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Nuclear News - 11/09/00
RANSAC Nuclear News, November 9, 2000
Compiled by Ethan Penfield and Christopher Ficek



Preface [MPC&A]
Response by the authors of ´┐ŻRenewing the Partnership: Recommendations for Accelerated Action to Secure Nuclear Material in theFormer Soviet Union, ´┐Ż to an article published in the October 30 editionof Insight Magazine, Oleg Bukharin, Matthew Bunn, and Kenneth N. Luongo(November 2000)
A. Russian Nuclear Forces
    1. Strategic Rocket Forces to Retain Present Status Till at Least2006, RFE/RL (11/6/00)
    2. Rocket Force Commander Comments on Defense Strategy, Interfax(11/4/00)
B. START
    1. Defense Bill Bars Unilateral Nuclear Reductions, Orders PostureReview, Philipp C. Bleek, Arms Control Today (11/2000)
C.  Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)
    1. News Briefing [HEU Purchase Agreement], Uranium Institute(11/7/00)
D.  Nuclear Testing
    1. Two More Subcritical Tests At Novaya Zemlya In October,Bellona (11/3/00)
E.  Nuclear Power Industry
    1. News Briefing [Russian Nuclear Power], Uranium Institute(11/7/00)
F. Nuclear Waste
    1. Authorities Deny Radiation Hazard in Siberia, RFE/RL (11/7/00)
    2. Siberian Radioactive Pollution Has Recent Origin¸Sophie Lambroschini, RFE/RL (11/7/00)
    3. Radiation Leaks Into 2 Rivers, Oksana Yablokova, St.Petersburg Times (11/7/00)
G. U.S. Elections
    1. ...And Zyuganov, Seleznev See Little Change For Russia EitherWay, RFE/RL  (11/7/00)
    2. Most Russian Politicians Unperturbed by Bush Election Win,Interfax (11/8/00)
    3. Bush Victory Would Mean USA-Russia Relations Have to StartFrom Scratch, BBC Monitoring (11/8/00)
    4. The Election Matrix, Carnegie Endowment ProliferationBrief (11/1/00)
 

Preface [MPC&A]

The following is a response by theauthors of ´┐ŻRenewing the Partnership:  Recommendations for AcceleratedAction to Secure Nuclear Material in the Former Soviet Union, ´┐Ż a comprehensive,independent examination of the MPC&A program, to an article publishedin the October 30 edition of Insight Magazine.
        Oleg Bukharin, Matthew Bunn,and Kenneth N. Luongo
        November 2000
        (for personal use only)

[begin text]

To the Editor:

One would never guess that we are strong supporters of the administration´┐Żsprograms to secure potential bomb material in Russia from the grossly distortedpicture of our views provided by J. Michael Waller (´┐ŻEx-Clinton OfficialsRake Russia Policy,´┐Ż October 30).  Waller selectively quotes our critiqueswithout our positive assessments.

In fact, the first major finding of our report on the program to secureand account for nuclear material in Russia, which we repeated in the pressconference Waller quotes, is that the program ´┐Żis achieving major successes´┐Żand  ´┐Żdeserves strong support, including increased funding and personnel.´┐Ż We also concluded in that press conference that Vice President Gore´┐Żs officehad played an important role in moving these programs forward and solvingmany problems as they arose -- none of which was mentioned by Waller.

We do believe, as Waller reports, that these efforts require more resourcesand more sustained high-level political attention.  But both the successesand the failures of these efforts have bipartisan sources: there are bothheroes and villains on both sides of the aisle, and in both the administrationand the Congress.  Securing nuclear material as rapidly as we canshould be a bipartisan issue.  Indeed, we are pleased that both VicePresident Gore and Governor George W. Bush have called for increased attentionto these critical national security issues.

In some cases, Waller´┐Żs presentation is factually wrong as well as selective. Oleg Bukharin is a researcher at Princeton University, not at the RussianAcademy of Sciences, as reported.  Similarly, when we referred toa policy ´┐Żblunder´┐Ż, as quoted in the article, we were  not referringto the administration´┐Żs entire policy on securing nuclear materials, butinstead to a specific decision, in September, 1999, to cut off furthercontracts for several key facilities in Russia over the access question-- a blunder made in part as a result of pressure from Congress, and sincecorrected by the administration (a fact we also reported in our press conference).

For those who would like to judge for themselves, a complete transcriptof our press conference, and the full text of our report, is availableat www.216.119.87.134.

Sincerely,
 
Oleg Bukharin
Matthew Bunn
Kenneth N. Luongo

[end text]
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A. Russian Nuclear Forces

1.
Strategic Rocket Forces to Retain Present Status Till at Least 2006
        RFE/RL
        November 6, 2000
        (for personal use only)

MOSCOW, Nov 6, 2000 -- (RFE/RL) In his interview with the 3 November"Vek," Security Council Secretary Ivanov also said that the Strategic RocketForces will remain a separate branch of the armed forces for at least anothersix years.

"A possible change in the [forces'] status will be considered only after2006," he said.

At the same time, Ivanov noted that over the next six years the forces'arsenal will decrease as missiles are decommissioned.

Earlier this year, Defense Minister Igor Sergeev and Chief of the GeneralStaff Anatoly Kvashnin had engaged in a public battle over the fate ofthe Strategic Rocket Forces. Sergeev was in favor of leaving the forces'status intact, while Kvashnin wanted the forces to be merged with armedforces in order to save scarce funds.

Putin had ordered the Security Council to decide the matter.
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2.
Rocket Force Commander Comments on Defense Strategy
        Interfax
        November 4, 2000
        (for personal use only)

MOSCOW.Nov 4 (Interfax) - The Russian nuclear force's composition andtasks may change "depending on the changing situation," Commander-in-Chiefof the Strategic Rocket Force Vladimir Yakovlev told Interfax on Saturday.

However, "despite the radical changes in the world in the past decade,the planning of the use of nuclear weapons, unfortunately, has not changedfundamentally compared to the Cold War period," he said. "The notion inplanning is still that nuclear arms are the armed forces' supreme instrument,"he said.
 
"Several versions of the form and use of strategic force in the futureare being considered now - from preserving the current arsenal to developinga fully non-nuclear strategic force," Yakovlev said. "It is important tonote here that even now options are being checked for hitting strategicenemy targets [including Russian] with high-precision long-range arms,including intercontinental ballistic missiles with conventional warheads,"he said.

The importance of the forces and means of air defense and missile defenseto shield strategic targets from such strikes is growing in these circumstances,Yakovlev said. "If it is impossible to destroy high-security targets evenwith high-yield nuclear weapons, it is planned to put them out of orderby destroying elements guaranteeing their combat capability [power supplysystems, communications, etc.]," he said. "The United States considershigh-security facilities as bargaining chips in negotiations," he stated.

"In the United States, serious discussions are under way at a fairlyhigh level on the difficulty or impossibility of modernizing nuclear warheadswithout nuclear tests. I cannot claim that this may be a preparation ofthe public opinion for a corresponding modification of the nuclear armstest ban, but the Untied States' current stance on ABM and START showssuch a precedent is possible," Yakovlev said.

In foreign policy, the United States "has always been quite tough inguaranteeing its own vital interests," he said. "It considers nuclear weaponsas a component in a coordinated program to guarantee national securityalso constituting diplomacy, arms control and conventional forces," hesaid.

Speaking about the state of his force, Yakovlev said that it "guaranteesthe fulfillment of the given tasks." At the same time, "a very thoroughexpert evaluation of the possibilities of maintaining the group, modernizingit, and primarily advancing arms-control systems lies ahead," he said.

The force's press service has told Interfax that the force is planningefforts to maintain the level of combat readiness set by the defense ministryfor 2001 and the nearest future as part of the army reform.
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B. START

1.
Defense Bill Bars Unilateral Nuclear Reductions, Orders PostureReview
        Philipp C. Bleek
        Arms Control Today
        November 2000
        (for personal use only)

On October 30, President Bill Clinton signed the fiscal year 2001 NationalDefense Authorization Act (H.R. 4205), which contains several provisionsimpacting the future of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The act, a 500-page documentaddressing a wide range of military activities, maintains a previouslylegislated restriction on unilateral nuclear reductions below START I levels,calls for a strategic review of U.S. nuclear weapons policy, and mandatesresearch on how to defeat hardened targets. Despite efforts of severalDemocratic senators to the contrary, the act prohibits the United Statesfrom reducing its deployed strategic nuclear arsenal below START I levelsof about 6,000 warheads until START II enters into force. First includedin fiscal year 1998 legislation and originally intended to pressure Russiato ratify START II, the restriction prevents the president from unilaterallyreducing U.S. strategic forces.

Senator Bob Kerrey (D-NE) has unsuccessfully offered language repealingthe restriction every year since it was implemented. This year, supportfor the senator´┐Żs amendment built after Republican presidential nomineeGeorge W. Bush announced May 23 that he would unilaterally reduce U.S.nuclear forces if elected. In June, Senator John Warner (R-VA) offeredan alternative amendment that would have lifted the restriction after astrategic review, effectively barring Clinton from making reductions duringthe remainder of his term. (See ACT, July/August 2000.) Warner´┐Żs amendmentdefeated Kerrey´┐Żs in an essentially party-line vote but was subsequentlyremoved during House-Senate committee negotiations after Warner reportedlymade it known that he would not object if his language were dropped. Warner´┐Żsstaff declined to comment on the report.

As a result, the United States cannot lower its strategic nuclear arsenalbelow START I levels, despite the fact that both Congress and the executivebranch support further reductions. The Senate ratified START II, whichreduces the deployed strategic arsenal to 3,000-3,500 warheads, by an overwhelmingmajority in 1996, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved cutting nuclearforces to 2,000-2,500 warheads in the context of a START III agreement,a move the White House also supports. (See ACT, June 2000.)

Russia ratified START II in May´┐Żremoving the original justificationfor the restriction´┐Żbut it made entry into force contingent on the Senate´┐Żspassage of a group of 1997 agreements that extend START II´┐Żs implementationdeadline and amend the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The White Househas refused to submit the package for consideration, effectively stalematingSTART II implementation, because the Senate has indicated it will rejectthe ABM Treaty-related protocols. Ironically, while Republican nomineeGeorge W. Bush has pledged to pursue unilateral reductions, his Democraticopponent, Al Gore, has emphasized that he would only seek treaty-basedreductions.

The act also requires that a comprehensive nuclear posture review beconducted ´┐Żconcurrently´┐Ż with the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR),a thorough assessment of U.S. military policy conducted by the Pentagon.The nuclear posture review, which must be submitted to Congress with theQDR in December 2001, is tasked with examining all aspects of U.S. nuclearstrategy, including the role of the arsenal, its size, and the weaponscomplex required to maintain it. The act also requires the review to address´┐Żthe relationship among United States nuclear deterrence policy, targetingstrategy, and arms control objectives.´┐Ż Prior to the legislation´┐Żs passage,both Bush and Gore had pledged to conduct a nuclear posture review if elected.(See ACT, September 2000.) The last such review was conducted in 1994.

While calling for a far-reaching review to re-evaluate all facets ofU.S. nuclear policy, the act notes that it is the ´┐Żsense of Congress´┐Ż thatgiven the potential for further strategic arms reduction agreements withRussia, maintaining a strategic triad of bombers, long-range ballisticmissiles, and submarine-based ballistic missiles is ´┐Żin the national interest.´┐ŻThe bill requires the secretaries of defense and energy to submit by April15 a long-term plan for sustaining and modernizing all legs of the nucleartriad.

The authorization act also requires the secretary of defense, in conjunctionwith the secretary of energy, to complete a study by July 1 ´┐Żrelating tothe defeat of hardened and deeply buried targets,´┐Ż and it authorizes ´┐Żlimitedresearch and development´┐Ż on the subject. Senators Warner and Wayne Allard(R-CO), who offered the language, had originally attempted to overturna 1994 provision barring research and development of low-yield nuclearweapons, but their amendment was moderated in committee. The final versiondoes not make explicit reference to nuclear weapons, but both senatorshave publicly stated that the language is intended to facilitate researchon developing low-yield nuclear weapons.
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C. Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)

1.
News Briefing [HEU Purchase Agreement]
        Uranium Institute
        November 7, 2000
        (for personal use only)

[NB00.45-14] US: A new contract with Russia's Techsnabexport (Tenex)for post-2001 deliveries of blended-down Russian high-enriched uranium(HEU) should be in place on 1 January 2002, USEC Inc's President WilliamTimbers announced. The deal is expected to contain 'predominantly' theterms agreed to by USEC and Tenex in May. Timbers also confirmed that USECis 'engaged in' the bidding for the German and Dutch shares in Urenco.USEC is seeking to gain access to Urenco's centrifuge technology eitherby acquiring shares in the company or through a technology transfer agreement.He also said that USEC had held 'discussions' with the Russians about Russiancentrifuge technology. (Nuclear Fuel, 30 October, p1; see also News Briefing00.41-4)
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D. Nuclear Testing

1.
Two More Subcritical Tests At Novaya Zemlya In October
        Bellona
        November 3, 2000
        (for personal use only)

Russia conducted two underground subcritical nuclear tests on NovayaZemlya last week. The two tests were on October 20 and 27 in tunnels atthe northern test site. The tests had been planned for a long times, saysthe press service of the Ministry for Atomic Energy (Minatom) of the RussianFederation in a statement on Friday. Three subcritical tests were alsoconducted earlier this autumn, on August 28 and 31, and September 3. Thelast real nuclear bomb test at Novaya Zemlya was ten years ago, on October24, 1990.
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E. Nuclear Power Industry

1.
News Briefing [Russian Nuclear Power]
        Uranium Institute
        November 7, 2000
        (for personal use only)

[NB00.45-10] Russia: A new generating company has been formed from themerger of eight nuclear power plants, the TVEL Nuclear Fuel-Producing Concern,and several export companies. The power plants are Balakova, Kalinin, Kola,Kursk, Leningrad, Novovoronezhskiy, Rostov and Smolensk. Russia aims touse the investment component of each enterprise 'in order to achieve thesector's strategic tasks'. (Ux Weekly, 6 November, p3; see also News Briefing00.30-12)
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F. Nuclear Waste

1.
Authorities Deny Radiation Hazard in Siberia
        RFE/RL
        November 7, 2000
        (for personal use only)

Russian federal and regional officials have denied charges in a jointU.S.- Russian report on radiation in the Tom and Romashka Rivers in TomskOblast (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 3 November 2000). Natural Resources Ministryofficial Andrei Pechkurov said the report's claim that the Tom River isthe most polluted in the world in terms of radioactivity is "baseless,"RFE/RL's Moscow bureau reported. He explained that there are only "pocketsof radioactive residue." And a local government representative in Seversk,where a former nuclear weapons development facility is located, similarlycalled the report inaccurate, insisting the ecological situation in thearea has improved. According to Interfax, the Seversk Chemical Complexis planning to sue London's "The Guardian" for its coverage of the report.
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2.
Siberian Radioactive Pollution Has Recent Origin
        Sophie Lambroschini
        RFE/RL
        November 7, 2000
        (for personal use only)

MOSCOW, Nov 7, 2000 -- (RFE/RL) Russian officials and environmentalistsare locked in a war of words over allegations that the eastern provinceof Siberia is home to the world's most radioactive rivers.

Physicist Sergey Pashchenko, who took part in a recent Russian-Americannon-governmental survey of radioactive pollution in Siberia, says the studyproves the Seversk nuclear complex is guilty of discharging radioactiveelements into nearby rivers.

But Russian officials refuse to acknowledge the results and say theclaims are absurd.

The survey was the work of the U.S. group "Government AccountabilityProject." That NGO worked with prominent Russian scientists earlier thissummer compiling the findings. The group made the results known last week.

Pashchenko says the group was not surprised to find pollution in theTecha River near the infamous Mayak nuclear facility (Chelyabinsk). Buthe says it was very surprised find the Romashka and Tom rivers to containso much radioactivity.

The Romashka flows through the Seversk complex, considered to be thebiggest nuclear complex in Russia, before flowing into the larger Tom River.

At first, the group assumed the pollution was a holdover from Cold Wardays. The Seversk plant produced weapons-grade plutonium and commonly dischargedradioactive pollutants such as strontium-90 into the river. Strontium residuecan last for decades.

But when scientists analyzed the sample, they discovered most of theradioactivity was not caused by strontium but by another element, phosphorus-32.Phosphorus-32 is notable because it's only present in measurable tracesfor about two months. This told the scientists the pollution was relativelyrecent.

"This is a fresh discharge because in two months, it would have completelydisintegrated and it's an important discharge of phosphorus-32. Now beginsthe technical questions about what happened but that we cannot answer becausewe weren't allowed to inspect the reactor."

This is not the first time the Seversk complex has been in the news.In 1993, a tank at the complex exploded, releasing radioactive waste. Russianauthorities at the time called the accident the most serious nuclear incidentsince the 1986 Chornobyl nuclear accident. The plant later reduced itsactivity and closed three out of its five reactors under a 1992 U.S.- Russiasafety agreement.

Pashchenko believes the radioactivity did not come from an accidentor from a storage leak, but from water flushed every day around the tworemaining reactors to cool them down.

"So where does the phosphorus-32 come from? It's very simple. In theenvironment and water there's a lot of phosphorus-31. When this phosphorus-31is irradiated, it becomes phosphorus-32, and that's already a radioactiveelement."

He says this would make sense if the two Seversk reactors are cooledby an older type of system called "one-through" systems. These coolantsystems were built in the 1960s and used river water to cool the reactors.

"The...old reactors always need to be cooled, the same way an engineneeds to be cooled. So the first reactors took water from a nearby river,flushed it though the radioactive elements to take away excessive heat,and then the water was again thrown into the river. These reactors weremostly military ones for making weapon-grade plutonium, so no one triedto save the heat. The reactors of the next generation already used heatfor electricity and heating."

In its report, the Government Accountability Project does not name thecause of the discharge. It says no present-day operation can account forthe short-lived fraction of radioactivity, but the report does speculatethat the source could be a military reactor or an immense particle accelerator.

Pashchenko says phosphorus-32 is dangerous to human health and can penetratethe body through drinking water or eating fish from the river. It can alsopenetrate through the skin or be inhaled through water droplets in theair. Pashchenko says laboratory studies show that mice die quickly whenexposed to phosphorus-32.

He says the next step is to calculate the intake of the element by localsinhabitants but this is expensive and would exceed the NGO's resources.

Reacting to the report over the weekend, Russian officials played downthe situation in the two rivers.

Natural Resources Ministry official Andrey Pechkurov says there are"pockets of radioactive residue." But he says calling the Tom the mostradioactively polluted river in the world is "baseless." The ministry saysoccasional observations, such as used in the study's methodology, are nosubstitute for permanently monitoring the environment, as the ministrydoes.

A local government representative in Seversk says the survey is inaccurateand the ecological situation in the area has actually improved.

The Seversk plant now is threatening to sue at least one foreign publication,the British daily The Guardian, for running news of the survey last week.

It's not clear what effect the survey will have. Earlier this year,the country's only independent but officially recognized organ for monitoringthe environment, the State Committee for the Protection of the Environment,was disbanded and integrated into the Natural Resources ministry. Environmentalistsat the time issued warnings the absence of an acknowledged watchdog wouldleave the country without protection from dangerous industrial projectsbacked by the government.
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3.
Radiation Leaks Into 2 Rivers
        Oksana Yablokova
        St. Petersburg Times
        November 7, 2000
        (for personal use only)

MOSCOW - Dangerous levels of radioactivity - exceeding the amount producedby 10,000 nuclear reactors - have been detected in two rivers near a westernSiberian nuclear complex, a U.S.-based nuclear watchdog said in a reportissued Thursday.

The Government Accountability Project said that more than enough radioactivityto meet the world's electrical power demand had been found in the Tom andRomashka rivers flowing from the Siberian Chemical Complex, Russia's largestnuclear site.

"This pollution is probably the largest ongoing discharge of radioactivityin the world," Norm Buske, the head author of the report, said Thursdayby telephone from Washington.

Buske said it was shocking that the Russian government has never announcedthe contamination and is not taking any precautions to protect civiliansor clean it up. "It's a huge secret out of control," he said.

Buske, a physicist and oceanographer with the Government AccountabilityProject, traveled to the Tomsk region some 3,000 kilometers east of Moscowin August and conducted tests in the Tom and Romashka rivers.

Both rivers run near the 40-year-old nuclear complex, which once developedtop secret Soviet weapons. The complex includes two working reactors, auranium-enrichment plant that was closed in 1990, and a reprocessing facility.It also contains the world's biggest underground storage site for nuclearwaste, into which highly radioactive waste from the reprocessing facilityis still being pumped.

Alexander Adam, head of the ecological committee in the Tomsk regionaladministration, said the findings in the report are false and "elicit surprise."

Buske's expedition, which was carried out with a group of Russian environmentalists,aimed to assess the area around Tomsk, where an accident at the complex'sreprocessing plant occurred in 1993 and contaminated three nearby villages.

Analyses found strontium 90 in plant life along the Romashka River at10,000 picocuries per liter, the report said. Levels above 8 per literare outlawed in U.S. drinking water. Dangerous levels of phosphorous 32were also found, it said. Buske said fish purchased in a Tomsk market hadradiation levels 20 times higher than normal. The levels of radioactivityare too high to originate at a nuclear power plant or in normal reprocessing,the report said, adding that there might be a secret nuclear military reactoror an immense nuclear accelerator at the complex. Some of the radiationwas discharged as recently as two weeks before the tests were conducted,suggesting that radioactivity is continuing to be discharged from somesource in Tomsk, Buske said. Siberian Chemical Complex officials couldnot be reached for comment Thursday.

Nuclear Power Ministry spokes man Yury Bespalko called the report false,saying as far as he knew the complex does not dump any nuclear waste intothe rivers.

Thomas Nilsen of the Norwegian Bellona environmental group said thatthe fact that Phosphorus 32 was found in samples of aquatic vegetationthat grew in at the point where the Romashka River enters the Tom indicatedthat the pollution came straight from an operating reactor.

Maintenance of Russia's aging nuclear plants and the adequate disposalof nuclear waste has been a matter of concern with activists for some time.

In spite of this, Nuclear Power Minister Yevgeny Adamov is fiercelylobbying for legislation that would allow Russia to import nuclear wastefor reprocessing and long-term storage, activities that would bring extrahard currency into the government's coffers. State Duma hearings over theproposed bill, which ministry spokesman Bespalko said has been approvedby the Cabinet, are scheduled for Nov. 22.

U.S. Vice President Al Gore signed an agreement in 1994 with then-PrimeMinister Viktor Chernomyrdin to close down the old reactors in Tomsk. Butthe reactors are still running because no alternative power source forthe 500,000 residents of Tomsk is available.
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G. U.S. Elections

1.
...And Zyuganov, Seleznev See Little Change For Russia Either Way
        RFE/RL
        November 7, 2000
        (for personal use only)

Russian-U.S. relations will barely change regardless of who wins the7 November elections in the U.S., Communist Party leader Gennadii Zyuganovpredicted in an interview with Interfax on 6 November. At the same time,Zyuganov indicated his preference for a Republican victory. Policies pursuedin the past by the Republicans were "unambiguous and predictable," he said,noting that the former Soviet Union had signed major treaties with theU.S. when a Republican was in the White House. A victory by the DemocratGore, however, would mean the continuation of a "destructive" policy asfar as Russia is concerned, Zyuganov warned. State Duma Chairman GennadiiSeleznev similarly expects few changes in Russia's relations with the U.S.whether Bush or Gore wins. Like Zyuganov, however, he suggested in an interviewwith Interfax that based on past experience, a Republican victory wouldbe the more favorable outcome for Moscow. JC
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2.
Most Russian Politicians Unperturbed by Bush Election Win
        Interfax
        November 8, 2000
        (for personal use only)

Moscow, 8th November: The victory of Republican George Bush Jr in theUS presidential election would hardly lead to any fundamental changes inRussian-American relations, the leader of the Communist Party faction inthe Russian State Duma, Gennadiy Zyuganov, told Interfax on Wednesday [8thNovember]. He said that there are no serious differences between the Republicanand Democratic parties and that their leaders "have always rigorously andconsistently defended the interests of the United States in the world".

He noted, however, that Democrats Bill Clinton and Al Gore had "pursueda patronizing policy with regard to Russia, and their unconditional supportfor ex-President Boris Yeltsin and the so-called reformers brought sufferingand poverty to millions of Russian citizens".

"The USA set itself the task of establishing control over the world'sfinancial, information and energy flows. This goal will be consistentlypursued by all US presidents, irrespective of the party they represent,"Zyuganov said.

He said that George Bush Jr would "interfere in Russia's internal affairsmuch less than his predecessors, but is likely to defend American interestsmore toughly". This policy is aimed at "destroying our military-industrialcomplex, pushing us out of the world arms markets and deploying an Americanmissile defence system", Zyuganov said.

Leader of the Union of Right Forces faction Boris Nemtsov told Interfaxthat "George Bush Jr is an inexperienced politician and is not sufficientlyinformed about the situation, particularly on the international scene".

He said that statements made by George Bush Jr during the election campaignsuggest that "he has a very tough stance regarding Russia". But these statementsbetray little, as there is a difference between election rhetoric and realpolitics, Nemtsov said.

He said that under the new president no hostile moves should be expectedfrom the USA in relation to Russia. George Bush Jr's administration wouldtry to pursue a more rigorous financial policy with regard to Russia. Butif the main American oil companies say that investments should be madein Russia, George Bush Jr "will follow this advice".

Concerning militaryategic relations, he said that both George BushJr and Al Gore, if he wins the presidential elections, would want to reconsiderthe 1972 ABM Treaty and deploy a National Missile Defence system.

State Duma Deputy Chairman Vladimir Lukin of the Yabloko faction hassaid he believes that Republican George Bush Jr's victory in the US presidentialelections would mean that "a team of more pragmatically-minded people hascome to power" in that country.

He told Interfax that he is personally acquainted with many membersof the Republican Party and that "among them there are many sober-mindedand rational politicians who will undoubtedly play a great role".

"The Republicans are less adventure-minded in the world arena (thanthe Democrats)," Lukin said. "Perhaps some people in this country wouldhave preferred the Democrats to win, as it is more habitual to deal withthem. But this does not mean that it would definitely be better (to workwith the Democrats)," Lukin said.

He admitted that the Republicans have a tougher stance on the deploymentof the National Missile Defence. "But their humanitarian aid policy ismore liberal. The Republicans are trying not to mix up two things: humanitarianintervention and the implementation of American foreign policy plans,"said Lukin.
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3.
Bush Victory Would Mean USA-Russia Relations Have to Start FromScratch
        BBC Monitoring
        November 8, 2000
        (for personal use only)

Text of report by Russian news agency Ekho Moskvy

[No dateline as received] Victory for George Bush in the US presidentialelection would mean "an end to the preferential period Russia had as aresult of democratic reforms, at first in the Gorbachev years and thenin the early Yeltsin years", former Russian foreign minister Andrey Kozyrevtold Ekho Moskvy radio in an interview.

"We sought equality in relations and we will get it. This will helpto sober us up. We will understand that we cannot count on Uncle Sam andthat we will have to bid for a fresh relationship with America, unfortunatelystarting from scratch", he said.

"One must understand that relations on equal terms will be tough. Therewill be no preferential loans, no humanitarian aid", he said. "As soonas the favourable period with oil prices and prices for other resourcesends, which it definitely will in 2001, Russia will face a new Americanadministration talking tough on all issues, from trade to credit terms."
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4.
The Election Matrix
        Carnegie Endowment ProliferationBrief
        November 1, 2000
        (for personal use only)

The selection of the next president will be important for U.S. policyon nuclear weapons, but not as decisive as some might think. If the Senatestays Republican, as expected, a great deal depends on which party controlsthe House of Representatives.

The matrix below ranks the various outcomes by their impact on nuclearweapons policy. The most favorable outcome, from this point of view, wouldbe the election of Governor George Bush and Democratic control of the House(1). Historically, this has proven to be a very positive combination forthe non-proliferation regime. Almost all major arms control agreementswere negotiated or enacted by Republican presidents with a Democratic Congress.These include the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Anti-Ballistic MissileTreaty, the first SALT treaty, and the unilateral end of US biologicalweapons programs (all Nixon), the Biological Weapons Convention (enactedby Ford), the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, START I, the MissileTechnology Control Regime (Reagan), the Chemical Weapons Convention, STARTII and the 1991 unilateral tactical nuclear force reductions and strategicde-alerting (Bush). This is true even though Republican candidates frequentlyattack arms control efforts during campaigns. Richard Nixon, for examplecriticized the Non-Proliferation Treaty President Lyndon Johnson negotiatedin 1968, but signed it with enthusiasm in a 1970 Rose Garden ceremony.

               Bush     Gore
Democratic
House         1         2

Republican
House         4        3
 

It is more than history, though. If George Bush becomes President, hehas promised after review to de-alert and reduce deployed US strategicnuclear weapons, what he calls "expensive relics of dead conflicts." Ifthe Democrats regain the House, they will encourage this position. Thoughtheir influence will likely not be enough to convince Bush to submit theComprehensive Test Ban for ratification, it should be enough to ensurethat the US continues its 8-year moratorium on new nuclear tests.

The key issue could be missile defense. Many of Bush´┐Żs advisors areopenly contemptuous of the Clinton plan and would scrap it for sea-baseddefenses. But Bush will discover that there is nothing to deploy. Evenwith increased funding, land-based defenses could not be deployed until2006 or 2007 at the earliest, while sea-based defenses could not be fieldeduntil 2010. Space-based systems cannot even be considered until the nextdecade. (see "Lost at Sea," vol. III, no.27)

Thus, once in office, Bush will find that he cannot field any usefulmilitary capability during his first term in office and probably not duringa second term. But he will know with great certainty that if he abrogatesthe ABM treaty, he will have an international crisis that may dominatehis first year. This is why several of his advisors now say that they wouldtry to negotiate amendments to the treaty with the Russians, not abruptlytrash the treaty.

If Vice-President Al Gore wins the election and the Democrats take backcontrol of the House (2), Gore would start a new round of START III negotiations,not cut unilaterally. But these could be long, difficult talks, with uncertainoutcomes, particularly as Gore would try to continue missile defense deploymentefforts. He, more than Clinton, helped fashion the "New Democrats" positionson defense in the Democratic Leadership Council in the 1980s. Like hispersistent effort to build a Midgetman small, mobile ICBM instead of theten-warhead MX missile, Gore prefers to promote strategic weapons he believescan be stabilizing, rather than oppose such weapons directly.

However, many Democratic members in the House do not share this perspectiveand are likely to be much more critical of national missile defense, whomeveris President. Most importantly, merely by winning a majority in the House,the Democrats will have dethroned the major political base for missiledefense, the hard-line House conservatives. The House would restrain eitherpresident´┐Żs budget excesses and restore some balance to the oversight responsibilitiesof the Congress.

Senate NMD proponents may remain in the majority in that chamber, butthey will be an overall minority in the government and at a decisive legislativedisadvantage. Gore may be able to win enough Republican votes to ratifythe test ban treaty.

If Gore wins, but the Republicans retain the House (3), the currentstalemate could continue, though with less personal animosity. His negotiationswould be constantly criticized, resulting in higher numbers of deployedweapons and slower progress. Gore could well move towards NMD deploymentto blunt conservative criticism on defense issues. CTB could die.

Stormy Weather

The worst outcome would be a Republican "trifecta" of White House, Houseand Senate (4). This formation has occurred only once in modern times,for two years during the Eisenhower administration. The Congress couldpull Bush to the right, giving nuclear weapons a more prominent role insecurity policy while pushing to abrogate the ABM treaty, and putting thetest ban and other negotiated agreements on the back burner´┐Żor worse.

International and domestic events, of course, could greatly influencethese possible futures. But it begins when Americans choose either thered pill or the blue pill.
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