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Nuclear News - 04/30/99
RANSAC Nuclear News, 30 April, 1999


7.2. New Distribution Of Charges In Minatom
Scientific Informational&Metodical Bulletin Of Nuclear Society Of Russia4
1998

New distribution of charges and structural units subordination withinthe central organs of the RF Ministry on Atomic Energy between top leadersand members of the Ministry's Board.

Since November 17, 1998 a new distribution of functional duties,including the order of subordination of the Ministry's central staffdivisions, within the Minatom's top leadership has come into force. Inaccordance with the new distribution:

The Minister E.O.Adamov is charged with the direct supervision and controlfor the Department of Social Policy, Production Work Relations andPersonnel the Department of International Cooperation and Foreign Tradethe Department of Protection of information, Nuclear Materials and Objectsthe Department of Conversion of the Nuclear Industry

The Secretary of State - First Deputy Minister L.D.Ryabev is charged withthe direct supervision and control for the Department of Designing andTesting of Nuclear Munitions the Department of the Nuclear Munitions'Industry the supervision in the part, concerning nuclear weapons complex,for the Department on Nuclear Power Industry the Department of Safety andExtreme Situations the Department of Nuclear Fuel Cycle the Department ofConversion of the Nuclear Industry

The First Deputy Minister, the Chairman of the Scientific CouncilV.N.Mikhailov is charged with the direct supervision and control for theDepartment of Atomic Science and Technology the Authority for Support ofthe Scientific and Scientific & Technical Councils' Activities

The First Deputy Minister V.B.Ivanov is charged with the directsupervision and control for the Department of Safety and ExtremeSituations the Department of Nuclear Fuel Cycle the Authority on theNuclear Machine-Building and Instrument Making the Joint-Stock Society«Atomredmetzoloto» the Joint-Stock Society «TVEL» the Joint-Stock Society«Tekhsnabexport»

The Deputy Minister V.G.Vinogradov is charged with the direct supervisionand control for the Department of Branch Economy and Planning theDepartment of Finance, Analysis and Payments the Authority of Accountancyand Book-Keeping

The Deputy Minister N.N.Egorov is charged with the direct supervision andcontrol for the Authority of the Environmental Protection andDecommissioning of Nuclear Objects

The Deputy Minister B.I.Nigmatullin is charged with the direct supervisionand control for the Department on the Nuclear Power Industry the StateEnterprise «Rosenergoatom Concern» the State Unitary Enterprise «LeningradNPP» the NPPs of the Siberian Chemical Combine and the Mining & ChemicalCombine (except plutonium production)

The Deputy Minister E.A.Reshetnikov is charged with the direct supervisionand control for the Department of Construction of Nuclear Objects

The Member of the Board V.F.Konovalov is charged withthe direct leadership and control for the Open Joint-Stock Society «TVEL»and its enterprises and also the Moscow Plant of Polymetals and the StateEnterprise VTF «Energiya» the supervision for the Joint-Stock Society«Atomredmetzoloto»the Joint-Stock Society «TVEL Concern»

The Member of the Board M.N.Ryzhov is charged withthe direct leadership of the Department of International Cooperation andForeign Trade

The Member of the Board Yu.A.Sokolov is charged withthe direct leadership of the Department of Atomic Science and Technology

The Ministry's Affairs Manager S.V.Kushnarev is charged with the directleadership of the Authority for the Ministry's Affairs and Protocol thedirect supervision and control for the Social & Production Authority theMinistry's Center for Crisis Situation the State Unitary Enterprise «VMTs»the State Unitary Enterprise «CONSAT»
7.3. The Institute's Outlook From Today's Point Of View
A.Rumyantsev
Kurchatovets No. 1-2
January-February, 1999

A.Rumyantsev is discussing the strategy of Kurchatov Institute'sdevelopment in XXI century.

Science in the Center: the State and the prospects

The scientific activities of Kurchatov Institute are diverse andmany-sided.The Ministry of Science and Technology of Russian Federation has approvedeight main directions of the Federal Special Purpose Scientific &Technical Program's section «Search Studies in Physical Science»:

1. Fundamental Nuclear Physics.

2. High Energy Physics.

3. Controlled Nuclear Fusion and Plasma Processes.

4. Synchrotron Radiation, Applications.

5. Topical Problems of Condensed Matter Physics.

6. Wave and Quantum Processes.

7. Fundamental Astronomy and Space Exploration.

In all the programs the role of Kurchatov Institute is seen quitedefinitely, the state and the level of research therein are oftendetermined by our specialists.

What can complicate our life?

1. Unfortunately in the Center negative processes are growing, and thiswill inevitably tell on our activities. Because of lack of funding in thesecond half of 1998 practically all large facilities of the Center ceasedtheir operation. The scientists lost opportunities to conduct experiments.

2. Alienation is growing, both in research and resources' drawing in.

3. So far the issue of power supply is not solved.

4. Aging of the collective body: the mean age of a research worker is55years.

5. The brain drain. If formerly 70 percent of experimental works wereperformed in the Center and only 30 percent - within the framework ofinternational collaborations, so today the ratio has changed to opposite.

What is to be done?

1. To fight actively at all levels for increase of both budget andnon-budget components of the funding.

2. To keep the experimental base and the viability providing systems.

3. To ensure minimum starting conditions for the Center'ssub-divisions.

4. To follow the strategic line of the President of KurchatovInstitute:science-technology-university. The basic science development is one of thebearings, supporting all the Center's structure. We have to create,develop and sale technologies.

How is this to be done?1. Participation in the international scientific & technical cooperationas a way of keeping its own potential and research fields of importance toRussia.

Two examples may be given. Under the guidance of N.N.Ponomarev-Stepnoy,vice-president of the Center, a set of problems in being solved linkedwith the non-proliferation and physical protection of fissile nuclearmaterials. The works are conducted in broad cooperation with scientists ofthe USA and European centers. They have enlivened our intra-Russiascientific and industrial links: we began actively cooperate with theNavy, Minatom, industrial complexes.

Another example - the works under the «Rasplav» project (studies ofinteraction of corium - the fused nuclear fuel - with reactor vessel),which has been carried out in Kurchatov Institute since 1994. It is thefirst international project of the OECD countries and Russia withparticipation of specialists from 17 countries of Europe, America andAsia. Experiments on imitation of accidents with reactor core melting arebeing performed at the Kurchatov Institute's mock-up facility.

2. Taking part in competitions.

3. The infrastructure: assignments for the infrastructure should beenvisaged in all projects.

4. Power supply.

5. Differentiation of wages.

6. Compulsory execution of decisions made by the Center's leadership.

7. The status of the Center.Seven years ago Kurchatov Institute was given the status of an independentresearch center outside of the structure of the Russian Academy of Scienceand branch Ministries. The Center is directly subordinated to theGovernment of Russian Federation. Owing to that, we managed to keep ourpotential and rather high rating of our research.
7.12. "Wandering" Chernobyls
V.Emelyanenko
Moscow News
February 7-14, 1999

Regardless of the law, Russian nuclear agency is going to continueradwaste import to the country. As it has become known to the "MN", theirplans are going in scale.

Almost three years ago the «Moscow News» believed in assurance ofnuclear scientists, that there was no danger to the country of becomingthe world's nuclear dump. Shortly after that the RF Supreme Court passed areassuring decision, recognizing import of radioactive waste for storageand disposal to be illicit.

However, as it has become known to «MN», in February/March 1999, at thesame time with expected import of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from Bulgaria,Czechia and Hungary, the nuclear agency is holding intense negotiationswith Japan, China, South Korea, Switzerland, Iran and India on their SNFstorage and reprocessing in Russia.

So, what has happened? Something unforeseen has occurred.. Germany sharplychanges the formed balance in the world's nuclear market. Basing onarguments of scientists, the German authorities passed a law, permittingnot to remove SNF for reprocessing but to place it at the sites of nuclearpower plants and in a centralized repository. It is a heavy blow to GreatBritain, France and Russia, the world's leaders of commercialreprocessing.

The case turned the world back to an old debate: what nuclear fuel cycleis more profitable - the open or closed one? The Americans keep to theformer approach. They are in principle refusing to reprocess the SNF andare simply accumulating it, mainly at the sites of NPPs scattered all overthe country: this being profitable, from the economic point of view, buthazardous, as far as environmental safety ins concerned. The latterapproach is pursued by France, Great Britain and Russia, reprocessing theSNF. As accidents at the plants in Cellafield (Great Britain), La Hage(France) and Chelyabinsk have shown, the way is no less dangerous.Moreover, as estimates of German experts show, the open cycle is 25-30 %cheaper as compared to the closed one. Just by that reason in 1995-1996the Germans and then Japan, South Korea and Sweden refused to send theirSNF for reprocessing to Russia.

If in the beginning of 80s France and Great Britain took $ 2-3 thousandfor reprocessing of 1 kg of SNF, now the price is in the range of $700-800. In this situation Russia may count on getting of no more than $400-620 per a kilogram.

Now the West is pressing Minatom in its old «domain» - in the East Europeand the CIS countries. It is not without purpose, that at the turn of1998/1999 Russia's arguments with Ukraine, Bulgaria and Hungary,concerning SNF, coincided with the US offer to Ukraine of constructionthere of a dry SNF storage facility on credit and with a discount, butunder the condition of ceasing of Ukrainian SNF removal to Russia. As ithas become known to «MN» from confidential sources, France is holdingsecret negotiations with Bulgaria. They are discussing conditions ofBulgarian SNF reprocessing at the French plant in La Hage. In order toprevent that, Russia has begun to solve the problems of Bulgarians: Moscowis discussing an opportunity of transportation of Bulgarian SNF acrossRumania. Russian «greens» have learned (though the information is notconfirmed by the Minatom): Sweden offers Finland (one more Russiancustomer) to build a centralized SNF storage facility. Great Britain, inits turn, has offered Hungary to reprocess its SNF.

Evgeny Kudryavtsev, the Head of Division of the Department of Nuclear FuelCycle of the RF Minatom, is commenting the situation: «The SNF market isto enlarge and change in perspective . But that will be done on anotherbasis and with other key players».

The repartition of the market of nuclear services between Germany, USA,Japan and Russia is confirming, that the countries refusing of their SNFreprocessing, are enlarging their «peaceful atoms» market in some otherway - by supplying third countries with fresh nuclear fuel and byconstruction of new nuclear power plants abroad. Therewith, the suppliers(in particular, Germany and USA), as early as the stage of concludingcontracts, turn down beforehand to take back the SNF.

And Russia is trying to sign contracts for 30-50 years in advance for SNFreprocessing with countries, such as China, India, Iran, where theconstruction of nuclear power plants is planned. In other words, we aregoing to increase the SNF import, whereas the rest countries of the worldare refraining from its reprocessing. I.e. the Minatom, by passing the«Law on Atomic Energy Use», prohibiting the storage of foreign radioactivewaste, still does take it for storage. And the Gosatomnadzor is issuinglicenses for storage of SNF and radwaste to the Mining & Chemical Combinein Krasnoyarsk Land, and this allows the enterprise to survive somehow.

The situation with Ukraine is more complicated. The state does not pay forreprocessing of its SNF and does not discuss the issue of return of itsradwaste stored free of charge in Siberia. Russia nuclear authoritiesdon't raise the question in hope to keep the customer. In such situationMinatom is trying to attract new partners - Iran, China, India and, maybe,Japan and South Korea - and also to keep the old ones, the East Europeancountries. For that objective Minatom is developing a new draft law,which would permit storage of foreign SNF for the time period up to fortyyears. Both environmental and economic risk of that is rather high. TheSNF storage conditions are less and less safe. At the «Mayak» (ChelyabinskRegion), which is to reprocess the foreign SNF, disposal of liquidradwaste into open aqueous systems was recorded. As a result of that theworld's most radioactively contaminated lake - that of Karachai - hasappeared in the Chelyabinsk Region.

They acknowledge in the Minatom: «The radwaste discharges into specialtechnical water reservoirs really take place at «Mayak». In order toeliminate them, it is necessary to invest significant means into a partialreconstruction. Tens millions dollars would be necessary. And the completereconstruction would cost no less than $ 100 million».

The specialists hope the investments to be received and used for bothreconstruction of «Mayak» and the completion of RT-2 plant construction inKrasnoyarsk-26. Thereat, they fail to mention two things of importance. In1995-1969 an attempt to complete the RT-2 construction at the expense ofinvestment from the West came a crasher. Meanwhile a huge amount of SNFhas been accumulated in Russia itself.
7.13. New Attack On Moscow
D.Gornostayev
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
February 11, 1999

CIA claims Russia to be a major source of mass-destruction weaponsproliferation.

The United States are probably pursuing a purposeful policies ofdiscrediting the image of Russia, presenting it as one of the majorculprits of proliferation of nuclear weapons and other types ofmass-destruction arms.

In a report forwarded by the US Central Intelligence Agency to theCongress Russia, jointly with China and North Korea, are nominated as themain sources of proliferation of nuclear and other weapons' materials andtechnologies. Truth, a reservation is made, that the sources of leakageare, probably, organizations, which are not directly controlled by thestate. But, therefore, a question is put, to what degree can the RussianGovernment control nuclear materials and technologies. It is emphasized,that Russia was «the main supplier on non-military nuclear programs toIran and to a lesser degree - to India».

At the first sight, the arguments seem to be sufficient, firstly, tojustification of the already imposed sanctions against Russianorganizations, and, secondly, to taking new measures of the kind.

But, on the other side, a lack of sufficient reasons for seriouslygrounded allegations of Russia is obvious. Firstly, the CIA, as usual,does not give any concrete evidence of cooperation between Moscow andTeheran in the military field. Secondly, to the claims about joint missileprograms the in no way kept in secret cooperation in the field of«peaceful atom» is added. The cooperation is, however, carried out instrict compliance with international standards, that was many timesofficially confirmed by the IAEA. Nevertheless, the Americans permanentlyaccuse us of nuclear power plants' construction in Bushier (Iran) andKudankulam (India). And they oppose the construction by obviouslycommercial reasons. Its own absence at the Iranian market Washington maycompensate only by counteraction to penetration there of other players, inthis case - of the Russian ones.

By Dmitry Gornostayev.

As parliament sources reported, on February 5, 1999 secret information onthe status of nuclear & technical objects of Russian Army was submitted inwritten form to the State Duma from the RF Ministry of Defense. Accordingto competent military sources, the information was prepared withparticipation of specialists of the 12th Chief Directorate of the RFMinistry of Defense, which is in charge with operation, safety andtransportation of all nuclear munitions available in Russia. They havestressed, that there are no reasons to be anxious of the nuclearmunitions' safety. Only thoroughly selected officers are allowed to haveaccess to nuclear weapons and nuclear materials.

General Igor Valynkin, Head of the 12th Chief Directorate, informednewspapermen in detail on implementation of the US/Russia agreements onensuring nuclear weapons safe storage and transportation within theframework of the Nunn-Lugar program. He said, that last time there were alot of rumors, as if the US support in providing nuclear munitions' safetycould threaten the security of Russia. «It is absolutely wrong, - hestated. - There is an economical crisis in the country, and much lessfinancial resources are allotted for defense purposes, that it would benecessary. That is why we cannot reject a reasonable support. And I shouldsay frankly, we are thankful to the American leadership for thecontribution to solving of our nuclear safety problems».

By Vladimir Mukhin.
7.14. Russia Is Being Prepared To Become A World's NuclearDump
B.Lysenko
Novye Izvestiya
February 12, 1999
Even at a reduced price.

As the Hamburg magazine «Der Spiegel» and the internationalenvironmental protection organization Greenpeace report, Germany andRussia are conducting secret negotiations, concerning eventual disposal atRussia's territory of spent nuclear fuel from German nuclear power plants.Russian party in the negotiations is headed by the RF Minatom's leaders,the Minister Evgeny Adamov and his First Deputy Valentin Ivanov, theGerman party is represented by officials of the Siemens Concern. It turnedout, that Minatom had suggested its services in the SNF disposal for asuspiciously low price - $ 1000 per a kilogram. The Russian nuclear agencywould be ready to receive from its Western partners up to 10 thousand tonsof SNF for the total sum of $ 10 billion. Therewith a number of variousservices is suggested by Minatom.

The German magazine also reports, that the Minatom would also like toreceive SNF from such solvent countries as Switzerland, Spain, SouthKorea, Taiwan and, possibly, Japan.

Natalya Timashova states in «Novye Izvestiya»:

There are simply no production capacities in Russia for reprocessing offoreign SNF. Only three enterprises - in Tomsk, Krasnoyarsk andChelyabinsk - possess reprocessing technologies, but they are notoperating now. To arrange the receipt and processing of foreign SNF, itwould be necessary to perform reconstruction of these enterprises andbuild new production sections and up-to-date storage facilities there. Allthat may cost several billion dollars.
7.15. Minatom Has Reasons To Be Proud
V.Dernovoi
Krasnaya Zvezda
February 12, 1999

The nuclear sector managed to keep its potential, in spite of 20%reduction of defense orders.

The development of military nuclear technologies and the world's processof nuclear disarmament seem to be mutually eliminating phenomena. However,in the Minatom of Russia they are peacefully co-existing and developing.Lev Ryabev, the RF First Deputy-Minister on Atomic Energy, stated at anews-conference, that though the production of new nuclear warheads atseries plants decreased last years more than by 10 times, qualityup-grading of the weapons, as formerly, remains the top priority.

Despite of the unsatisfactory funding, the total volume of defenseproduction in 1998 was 81.3 % to the level of 1997. Keeping of thecountry's necessary nuclear potential on the basis of improvement of theproduction & technological structure is still the dominating line ofdevelopment of the nuclear industry, first of all - of its nuclearweapons' sector.

Utilization of written-off nuclear submarines and remediation ofradiation-hazardous objects of the Northern and Pacific Navies is stillone of the most urgent tasks. Last year 4 special trains with spentnuclear fuel were sent for reprocessing. This year they plan to send 10more special trains and utilize 9 nuclear submarines. For that purpose theUSA are allotting $ 48.25 million under an intergovernmental agreement.

Conversation and restructuring of Minatom's enterprises is going ahead.The programs will hardly be implemented without development of scientificresearch. Russian scientists have achieved rather impressive results. Forinstance, in the area of super-powerful magnetic fields, that was shown inrecent experiments in Arzamas-16.

USA and France show interest to cooperation with Russia in the field ofhigh energy physics, high energy densities, explosive materials' conduct.
7.23. On The Adoption Of New Regulations In The System Of StateControlAnd Accounting Of Fissile Materials
N.Nikiforov (Ministry Of Atomic Energy)
Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control). International Security. ArmsControl.
Nonproliferation. Journal of the PIR-Center for Policy Studies. Volume 43.Number 1. Moscow.
January-February, 1999

Nikita Nikiforov (Ministry of Atomic Energy) comments on the adoption ofnew regulations in the system of state control and accounting of fissilematerials. He states, "Not waiting for a better budget for that branch ofcivil service, there is an urgent need to work out mechanisms ofself-financing through the establishment of special funds. Thesestructures will provide financial means for the development and normalfunctioning of the state system of control and accounting of nuclearmaterials. The issues of top priority are elaborating and introducing intopractice the legal acts on accounting and control, and solving theproblems of system as a whole. At present, the work is under way to draftthe set of federal and ministerial acts, containing norms, rules, methodsof measurement, technical requirements, forms of presenting data,procedures for information exchange and decision making.'
7.26. Some Aspects Of Providing Russia's Nuclear Deterrence In TheNextDecade
Vladimir Medvedev, Rt. Lt. Gen.
Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control). International Security. Arms Control.Nonproliferation.
Journal of the PIR-Center for Policy Studies. Volume 43.Number 1. Moscow.
January-February, 1999

In his article Vladimir Medvedev argues that "Russian strategic nuclearforces are guided by the strategy of retaliatory strike. This is proved bylong-standing activities on improving protection of silo launchers andpromoting mobile ICBMs, thus, implying greater survivability of missilesystems after the enemy's preemptive nuclear strike and enhancedcapabilities of response strike. As Russian strategic offensive forces arebeing reduced the number of mobile systems in their structure increases.Therefore, their orientation on retaliatory nuclear strike will be evenmore evident". Gen. Medevedev suggests that "further Russian steps onstrategic nuclear forces' reduction in the framework of START-II andSTART-III could be always linked to the IBM treaty.

It may happen either through preliminary refusal to carry out thereduction (in case of nuclear US attitude towards the treaty) or in theprocess of implementation of the concluded agreements. Anyway the initiallevel of strategic arms for reciprocal measures on increasing Russiannuclear might would be the same. However, the second option means thatmutual reductions (taken before Russia's decision to start reciprocalmeasures) will lead to the considerable decrease in American nucleararsenal. That will enable the Russian Federation to take less costlycountermeasures". He maintains that "Russia's decision to rest on nucleardeterrence to provide for national security and defense is transitory inthe long-term perspective, although it is tremendously important forpresent Russian defense system. This conclusion can be drawn, taking intoconsideration not only the future of the Russian-American strategic armsreduction process, which seems to be irreversible, but the increasingpressure on nuclear weapon states on the part of non-nuclear weaponstates, participating in the NPT. Bearing in mind these prospects, it isnecessary to draw attention to the development of new means of combat,which could replace nuclear weapons, providing for adequate adaptation tothe changes that happen in the world".



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