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Nuclear News - 02/28/99
RANSAC Nuclear News, 28 February, 1999

November 11, 1998

Americans are ready too freeze their support to Russian defense sector.

On November 10, 1998 the US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright,raised an ultimatum to Igor Ivanov, the RF Minister of Foreign Affairs: ifMoscow does not turn down its participation in Iranian nuclear projects,Washington would take adequate measures. According to reports of Americanpress, the Secretary of State meant quite concrete consequences -suspending of financial support to Russia's nuclear sector within theframework of the Nunn-Lugar program.

The tough reaction of M-me Albright was a response to the last successofMinatom in Iran. As a result of the recent visit of Evgeny Adamov, the RFMinister on Atomic Energy, to Iran they came to agreement on constructionof three more units at the NPP in Bushier with the support of Russia.According to Adamov, the three units may bring Russia $ 3 -4.5 billion.But the US Department of State is still alleging Moscow of renderingTeheran assistance in realization of its nuclear programs.

Moscow has taken seriously the threat of M-me Albright. On November 10,1998 Yuri Maslyukov, the First Vice-Premier, after his negotiations withStrobe Talbott, the First Deputy Secretary of State, declared forstrengthening of control exports of technology and equipment by Russianenterprises to Iran. If the facts are confirmed, the Russian party offersto establish so called cooperative groups of monitoring at theenterprises. The First Vice-Premier expressed his belief, that «thecontrol exports is to be enhanced, and the trust to each other should beraised».

Washington does not like the Iranian policy of Moscow for a long time.Sofar, however, Russia has made no serious concessions. The statement ofM-me Albright is the evidence, that the time, as Russia could have anarrow escape, has gone. In the opinion of Vladimir Orlov, the Director ofCenter for Policy Studies (the PIR-Center), Russia has exhausted allopportunities of maneuvering in the «Iranian game». The last of eventualconcessions is turning down contracts on the Bushier NPP. But Moscow willnever do that - «the point is not only the profits, but also politicalaspect of the story». But Americans are likely not to step back now: underthe conditions of financial crisis Russia's defense sector extremely needssubsidies. The Nunn-Lugar program remains the strongest trump: havingstarted since the USSR disintegration, it has become a real escape forRussia's nuclear sector. In 1992-1998 Russia received $ 1.272 billionwithin the framework of the program. The experts of PIR-Center considerthis funding to be «drastically important to Russia»: in its absence itwould be hardly possible to prevent leakage of nuclear materials from someobjects. The American means have already been accounted in the 1999 draftFederal Budget. If now Moscow does not become more complaisant in theIranian issue, the USA can significantly reduce the planned funding - fullsuspension of the program's action would by dangerous to the US security,because the threat of nuclear materials' leakage will emerge. Most likely,less important items will be reduced: for instance, the chemical wastedestruction or some conversion projects, being carried out at the «Mayak»Combine in the Urals. Some other items fall under the threat ofsuspension. Among them - funding of the Moscow Engineering & PhysicsInstitute (there is a small research nuclear reactor at the Institute'ssite, and Evgeny Adamov announced, that thereupon Iranian students wouldbe taught in MEPhI) or the starting program of US Department of Energy«Closed Cities Initiative», which supposed assistance to Minatom's closedcities in development of their social infrastructure.
VEK No. 46
November 27 - December 3, 1998

A new strategic defense initiative instead of the START-2

Many experts think, that under the turned out conditions instead ofratification of the START-2 Treaty, envisaging abolition of the RS-20missiles with MIRVed warheads, the State Duma might timely initiate moreradical reduction of Russia's strategic nuclear forces (SNF) by 2010: forinstance, to the level of 1200-800 nuclear warheads, that is thrice as lowas it is envisaged by the START-2 Treaty and twice as low as it issupposed in the new START-3 Treaty. In such a way Russia could not onlypreserve the world's best (as Americans themselves acknowledge) RS-20shaft-based missiles, capable of carrying up to 20 warheads, but also savemoney for both the necessity of making and deployment of new but worse intheir combat characteristics mobile missiles, and the maintenance of agreat number of unnecessary warheads. In other words: it is not necessaryto fulfill the START-2 Treaty and abolish the fine RS-20, but it is stillnecessary to free the planet from nuclear war stocks, reducing the numberof warheads.

And the strategic defense initiative, being announced by the Russianparliament, would be normally perceived both within Russian Federation andabroad. At the same time, it is obvious Russia's incapability of not onlyplacing by 2007 the number of nuclear warheads permitted by the START-2 orplanned by the new START-3 on the single-unit land-based missiles, butalso of keeping by that term the quickly getting obsolete anti-missiledefense systems of Moscow, land-based and space means of warning onmissile attack.

The uncertainty of the State Duma's position will allow the Governmenttobegin up-grading of the submarine missile-carriers (submarines withnuclear weapons on board) and the Tu-22 M3 bombers, and to put thesuccessfully tested «Topol-M» missiles in the basis of the StrategicMissile Forces.

It is not difficult to foresee, that by 2003 Russia will have severalsubmarine and air-based carriers of nuclear warheads, 10-20 single-unitshaft-based «Topol-M» missiles and 200-300 mobile missiles. Such anarsenal of strategic nuclear force is unacceptable because of its highcost, low safety and war efficiency. That's why the new Russian SDI maybecome the only worthy way out of the turned out situation.
YADERNY KONTROL (NUCLEAR CONTROL). International security. Arms control.Nonproliferation. Journal of the PIR-Center for Policy Studies. Volume42.
Number 6. Moscow.
November-December 1998

In Moscow they are more and more clearly realizing, that despite of allthe importance of emphasizing the special and independent position ofRussia, concerning the Iraqi settlement, it is much more important to marka distance from such friends, which, from the economical point of view,are bringing Russia, instead of dividends, only their mirages, and, fromthe geopolitical point of view, are not capable of being a support,because they are likely to let us down at any opportunity.

They are hardly in the firm belief in Moscow, that Baghdad is soinnocentfrom the non-proliferation point of view. Even as far as the militarynuclear programs are concerned, the conclusions of the IAEA inspectors,complacent enough in general, don't allow to relax for a long time. Morethan that, Iraqi underground works in the field of chemical and biologicalweapons should cause anxiety. It is in the interest of Russia, in nolesser extent than in the interest of other members of the world'scommunity, to do its best to let the UNSCOM inspectors to have access toall «dark corners» of Iraq and to clear up answers to many existingquestions, concerning the actual scale of the programs of the Saddam'sregime and its real intentions.

It would be a mistake to consider all the UNSCOM actions, without anyexceptions, to meet the interests of international security and stability.Sometimes the inspectors carried their duties too far. Sometimes theirwork was complicated and confused by the Commission's contradictorystatus. But, on the whole, the UNSCOM role, remains important as far asthe issue of control for the programs and plans of Baghdad in the field ofmass-destruction weapons is concerned. Of course, it is a very soft whip,as compared to the American armada, which is concentrated in the IndianOcean, Red Sea and Persian Gulf each time at the height of crisis aroundIraq. But still it is an efficient whip, and not for nothing it causessuch an irritation of the Iraqi dictator.

It is said, that in the policy of pressure on states, violating theinternational non-proliferation regime, a whip must be indispensablycombined with a cake. May be it is so. But the point is the proportion.The policy of «cake» at a certain stage becomes inefficient with respectto a number of regimes. And this undoubtedly relates to Iraq. And it alsorelates to the North Korea. Americans, who did not like one time to bringthe situation to a hot war on the Korean Peninsula, seem to only teasePyongyang with their «cakes» in the form of a program of construction oflight-water reactors within the framework of KEDO, and now the NorthKoreans demand the next hundreds million dollars for only the right ofdemonstration of their secret objects. Both the five nuclear states andthe eight industrial developed states must not be at conceptual variancein their approach to dictatorial regimes, striving to possession ofmass-destruction weapons. So, it is no less important to Russia, than tothe United States, that such attempts were at last effectively cut down inone or another way and without any damage to the international stability.
YADERNY KONTROL (NUCLEAR CONTROL). International security. Arms control.Nonproliferation. Journal of the PIR-Center for Policy Studies. Volume42.
Number 6. Moscow.
November-December 1998

"Russian nuclear weapons are under strict control", - Colonel-GeneralIgor Valynkin, the Head of 12-th Chief Directorate of the Ministry ofDefense of Russia, said to Victor Litovkin in an exclusive interview withthe "Yaderny Kontrol".

«Any talks on unreliability of our control for nuclear munitions arisein periods of political instability of the Russian society and have theonly pragmatic objective - to persuade the world's community in ourcountry's incapability of maintaining the nuclear security and to take adecision on setting up the international control for the weapons, as itwas done, for instance, in Iraq», - Colonel General Valynkin said in hisexclusive interview to the «Yaderny Kontrol».

Meanwhile, objects of the 12th Chief Directorate of the RF Ministry ofDefense, where warheads of strategic, operative & tactical, tactical andwinged missiles, and also aviation bombs with nuclear charges, nuclearmines and artillery nuclear shells, are under unremitting control of notonly Russian servicemen but, to some extent, of American militaryspecialists, too. «Not so long ago, this summer, - General Valynkin said,- the Chief Commander of the US Strategic Nuclear Force, General Habiger,visited one of our nuclear & technical bases, the so called objects S».According to General Valynkin, the visitor was completely satisfied withthe level and quality of protection of that object.

«Tadpoles» (an army nickname of officers engaged in nuclear munitionshandling) even showed an exercise to the American visitor: «terrorists» (aspecial unit of the Federal Security Service) attempted to capture thenuclear & technical base, and its guards, jointly with sent to supportthem motorized shooting units of the military district, defendedthemselves against the attacks.

General Habiger, as General Valynkin stated, even told the RF MinistryofDefense leadership, and then repeated the claim at hearings in the USCongress, that the nuclear security level at Russian military bases iseven somehow higher than at similar objects of the American Army.Nevertheless, USA are rendering significant support to our military infitting out the objects with the most up-to-date control instruments andprotection equipment, Russia lacking evidently, the Head of the 12th ChiefDirectorate said.

Only for the last time Russia received 300 computers under theNunn-Lugarprogram for the purpose of creation of a computerized system of accountingof nuclear munitions. (The computers are certified by our specialists,General Valynkin said, there are no «bugs» or other hidden devices,reading out secret data. And the software for the Chief Directorate'scomputer network was also developed in the RF Ministry of Defense).Besides the computers, the 12th Chief Directorate received five «liedetectors» to be used for checking up the staff of the nuclear &technical bases, five sets of instruments for checking up the people fordrug addiction and a hundred of specially protected railway cars fortransportation of missile warheads, as well as eighteen railway cars forthe accompanying guards. The total cost of the equipment is estimated tobe equal to $ 35 million, but the Americans also allotted just as muchmoney for further improvement of locks at Russian nuclear objects. ColonelGeneral Valynkin recognized: «We understand the anxiety of our strategicpartners with the regime at the objects. Particularly, against thebackground of incidents, which regularly occur there (armed seizure ofhostages at the Novaya Zemlya test site, shooting of guards at the combine«Mayak» in Chelyabinsk Region, suicide of sailor in a torpedo compartmentof the nuclear submarine «Vepr'», etc.). But they are confident in the12th Chief Directorate, that all necessary measures are taken to preventsuch incidents, and that Russia will at any price manage itself thenuclear security of its special objects, where about 30 thousandserviceman (45 % of them are officers) are doing their duty. GeneralValynkin said, that serious conclusions are made in the Chief Directorateas a result of the incident on the Novaya Zemlya. And, though they can'treplace at once all the 123 conscripts originated from the North Caucasus,and they are continuing to serve until the dismissal to reserve, thecontrol for the conscripts' behavior has been made much more rigorous,.They are not permitted to any special objects or to some other places,where serious devices and materials are located. Since the last autumnconscripts are selected to the units of 12th Chief Directorate from thoseyoung men, who are irreproachable in all respects, have no criminal past,but have appropriate education and psychological stability. The localbodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Security Serviceas well medical establishments are charged with personal responsibilityfor that. And officers-tutors of the Chief Directorate in their turn alsotest the conscripts before permitting them to guarding of special objectsor to other crucial works. Thereat, both lie detectors are used and theprinciples of personnel selection, applied in many developed countries,General Valynkin said to «Yaderny Kontrol». We'll do our best to preventincidents like that one on the Novaya Zemlya test site, he assured.
December 2, 1998

Last time the radiation situation in Moscow Region is simplythreatening. Such a conclusion was made by radiologists examined theMoscow Region's territory.

The monitoring allowed to reveal more than 250 lots of radioactivecontamination in the Region. However, in the opinion of the specialists,the actual number of radioactive anomalies in the Moscow Region is 5-10times higher. But because of economical confusion it is simply impossibleto reveal all the contaminated sites. It was determined, for instance,that almost a half of the Moscow Region's educational institutions havedevices with hazardous sources of ionizing radiation, which are notregistered anywhere.

At 400 enterprises in the Region there are 72.2 thousand of similarsources, 80 % of them expiring their service-life times. Moreover, theenterprises have no place to bury the radioactive wastes, as far as theRegion has no burial of its own. The plants have to store all thehazardous waste at their sites, that makes a real threat of radiationaccidents. Apropos, so far consequences of five such accidents atenterprises of the Moscow Region, including the Podolsk Plant ofNon-Ferrous Metals, have not yet been eliminated.

The Moscow Region's authorities try to improve the situation. RecentlytheRegion's Government approved a program «Radiation Safety of the MoscowRegion». One of the most important items of the document is the creationof a radioactive waste burial. Urgent abolition of all sites ofradioactive contamination is also planned, as well as setting up of strictradiation & hygienic certification of organizations and taking protectivemeasures for prevention of the population's medical over-irradiation.
NVO (Independent Military Review) - NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA No. 46
December 11-17, 1998

The unification of strategic forces is an objectively necessary move ofthe military reform.

In XXI century nuclear weapons will play an important part in the worldpolicy and will essentially influence on the global military balance.Preservation of a safe nuclear restraint potential in XXI century willhave conceptual importance to our country. Russia's share in the globalnuclear will inevitably decrease. Moreover, further evolution of theeconomical crisis may lead to a complete disruption of Russian nuclearpotential. We shall not be able to keep not only the existing nucleararsenal, but even the level of 3500 warheads set by the START-2 Treaty.With the current level of funding the strategic nuclear forces (SNF) ofRussia will reduce by the end of the next decade to the level below 1000warheads. Therefore urgent re-equipment with new types of arms andtechnical devices of the SNF, their systems of combat management,information support and early warning is necessary.

Formation of the Joint Chief Command of the Strategic Restraint Force(JCCSRF) with the simultaneous transition to three-kind structure of the RFArmed Forces (Land Troops, Air Force, Navy) - is the next stage of themilitary reform, corresponding not only to the concept of Russian militarydevelopment, but also - to general trends of integration of efforts andmeans, which are characteristic of the Armed Forces of leading countries,first of all - the USA. This is dictated by the very essence of thenuclear restraint. There is practically no alternative to such reformingin long term perspective. Keeping of the existing structure of the SNFmanagement would preserve the narrow agency's approach to development ofthe means, the lack of their unification (this relates both to hardwareand software), would restrict versatility and efficiently of themanagement and, at last, would lead to considerable outlays.

The experience gained shows, that the integration would allow to makethemanagement bodies more optimal, that would save no less than 10-15 % offinancial means and also reduce outlays for the development and seriesproduction by no less than 20 %.

Implementation of the military reform, including the improvement ofcombatmanagement and funding of the strategic forces, on the one hand, andmeasures of control for nuclear weapons, on the other hand, will allow tosecure the reliability of the RF potential of nuclear restraint for thenear decades.
December 1998

In Sosnovy Bor the First meeting of the Council of InterregnalAssociation of Cities and Enterprises of Nuclear Power Industry was Held.

It is obvious, that decommissioning in 2001-2005 of the firstgenerationNPP power units, having expired their service lives, will seriouslycomplicate electric power supply of the vast central areas of the country,and the existing financial & economic difficulties in the State and in thenuclear sector do not allow to provide construction of new substitutingnuclear power units timely. Taking into account the great importance ofthe arisen problems, the Council of Interregnal Association of Cities andEnterprises of Nuclear Power Industry decided, in particular:

1. To come out with a draft program, that would envisage extrememeasures, providing creation of substituting power units at NPPs ofRussia.

2. To ask the State Duma and the Federation Council of the FederalAssembly of Russian Federation to consider and pass as quickly as possiblea number of Federal laws in the field of atomic energy uses.

3. To apply to the Administration of the President of RussianFederationwith a draft Order «On the Immediate Measures for Development of theNuclear Power Industry of Russian Federation and Working out of a RelatedProgram».

4. To offer the Ministry of Russian Federation on Atomic Energy, the«Rosenergoatom» Concern to work out till July 1, 1999 and coordinate withthe RF Gosatomnadzor a concept and a program of extension of service lifeterms of the first generation NPP power units, determining the cost andsources of funding.

5. To offer the «Rosenergoatom» Concern till January 1, 1999 to workouta program of financing of substituting NPP power units, taking intoaccount regional priorities, investment opportunities and the FederalBudget.
December 16, 1998

The SMF Chief-Commander considers the unification of Russia'sStrategicforces to be natural and necessary.

As Colonel General Vladimir Yakovlev, the Chief Commander of theStrategic Missile Forces (SMF), said, the SMF have completely fulfilledthe set tasks in the passing year.

The SMF Chief Commander for the first time publicly spoke out in favorofforming of Strategic Restraint Forces (SRF) and their Joint Chief Command(JCC). He emphasized, that such a decision has already been taken by thePresident and the Minister of Defense.

Answering a question of the «NVO» correspondent, General Yakovlev said,that the new formation should not be completely similar to the US JointStrategic Command. At the same time, he didn't clear up, whether the UCCof SRF would have a full complex of maintenance forces in its structure,or it will be only an administration body, according to the Americanexample. The SMF Chief Commander particularly stressed, that the SRF ChiefCommander particularly stressed, that the SRF formation didn't contradictto the concept of military development and the program of strategicnuclear force progress authorized by the President.

The SMF achievements were as follows: high combat readiness of itsgrouping of attack - more than 92 % - and extension of service-life ofintercontinental ballistic missiles (IBM) RS-20 to 22 years, RS-18 - to 23years, RS-22 to 11 years. The «Topol-M» missile complex will become thebasis of future development of the combat resources. Its sixth flying testwas successful, and this gives way to putting on combat duty of acompletely equipped (10 missiles) regiment in the end of 1998. Earlier inthe Tatishchevo Division the «Topol-M» missiles were put on testing &combat duty, i.e. they had no nuclear warheads. General Yakovlev reported,that in the course of the latest flying test the new missile showed higherhit accuracy, than any other series IBM did in the course of training &combat testing.

According to Vladimir Yakovlev, the main line of technical developmentwill be designing of a unified missile complex for Missile Force and theNavy (thereat it should first of all get to the Navy). Formation andup-grading of a unified system of combat management of all strategicnuclear forces will remain the top priority for the SMF.

The Chief Commander declared, that taking out of the Skrunde stationfromthe structure of the system of warning on a missile attack was compensatedwith the aid of means of the anti-missile defense system. Besides that,fitting of the newly formed 3d independent Army of missile & space defensewith new radar stations with higher readiness and lower cost is planned.
GORODSKOI KURIER No. 50 (The newspaper of Sarov town)
December 17, 1998

On December 20, 1998 the security bodies in military forces areeighty.The Sarov division of the Nizhny Novgorod Department of RF FederalSecurity Service has cut an attempt of employees of a local enterprise toget technical documentation (with the aim of subsequent sale it abroad fora non-nuclear military use article designed and produced at the specialobject.

On the eve of 80th anniversary of the military counter-intelligenceLieutenant Colonel Nikolay Sokolyuk, the Head of Federal Security Service(FSS) Department of MVD Division in Sarov, visited the editors' office of«Gorodskoi Kurier». His interview with correspondent Natalia Kocheshkovais presented below.

N.K.: A lot of things are said and written about the FSS as a certainclandestine brotherhood. Much less is known about the militarycounter-intelligence. What is the specificity of your service?

N.S.: The military counter-intelligence is engaged in providingsecurityin troops. There is a lot of arms in combat units of the Division, theservicemen are guarding important objects, hazardous in all respects.Naturally, we don't act autonomously, but interact with Sarov Division ofthe FSS, the Division's Command, the Department of Internal Affairs (DIA)and the Prosecutor's Office.

N.K.: Let's talk about things, urgent to our city. I mean the thefts ofrare and non-ferrous metals from the industrial sites.

N.S.: Causes, leading to thefts and pilfering of material resources,including radioactive materials, emerged after the USSR disintegration in1991.

N.K.: Can you tell me, what is even though approximate sum of materiallosses incurred for all that period of time?

N.S.: This would be a very impressive figure, though not the moneyaloneare the thing. The very fact of theft of radioactive materials causes suchkind of thoughts with some non-competent people: as if leakage ofradioactive materials from nuclear objects occurs, as if the objects arenot protected in a proper way. This may be used and is actually used inorder to compromise the very concept of physical protection, to put underquestion Russia's capability to protect its nuclear materials.

N.K.: I remember a loud affair linked with theft of non-ferrousmaterials.I mean the affair of Yu. Grechin. Was it your service, that had receivedinformation on the prepared removal of a great lot of materials from theindustrial site?

N.S.: Yes, it was. Later on officers of the DIA Division of FightagainstEconomic Criminality joined the operation. It was not a typical affair atall, and Yuri Grechin is not a common thief. He tried to get money by anymeans. That's why I distinguish the case and call it the «Grechin'sphenomenon». It is just Grechin's activities, that makes impression ofnuclear objects' vulnerability.

Grechin had learned through his acquaintance and friends, that a formeremployee (now dead) of the site 19 one time collected and stored (partlyat the industrial site) pieces of uranium-238. Under the pretext of beinga journalist, going to write an article about the honored worker of theVNIIEF (the All-Russia Research Institute of Experimental Physics),Grechin made acquaintance with the person's friends and colleagues. Fromthem he found out about the hidden uranium and later on removed it fromthe site 19 area.

The well-experienced officers of our Department were horrified as theysawYu. Grechin bringing to a set place in his hand about 5 kilograms ofuranium in a polyethylene parcel. His little daughter held on the hand.Grechin prepared the uranium for sale. But he failed to find buyers.That's why he kept the uranium for a long time on the balcony in theapartments of his parents. Sometimes he carried it in public transport.

N.K.: Is it possible to prevent penetration of outsiders to theindustrialsites?

N.S.: I have suggested to draw the militia in guarding of theindustrialsites. Officers of the State Inspectors' Office for Road Traffic Safetycould and should carry out patrolling of not only the city, but also ofindustrial objects, areas, surrounding the industrial sites, access roadand technological lines. I think such measures would partly help to solvethe problem.

N.K.: Is it possible to do that only by your Division's efforts?

N.S.: It would be the ideal variant. But I have no illusions with thisrespect. Everything depends on monetary resources, and they are lacking.

The «Gorodskoi Kurier» of 12/17/98 published the following communication.Sarov Division of the RF FSS Nizhny Novgorod Department put an end to anattempt of employees of an enterprise of the city to get for the purposeof selling abroad technical documentation for a non-nuclear military usework designed and made at the special object, information concerning itbeing the State secret. Preventive measures are taken with respect to anumber of employees of the enterprise and residents of the city.
December 17, 1998

Easier said than done.

Within the framework of Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) a USdelegationcame to Sarov, one of the three nuclear cities (as well as Snezhinsk andZheleznogorsk), aspiring for the $ 30 millions allocated by Americans. Thedelegation included representatives of the Los-Alamos National Laboratory,Savanna River Center and S.Mladineo of the Pacific North-West NationalLaboratory (PNNL). Vladimir Rogachev, Deputy Director of the VNIIEF(All-Russia Research Institute of Experimental Physics), noted, that itwas a preliminary meeting, though the objective of our cooperation iscreation of new jobs. The delegation included just those people, who willdetermine the future development of the program.

Certain results may be expected in the next year. As Vladimir Rogachevestimates, 200-300 new jobs may be created in Sarov. As formerly,Americans are very cautious. They try to clear up everything, beforeassigning Russia the money of their tax-payers.

Will it be any profit from these negotiations? Our people are likely todoubt in that.
December 5, 1998

Approved by the Decree of the Government of Russian Federation ofJuly21, 1998, No. 801.

The Government of Russian Federation and the Government of UnitedStatesof America have agreed in the following:

Article 1

The objectives of this Agreement are:

a) working out of a scientific & technical substantiation to making adecision on plutonium disposition, that is the subject of this Agreement;

b) determination of main lines of continuation and enlargement ofscientific & technical cooperation aimed at fulfillment of the point «a»of this Article.

Article 2

Hereafter within the Agreement the following terms mean:

1. «plutonium» - plutonium retrieved from nuclear military programs,which is not required any more for military uses;

2. «plutonium disposition» - plutonium transformation to spent nuclearfuel or other forms equally non-suitable to be used in nuclear weapons orother nuclear explosion devices, and may include plutonium conversion,making mixed oxide fuel (hereafter - MOX-fuel) of plutonium, the MOX-fueluse in nuclear reactors, plutonium immobilization in various forms.

Article 3

1. The Parties will:

a) continue cooperation in the field of small-scale tests anddemonstrations in the field of plutonium disposition;

b) as soon as it is practically possible, go to experimental &industrialdemonstration on plutonium disposition;

2. The main lines of cooperation of the Parties will be:

a) conversion of metallic plutonium to oxide, suitable for makingMOX-fuel for nuclear power reactors of different types;

b) stabilization of unstable forms of plutonium;

c) plutonium use in the form of MOX-fuel in nuclear power reactors ofdifferent types;

d) plutonium immobilization, including wastes and forms difficult toprocess;

e) disposal of immobilized materials, containing plutonium, in deepgeological formations.

3. The Parties will develop methods, technologies and hardware toprovidethe transparency measures.

Article 4

1. To ensure implementation of the clauses of this Agreement, thePartiesappoint the executive bodies:

· from the Russian Federation - the Ministry of Russian Federation onAtomic Energy.

· from the United States of America - the US Department of Energy.

2. To ensure fulfillment of this Agreement the Parties form aRussian/American Joint Coordination Committee on Plutonium Disposal.Each party appoints its representatives in the Joint CoordinationCommittee. The Committee's decisions are taken on the basis of consensus.

Article 5

The cooperation of the parties within the framework of this Agreementmayinclude several directions.

Article 6

1. Exchange of only unclassified information is performed within theframework of this Agreement.

2. Information is determined as confidential by a transferring Party inaccordance with its laws and rules. The receiving Party classifies theinformation so, that the level of the information protection was, atleast, adequate to the level of protection required by the transferringParty.

3. Management of confidential information is performed in accordancewithlaws and rules of a receiving Party, therewith the information should notbe spread and passed to a third party, which is not related to thisAgreement, without consent of the transferring Party given in writtenform.

4. The parties secure effective protection of intellectual property anddistribution of rights for intellectual property transferred or createdwithin the framework of this Agreement.

5. Information transferred within the framework of this Agreement mustbeused exclusively for the objectives set by this Agreement.

6. The number of persons, having access to confidential information,should be limited.

Article 7

1. Materials, equipment and technologies transferred under thisAgreementwill not be used for making nuclear weapons, any nuclear explosion devicesor for research and development of such devices and also for militarypurposes.

2. Materials, equipment and technologies transferred under thisAgreementwill not be exported, re-exported or passed from under jurisdiction of thereceiving Party without written consent of the Parties.

3. In a case of export deliveries to a third party of any equipment,materials or technologies subject to action of this Agreement the Partieshave to coordinate in written form the conditions of the objects' export,re-export or transfer from under jurisdiction of the third party.

4. The executive bodies of the parties should take all necessarymeasuresfor the purpose of securing appropriate physical protection of nuclearmaterials, equipment, facilities and nuclear technologies, being undertheir jurisdiction, and also have to apply such physical protectioncriteria and levels, which are not lower, that the criteria and levels setby the Convention on Nuclear Materials Physical Protection and by the IAEArecommendations.

Article 8

Goods and services delivered by the United States of America, theircontractors, sub-contractors and their personnel or acquired at theexpense of means of the United States of America with the objective ofimplementation of this Agreement, are unpaid technical assistance, whichis to be free of payment of customs duties and taxes.

Article 9

1. Besides claims to individuals for a damage or a corporal hurtresultedfrom their deliberate actions, the Government of Russian Federation doesnot bear grudges and bring suits against the Government of the UnitedStates of America and their personnel in connection with activitiesconducted within the framework of this Agreement.

2. If necessary, the parties may perform consulting connected withclaimsand legal investigations related to this Article.

3. Clauses of this Article don't rule out eventual giving ofcompensationby the Parties in accordance with their national law.

Article 10

1. Joint activities within the framework of this Agreement is funded atthe expense of monetary resources allotted for these purposes by theRussian Federation and the United States of America.The joint activitiesmay be also funded partly or completely at the expense of other sources,including non-governmental funds and the private sector.

2. In all cases the activities within the framework of this Agreementandtheir financial support by the Russian Federation and the United States ofAmerica will depend on availability of assigned means.

Article 11

In a case of concluding a contract with a Party, the contracts areconcluded in accordance with laws and rules of the Party.

Article 12

1. Representatives of the Department of Energy of the United States ofAmerica have a right with notification in reasonable time to apply withrequest on conducting inspection and revision of use of any help andassistance, rendered by the US Government within the framework ofcooperation envisaged by this Agreement in the course of all the term ofvalidity of this Agreement and three years thereupon.. Such inspectionsmay be conducted on the territory and in the sites of the parties, whichare determined under mutual understanding between the Parties' executivebodies.

2. The order and procedures of conducting the mentioned revisions andinspections will be developed additionally and should be coordinated bythe Parties.

Article 13

All issues related to interpretation or application of clauses of thisAgreement should be solved by means of conducting consultations betweenthe Parties.

Article 14

1. This Agreement comes into force since the date of its signing and isvalid during 5 years. The term of its validity may be prolonged.

2. Validity of this Agreement may be ceased by any party by means ofsending of a written notification on such an intention through diplomaticchannels. In this case this Agreement will become invalid in six monthssince the date of sending of the notification.

3. The parties agree, that in a case of suspending validity of thisAgreement, all confidential information and intellectual property,received in the course of implementation of this Agreement, will be alsomanaged henceforth in accordance with the other agreements in written formbetween the Parties are attained.

Supplement to the Agreement between theGovernment of Russian Federation and the Governmentof the United States of America on Scientific & Technical Cooperation in the Field of Dispositionof Plutonium Retrieved from Nuclear MilitaryPrograms

In accordance with the Article 6 of this Agreement the parties haveagreed:

to secure adequate and efficient protection of intellectual property,created or transferred within the framework of this Agreement and relatedexecutive agreements, to inform each other in time about all inventions,results of scientific and information activities and works performedwithin the framework of this Agreement, which are subject to the copyrightlaw, and also to aspire to timely protection of objects of intellectualproperty. Distribution of rights for such intellectual property isrealized in accordance with clauses of this Supplement.

1. The Field of Application.

2. The Distribution of Rights.

3. The Confidential Business Information.

December 17, 1998

The Program is the extension of works, which have been carried outsince1992. The program's measures are developed for the purpose of putting intoexecution the liabilities of the Russian party on the ITER project.

The main sections of the Program:

1. The Problem's Urgency.2. The Program's Objectives and Tasks.3. The Main Measures of the Program.4. The Means of Realization of the Program's Measures.5. Expected Results of the Program's Realization.6. The Program's Providing with Resources.7. The Control for the Program's Fulfillment.

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