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G8 Declaration: Renewed Commitment for Freedom and Democracy
G8 Summit of Deauville, France
May 26-27, 2011


VII. Peace and Security


70. We reiterate our strong concern about severe proliferation challenges and the major threat they represent for international peace and security. We will spare no effort in fighting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. We reiterate our commitment to working to resolve them through diplomatic means. We recall our commitment to seeking a safer world for all and to creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in a way that promotes international stability based on the principles of undiminished security for all.

71. We are determined to strengthen the global non-proliferation architecture by supporting all relevant multilateral treaties and arrangements and by promoting their implementation and universalization. In this respect, we are committed to maintaining and strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime based on the NPT and its three pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including by taking the actions in the plan adopted by consensus at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. We also call upon all States still not Parties to the NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) to accede without delay.

72. Iran's persistent failure to comply with its obligations under six UNSC resolutions and to meet the requirements of ten IAEA Board of Governors resolutions is a cause of utmost concern. We note with deep concern the recent report by the IAEA which underlines that Iran is not implementing a number of its obligations, that areas of concern remain regarding possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear programme and that the Agency is therefore unable to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities. We recognise Iran's right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the NPT, but this right also comes with obligations that all States parties to the NPT, including Iran, have to respect. We regret that while Iran finally met twice with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union High Representative, following their intensive diplomatic efforts and the adoption of measures in UNSCR 1929, it was not possible to reach any substantive result, Iran having not yet entered into a genuine dialogue without preconditions. Depending on Iran's actions, we will determine the need for additional measures in line with the dual-track approach.

73. We condemn the DPRK's provocative behaviour with regard to the Armistice Agreement and numerous Inter-Korean agreements, its continued development of nuclear and missile programmes and its uranium enrichment programme and light water reactor construction activities in violation of UNSC Resolutions 1718 and 1874. We reiterate our commitment to implementing fully the UNSC Resolutions and call upon all UN Member States to do the same. We urge the DPRK to comply with its international obligations, including the complete, verifiable and irreversible abandonment of all its nuclear programmes and ballistic missile programmes and promptly to address international humanitarian concerns, such as the issue of abduction. While taking note of relevant parties' willingness to resolve problems through the Six Party Talks, we urge the DPRK to take concrete actions to create an environment conducive to the resumption of the Six Party Talks and express support for the current efforts by the Republic of Korea to this end.

74. We note with deep concern the lack of cooperation by Syria reflected in the most recent IAEA report. We urge Syria to fulfil its obligations and fully cooperate with the Agency and respond to the IAEA Director-General's requests for access and information in order to clarify all outstanding issues. We look forward to the IAEA Board of Governors addressing the seriousness of the issue.

75. We express our grave concern at the continued proliferation of WMD delivery systems and at the acquisition of key technologies and development of certain ballistic missile programmes usable for weapons of mass destruction. In particular, the Iranian and DPRK's programmes are a serious cause for concern. We recognise the need to step up our efforts to combat the threat of proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering WMD to international peace and security, including by promoting multilateral arrangements and instruments, such as the Hague Code Of Conduct and the Missile Technology Control Regime.

76. We fully support the paramount role played by the United Nations Security Council in addressing proliferation issues as well as the key role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in assuring the exclusively peaceful nature of nuclear activities. We call on all States that have yet to do so to sign and ratify a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with an Additional Protocol and to bring these agreements into force as their combination is meant to constitute the universally accepted international verification standard.

77. We welcome the ratification by the United States and the Russian Federation of the New START Treaty and its subsequent entry into force as significant progress on the disarmament agenda. We call on all States participating in the Conference on Disarmament to start substantive negotiations on a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT), building on the CD/1864 programme of work. We express our support for the moratorium on the production of such material announced by the G8 nuclear-weapon States and call on the other States concerned to follow suit. We will continue our efforts for the permanent and legally binding cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion through the swift entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and we call upon all States to join our efforts in this regard as well as to uphold the moratorium on testing pending the entry into force of the CTBT.

78. We welcome the concrete achievements and measurable results of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction launched in Kananaskis in 2002 for a 10-year period. We remain committed to completing priority projects in Russia. Our assessment of the Partnership recognises the significant progress the 23 Partners have achieved on the full range of WMD non-proliferation activities worldwide. The assessment also provides directions for the future. As such, we agree to extend the Partnership beyond 2012, based on the areas of focus enunciated at Muskoka (nuclear and radiological security, bio-security, scientist engagement, and facilitation of the implementation of UNSCR 1540). We will work with all Partners in discussing assistance needs and coordinating possible projects in the above-mentioned areas, and we will expand membership of the Partnership. Partners will decide on funding of such projects on a national, joint, or multilateral basis.

79. While proliferation must be fought, we ask our experts to explore ways of ensuring fair and responsible access to the benefits of the peaceful uses of technologies and to report back by the next Summit. We support the exchange, in conformity with the obligations of the NPT, of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in particular for developing countries. We will consider the enlargement of the suppliers' groups to responsible stakeholders in a manner consistent with the groups' procedures and objectives. We reiterate our commitment as in paragraph 8 of the L'Aquila Statement on Non-Proliferation.

80. We remain committed to holding a conference in 2012 on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, as endorsed by the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, with a view to creating a peaceful environment in the region.


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