would be free to decide how to deploy its weapons.MIRVing of mobile ICBMs should be allowed; and mobile ICBM SS-27, shouldbe treated as "stabilizing" as the D-5.

Another idea Rogov proposed is the adoption of different alert stages. All deployed weapons would be classified according to a scheme of differentalert stages.  For instance, high alert status may denote weaponsthat could be launched within minutes; low alert weapons could be launchedwithin days or weeks; and zero alert weapons would require months. Even if Russia or the US place 500 weapons on high alert status, the scenarioof a counter-force disarming first strike becomes impossible.  Raisingthe alert status of weapons by one side would send a clear signal to theother side, who can respond in kind.

The combination of a low number of weapons with an alert status differentiationwill help us to move beyond "the Holy Grail of nuclear theology" - thatis, the knowledge that one side is capable of destroying its opponent withoutwarning in half an hour.  If these two proposals are adopted, Rogovestimated that Russia would have a 1,000 warheads, 700-800 of these onballistic missiles, and 200-300 on the heavy bombers.  If there isan option of MIRVing Topol-Ms, half of the 700-800 missiles would be onroughly 150 of these, and the other half on the 7-8 submarines.  TheUS would have numerical superiority - it is not likely to agree to lessthan 1,000 ballistic missiles, and an additional 700 on bombers. Rogov doubted that the superiority in airborne weapons would afford theUS a real advantage, and is thus acceptable under his proposed regime.

Rogov suggested that it is then possible to rethink the conventionaloffense/defense relationship.  Even if a decisive first strike attackbecomes impossible, Russia would retain sufficient retaliatory potential,even with limited defenses.  Limited defenses would mean that insteadof 50 million Americans, 40 million would perish in the retaliatory strike. This does not at all change the essence of retaliation, and brings up thequestion of what limits limited defenses? Rogov claimed that the Clintonadministration has not been able to answer this question.  ABM treatydoes not prohibit all strategic defenses -  it does not prohibit strategicair defenses, strategic ASW (anti-submarine warfare?), or land-based strategicdefenses.  It limits land-based defenses by prohibiting territorialdefense, placing a limit on the number of interceptors, and restrictingbattle management system -- command and control - by imposing strict technicallimitations on the phased array ground based radar.  Now the US wantsto deploy new technology; according to Rogov, it does not have effectivenew technology yet, and it will take years before it will have anythingto deploy.  Rogov expressed his personal opinion that if US stillwants to deploy this future technology, and at the same time fundamentallychange the relationship with Russia, Russia can be accommodating on theissue.  It is possible to imagine maintenance of the general ABM treatyregime, with somewhat different limitations.

On the issue of interceptors, Rogov asserted that space-based defensesonly become problematic when they acquire capability to intercept missilesduring mid-course or at boost phase; this is the point at which defenseis no longer limited, but becomes really robust.  This is a line thatshould not be crossed, Rogov cautioned.  With respect to numericallimits on interceptors, the original 1972 protocol sets it at 200; anythingbetween 100 and 200 is negotiable and acceptable.  The main problemis what types of restrictions to maintain on battle management systems. The new generation of space-based sensors renders the old restrictionson phased array radar irrelevant; the proposals of the Clinton administrationdo not include any restrictions on x-band radar and SBIRS satellites. Rogov proposed several possible restrictions that would address this newtechnology.

Russia can propose that the US deploy only 4 or 6 SBIRS satellites,instead of 24.   The orbits' lifetime could be restricted to2 years, the satellites could be forbidden from going above the degreethat allows them to cover Russian territory, or from changing orbits. Thusthe command and control of ballistic missile defenses becomes again effectivelyrestricted, while preserving the Americans' ability to deal with limitedthreats such as North Korea or Iraq.

To achieve the kind of strategic partnership that he envisions, Rogovoffered another suggestion.  The desired kind of relationship betweenRussia and the US should not be formalized by 800 pages of small printof the START I treaty, but should be more "flexible and self-regulating."Establishing an informal common ceiling on offensive and defensive weaponswould aid that objective.  For instance, both can agree that eachside could have no more than 600 missiles, and no more than 500 offensivemissiles.  Thus, if one side wants more than 100 interceptors, itwould have to cut the offensive potential, creating a situation where neitherside would be willing to build up too great of a defensive system.

To conclude his discussion, Rogov ventured several predictions regardingthe US-Russian nuclear relationship.  He expressed the opinion thatGeorge W.  Bush is more likely to win the presidency, and the resultingRepublican administration will not rush into the decision of NMD deployment. It will not do so for several reasons - mainly, because there is nothingto deploy.  Secondly, Rogov claimed that it would be difficult forthe new administration, whether Republican or Democratic, to push throughany controversial decision, because of the close balance between partiesin Congress, and the circumstances of this election.  Rogov also expressedconfidence in Governor Bush's security team, asserting that they understandthe costs of unilateral withdrawal from the ABM treaty.  Overall,Rogov concluded that in the near future, US-Russia relations are "not goingto be a disaster, but a period of very serious bargaining."
 
Questions and Answer Period

Rogov elaborated on several points of his presentation through his answersto the numerous questions posed to him.  To further clarify the stateand the prospects of US-Russian relations with regards to nuclear armscontrol, Rogov shared his perceptions of the Russian government's attitudes,and outlined some of the key strategic issues around which the strategicpartnership between the two countries can be built.

With respect to the Russian official position, Rogov admitted that Russianswould naturally prefer to deal with an America without NMD.  WhileRussia would like to preserve the ABM Treaty in its original form, it wouldalso like to reduce American offensive capability, harboring no illusionsabout matching it. Rogov suggested that this provided some leverage tothe Americans, and although Russia is not currently making any concessions,realistically it understands that status quo cannot be maintained. PresidentPutin had made a serious commitment by ratifying START II, and he is unlikelyto become uncooperative in the future.

Rogov also identified several strategic interests that demonstrate theadvantage of a strategic partnership between Russia and the US.  First,both view China as a potential threat.  If China's rapid modernizationis to be followed by a military modernization, China turns into a countrythat can physically challenge Russia and threaten its natural resources. Both US and Russia consider it in their interests to prevent China fromcatching up in the nuclear field. Second, both nations face the challengeof Islamic fundamentalism, and both are unsuccessful at responding to thischallenge that is proving to have no military solution.  Third issueof mutual interest is energy - the US must realize that Russia could playan important role in stabilizing the global energy situation, with itsgreat natural gas and oil resources.  These and other issues of sharedconcern demonstrate the need and the advantages of a strategic partnership,and the dangers of perpetuating hostile competitiveness.

Rogov's presentation concluded in the same cautiously optimistic tonethat he began - although there are problems, Russia and the US have boththe incentives and the practical opportunity to change their bilateralarms control regime for the better.

Summary by Elina Treyger, Junior Fellow with the Russian and EurasianProgram
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C. Nuclear Waste

1.
Novovoronezh NPP Discharges Radioactivity
        Vladislav Nikiforov
        Bellona
        December 4, 2000
        (for personal use only)

High levels of radioactive contamination were found in sediments inthe River Don in the vicinity of Novovoronezh NPP.

The sediment samples from the River Don near Novovoronezh nuclear powerplant and soil samples taken in the forest separating the plant and thecity of Novovoronezh showed threatening levels of radioactive contamination.

Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations reported that environmentalorganisation Green Wave based in Volgodonsk, Rostov county, is examiningwhether the recent findings of radioactive contamination in Tsymlansk reservoirof up to 150 Bq/kg can be traced back to Novovoronezh NPP situated around500km upstream the river. The reservoir is located near new Rostov NPPwhich is under construction.

The state chemical laboratory Tsymlanskaya examined the silt samplestaken by the Green Wave activists from the River Don downstream of NovovoronezhNPP and found high concentration of cesium-137 (6,000 Bq/kg). Gamma radiationof the sample was more than 500 micro R/h, while background level is 20micro R/h. The soil samples from the forest near the power plant were alsocontaminated with cesium-137 (1,587 Bq/kg).

The new Rostov NPP, situated 18 km from the city of Volgodonsk, willbe launched in December. The NPP will operate one VVER-1000 reactor unit.Novovoronezh NPP has in operation two VVER-440 and two VVER-1000 reactorunits.
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D. Russian Nuclear Power Industry

1.
Russian Uranium Stockpiles May Run Dry In 20 Years
        Interfax
        November 30, 2000
        (for personal use only)

MOSCOW. Nov 30 (Interfax) - Russia's uranium stockpiles, which are amongthe world's biggest, could run dry in 20 years as the nuclear energy sectorand exports grow.

Russia and the Eastern European nations that consume Russian uraniumuse about 16,000 tonnes per year. Russian nuclear plants get through 4,500tonnes of this and nuclear submarines 1,000 tonnes, according to a jointreport by the All-Russian R&D Institute for Chemical Technology andAtomredmetzoloto, the company that controls the Russian uranium industry.Yet Russia mines at most 2,500 tonnes of uranium per year, and compensatesthe difference between mine output and consumption by drawing on stockpiles.

Russia's stockpiles are equivalent to 500,000 tonnes of low- enricheduranium. This includes 1,400 tonnes of high-enriched, or weapons-gradeuranium extracted from nuclear warheads and which is equivalent to 420,000tonnes of low-enriched uranium, and 80,000 tonnes of uranium stockpiledfrom years past.

Russia has already committed itself to shipping 150,000 tonnes of low-enricheduranium derived from 500 tonnes of HEU from dismantled warheads to theUnited States under a 20-year agreement signed in 1993.

Thus, Russia effectively has no more than 350,000 tonnes of uraniumwith which to plug the gap between mine output and consumption.

Russian nuclear installations are likely to be consuming up to 7,500tonnes of uranium per year by 2020, and 8,500 tonnes by 2030. New uraniummines would not be able to meet more than 40% of demand for uranium by2010, the report says.
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E. U.S. - Russia Relations

1.
Organization Would Target Nuclear Threat
        Pat Murphy
        Times-News
        December 3, 2000
        (for personal use only)

SUN VALLEY -- Billionaire media mogul Ted Turner is in the process offorming another nonprofit activist organization to tackle major internationalissues -- this time, threats from nuclear weapons, nuclear waste and blackmarket nuclear missiles.

The new group, Nuclear Threat Initiative, will open for business inJanuary or February, according to former Democratic U.S. Sen. Timothy Wirth,of Colorado, who now heads up Turner's Washington-based United NationalFoundation and who revealed Turner's plans Saturday at an environmentalconference in Sun Valley where he was a major speaker.

Joining the group as its operating head, Wirth said, will be formerU.S. Sen. Sam Nunn, of Georgia, who this week removed himself from considerationas defense secretary in the administration of George W. Bush, if Bush becomespresident.

The United Nations Foundation, funded by $1 billion from Turner in Times-Warnerstock, was created in 1997 to assist worldwide United Nations programs,especially those involving the environment, children, and population controland family planning.

Wirth said that the new Turner group would target an array of nuclearissues. He said one of them, the "hair-trigger alert" on which thousandsof U.S. and Russian missiles are maintained in a Cold War status, continuesto pose the major threat to the world. He said Nuclear Threat Initiativewould campaign to not only end the war-stance alerts but reduce the numberof missiles.

"(George W.) Bush is ahead of Al Gore on this one," Wirth said, alludingto Bush's campaign pledge to reduce the number of U.S. missiles, and insteaddivert funds to a "Star Wars" anti-missile defense system.

As head of the new Turner anti-nuclear group, Sen. Nunn would bringspecial credentials for the job. When in the U.S. Senate, Nunn was chairmanof the Armed Services Committee, dealing with military issues that includednuclear weaponry.

Wirth said that in addition to nuclear weapons, the new Turner organizationwould focus on nuclear waste disposal and storage, alternative careersfor nuclear scientists who would be displaced by disarmament, the potentialfor black market trafficking in nuclear weapons from Russia to rogue nations,and nuclear tensions between Pakistan and India.

Wirth asserted that most Americans assume wrongly that the Cold Waris over. He said 20,000 nuclear missiles still are active in the world,with about 5,000 of them intercontinental weapons.

He said the "high priests" of nuclear weapons -- military officialsand politicians in the West and the East -- are reluctant to give up theirpower and their arsenals.
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2.
Professor Says U.S. Policy Destabilized Nuclear Power [excerptsof an interview with Stephen Cohen]
        The Charlie Rose Show
        PBS Television (Transcript#2825)
        November 30, 2000
        (for personal use only)

[This transcript has not been checked against videotape and cannot,for that reason, be guaranteed as to accuracy of speakers and spellingof names.]
 
CHARLIE ROSE, Host:  Welcome to the broadcast.  Tonight webegin with Stephen Cohen on the future of Russia.  STEPHEN COHEN,New York University, Author of ``Failed Crusade'':  The anger of thisbook is about the opportunities lost.  Yes, there's hope. Yes, therewas an election.  Yes, that's good.  But there could have beenso much more.  The opportunities were there.  Now, some peoplehave liked book, but the point of the book is make people pay attentionto what I consider an enormous potential catastrophe waiting to happen....

[begin excerpt]

STEPHEN COHEN:  But the worst of it-- the worst of it is that thesepolicies, whether we're the most guilty because we recommended them orthe Russian government's more guilty because it adopted them -- and letme emphasize this -- for the first time ever, ever, ever in history, destabilizeda fully nuclearized country.  What does that mean?  We don'tknow what it means, but it doesn't mean anything good.  We are infar greater danger today because of what happened in the '90s than we everwere during the cold war.  That's the American bottom line.
 
Even if it's not a moral issue, it's a security issue.  You andI, our kids, our grandchildren, are living in a new nuclear era becausea nuclearized country -- nobody foresaw this -- has been destabilized.Destabilized.  And now the nuclear risks are much greater.  I'mnot a nuclear expert, but I-- I'm not going to read it to you, but I gota list here of nuclear scientists who tell us this, and nobody listens.

CHARLIE ROSE:  Well, they do listen.

STEPHEN COHEN:  Nobody listens-- [crosstalk]

CHARLIE ROSE:  Well, they-- not only do they listen, but there'vebeen commissions and there've been respected American officials have takena look at this.  I mean people like Sam Nunn.

STEPHEN COHEN:  That's right.  Yeah.  He wants a lotmore money than anybody's given him.  I mean, he's an exception. He shows the exception-- former senator Nunn.

CHARLIE ROSE:  Right.

STEPHEN COHEN:  A very wise man.

CHARLIE ROSE:  Right.

STEPHEN COHEN:  He understands the danger.

CHARLIE ROSE:  Right.

STEPHEN COHEN:  Let me say one thing about that.  There arefour nuclear dangers that didn't exist during the cold war that now exist.Proliferation is the sexy one.

CHARLIE ROSE:  Right.

STEPHEN COHEN:  It's the poster child.  We make movies aboutit.  We imagine people stealing -- what did they used to be called?-- football nuclear bombs--

CHARLIE ROSE:  Right.

STEPHEN COHEN:  --in suitcases and in the dark of the night, likea thief. However, Russia's got several scores of unstable nuclear reactorson land and the sea that are extremely dangerous.  There's a civilwar in Russia, in Chechnya, the first civil war ever in a nuclear country. Each side has threatened the other with nuclear retaliation.
 
And the worst danger probably is, is that these warning systems thatthe United States and Russia built -- the Soviet Union and the United Statesbuilt during the cold war to tell us if the Russians have launched-- theRussian system has broken down, the satellites and the computers, and they'regetting false signals.  They constantly think we're attacking them.
 
And they're on hair-trigger alert.  And they don't have the moneyto fix the system.
 
Personally, I think we ought to fix that system for them, $2 billion.What a bargain, national security.
 
One of the guys I got in here says that he-- he wrote the report onthis. I mean, again, you know, I have to read the nuclear scientists. But he says-- he's asked ``How come there hasn't been such a disaster?'' And he says, ``If you ask me, what's the main reason New York City hasn'tgone up in a mushroom cloud, I'd say the main reason is we've been verylucky.'' And this guy is a former official of the Department of Defense. He's no radical.

CHARLIE ROSE:  Who is this?

STEPHEN COHEN:  His name is John Wolfstahl [sp].

[end excerpt]
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