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Nuclear News - 11/10/99
RANSAC Nuclear News, 10 November 1999



A.  CTR

    1. Russia Needs to Scrap 107 Nuclear-Powered Subs Minister,Itar Tass (11/09/99)
    2. Russian Navy Cleans Up Nuclear Subs, Associated Press(11/09/99)
B.  Nuclear Power Industry
    1. IN BRIEF: Reactor Shut Down, Associated Press (11/10/99)
    2. Radiation Security Conference Opens in St Petersburg,Itar Tass (11/10/99)
C.  Y2K
    1. U.S. Embassy's Y2k Plans Criticized, RFE/RL (11/08/99)
    2. US, Russia to Eye Y2K Nuke Blunders, Associated Press(11/10/99)
D.  CTBT
    1. Continued Fallout From Test-Ban Defeat, Christian ScienceMonitor (11/10/99)
E.  Arms Control – General
    1. Laurin Dodd Named To Security Position, Spokane.Net(11/10/99)
    2. WORLDNET "DIALOGUE" – John Holum and Norman Wolf (transcript),United States Department of State (11/09/99)

A. CTR

1.
Russia Needs to Scrap 107 Nuclear-Powered Subs Minister
        Itar Tass
        November 9, 1999
        (for personal use only)

ST. PETERSBURG, November 9 (Itar-Tass) - Russia needs to scrap 107decommissionednuclear-powered submarines of its Northern and Pacific fleets, Deputy NuclearEnergy Minister Valery Lebedev said.

He said speaking at a conference of northern territories in Saint Petersburgon Tuesday that nuclear sector experts hoped to unload fuel from at least18 submarines and dispose of them next year.

"Seriousness of the problem finds an understanding in the government,and this gives us hope that our programme will be implemented," Lebedevsaid.

However, Russia lacks a single technological cycle of treatment of spentnuclear fuel and radioactive waste, he said.

Such a "through" technology is being developed these days by specialistsof the Nuclear Energy Ministry and the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Part of this technology is to set up several storage sites for spentfuel near locations of nuclear submarines. Storage tanks are being designedat Saint Petersburg's Izhora plants.

Part of fuel will be transported to Mayak chemical factory in the Urals.Lebedev said a plant for liquid radioactive waste treatment would be launchedby the end of this year at Murmansk's service and maintenance enterpriseAtomflot, which is a base of civilian nuclear-propelled ice-breakers.

The enterprise will meet demand of the whole northern region for disposalof the nuclear sector's waste.

Russia will use funds of foreign countries and organisations in thefuel and waste treatment programme, Lebedev said.

He said the environmental situation at anchorage sites of nuclear submarinesin the northern Murmansk anbd Arkhangelsk regions is not alarming.

Lebedev said the environmental situation was close to dangerous onlyat a submarine base in the Kola Peninsula's Andreyeva Bay, but it is undercontrol.

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2.
Russian Navy Cleans Up Nuclear Subs
        Andrew Kramer
        Associated Press
        November 9, 1999

ARKHANGELSK, Russia –– Nikolai Birillo was trained to end the world,not clean it up.

Birillo, a vice admiral in the Russian navy, ran patrols on nuclearsubmarines for 23 years, carrying missiles and torpedoes tipped with atomicwarheads.

Now he sits on a cleanup committee that receives handouts from the UnitedStates and Norway to dismantle the subs in an environmentally friendlymanner at Arkhangelsk, less than 200 miles south of the Arctic Circle.It's a role Birillo seems reluctant to play.

"We aren't technically backward," he said, bristling when asked aboutthe foreign aid that's being provided because Russia is too poor to payfor the work itself.

Since the 1991 Soviet breakup, the United States and other Western countrieshave provided several billion dollars to help Russia dismantle and destroyits weapons of mass destruction under arms control agreements.

The program is widely viewed as a success by both sides, although ithas moved more slowly than anticipated in some cases. Environmentalistshave long pointed to the derelict subs moored at this region's shipyards,many of which are little more than weed-overgrown derelicts themselves.

A senior Russian official said Tuesday that 18 nuclear submarines willbe dismantled next year and new techniques are being developed to speedup the process. Valery Lebedev, deputy minister of atomic energy, saidexisting methods "do not permit rapid disposal," according to the Interfaxnews agency, but gave no details.

The news will please environmental groups, which want to see the paceof work quicken, fearing that the risk of a nuclear accident grows thelonger abandoned submarines are allowed to deteriorate. Current plans callfor some 125 Russian nuclear submarines to be dismantled by 2010.

An accident would endanger not just Russian territory, but neighboringcountries and the Barents Sea, the groups say.

With its severe financial problems, Russia generally welcomes the foreignhelp, but officials worried about security have grumbled about openingsecret facilities to outsiders.

Years of negotiations were required before the dismantling of leakyand rusting nuclear submarines began last year. The program gained momentumin September with the opening of new facilities to handle nuclear waste.

U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen visited Arkhangelsk earlierthis fall as work began on dismantling the first Typhoon-class ballisticmissile submarine, one of the largest submarines ever built, and capableof carrying up to 200 nuclear warheads.

Much of the work will take place in the shipyards outside Arkhangelsk.

The region houses the largest concentration of nuclear reactors anywherein the world. Crumbling concrete tenement houses and potholed streets lookout on broken-down nuclear submarines.

In the bay, a huge, dark object wallows in white-capped waves. A closerlook reveals it's a submarine almost two football fields long, the hugecylinder riding low in the water.

Foreign visitors are not allowed to get any closer, because the navystill wants to maintain some of the secrecy that shrouded the Soviet submarineprogram. The navy has also been reluctant to acknowledge the potentialenvironmental dangers.

But environmental groups say that risks abound. The submarines containradioactive waste and noxious gases that are both dangerous and costlyto handle.

Dismantling a single submarine costs about $10 million, according toestimates by officials in the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.The program, established in 1992, pays for decommissioning Russian weaponsof mass destruction.

When taking apart a submarine, the biggest risk comes when a crane operatorhoists the chunky steel lid off the nuclear reactor compartment.

"You've got to hope that everything is OK underneath," said Josh Handler,a former Greenpeace researcher living in Moscow. Often, radioactive gasgushes out.

Liquid missile fuel also poses a threat, giving off gases so toxic theycan kill if inhaled, said Luke Kluchko, an American official with theCooperativeThreat Reduction Program in Moscow.

"Taking apart a nuclear-driven sub is tricky business," he said.

At the Arkhangelsk navy yard, Birillo, the vice admiral, accompaniedvisitors on a tour of a museum dedicated to nuclear submarines. He ranhis hand over smooth, stainless-steal periscopes and intricate gyroscopes.

"I know this equipment well," he said, clearly proud of the technology.

But when asked about the waste problem, he replied angrily, "We don'thave a problem."

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B.  Nuclear Power Industry

1.
IN BRIEF: Reactor Shut Down
        Associated Press
        November 10, 1999
        (for personal use only)

MOSCOW -- The safety system at a nuclear power station 450 kilometerssouth of Moscow automatically shut down one of the plant's reactors Tuesday,and no radiation was released, a nuclear official said.

Officials at the plant in Kursk were still trying to figure out whyreactor No. 2 was shut down, Nuclear Power Ministry spokesman Andrei Poloussaid.

The Kursk plant has four modified RBMK-1000 reactors, the same typethat exploded at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in 1986.

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2.
Radiation Security Conference Opens in St Petersburg
        Itar Tass
        November 10, 1999
        (for personal use only)

ST.PETERSBURG, November 10 (Itar-Tass) - A specialized conference onproblems of radiation security opens in St.Petersburg on Wednesday. Itwill discuss the radiation situation in Russia and other CIS member states,as well as the handling of used nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. Theconference has been organised by the federal ministries of the atomic energy,for emergency situations and for natural resources, the State Committeefor Natural Environment and the North-West Association.

An enormous amount of used nuclear fuel and radioactive waste have beenaccumulated in Russia as a result of the production of nuclear weapons,electricity generation at nuclear power plants and mass production ofradionucleicenergy sources of various types. Their reserves will be further increasedwithin the coming ten to fifteen years because of the massive phasing outof nuclear power units, whose service life is over.

Russia needs a state conceptual framework for handling waste productsremaining after both peaceful and military use of the atomic energy.Participants in the conference are going to put forward their own understanding of sucha conceptual framework. Dozens of reports will be made at the conference,which will suggest various ways of resolving radiation problems in Russia.

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C. Y2K

1.
U.S. Embassy's Y2k Plans Criticized
        RFE/RL
        November 8, 1999
        (for personal use only)

"The New York Times" reported on 8 November that "although the StateDepartment is planning to withdraw hundreds of government employees andtheir families from Russia and other former Soviet republics before 1 January,experts at the U.S. embassy in Moscow have concluded there is virtuallyno risk to diplomats from the year 2000 computer problem." The daily alsoreports that the estimated cost to the U.S. government is $5,000 per personfor 15 days of leave and that estimates for the total cost of withdrawingpersonnel range from $8-$1.25 million. The newspaper noted that "the U.S.is spending $7.5 million this year under its program to create civilianjobs for scientists in Russia's closed nuclear cities." Interfax reportedon 5 November that the U.S. appears to be the only leading Western countryconsidering changes to the operation of its embassy in Russia during themillennium transition.

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2.
US, Russia to Eye Y2K Nuke Blunders
        Robert Weller
        Associated Press
        November 10, 1999
        (for personal use only)

CHEYENNE MOUNTAIN AIR STATION, Colo.—Every Christmas Eve, the missiledefense wizards stationed here take time for a tongue-in-cheek report onmysterious radar readings at the North Pole.

Things will be much more serious at Cheyenne Mountain this year: Ina landmark effort, U.S. and Russian experts will be watching to make surethe Year 2000 bug doesn't trigger nuclear war.

The hunt for inadvertent missile launches will begin with the Kingdomof Tonga once the clock strikes 12:01 a.m. on Jan. 1.

"We are partnering with the Russians to make sure nobody makes a mistake,"Lt. Col. Gary Warren said Tuesday from deep inside Cheyenne Mountain, themissile defense headquarters for North America.

The U.S. military began preparing for the effects of Y2K more than fouryears ago. With its economy in turmoil, Russia is believed to be considerablybehind in its efforts.

In February, the Clinton administration proposed setting up the jointY2K center. Russian officers have already visited the site, and 18 willreturn -all expenses paid by the U.S. military -on Dec. 23.

They will work out of a nondescript structure, Building 1840, near theU.S. Space Command Center at Peterson Air Force Base.

The space command, Space Warfare Center, North American Air DefenseCommand (NORAD) are all in Colorado Springs, sprawled across the prairieat the foot of Pikes Peak some 65 miles south of Denver.

It is NORAD that tracks the missiles. The 4.5 -acre granite bunker isburied 1,700 feet beneath Cheyenne Mountain. The base, which opened in1966, features 2.8 miles of tunnels, 3 -foot-thick blast doors and buildingsatop mammoth metal coils that serve as shock absorbers.

On Tuesday, Russian journalists were allowed into Cheyenne Mountainfor the first time. The Russian officers, however, will not be permittedinside the command center, which was carved out of 700,000 tons of granite.

"There is that residual distrust," said Lt. Col. Greg Boyette, who tookpart in the negotiations and visited Russia several times. "I'm an oldStrategic Air Command guy. We've been doing this (fighting each other)for 40 years, and we didn't ask them to give away the farm, either."

No U.S. soldiers will be stationed in Russia.

However, the two nations will share basic data about any launches ormaterial falling from space. The information will include where missilesor other objects are coming from, where they are headed and what type ofobject is involved.

While Boyette said he expects most nations to avoid any missile launchesduring the holiday period, the most-discussed scenario is a computer errorthat creates the impression of a false missile threat.

Brig. Gen. Robert Latiff, Cheyenne Mountain's commander, said his teamsalso are aware of the possibility that an attacker might use any confusioncreated by Y2K glitches to launch an attack.

Still, on New Year's Eve, Cheyenne Mountain will have only a few morethan normal staff on hand. Senior officers will be present, so there wouldbe no need to track them down in case of a problem.

"If there was an accidental missile launch you can bet the two presidentswould be on the hotline," Boyette said.

The Russian teams, usually three officers and a translator, will havea direct line to Moscow from the Y2K center at Peterson. At least one memberof their U.S. counterparts will be fluent in Russian.

Maj. Dan Mullen, who is in charge of managing Y2K problems for CheyenneMountain, assured journalists that a scenario similar to "WarGames" -the1983 movie in which a teen hacks into a military computer -could not setoff a war.

"Computers do not make the decisions around here. People do," he said."We plan to be bored on New Year's Eve. We've counted every sesame seedon every bun."

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D. CTBT

1.
Continued Fallout From Test-Ban Defeat
        David D. Newsom
        Christian Science Monitor
        November 10, 1999
        (for personal use only)

The United States Senate's failure to ratify the Comprehensive TestBan Treaty (CTBT) on Oct. 13 marks a disturbing step backward from Americanengagement in today's world.

Hans Bethe, a Nobel Prize physicist who assisted in the developmentof the first nuclear bomb, wrote in The New York Review of Books that "thefailure to ratify will have serious consequence for American foreign policyfor years to come."

The impact on arms control is but one kind of fallout. Perhaps evenmore serious is what the Senate decision says about the ability of theUS to influence events in an increasingly fractured, multidimensional world.

The germ of the test- ban treaty began in the Eisenhower administrationand has been negotiated by US and foreign diplomats in good faith overmany years. In each administration, whether Democrat or Republican, theprocess included consultations with relevant congressional committees.

The treaty's opponents use various arguments: It is flawed, they say;it will not prevent rogue states from violating the ban; it would keepthe US from maintaining a viable nuclear deterrent. Why should Washingtonclose out its options?

Supporters have insisted that by establishing extensive global monitoring,the treaty will greatly improve the capability to detect violators. Computerscan provide the means to maintain the deterrent. A ratified treaty offersan internationally recognized basis for mobilizing official pressure andpublic opinion against violators.

If the treaty is flawed, the response should not be rejection, but anexamination of the problems and efforts, through further negotiation, toresolve them. Some in Congress are now proposing just this. But they encounteramong their colleagues a deep-seated distrust of negotiators and of negotiation- a strange attitude in a country of traders and poker players.

But, at the base of opposition to the treaty is the idea that the UShas the power unilaterally to deter any threat - that neither this treatynor any other is necessary.

Three other recent developments further accent this "go-it- alone" attitude.Pressure for a missile defense system is already creating serious problemsin US relations not only with the Russians, but with allies. A report issuedlast week by a committee of corporate executives, military officers, anddiplomats said the American diplomatic presence abroad is nearing a "stateof crisis," further proof that the tools by which Washington conducts itsforeign policies are being degraded.

The president's difficulties in getting congressional approval for theminuscule amount of the federal budget that goes to foreign aid is a thirdindicator. Opponents of such assistance not only sought to block it, butridiculed the "turbans" - as one congressman put it - who were receivingit.

Those who propose "going it alone" do not have satisfactory answersto the implications of their philosophy. Could the US have prevailed andkept US casualties low in Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo without the allies preparedto share the risks? How could forces have been moved without the willingnessof intervening countries to grant overflight rights? If a rogue state dropsa nuclear bomb or releases chemical or biological weapons in anger, isthe US prepared for the risks of responding unilaterally, without eitherallied or regional support?

Weapons issues are not the only ones in which the rest of the worldis involved. The effects of degraded environments, conflict, poverty,overpopulation,uncontrolled disease, crime, and drugs in other countries can threatenour own health and safety - and have before.

We cannot gain the necessary cooperation of others in reducing thesethreats without the effective diplomacy and supporting resources currentlyso denigrated by some members of Congress.

The US diplomat today, seeking to deal with any of these issues, isseverely handicapped by an impression abroad, reinforced by the CTBT rejection,that whatever the US agrees to, even with congressional consultation, isunlikely to gain the approval of legislators who insist that America can"go it alone."

David D. Newsom, a former US ambassador and undersecretary of Statefor political affairs, lives in Charlottesville, Va.

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E. Arms Control – General

1.
Laurin Dodd Named To Security Position
        Spokane.Net
        November 10, 1999
        (for personal use only)

Compiled from our staff and wire services

The former international nuclear safety program manager at the PacificNorthwest National Laboratory will take over management of national securitywork at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory.

Laurin Dodd will hold the position of associate laboratory directorin overseeing the projects related to national security, Laboratory DirectorBilly Shipp announced on Monday.

A spokeswoman said the job in the reorganized management scheme underBechtel B&W Idaho, the new contractor at the INEEL, is intended tofocus more attention on the facility's national security work.

Shipp called Dodd a technical authority on activities in the formerSoviet Union who has excellent contacts in the government and nuclear industrysectors both domestically and in the nine former Soviet republics.

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2.
WORLDNET "DIALOGUE" – John Holum and Norman Wolf (transcript)
        United States DepartmentOf State
        November 9, 1999
        (for personal use only)

MR. FOUCHEUX: We are most fortunate to have with us today two key suchofficials, Mr. John D. Holum, the administration's senior adviser for armscontrol and nuclear security affairs; also joining us today is Norm Wolf,the administration's senior adviser and chief negotiator for the NuclearNon-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Goodmorning both of you, welcome very much to our program.

Mr. Holum, I understand that you have some brief opening remarks beforewe begin the Q&A today.

AMB. HOLUM: Thank you. Just a few thoughts. It's a great pleasure forme to participate in this dialogue this morning. The coming year couldbe, and likely will be, a pivotal one for the whole arms control andnon-proliferationprocess. We have had some setbacks, as the film noted, including the failureof the U.S. Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. But wehave an important agenda ahead, including next April's review of the NuclearNon-Proliferation Treaty, a number of efforts to strengthen safeguardsunder that agreement. The Biological Weapons Convention needs to bestrengthened,and efforts are underway in Geneva to do that. We have a challenge aheadto continue the process of reducing the Cold War build-up of strategicnuclear arsenals in the United States and Russia and ultimately to includeother countries. We want to negotiate a cut-off in the production of thefuel for nuclear weapons, the fissile material from which they are made.

The United States will be centrally engaged in all of those efforts.As the president said after the Senate vote on the Comprehensive Test BanTreaty, we intend to continue this effort, and in the meantime the UnitedStates will not conduct nuclear tests; we'll continue to urge other countriesto ratify the treaty so that it can ultimately be brought into force. Weintend to remain at the forefront of all of these efforts.

I look forward to a good discussion with all of you this morning, andI am very happy to be here with my colleague Norm Wolf.

MR. FOUCHEUX: All right. And once again we are happy that you were ableto give us a little time for this very important discussion.

We now welcome our participants who are standing by in Moscow, Pragueand Kiev. Let's begin with your questions and comments. Please go aheadfirst in Prague.

Q: Good morning. (Inaudible) -- according to French Agency -- (inaudible)-- for all remaining nuclear weapons from Europe. Can you confirm thisreport?

AMB. HOLUM: I have heard this report in the press, and I don't knowwhat the basis for it is. Nuclear deterrence remains a central part ofU.S. involvement in the NATO alliance, and the strategic umbrella affordedby U.S. nuclear weapons, including those stationed in Europe, remainsfundamentalto us.

MR. FOUCHEUX: Thank you, Prague. We now move on to Moscow. Please goahead with your question in Moscow. Okay, we are still waiting for Moscowto come across our lines. Let's move on to Kiev for their first question.Please go ahead in Kiev.

Q: I'm interested in the question having to do with the group headedup by Mr. Robert Joseph. In particular this group suggests not just resumingnuclear testing, but also to step up work on creating tactical weapons,including using it for locally based wars. To what extent do these viewscurrently in the United States and in the administration can be consideredserious or weighty? Thank you.

AMB. HOLUM: Well, as the president said, and I've repeated, and thesecretary of State has made clear, we have no intention, no need to testnuclear weapons, and no interest in developing new kinds of nuclear weapons.I think it's a serious mistake to consider lowering the nuclear thresholdby making ever smaller nuclear weapons. The key to us is to maintain asharp dividing line between nuclear and other kinds of armaments, and weare not interested in pursuing new kinds of small tactical nuclear weaponsor indeed any new kind of warhead. Since the Cold War the role of nuclearweapons has declined dramatically. The use in low-intensity or smallerconflicts has always been outside of our doctrine, and it certainly isnow.

MR. FOUCHEUX: And now we invite Moscow to join in the discussion. Pleasego ahead with your first question or comment in Moscow. (Technicaldifficulties.)I'm sorry, but we are still having a bit of a technical problem with ourline to Moscow. We'll try to get that fixed. Let's continue the discussionnow in Prague for more questions. Please go ahead once again in Prague.

Q:     Good morning -- (technical difficulties).

MR. FOUCHEUX: Unfortunately, Prague, we are also having a bit of anaudio problem with our connection with you as well. We are going to tryone more time. I would ask you to repeat the question again, and in Englishif you don't mind. And failing our ability to understand that perhaps we'llmove on to Kiev. But let's try Prague once more. Please again slowly andin English if you don't mind, Prague. Thank you.

Q:     Good morning -- (technical difficulties).

AMB. HOLUM:  I couldn't make out the question, I'm sorry.

MR. FOUCHEUX: No, I'm sorry, evidently there is some interruptable linegoing on here because we are getting only, say, every other word from you,Prague. So again we'll try to get that technicality worked out as well.

We do have Kiev on the line, so let's continue our program in Kiev whilewe try to fix our connections with Moscow and Prague. So let's go to Kievagain.

Q: Voice of Ukraine Newspaper. Since 1993 Ukraine gave up its nucleararsenals the number of countries that possess nuclear weapons has grownsignificantly, although officially the nuclear club has not been expanded.Can Ukraine count on additional guarantees of security given the fact thatthe map of nuclear states of the world has changed? Thank you.

AMB. HOLUM: At the time that Ukraine gave up its nuclear arsenal thenuclear weapons state extended, including the United States, the principleof a negative security assurance precisely to Ukraine, making clear thatwe wouldn't use or consider using or threatening nuclear weapons againstUkraine. In addition to that, the assurance included positive indicationsof the kinds of support that would be available should Ukraine be threatenedwith nuclear weapons.

The number of states, as you indicated, that are openly claiming nucleararsenals, has grown in light of the tests by India and Pakistan. The numberthat we consider to be nuclear capable has not grown; in fact, the trendhas been the other direction. I'd like my colleague, Norm Wolf, who hasbeen working the Non-Proliferation Treaty extensively, to indicate progressin that area.

MR. WOLF: Thank you, John. It is indeed true that there has been progresstoward reducing the number of countries with the capability. For example,several years ago Argentina and Brazil were both considered countries thathad unsafeguarded nuclear programs, and therefore the potential to havethe possibility of a nuclear weapons program. They have since put all theirfacilities under IAEA safeguards and have become parties to the NuclearNon- Proliferation Treaty.

Similarly, in Africa, South Africa, not only had a nuclear capability,but they indeed claim to have nuclear weapons. And they have since turnedover all that material to international controls, have become a party tothe Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the IAEA, the International AtomicEnergy Agency in Vienna, has in fact been able to give assurances thatall of this material is now under safeguards.

So while it is true there has been a demonstrated potential in SouthAsia by India and Pakistan, on the other hand we should not forget thatthere had been pluses and some progress made elsewhere in the world.

AMB. HOLUM: In fact, the total number of members of the NuclearNon-ProliferationTreaty is now up to 187. Only four countries in the world -- India, Pakistan,Israel and Cuba -- remain outside the treaty. So this global agreementagainst the adoption of nuclear capability is getting stronger I thinkrather than weaker. And of course one of the most important developmentsin that trend was the decision by Ukraine as well as Kazakhstan and Belarusto completely give up their nuclear potential.

Q: (Inaudible) -- TV channel. Recently the prime minister of Hungary,Victor Orban, has not excluded possibility under certain conditions ofplacing nuclear weapons on the territory of Hungary. Then he actually rescindedthe statement. But how does the United States view their intention of newNATO members to have nuclear weapons on their territory? How would youview this in the future as well? Thank you.

AMB. HOLUM: We don't have plans to station nuclear weapons in new members.As I said earlier, the role of nuclear weapons is declining. There is aremaining nuclear presence in some locations in Europe. But we have madeclear we have no plans to ask additional countries, in particular new NATOmembers, to station nuclear weapons on their territory.

Q: Sergei -- (inaudible) -- newspaper. The United States has not ratifiedthe NPT -- the Senate has not ratified the NPT treaty. To what extent willthis complicate or compound the U.S. position on the ABM Treaty talks withRussia? Thank you.

AMB. HOLUM: Well, we do intend to continue the effort to ratify theComprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This is a detour. It is not a reversal.We are not changing course. This was a very abbreviated debate broughtup in an unfortunate partisan circumstance that didn't allow members ofthe Senate to examine the treaty closely. And for us to do the normal kindof review that we do, for example, when we ratified the Chemical WeaponsConvention, and to attach understandings and other steps to the resolutionof ratification that makes it more appealing to more senators -- that kindof effort still remains to be done.

Remember that the United States is not preventing the treaty from enteringinto force. We regret that we are not leading now the cause to ratify thetreaty, that the United States is not among those who have ratified. Butthere are 17 other countries whose ratification is essential in order forthe treaty to enter into force. As we continue our own efforts in the UnitedStates, we are going to encourage others as well to ratify the treaty.

I view that as a distinct issue from the ABM Treaty modifications weare working on with our Russian colleagues. The reason for seeking modestamendments to the ABM Treaty is to deal with the circumstance of a fewcountries who seem to be remaining outside the global norm, the globalagreement against both nuclear weapons and long-range missile capabilities.

We are not seeking a major disruption of the ABM Treaty; we are seekinga moderate adjustment of the treaty, not involving any nuclear testing,any nuclear capabilities, but the ability to deal with a few tens of incomingweapons from a country such as North Korea or Iran, who are developingthe capability to send missiles and weapons of mass destruction overinter-continentalranges. But this is a proposal that does not in our judgment upset thenuclear balance. It poses no threat to the nuclear deterrent of Russia.We think it should therefore be negotiable in our work with Russia, aswell as ultimately other members of the treaty.

Q: Sergei -- (inaudible) -- Kiev University. After the failure of theratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, don't you think thatthe situation in this area to great extent is becoming hostage to the domesticsituation, the political situation in the United States? Another part tothe question: How and what do you see the prospects, if any, of involvingsuch de facto nuclear states such as India, Pakistan and Israel into theexisting non-proliferation regimes? Thank you.

AMB. HOLUM: I think there was some political context to the defeat bythe Senate of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. And one of the thingswe have to do now in our domestic debate and deliberations is to work onways to restore the bipartisan consensus that has always been engaged inthe arms control process.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is a good example of that. It beganwith one of our greatest Republican presidents, President Dwight Eisenhower,in the 1950s. He described the failure to achieve a Comprehensive TestBan as one of their greatest regrets, the greatest disappointments of hispresidency looking back on it. And we have to work very hard -- not atintensifying the political aspects of this issue but to downplay and tosoften the sharp partisan edges that seem to come into play.

I suspect, given the recent history, it would be very difficult to accomplishthat in the course of the next year, but we are going to continue the effort.We are going to be consulting with leadership in the Republican Party inthe Senate, working with senators who have taken a long-time interest inarms control to see if we can't turn that process around.

One of the things that I think would be positive in that respect ifthe Indian and Pakistani processes would allow them to join the ComprehensiveTest Ban Treaty. We don't anticipate their joining the Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty any time in the near future. The current effort is aimed at tryingto prevent the situation there from becoming worse and from touching offan arms race in South Asia. But one of the important benchmarks that wouldhelp prevent an arms race in South Asia would be if both were to sign andjoin the test ban treaty. I think that would also have a valuable impacton the U.S. deliberations.

Do you want to add anything to that, Norm?

MR. WOLF: Yes. With respect to the caller's question regarding theratificationof the NPT, it has been and continues to be U.S. policy to seek universaladherence to the NPT. And as John indicated in an earlier answer, we alreadyhave 187 countries who are party to the NPT. Certainly we seek NPT ratificationby India and Pakistan, and indeed a Security Council resolution applicableto South Asia calls for such ratification. But as John indicated, that'sprobably not going to be the first step. And certainly CTBT would be auseful first step.

Israel on the other hand has made clear that in a declaratory policythat in the context of a just and enduring peace in the Middle East theywould be prepared to consider a weapons of mass destruction free zone inthe Middle East, and presumably in that context would see ratificationas a possibility. But of course there is still some way to go before thattype of peace has been put into place.

MR. FOUCHEUX: We thank you for those questions, Kiev. Let's move ononce again to Moscow. Moscow, please go ahead with your questions or commentsfor our guests.

Q: Mr. Holum, currently in Russia they're frankly talking about a newcold phase in the relationship between Washington and Moscow. This cannothelp but negatively impact the whole negotiation process, disarmament process.What does Washington intend to do to ameliorate and rectify this situation?

AMB. HOLUM: Well, I hope that proves not to be the case. We have madeenormous progress bilaterally between the Soviet Union and Russia and theUnited States in turning back the potential for nuclear holocaust and inlessening the role of nuclear weapons and reducing their numbers. The STARTII treaty will eliminate -- to bring us down to below 60 or 65 percentbelow the Cold War peaks of nuclear weapons when that's brought into force.The Helsinki agreement in 1997 between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin willbring us 80 percent below Cold War peaks. In the meantime we are intenselyengaged in cooperative efforts to bear the cost of taking down not onlythe nuclear delivery systems but actually dismantling warheads and bombs.We are working cooperatively on steps to dispose of spent fuel, to disposeof plutonium extracted from nuclear weapons, to purchase and ultimatelyburn up highly-enriched uranium that comes out of nuclear weapons. So thereis a broad range of cooperative efforts.

Now, it's true that we've had various times during the course of thelast decade down periods in our relationship. Political tensions have tendedto rise and fall. One of the things I think that is encouraging about thetrend is that we have managed to keep these programs going to keep thesecommon efforts going throughout those ups and downs in the political characterof our relationship.

I think ultimately that is a reflection of the fact that both countriessee a common interest, a self-interest in both cases in reducing the nucleardanger and in eliminating some of these costly and dangerous systems. Chemicalweapons is another area where we are cooperating, and both countries haveconcluded that even maintaining these old stockpiles of chemical weaponsis a danger to our society. So it makes sense for us to continue to cooperatein that and other areas, even when we are arguing off and on over otherissues. We have managed to avoid linkage of issues across the board, andI think that's in both of our interests.

MR. FOUCHEUX:  And Moscow once again -- please go ahead in Moscow.

Q: Russian Television. A question for Mr. Holum. Are you in any wayafraid that the U.S. intention to back out of the ABM Treaty will underminethe nuclear system all over the world? Even the START I, START II treaties,they stipulate that the ABM Treaty will be abided by in the forum thatit was concluded in originally. Thank you.

AMB. HOLUM: Thank you. We've made clear, and the president has repeatedlysaid that the -- and agreed -- that the ABM Treaty remains a cornerstoneof strategic stability. And we have no intention of withdrawing from thattreaty.

What we are trying to do is work cooperatively with our Russian partnerto negotiate modest amendments to the treaty that would permit deploymentof a national missile defense that would not threaten Russia's deterrent,that wouldn't have any significant capability against Russia, but wouldallow both countries to deploy modest national missile defense systemsto protect us against the rogue state threat. But no decision has beenmade even on deployment of a U.S. national missile defense. As the presidenthas said, that ultimate decision will depend on cost, it will depend onthe threat, it will depend on the technical feasibility of the system,and it will depend on the status of our arms control negotiations.

Pursuant to the agreement of our two presidents in Bonn in June, wehave had several rounds of discussions with our Russian colleagues on thisquestion, on possible amendments to the ABM Treaty, as well as on how wewould approach the START III, the further negotiations to reduce strategicoffensive arms. I can't report that those discussions have been successful,but I think we have laid an information base and are at least understandingeach other's positions better.

But I want to underscore again that our intention and our very stronginterest is to approach this problem in a cooperative way, to do it throughmutually agreed adjustments, modest adjustments to the ABM Treaty, andalso to approach the threat from rogue states in a cooperative way in termsof the operations of any national missile defense programs.

Q: Another question from the Russian Public Television. You just saidthat make certain modifications to the ABM Treaty and this will not doany serious harm. But suppose Russia does not agree to such modificationsin the ABM Treaty? Such moods actually do exist currently in Russia. Noway would we allow for changing this ABM Treaty. The U.S. press many timeshas run articles to the effect that the U.S. has a moral right to withdrawfrom this ABM Treaty in order to implement its goals. Don't you think thatthis can engender a new arms race? Russia of course in the economic senseis not fully capable to have a full-blown arms race and to respond in theABM sense to the United States, but Russia as an adequate response cancontinue to develop its TOPOL (ph) weapons, its offensive capabilities,so this can push Russia towards developing its offensive capability anddelivery systems for MIRVs and so forth, because Russia would not be ableto set up its own ABM. Don't you think that currently we are faced witha huge threat from this arms race? Thank you.

AMB. HOLUM: I think a renewed arms race would be unfortunate. But Ialso don't think it's either in prospect or would be called for by thecircumstances. Remember that the -- as you know, the ABM Treaty does containa supreme national interests clause that allows either country to withdrawfrom the treaty upon six months' notice. But what we are trying very hardto do, and what I certainly intend to do, is to devote all the effort Ican, and I hope we will have the same -- I am sure we will have the sameinvolvement from our Russian colleagues -- to avoid having that questionever come up, because again the kind of system we are talking about doesnot defeat the object and purpose of the ABM Treaty. The contributionsof the treaty to strategic stability can be preserved if the treaty isamended in a very limited way to allow a limited defense that wouldn'tinterfere with Russia's deterrent.

Now, what I would argue very strongly is that far from weakening thetreaty or undercutting the treaty the amendments that we are going to betalking about in negotiations would actually strengthen the treaty, becausethey demonstrate that this treaty that was negotiated in 1972 can be adjusted,can be modified to account for new realities, for threats that weren'tcontemplated at the time the treaty was negotiated. It seems to me it isboth of our interests, recognizing the value of the treaty, to put ourbest efforts into trying to preserve those benefits, not by putting upa brick wall against any adjustments, not by keeping the treaty frozenin time, but by making clear that the treaty is flexible enough to accommodatechanges in the strategic environment. That's what we are trying to do inthese negotiations.

Q: Mr. Holum, Interfax Agency. Russian press has published reports thatyou the United States suggested to Moscow -- proposed certain confidentialconcessions. I don't know what they are about – in exchange for Russia'sgiving up its highly negative stance on the ABM Treaty. Can you clarifywhat concessions could they be talking about? Thank you.

AMB. HOLUM: I don't know what they are talking about, if they are talkingabout concessions from our negotiating position. What we've determinedfrom the beginning of this process is that we wouldn't try to play negotiatinggames with Russia, that we wouldn't come in and jack up our negotiatingposition in order to be able to give away concessions later on in the process.We came in basically saying, Here's the threat, here are the limited kindsof responses we think are warranted, and the modest adjustments to thetreaty that would be necessary to allow them. But without, and being verystraightforward, without building in concessions. So I don't know whatconcessions that might be referring to.

Perhaps it relates to the fact that we have discussed in the contextof these negotiations possible other cooperative measures with Russia thatwould make Russia, as well as the United States, more secure against thegrowing threat of missiles from rogue states, keeping in mind that Russiais much closer to Iran, to North Korea, to the places where missile andweapons of mass destruction capabilities might be combined in the nearfuture. So Russia also has an interest in being able to protect itselfagainst those capabilities. And so we've talked about things like sharedearly warning, other kinds of steps, help on radar systems, that wouldmake Russia, as well as the United States, more secure against these dangers.That underscores again the way we are looking at this as a cooperativeenterprise, both in negotiating adjustments to the treaty rather than walkingaway from it, and in working on the kinds of defenses that the two countriescan share.

MR. FOUCHEUX: All right, Moscow, we thank you for those questions, andwe are glad that we were able to get our line reestablished with you. Let'shope that we've had the same kind of luck with Prague as we return there.Let's go back to Prague for questions.

Q: (Inaudible) -- Czech Radio. Mr. Holum, do you consider the situationin Asia more dangerous after both India and Pakistan have tested theirnuclear weapons? And do you see any way how to persuade the two countriesnot to deploy those weapons? Would you consider -- (inaudible) -- ?

AMB. HOLUM: Well, I think the situation is more dangerous, and it'sa particular concern because India and Pakistan are so close to each other.They've fought several wars since they both became independent. They haveborder conflicts. And if they both develop and deploy nuclear weapons andhave them mated to missiles so they are readily operational, one can imaginea situation where the flight times of the missiles would be so short thatthey'd be shorter than the warning times. That means that a nuclear warwould be in a hair-trigger situation. It's a very dangerous circumstances.So a major effort we're engaged in is to try to persuade both of them toput a lid on further development in both the missile and the nuclear areas.Ultimately, as my colleague Norm Wolf said, our interest is in having themjoin the Non-Proliferation Treaty. But in the meantime we have to do ourbest with other countries to make sure that the situation doesn't get anyworse, to try to prevent an arms race and a hair trigger situation withrespect to their nuclear weapons.

Would you want to add anything on that?

MR. WOLF: I think you pretty well covered the concern, John. But certainlyin a situation where these two countries have fought three prior wars overa border dispute, one cannot look at this problem with a sense of complacency.And indeed our diplomacy has been aimed at trying to convince the partiesthat it is in their mutual interests to stop where they are and ultimatelybegin to reverse the process they have begun. Those efforts were interruptedby the elections in India, and now with the change in government in Pakistanby the military takeover, it's not clear how fast we can proceed. But certainlywe intend to begin a resumption of a dialogue with India in the next severaldays.

MR. FOUCHEUX: Okay, let's continue in Prague. More questions in Prague-- please go ahead once again.

Q: This is -- (inaudible) -- Czech Television Prague again. The currentNATO strategy doctrine allows for the first nuclear strike. Does the Americanadministration plan to suggest any change to this concept?

MR. FOUCHEUX:  Did you not get that?

AMB. HOLUM:  I didn't hear anything.

MR. FOUCHEUX: Oh, I heard it loud and clear. I'm sorry, Prague, I amgoing to have to ask you to repeat your question. I got it in my ear, butevidently our guests lost direct contact with our control room. Pleasego ahead once again in Prague.

Q: The NATO strategy allows for the first strike. Does the Americanadministration plan to suggest any change to this concept?

MR. FOUCHEUX: Does the American administration plan to change the conceptof first strike?

AMB. HOLUM: I think what the question refers to is our doctrine relatingto no first use, and the fact that we have not adopted that position becausewe have retained the option, which I think is increasingly remote, butnevertheless real, of using nuclear weapons in response to an overwhelmingconventional attack or other kind of weapons of mass destruction in certaincircumstances. And I don't see any likelihood that we will change that.I think the likelihood of the option being exercised is very limited.

But remember that -- and I assume this question arises in the NATO context,that we have just completed a strategic review of NATO's nuclear doctrineand other elements of NATO's doctrine, and no change was made. Obviouslydiscussions will continue on these subjects, but we don't see any reasonto adjust this at this period.

Q: Thank you. You said the importance of nuclear weapons declined. Analystsspeak of another loss of political value of nuclear weapons in case ofthe abolition of the first strike doctrine in NATO. Is that loss of politicalvalue something positive or negative?

AMB. HOLUM: I think it's a positive thing that all countries, or atleast the United States, regard the utility of nuclear weapons as declining,that the roles that they might be used for are dropping just like the numbersof weapons and the numbers of different kinds of weapons are declining.So I think it's a positive trend. At the same time, I wouldn't want toproject a near-term elimination of nuclear capabilities and reliance onnuclear weapons in certain circumstances. On the plus side in terms ofnuclear weapons, a lot of people argue that they have prevented evenconventionalconflicts between the United States and the former Soviet Union becauseof the risk of escalation that both sides recognize. So they've tendedto help maintain the peace.

I suspect that that role of nuclear weapons, while it's diminished,while it's importance is less, will continue for some time into the future.At the same time, as the political process evolves, as various other armscontrol regimes strengthen, we still expect and seek the ultimate eliminationof nuclear weapons. And I think that will be a happy day for the internationalcommunity when we finally reach that objective.

MR. FOUCHEUX: Mr. Holum, I understand that you have an important meetingcoming up in just a few moments, so you are going to have to be leavingus here on the set. Before you leave, however, do you have closing commentsfor our guests overseas?

AMB. HOLUM: Well, I just want to compliment the questioners on somevery good and challenging questions. It's clear that there is a great dealof understanding, both of the intricacies of the arms control process andits fundamental importance to global security and to future peace and prosperityfor all of us. So I appreciate the participants and the way they've sentquestions to us. And I am sure my colleague Norm Wolf will handle the remainingquestions with no difficulty.

MR. FOUCHEUX: That's great. We still have about 15 minutes to go. Itwill be me and Mr. Wolf. I am glad to have you as well, sir. Mr. Holum,thank you very much, and good luck at your meeting at the White House.

AMB. HOLUM:  Thank you.

MR. FOUCHEUX: Let's go back to Prague for more questions. Please goahead once again in Prague.

Q:     Okay, this is -- (inaudible) -- Czech daily.

MR. FOUCHEUX: Hello Prague? (Technical difficulties.) Okay, sorry, Prague,we just lost you. How about Kiev? Let's try Kiev once again. Please goahead in Kiev.

Q: Voice of Ukraine newspaper. Madeleine Albright has stated that theCTBT Treaty will be reintroduced to the Senate at a time that is moreappropriate.Is that before the presidential election or after? And what will be thefuture fate of this treaty? Will it be rejected by the Senate again? Andmaybe Democrats will not win the election. Thank you.

MR. WOLF: I got part of that question, and I'll try to answer the partthat I heard. The decision on the ABM Treaty and whether to go ahead withdeployment of this limited national missile defense system that Mr. Holumhas talked about, that decision is due to be made in June, and I don'tbelieve there is any likelihood that that decision will be made at an earlierdate. I'm sorry, beyond that I did not catch the rest of the question.

MR. FOUCHEUX: There was a question about whether the treaty might comeup for another vote in the Senate before the national elections here.

MR. WOLF: The Comprehensive Test Ban? Well, it is certainly our hopethat this issue could be looked at and decided on by the Senate prior toour national elections. However, I think the likelihood of a reconsiderationof the Senate before the election would probably require some changes andfor example increased ramifications of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treatymight very well be the type of plan that would create a situation whicha decision by the Senate to relook at this issue. Certainly the administrationwill be continuing to press for ratification.

MR. FOUCHEUX: Okay, thank you in Prague. Let's return once again toMoscow -- more questions in Moscow. Go ahead please.

Q: Good afternoon, Russian Information Agency, Novistye. Mr. Wolf, inthe opinion of many foreign and Russian experts, Pakistan, India, and evenmore so North Korea, in no time soon will be able to set up delivery systemsthat would be able to reach the territory of the United States or partsof Russia. Just simply they are still using oxen to harvest. And thenon-ratificationby the Senate of the CTBT treaty and U.S. attempts to withdraw from theABM Treaty and to start setting up a national nuclear defense is viewedby those experts as active lobbying on behalf of the military industrialcomplex of the United States within the Senate and within the administration.Could you comment, refute or confirm or just say anything on this issue?Thank you.

MR. WOLF: Certainly there is no effort to create a -- shall we say animpenetrable shield that would allow the United States to live blithelyunder this shield and ignore the rest of the world. That is not what isintended. And indeed as Ambassador Holum made clear, the shield that iscontemplated, the national missile defense that we have in mind, wouldaddress a modest threat such as that that could be posed by North Koreafor example. It would not be adequate to address a threat such as thatposed by the Russian missile forces. So clearly there is no way that inthat context that one can withdraw from nuclear arms control agreements.We are, as John Holum indicated, actively engaged with Russia in a varietyof places in addition to the START III negotiations, to try to collectivelywork on reducing the nuclear threat. And we will continue to be activelyengaged.

The one prominent example that I have spent some time working on iscalled the trilateral initiative. This is an effort between the UnitedStates, Russia and the International Atomic Energy Agency to develop anagreement that would place excess materials in both of our inventoriesunder IAEA supervision. And the role of the IAEA would be to ensure thatthis material was never again used for nuclear weapons. So I don't believethat the concept that somehow the United States is withdrawing from theworld, or that the Senate vote indicates that there is a turning away fromnuclear arms control is an accurate indication of where the United Statesis

Q: Mr. Wolf, Interfax Agency. In our local press and in the Europeanpress they have written a lot about the fact that Washington allegedlyhas sent a good will signal and has released a leakage about its plansto withdraw out of seven European countries the remainder of your nuclearweapons. You probably heard about this story based on unclassified Pentagon,declassified materials. How would you assess those press reports both inEurope and in Russia that we hear about so much? Thank you.

MR. WOLF: I think with respect to those stories I would have to indicatethe same answer that John Holum gave to a similar question: I know of nobasis for that story, and to my knowledge there is no such plan to removesuch weapons.

MR. FOUCHEUX: Thank you, Moscow. Let's return to Prague once again.Go ahead please in Prague.

Q: This is -- (inaudible) -- Czech Television Prague again. There isa certain danger in the poor living standards of the Russian top nuclearscientists. Does the United States do anything to help them to try to preventthem from selling their knowledge to maybe dangerous countries or terrorists?

MR. WOLF: That's an extremely good question, and it's certainly an areain which we have put some time and effort. There has been established inMoscow the International Science and Technology Center, and it's purposeis to provide funding for Russian nuclear scientists in areas that havenothing to do with nuclear weapons. It is precisely because of the concernthat you indicated, that these scientists, even if not desiring to betraythese secrets to other countries, nonetheless feel that there is no alternativeto obtain a paycheck, that they would make such an effort.

So the United States, along with several European countries, is fundingthis ISTC unit to do precisely what I suggested; that is, to provide analternative to keep them gainfully employed. There are a number of otherinitiatives that also are being undertaken by the Department of Energyin the United States, called the Nuclear Cities Initiative, and the ideathere would be to see if one could not create other employment in thosenuclear cities -- the so-called closed cities of the days of the SovietUnion -- to ensure that there were alternatives available for earning aliving. So these issues are being addressed, and not only in Russia I mightadd but also in Ukraine.

MR. FOUCHEUX: All right, let's return to Kiev once again. Go ahead inKiev.

Q: In 1992 Russia and the United States talked about setting up a globalABM system. Are they still thinking about, and involving Ukraine's andother European countries' potential to this system? Thank you.

MR. WOLF: Could you -- I didn't quite catch the question I am afraid.

MR. FOUCHEUX: He was talking about the agreement in 1992 between Russiaand the U.S. to set up a global ABM system. Would that continued, and wouldit involve other countries such as Ukraine?

MR. WOLF: I am afraid I don't know of any such plan to create a globalsystem. We certainly have talked with Russia about an early-warning system,so that if there were a missile launch information would be conveyed tothe Russian authorities if we picked it up for example, telling them preciselywhat the launch was; or even better,  perhaps providing advancenotificationof launches before they occur, so there is no misunderstanding with respectto what is happening.

Presumably under this approach we would also receive similar warningfrom Russia: if they were to engage in a launch, they would provide advancenotification. These negotiations have been going on for some time now andI believe they are close to agreement. Similarly, because of concerns aboutthe Y2K issue, there is a plan in place that has been negotiated to providegreater assurance to both Russia and the United States during the transitioninto the year 2000, and this would include the presence of Russian militaryat U.S. early-warning sites, such as the one out in Colorado.

But I am afraid with respect to any global ABM approach, I am not familiarwith that.

MR. FOUCHEUX: And we go once again to Moscow. Please go ahead againin Moscow.

Q: Russian Public Television. Mr. Wolf, as it is known, a final decisionabout deploying an ABM system will be taken by the Clinton administrationJune of next year. Russia takes a very negative approach to those plans.Under what conditions can the U.S. give up on setting up and creating sucha system? Thank you.

MR. WOLF: Well, as Ambassador Holum indicated, there are four factorsthat would go into a decision with respect to whether to deploy or not:cost, the threat, technical feasibility, and the status of the negotiationsbetween the United States and Russia. I think it would be premature tospeculate as precisely which one of those factors would have to be outof alignment as it were for the United States to give up with a system.Certainly if the remaining tests that are to be conducted of the systemthat is being contemplated go well, I am sure that will add increased inducementto go ahead with the system. But at this point I could not conjecture whatcircumstances would persuade us or persuade the administration not to proceedwith this system.

MR. FOUCHEUX: Mr. Wolf, we were happy to have both you and the ambassadoron our program today. We are about to close up. We have about a minuteand a half to go. I wonder if you would have any closing comments for ourguests as well.

MR. WOLF: The only comment I would make would be to emphasize that theUnited States, despite the setback of the CTBT vote, has no expectationof withdrawing from the world. I was recently in New York last week forthree or four days talking with colleagues, and certainly there was a realconcern that, number one, the United States was abandoning nuclear armscontrol efforts; and, number two, perhaps even abandoning multilateralfora such as the United Nations. All I can say is nothing could be furtherfrom the truth. More and more it is recognized in the United States thatour security is inherently that of the security of the rest of the world,and that the non-proliferation effort must in fact be a global effort.This is not something that we can do on our own. We must work with othersif we are to keep the nuclear genie from spreading to other countries.Thank you.

MR. FOUCHEUX: Thank you very much, Norm Wolf, senior advisor and chiefnegotiator of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency. Thank you very much for being with us today. Thanksas well to your colleague, Mr. John Holum, senior adviser for arms controland international security affairs, who as you know was with us earlierin the program. And we have a big thanks as well to all of our participantsin Prague, Kiev and Moscow, as well as our entire international audienceof Worldnet. We thank you very much for watching. Have a good day.

END

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